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Abstract 
The proliferation of green parties on the European political landscape in recent 
decades has prompted much debate concerning the explanation of their 
emergence and the factors considered to influence their varying levels of 
electoral success. This thesis critically examines a number of perspectives and 
concepts drawn from the sociological and political studies literatures which shed 
light on these two key issues. Through a comparison of green party politics in 
Austria, Britain and the Netherlands, the thesis challenges the assessment of 
those who maintain that the emergence and/or electoral success of green parties 
can be understood principally in terms of the theory of 'post-materialist' value 
change, or in terms of the shift to 'post-industrial' society. Drawing on 
contemporary studies of 'high-consequence' risks, it argues for an alternative 
approach to understanding the emergence of green parties which is rooted in 
processes of social and global environmental change that have taken place during 
the post-war period. 
The question of green party electoral success is examined by means of the 
organisation of a variety of political and institutional factors into four 
overarching themes: political state-institutional structures, electoral dealignment 
and political competition, modes of interest representation, and internal 
dynamics. It is contended that attention to each of these can yield important 
insights into the conditions which have impacted on the electoral significance of 
green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. The final part of the thesis 
develops a new, ecologically informed approach to the emergence of green 
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Approaching Green Parties 
In recent decades green parties have flourished on the European political 
landscape. 1 The green party phenomenon has spread so fast that there is now no 
European country - West or East - which has not witnessed the establishment of 
such a party (Kortvellyessy 1996).2 In its infancy, green party politics in Europe 
reflected a somewhat modest response to growing public concern about the 
'ecological crisis' which had come to the fore in the early 1970s.3 Yet since these 
formative years, green parties have invested considerable energy to develop 
substantive political programmes which fundamentally challenge the established 
ideologies of parties and movements associated with the Left and Right. Most 
notably, green parties have called into question the wisdom of the untrammelled 
economic growth and anthropocentric politics which for decades formed the 
chief ingredients of social democratic and communist party politics, and which 
have, more recently, underpinned the neo-liberal outlook. The rise of the green 
party as a significant promotional vehicle of social and economic change has 
facilitated a process of rethinking among many on the radical Left, and, in some 
cases, this has prompted the development of new partnerships between reformed 
socialists, ex-communists and greens (Wainwright 1994). 
The extent to which green parties have managed to capture the political 
attention and support of European electorates in recent decades can be quite 
1 For general discussions on the history of individual green parties, see Parkin (1989); M01ler-
Rommel (1989b); Richardson and Rootes (1995) and O'Neill (1997). 
2 While Britain was the first European country to witness the development of a green party -
namely, PEOPLE in 1973 - New Zealand is credited as being the country to have produced the 
world's first national green party. This was the Values Party and was founded in 1972 (parkin 
1989). 
3 In this thesis the terms 'ecological' and 'ecology' will be taken as broad equivalents to those of 
'environmental' and 'environmentalism' (Vincent 1993). It should be noted that some 
commentators have, for philosophical and ideological reasons, chosen to attach quite different 
meanings to these terms (see, for example, Bookchin 1986; Dobson 1995). 
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readily observed. Green parties are now represented in 17 national parliaments 
across Europe (The Guardian, 15 March 1999).4 In addition, at the time of 
writing, green parties are represented in five national governments in the 
European Union (EU), namely, those of Italy (1996-), France (1997-), Germany 
(1998-), Finland (1999-) and Belgium (1999-) (Green World, Winter 1998/9: 4; 
European Federation of Green Parties 1999).5 The influence of green party 
politics has not solely been confined to the national level, however. As well as 
achieving representation at local and regional level in a host of European 
countries, green parties have, since 1989, formed a parliamentary group in the 
European Parliament - the Green Group in the European Parliament (GGEP). 
Since green parties have consistently placed a strong emphasis on cross-national 
issues, this has provided them with a particularly important platform from which 
to further advance their ecological and social agenda (GGEP 1994). In short, 
green parties have, in the space of a few decades, emerged as established actors 
on the European political scene. This has generated considerable interest among 
academics and the formulation of a range of research questions relating to 
aspects of the green party phenomenon. 
The aim of this opening chapter is to clarify some key issues and concepts 
that will form foci for detailed discussion in this thesis. The first section develops 
a twofold argument by means of which green parties may be identified and 
distinguished from other types of political party present on the European political 
landscape. This is followed in the second section by an examination of the 
character of green parties. The account offered is very different from established 
'left-libertarian' and 'new politics' analyses, and provides the underpinning for 
an understanding of green parties which prioritises the latters' ecological identity. 
The third section provides a review of the context and scope of green party 
4 The first green elected to a national parliament in the world was Daniel BrClaz in Switzerland in 
1979 (parkin 1989: 204). 
, In addition. the Swedish Greens currently wield considerable political influence at the national 
level. The minority Social Democratic government (1998-) has been forced to co-operate with the 
Greens and the Left Party. Elsewhere in Europe, Greens are represented in the governing 
coalitions of Georgia, Slovakia and Poland (European Federation of Green Parties 1999). 
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research, and establishes two central research questions around which the content 
of this thesis will be structured. The fourth section clarifies the meaning of two 
key terms that are essential components of these research questions - those of 
'party emergence' and 'success'. In the fifth section, issues relating to the 
selection of case studies are discussed. The final section provides details 
concerning the organisation of the thesis. 
1. Delimiting the Phenomena 
Before proceeding any further, criteria by means of which 'green parties' may be 
identified and distinguished from other types of political party need to be 
established. The term 'green' is problematic because it has been employed in a 
number of different ways by commentators. The scope of political thought and 
activity considered to fan within the boundaries of this term has ranged from 
modest demands for nature conservation to calls for fundamental social change 
and a profound rethinking of the relationship between humanity and nature 
(Vincent 1993). The flexibility of the term has meant that there are few political 
parties in Europe which have not been able to present themselves as advocating 
'green' politics in one form or another (Rtidig 1990b: 2). The following question 
therefore arises: are there sufficient grounds for arguing that green parties should 
be treated as a distinct category of party in their own right? 
A two-stage argument can be developed in providing a positive response 
to this question. The first aspect of the argument relates to the 'self-
identification' of green parties and states that a green party is one which, first and 
foremost, defines its identity in 'green' terms. That is to say its identity is 
primarily 'green', as opposed to, for example, 'social democratic', 'conservative' 
or 'liberal'. Thus, a political party which espouses 'green' rhetoric yet whose 
identity is recognisably and fundamentally shaped by an established political 
tradition does not constitute a green party. In contrast, a party which views itself 
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chiefly in 'green' - or ecological - terms can be said to have fulfilled the first part 
of the argument in question. Of course, such a party's political programme may 
incorporate aspects of other political traditions, but it is the 'green' identity 
which moulds these elements and not vice versa. 
The second stage of the argument concerns what can be termed the 
'family identification' of green parties. If a political party is indeed 'green', then 
it is reasonable to suppose that parties with a similar self-identity should view it 
in these terms. One significant development within the sphere of green party 
politics since the 1980s has been the enthusiastic coming together of like-minded 
parties, and the formation of international organisations with the aim of 
advancing the green cause at the European level. 6 The European Coordination of 
Green Parties (ECGP) - founded in March 1984 - began as an organisation of 
nine parties and 'provided a single European home to green parties' (GGEP 
1994: 186). During this period, much discussion surrounded the question of 
which political parties should be recognised as 'belonging' to the green party 
'family' and hence admitted to the Coordination. This issue was effectively 
resolved in 1989 (Green Times 1989: 14; GGEP 1994).7 In 1993 a new, more 
'efficiently' organised body was established, called the European Federation of 
Green Parties (EFGP). The EFGP defines green parties as those parties that meet 
with its requirements of having been 'established in a state or region of Europe ... 
subscribed to the Guiding Principles of the Federation ... accepted the Statutes of 
the Federation [and] accepted by the Federation as a Member according to the 
regulations for the application procedure elaborated by the Council' (EFGP 
1993b). Other parties, organisations or movements in Europe - or elsewhere - that 
6 Of course, green parties were not the first political parties to band together to form international 
networks of co-operation. For example., the communist and social democratic parties bad long c0-
operated in organisational networks such as the Third International (1919) and Socialist 
International (1951) (Wilde 1994). 
7 The main problem centred on whether to admit 'alternative left' parties as well as 'green' parties 
into the organisation. The Dutch parties in question - the CPN, PSP and PPR - had formed an 
electoral alliance for the 1984 European elections under the name Green Progressive Accord 
(Groen ProgressieJ Akkord). The debate was fina1Iy settled with the emergence of Green Left 
(Groen Links) in 1989 - an electoral body which, in 1990, became a fully-fledged green party to 
the extent that all parties at the ECGP agreed that it was 'green enough' (GGEP 1994: 186). 
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agree on the Federation's guiding principles can be granted 'observer' status 
(EFGP 1993b). At the time of writing, membership of the EFGP has been granted 
to 30 green parties in Western and Eastern Europe.s Of course, members of this 
organisation may disagree over many matters, but sufficient common ground 
exists between the member parties to result in the mutual acknowledgement that 
they belong to the same family of political party in Europe. This common ground 
is embodied in such documents as the Guiding Principles of the European 
Federation of Green Parties, which sets out the parties' 'pan-European strategy 
of ecological and social reform' (EFGP 1993a: 2). 
For the purposes of this study, then, the term green party is used to 
describe any political party which defines itself primarily as 'green' and which is 
also considered to belong to the green party family by the majority of other green 
parties. A political party which defines itself as 'green' but which is not 
internationally recognised as such by the EFGP thus does not fall within the 
boundaries of this definition of a green party. This is an important qualifier, and 
means, for instance, that certain parties of the far-right which have claimed to be 
green parties are not included within the context of this study, to the extent that 
they have not been accepted by the member parties of the EFGP.9 The definition 
offered here provides one means of delimiting the scope of green party politics in 
Europe. 
2. The Character of GreeD Parties 
The appearance of green parties on the political map of Western Europe 
prompted much academic discussion with respect to these parties' ideology, 
organisation and electoral support base. to It has been claimed that green parties 
8 See the EFGP website for further details on these parties. 
~ttp://www.europeangreens.org/] 
The far-right Ecological Democratic Party in Germany would be an example of such a party. 
10 For example, see Pridham (1978); Papadakis (1983); Rothacber (1984); Spretnak and Capra 
(1985); Miiller-Rommel (198580 1989b); Poguntke (1987, 1992, 1993a); Kvistad (1987); 
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are an example of a 'new type of party' which has come to prominence in 
European party systems in recent decades (Poguntke 1987). Within the academic 
community, it has become commonplace to reject the view that green parties 
possess a distinctive political identity of their own, and some have developed and 
subsumed them within much broader classifications such as those of 'left-
libertarian' or 'new politics' parties (Kitschelt 1988a, 1989, 1990; Muller-
Rommel 1990; Poguntke 1987, 1989, 1993a). Based upon a study of the Belgian 
and German cases, Kitschelt argues that green parties are primarily characterised 
by what he terms their 'left-libertarianism'.ll He argues that these parties are: 
'left'; they oppose the market place and insist on solidarity and equality. 
They are also 'libertarian' in that they reject centralized bureaucracies 
and call for individual autonomy, participation, and the self-governance 
of decentralized communities. (Kitschelt 1988a: 197) 
Along with this ideological disposition, 'left-libertarian' parties share a common 
socio-economic electoral support base. Thus he states: 
all of these parties overproportionately draw voters from the ranks of the 
younger, well-educated middle class; they are employed in human 
services (teaching, healthcare, social work), have left-of-centre political 
convictions, subscribe to 'postmaterialist' values, and sympathize with 
environmental, feminist, and peace movements. (Kitschelt 1988a: 198) 
Of particular note here is that Kitschelt's classification seems to ignore 
completely the central place of the ecological issue, let alone themes such as 
peace or feminism, within the programmatic content of green parties (ROdig 
1990b). The fact that the terms 'green' or 'ecology' appear in the fonnal title of 
these political parties is implicitly dismissed by Kitschelt as irrelevant, given that 
Kitschelt (l988b); Koeble (1989a); Hoffinan-Martinott (]991); Finger and Hug (1992); Doherty 
(1992); Richardson and Rootes (1995); and O'Neill (1997). 
11 The category 'left-libertarian' party also includes 'New Left' parties. The 'New Left' parties to 
which Kitschelt refers emerged initially in such countries as Denmark (Socialist People's Party -
founded 1959), the Netherlands (pacifist Socialist Party - founded ]957) and Norway (Socialist 
People's Party - founded 1960). For a useful summary of the themes espoused by New Left groups 
during their fonnative period see Lucardie (1989). 
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it is perceived to be 'left-libertarianism' which separates them from more 
established forms of political party (Kitschelt 1988a: 197). The term 'left-
libertarian', it can be argued, suffers from a lack of substantive inclusiveness and 
does not capture the ideological distinctiveness of green parties; namely, their 
ecological self-identity and understanding of events. Because Kitschelt treats 
green parties essentially as a reconstructed form of left-wing politics, his analysis 
disguises the extent to which many of these parties were 'started by people who 
felt the need for politics to be based on an entirely new set of values that could 
not be found in any existing political tradition' (Parkin 1989: 19). Even where 
green parties have directly sought to develop a synthesis of ecological and 
socialist ideas - in the Netherlands, for example - it has invariably been the 
'green' prerequisite which has defined the limits of such parties' 'leftism' 
(Voerman 1995: 118). 
This criticism aside, it can also be seen that the term 'left-libertarian' is 
fraught with tension and potential contradiction. The essence of the political 
theory of 'libertarianism' is a commitment to laissez-faire and a fundamental 
mistrust of state intervention (Barry 1986). Its 'negative' conception of individual 
freedom serves as a justification for a rejection of bureaucracy and the 
championing of appropriate interpretations of autonomy, participation and 
individual rights (Held 1987: 254-255). A problem with the term 'left-libertarian' 
is that 'leftist' opposition to the operation of free market forces sits 
uncomfortably with a political theory whose entire rationale flows from an 
optimistic faith in these very economic arrangements. Further tensions exist 
between 'leftist' and 'libertarian' conceptions of equality. Again, a traditional 
'leftist' commitment to a more equal distribution of wealth evidently clashes 
with the limited, meritocratic character of a typically 'libertarian' interpretation 
of equality. The term 'left-libertarianism' thus contains certain internal 
contradictions which would further call into question the claim that it represents 
a coherent conceptual tool with which to illuminate the ideological complexion 
of green parties. 
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Other attempts to classify green parties include those of Poguntke 
(Poguntke 1987, 1989, 1993a) and Muller-Rommel (Muller-Rommel 1990). Both 
authors advocate usage of the term 'new politics' party and argue that the latter is 
successful in capturing the distinctive ideological, organisational and electoral 
profile of most green parties. Broadly speaking, 'new politics' parties are 
believed to display a 'new politics' ideology - which encompasses a commitment 
to individualism, equal rights, participatory democracy, ecology, unilateral 
disarmament, solidarity and leftism - and, like Kitschelt's 'left-libertarian' 
parties, participatory party organisation, an unconventional political style and a 
support base rooted in the young, 'well-educated', 'new middle class' and 'post-
materialist' strata of society (Poguntke 1987: 78-79). One problem with this 
approach is that, like its 'left-libertarian' cousin, it does not acknowledge the 
extent to which some green parties have sought to transcend 'new politics' 
criteria such as 'leftism'.12 And despite conceding that 'ecology' forms an 
element of the 'new politics', the inclusion of this theme does appear somewhat 
'incidental' (Rudig 1990b: 15). 
The problematic nature of these two attempts to illuminate the ideological 
character of green party politics therefore necessitates the pursuit of an 
alternative conceptualisation based more directly upon the ecological premise. 
Yet the idea that green party politics fundamentally reflect an ecological ideology 
has received remarkably scant attention within the literature. While books and 
articles have been written setting out different approaches to the study of 
ecological thought (Eckersley 1992; Goodin 1992; Vincent 1993; Hayward 1994; 
Dobson 1995), few authors have specifically examined how ecological ideas 
have informed green party politics. As Bennie et al. put it, 'there is a gap between 
political theory and philosophy on the one hand and the empirical study of green 
politics (be it green parties, ecological movements or environmental public 
opinion) on the other' (Bennie et al. 1994: 218). However, an examination of the 
12 For example, the Swiss Green Party has sought to uphold a 'deep green' philosophy as opposed 
to a more 'leftist' form of green politics (Church 1995: 149). Yet to the extent that the Swiss 
Greens define themselves in 'green' tenos, and are viewed as such by other parties, they clearly 
constitute a green party. 
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available academic literature - the most comprehensive examples of which have 
focused on the German Greens - as well as the Guiding Principles of the 
European Federation of Green Parties, can facilitate a grasp of the elements of 
the political programme that has come to underpin European green party politics 
in recent decades. 13 
In 1980, the German Greens adopted the so-called 'four pillars' which 
would form the basis of their first national political programme: ecology, social 
responsibility, grass-roots democracy and non-violence. A consideration of each 
of these, supplemented by a discussion of the programme of the EFGP which 
represents a 'philosophical conjuncture' of Europe's green parties (Richardson 
1995: 19), can provide a means of comprehending the thematic focus of green 
party politics as it has come to evolve in Europe. 
From the outset, the German Greens displayed a profound commitment to 
ecology, reflecting a belief that an industrialism induced global ecological crisis 
was already a reality and worsening on a daily basis (Rothacher 1984; Spretnak 
and Capra 1985: 28). Ecological thinking formed a basic plank: of the Greens' 
philosophy which stressed the importance of viewing human beings and their 
environment in terms of a symbiotic relationship (Ambos 1988). One of the 
mistakes over the past centuries has been for humans to view themselves as 
'above' nature. Green parties have been critical of the strongly anthropocentric 
basis of much economic, social and political activity. In the German Greens' 
Federal Programme attention is focused on the importance of developing an 
'ecological politics', one which 'presents an all-encompassing rejection of an 
economy of exploitation and plundering of natural resources and raw materials, 
as well as the destructive intervention into the cycles of nature's household' 
(cited in Spretnak and Capra 1985: 31). This ecological theme is one which has 
come to serve as a lynch pin for green parties across Europe and lies at the very 
core of the Guiding Principles of the European Federation of Green Parties. In 
the preamble to this document it is stated that: 
13 The German case may be illuminating because it has become the paradigmatic cue of green 
party politics in Europe (Richardson 1995). 
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[t]he so-called progress of the past centuries has brought us into a 
situation where the basis of life on Earth is seriously under threat. While 
technological development may delay the deterioration of the 
environment for a time, it cannot prevent the ecological and social 
collapse of civilization without a fundamental change in the ideology of 
unquestioned material growth which still prevails. As pioneers of the 
industrialization which lies at the heart of the present crisis, Europeans 
carry a major responsibility for the reversal of these destructive trends. 
(EFGP t 993a: 2). 
Europe's green parties are thus united in their deep concern about the ecological 
crisis and in their belief that human activity, underpinned by a view of 'progress' 
based upon continued industrial growth, lies at the root cause of this crisis. There 
are, of course, differences among the member parties of the EFGP with respect to 
the strategies proposed in order to tackle this crisis. Just as the literature on green 
political thought has underlined the diversity of academic opinion fonnulated on 
this questionl4, so too has green party politics been characterised by the existence 
of a wide range of strategic approaches regarding the latter. Most commonly, 
these different approaches have been expressed in tenns of dichotomies such as 
"realists' versus 'fundamentalists'; 'electoralists' and 'anarchists'; or 'eco-
socialists' and 'pure greens' (Doherty 1992; Rudig and Lowe 1986; O'Neill 
1997). Thus while all green parties share a fundamental concern about the 
ecological crisis, there has been a considerable degree of flexibility and 
disagreement between and within such parties as to precisely how this crisis 
should be tackled. IS Yet it is the ecological premise which underpins the political 
programme of green parties. Without this ecological core a political party cannot 
in any real sense be considered 'green'. 
The theme of social responsibility is one which has further moulded the 
outlook of Europe's green parties. Again, this was a principle to which the 
Gennan Greens accorded priority. One of the main ways in which the party 
14 See, for example, Vmcent (1993); Eckersley (1992); Dobson (1995) and Goodin (1992). 
IS For a discussion of the extent to which these issues have affected different green parties in 
Europe see O'Neill (I 997). 
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interpreted the theme of social responsibility was in terms of 'social justice and 
an assurance that the poor and working class [would] not get hurt by programmes 
to restructure the economy and our consumer society ecologically' (Spretnak and 
Capra 1985: 33). In more concrete terms, green parties' commitment to greater 
social justice has involved advocacy of a more equitable distribution of power 
and resources, the meeting of basic human needs on the broadest scale possible, 
and ensuring that all citizens 'have full opportunities for personal and social 
development' (EFGP 1993a: 3). Green parties have also drawn attention to the 
extent to which social and ecological responsibility go hand in hand. They have 
criticised the dominant culture of unlimited production and consumption which 
has placed undue strain on the natural environment. For green parties, the 
preservation of the natural environment requires that humans exercise social 
responsibility by limiting their consumption and ensuring that citizens in the so-
called 'developing' countries are given opportunities to share in the earth's 
resources (EFGP 1993a). The green perspective on issues of social responsibility 
is thus based upon the realisation that 'the social, economic, and ecological 
realms are inextricably linked' (Spretnak and Capra 1985: 116). 
In their party programme of 1980, the German Greens declared that they 
had 'decided to create a new type of party structure founded on the inseparable 
concepts of grassroots democracy and decentralization' (cited in Spretnak and 
Capra 1985: 35). The model of a 'grass-roots' - or participatory - party 
organisation was considered to represent the antithesis of that of the established 
parties - a 'semi-institutionalized, non-professionally led, bottom-up 
organization' (Frankland 1995: 28-29). A study carried out during the 1980s 
revealed that the majority of Europe's green parties shared a commitment to the 
participatory model of party organisation. Reflecting their participatory 
orientation, the bulk of green parties were also found to exhibit a preference for 
unconventional forms of political action (Poguntke 1989). Yet, as more recent 
studies have shown, several of Europe's green parties have - during the 1990s -
embarked upon processes of organisational change, shifting away from the 
11 
'grass-roots' model of party organisation and embracing more 'professional' 
party structures (Frankland 1993~ Burchell and Williams 1996, 1997).16 The 
claim that a commitment to 'grass-roots' democracy remains a key pillar of 
European green party politics should therefore be approached with considerable 
caution. While there is some uncertainty as to the place of 'grass-roots' 
democracy in contemporary green party organisations, there can be little 
doubting that green parties attach importance to the theme of democratisation in 
a broader sense - in particular, to the need for 'greater democratic control and 
openness in institutions [and] to actively involve all sections of society in 
decision-making processes' (EFGP 1993a: 14). For the green parties of Europe, 
'ecodevelopment' must be based upon democracy - defined as 'the right of all 
peoples to express themselves and to participate fully in decision-making, which 
[in turn] requires access to all relevant information and ... to education' (EFGP 
1993a: 3). 
A commitment to non-violence has formed a further component of green 
party ideology and was the fourth of the principles in the German Greens' 
Federal Programme (Richardson 1995~ Doherty 1996). Broadly speaking, it refers 
to the 'cessation of both personal violence and "structural violence", that is, 
violence and oppression imposed by the state and by institutions' (Spretnak and 
Capra 1985: 40). Green parties wish to see an end to violence towards women, 
children and minority groups and to the use of force by the state as a means of 
resolving conflicts. They have spoken out against militarism and formulated 
policies geared towards the prevention of armed conflicts, the removal of the 
causes of war and the development of peaceful forms of conflict resolution 
(EFGP 1993a: 9). The green parties' commitment to non-violence can also be 
linked to their overarching concern about the environment. Green parties have 
been critical of violent acts carried out by humans upon the non-human natural 
world and called for a qualitatively different relationship with nature based upon 
16 For example, the Swedish Greens - MiljOpartiel - embarked upon significant organisational 
change during 1991-2, as did the German Greens between 1991 and 1993 (Burchell and Williams 
1997; Frankland 1995). 
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the principle of respect. For the late Petra Kelly, non-violence, interpreted in the 
broadest sense, was 'the essential ingredient in an ecological society' (Spretnak 
and Capra 1985: 41; my emphasis ). Yet the principle of non-violence has proved 
problematic for green parties. As Doherty has argued, while they have retained 
their moral commitment to non-violence their participation in government has 
sometimes led to a more pragmatic position with respect to the use of force by 
the police, for example. 17 As green parties come to play an increasing role in 
government across Europe, it has been suggested that the result 'is more likely to 
be a reformist approach concentrating on reducing the use of force and curbing 
developments such as the militarisation of the police' (Doherty 1996: 44). 
This interlinked set of principles provides one means of grasping the 
ideological character of European green party politics. However, a further 
interesting issue that warrants some discussion relates to green parties' 
relationship to the classic LeftJRight split. It was mentioned above that many 
greens have made a conscious attempt to transcend this distinction. Yet green 
parties evidently have more in common with the politics of the Left than with the 
Right. While it is green parties' overarching ecological perspective which 
distinguishes them from the politics of the (radical) Left, there is clearly an 
affinity between these parties' emphasis on such themes as social justice, 
emancipation, non-violence and participation and a 'leftist' political outlook. In 
addition, green parties' critical stance towards the commercial sector (albeit 
principally on ecological grounds), their opposition to a society based mainly 
around monetary interests, and support for fundamental social change, have 
distinct parallels with the values of the Left. It is true that green parties have 
generally been critical of socialist projects as they have unfolded, on the grounds 
that they have been premised upon industrialism and economic growth. But a 
17 However, as Doherty points out 'there have been incidents where green reluctance to use force 
has become an issue of conflict: conflicts with the SPD [Social Democratic Party] over the violent 
eviction of squatters Jed to the collapse of the Red-Green coalition in Berlin in 1989' (Doherty 
1996: 43). Recently, the German Greens de facto leader and German foreign minister, Joschka 
Fischer, expressed strong support for NATO policy during the conflict in Kosovo, exposing splits 
within the party and, once again, underlining its problematic relationship with the principle of non-
violence (The Guardian,S July 1999). 
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good deal of common ground exists between greens and socialists when it comes 
to the underlying principles of each tradition. It is perhaps for this reason that 
certain European green parties - e.g. the German, Italian and French Greens -
have found it more productive to seek coalitions with parties of the Left rather 
than with those of the Right, and that many disillusioned socialists and former 
communist party activists have been attracted to green party politics. 
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that an approach to 
understanding the ideological character of green parties can be developed which 
comes much closer to capturing their ecological identity than either the 'left-
libertarian' or 'new politics' traditions. Such an approach recognises the green 
parties' overriding concern with the 'ecological crisis' and the importance of the 
principles of social responsibility, democracy and non-violence in the attempt to 
resolve this 'crisis'. The links between these concepts, along with the relationship 
between green parties and the politics of the Left, will be further examined at a 
later stage in this thesis. 
3. Political Studies, the Environment and Green Parties: 
An Evolving Relationship 
Over the past few decades environmental themes have emerged as significant 
foci for political researchers. Academics working within different sub-fields of 
the discipline of political studies have turned their attention to a host of issues 
concerning the phenomena of environmental politics including pollution control 
(Enloe 1975; Weale 1992; Jordan 1993), the making and shaping of 
environmental policy (Paehlke and Torgerson 1990; Lester 1995; Liefferink 
1997), environmental attitudes (Rohrschneider 1988; McAllister 1994; Inglehart 
1995), environmental interest groups and movements (Lowe and Goyder 1983; 
Dalton 1994), climate change (Rowlands 1995; O'Riordan and Jager 1996), 
green political thought (Goodin 1992; Eckersley 1992; Dobson and Lucardie 
14 
1993; Vincent 1993), nuclear energy (O'Riordan 1988), sustainable development 
(Fritsch 1995; Baker et al. 1997; Meadowcroft 1997~ Young 1997), and the 
relationship between democracy and the management of environmental problems 
(Doherty and de Geus 1996; Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996). 
One aspect of environmental politics that has recently been subject to a 
flurry of research activity has been green parties. To some extent this can be 
interpreted within the context of the aforementioned growing interest among 
political researchers in environmental themes - an interest which took root from 
the early 1970s onwards (Meadowcroft et al. 1999). Yet there can also be little 
doubt that a major catalyst which sparked interest in green parties was the 
electoral success of the German Greens during the early 1980s (Frankland 1995: 
23). Academic observers have since broadened their research focus by paying 
attention to party political developments in a host of additional European 
countries (Richardson and Rootes 1995~ O'Neill 1997). One of the intriguing 
features of green party politics is that it has transcended the boundaries of 
political systems and cultures, and assumed a ubiquitous presence on the 
contemporary European political landscape (Mtiller-Rommel and Poguntke 1989: 
11). 
An indication of the extent to which the discipline of political studies has 
responded to the rise of green parties has been documented in a study of 
environmental coverage in 40 English language politics journals, 1960-95 
(Meadowcroft et al. 1999). This study revealed that, by the end of the 1970s, only 
two articles explicitly dealing with green parties had been published within the 
periodical literature. Yet, reflecting their rise in Germany and elsewhere, the 
1980s saw an explosion of academic interest in green parties and this trend has 
broadly continued throughout the 1990s (Meadowcroft et al. 1999).18 The 
expanding periodical literature has been complemented by the publication of 
numerous texts dealing explicitly with the phenomenon of green parties 
18 During the 1980, a total of 22 articles was published on green parties. In the tint half of the 
19908 (1990-95) 30 articles on green parties were published within the periodical literature 
(Meadowcroft el al. 1999). 
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(Spretnak and Capra 1985; Hulsberg 1988; Kitschelt 1989; MUller-Rommel 
1989b; Parkin 1989; Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992; Poguntke 1993a; 
Richardson and Rootes 1995; O'Neill 1997; Bomberg 1998). Green parties now 
constitute a significant sub-field of interest for academics working within the 
domains of European environmental and party politics. 
Much early work on green parties was carried out explicitly with the aim 
of understanding the origins, ideology, organisational structure and electoral 
appeal of the German Greens (Papadakis 1983; Rothacher 1984; Kolinsky 1984; 
MUller-Rommel 1985c). These themes have since been examined in relation to a 
broader range of European green parties (Mtiller-Rommel 1989b; Richardson and 
Rootes 1995). Other issues which have provided research themes for observers of 
green parties include ideological conflict (Doherty 1992), green party strategy 
(Kitschelt 1988b), the classification of green parties (Kitschelt 1988a; Poguntke 
1987), green party organisational adaptation and change (Frankland 1993; 
Poguntke 1993b), and the explanation of the emergence and varying electoral 
success of these parties (Muller-Rommel 1982, 1998; Chandler and Siaroff 1986; 
Rudig 1986, 1990b; Rudig and Lowe 1986; Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt 1988a, 
1989, 1993; Alber 1989; Kreuzer 1990; Rootes 1992, 1995b; Kaelberer 1993; 
Franklin and Rudig 1995). 
Of the themes that have attracted the attention of green party researchers, 
it is clear that those of party emergence and electoral success have been given the 
most consistent and widespread consideration within the literature. The 
substantial focus on these two research questions reflects a long-established 
interest among political analysts in the development of party systems and 
political parties (Duverger 1954; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Bartolini and Mair 1984). An examination of the 
green party literature reveals that researchers have been inclined to draw upon 
three areas of social science writing in their engagement with the issues of party 
emergence and electoral success: (1) political studies based approaches, (2) 
sociological and social movement theory, and, to a lesser extent, (3) 
16 
internationally comparative literature in environmental politics. A prominent 
focus for reflection among some observers has involved the attempt to develop a 
framework which can account for the emergence and varying electoral success of 
green parties across a broad range of European countries (RUdig 1986, 1990b; 
Kitschelt 1988a, 1989; Muller-Rommel 1998). 
The classical literature on party systems and political parties has provided 
green party researchers with an array of concepts and 'facilitators' which may 
potentially shed light on the issues in question. From an established political 
studies perspective, the understanding of the emergence of political parties has 
been grounded in theories which emphasise the degree to which social cleavages 
- such as class, religion, ethnicity and centre/periphery relations - underpinned 
the development of stable party systems in Western democracies (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Zuckerman 1975). Since the 196Os, however, processes of 
electoral dealignment and realignment are considered to have undermined these 
patterns of party system stability (Dalton et al. 1984). 
The idea that the emergence and electoral success of green parties might 
be related to the changing nature of established cleavages structures and the rise 
of new issue strains has proved particularly attractive to party specialists 
(Franklin and RUdig 1995). Yet in seeking to obtain a grasp of the nature of these 
processes, commentators have tended to tum to sociological, cultural and, more 
specifically, 'new social movement' accounts of political change.19 These 
'macro' accounts have provided potential means of explaining why recent 
decades have witnessed growing societal pressure to form green parties, as well 
as the processes of social and cultural transformation underpinning the electoral 
appeal of these parties (Kitschelt 1990). 
By far the most frequently employed of these approaches has been Ronald 
Inglehart's theory of value change, according to which the emergence and 
electoral success of green parties is interpreted in terms of the rise of a new 
cleavage based around 'materialist' and 'post-materialist' values (Inglehart 1977, 
19 For useful summaries of social movement approaches see Pakulski (1991) and Gladwin (1994). 
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1990b; Poguntke 1993a). Other commentators have interpreted the rise of green 
parties within the context of processes relating to the shift from industrial to 
'post-industrial' society (Touraine 1971; Bell 1974) - for instance, a change in 
the class structure, the expansion of higher education, the rise of bureaucratic 
decision-making (Chandler and Siaroff 1986; Alber 1989; Papadakis 1989; 
Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992). Reflecting the growing importance of 
comparative research into the relationship between environmental issues and 
politics (Lowe and Rudig 1986; Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991; Carter 
and Turnock 1993; Dalton 1994; Doyle and McEachern 1998), a further 
perspective has focused more specifically on the links between environmental 
problems, the rise of an ecological 'cleavage', and the emergence and electoral 
success of green parties in different countries (Rudig 1990b). 
Yet despite the evolving relationship between political studies and 
environmental themes, ecologically informed approaches to understanding green 
parties have occupied a marginal position within the academic literature. 
Moreover, of the small number of studies which explicitly address the 
relationship between environmental problems and green parties, few, if any, have 
provided an in depth analysis of the conditions that gave rise to these problems in 
the first place. Of course, there is a burgeoning literature dealing with the 
deleterious effects of patterns of economic growth, industrialism and capitalism 
on the human and non-human environment. 20 But even these broader theoretical 
studies have omitted to explore the precise relationship between environmental, 
social and political change. While studies of green parties rooted in the 'post-
materialist' and 'post-industrial' traditions have been given added weight by the 
rich theoretical literatures which form the backbone of these perspectives, the 
same cannot be said for research which places emphasis on the role of 
environmental problems in the development of green parties. In terms of 
understanding green parties, then, there is a clear gap within the literature. Given 
that green parties are - first and foremost - defined by their ecological identity, a 
20 For a review of these issues see Porritt (1984), Eckersley (1992); Pepper (1993), Martell (1994) 
and Dobson (1995). 
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proper account of their origins and electoral appeal must examine the specific 
environmental and social conditions that have given rise to ecological politics in 
contemporary European societies. 
There is a further body of relevant literature which deals more explicitly 
with the impact of institutional structures, political competition and patterns of 
interest representation on the emergence and electoral success of green parties. 
The central claim here has been that the developmental patterns of these parties -
that is, the timing of their formation and the levels of electoral support that they 
have been able to attract - have been shaped by what have been termed 'political 
and institutional facilitators' (Riidig 1986).21 These are themes which have long 
been the subject of discussion within more mainstream analyses of political 
parties (Duverger 1954; Rae 1971; Sartori 1976; Hauss and Rayside 1978). 
Factors cited as being of potential relevance to the development of green parties 
have included the type of electoral system, structures of government, electoral 
dealignment, the conditions of political competition, neo-corporatism, and the 
strategic orientation of social movements (Hauss and Rayside 1978; Mwler-
Rommel 1982, 1985b, 1985c, 1998; Riidig and Lowe 1986; Kitschelt 1988a, 
1989; Kreuzer 1990; Rootes 1992, 1995b). But while commentators have paid 
considerable attention to the role of 'external' political and institutional factors 
on green parties, there has been a noticeable neglect of the potential impact of 
'internal' dynamics - ideology, organisation, strategy, party leadership - upon 
green party development. 22 
21 Some commentators have preferred to employ the term 'political opportunity structures' to 
describe the range of political system related factors affecting the rise of green parties (see, for 
example, Frankland 1995: 26-28 and Demertzis 1995: 202-204). Broadly speaking, the term refers 
to the extent to which state structures are 'open' or 'closed' to new issues and movements 
(Kitschelt 1986). However, a number of weaknesses are associated with the concept of 'political 
opportunity structure' which would cast doubt on its suitability as a framework within which to 
examine green parties. Most importantly, as Rootes suggests, 'it has too often been used to 
obscure the analytically important distinction between factors which are. on the one hand, 
genuinely structural in that they derive from more or less temporally durable and often formally 
institutionalized arrangements, and, on the other, conditions which are essentially contingent and 
usually more temporary' (Rootes 1995b: 250). 
22 As was mentioned earlier, these themes have been the subject of detailed scrutiny by green party 
researchers. However, they have been largely examined within the context of discussions about the 
character of green party ideology and organisation, and the nature of internal strategic conflict 
within green parties, as opposed to the emergence and electoral success of these parties. 
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Existing studies have undoubtedly advanced academic understanding of 
the range of 'external' factors which can potentially impact upon the emergence 
and electoral success of green parties. Yet there are problems even with this 
literature. These problems stem from academics' hesitancy when it comes to the 
task of synthesising the multiplicity of political and institutional factors identified 
and/or to considering their relative impact on green party emergence and 
electoral success in different European countries. One of the clear problems with 
the literature as it stands, therefore, is its diffuseness. Even the few studies that 
have attempted to move towards a more integrated approach (Kitschelt 1988a; 
Taggart 1996; MOller-Rommel 1998) have been limited by their failure to 
consider the often different ways in which these factors have impacted on green 
parties. Because these commentators have usually chosen to focus upon a large 
number of cases, they have not been able to examine in detail the varying extent 
to which different political and institutional arrangements have impinged upon 
green parties, nor the often complex interrelationship between these factors. 
The focus of this thesis is thus upon the two questions that have come to 
dominate the literature on European green parties: the explanation of the 
environmental, social and political context within which such parties emerged 
and the varying levels of electoral support attracted by them in different 
countries. The study challenges the existing literature on two main counts. First, 
with respect to the broad conditions which have shaped the context within which 
there has been public pressure to form and support green parties, primary 
emphasis is placed upon the rise and heightened perception of large-scale 
ecological risks and problems. Attention to these issues can contribute towards 
the development of a more theoretically sophisticated understanding of the 
ecological identity of green parties. These ideas challenge existing approaches 
which have interpreted the rise of green parties principally within the frameworks 
of 'post-materialist' value change and/or 'post-industrial' society. However, it is 
argued that aspects of these latter frameworks can be reworked and integrated 
into a perspective which stresses the centrality of the existence and perception of 
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ecological risks and problems. Second, in contrast to existing studies, an attempt 
is made to assess in detail the relative impact of, and interrelationship among, a 
wide range of 'external' and 'internal' political and institutional factors on the 
emergence and electoral success of green parties. 
4. The Emergence and Electoral Success of Green Parties: 
Terminological Clarifications 
The principal concern in this section is to clarify the meaning of two terms that 
will be used on a regular basis within this study~ namely, those of party 
'emergence' and 'success'. On the issue of party emergence, it has been 
suggested by Rose and Mackie that: 
The establishment of a party organization is a process~ a particular date, 
such as the foundation meeting, is only one point in time in a process of 
previous political activity often extending for many years. (Rose and 
Mackie 1988: 535) 
This 'dynamic' approach has long been employed by party specialists (Duverger 
1954). The intention in this thesis is to develop a 'dynamic' approach to party 
emergence which encompasses yet transcends the somewhat limited influence of 
'previous political activity' (whether in the form of social movements, citizen 
involvement in political parties or outside organisations) upon green party 
emergence. In doing this, the approach to green party emergence incorporates a 
range of additional themes, including long-term processes of social, political and 
environmental change, as well as consideration of the impact of a variety of 
political and institutional arrangements. 
Thus far little has been said with respect to the 'success' or 'failure' of 
green parties. One of the notable features of green parties is that while they have 
been formed in all European countries (Kortvellyessy 1996: 22), their electoral 
fortunes have differed dramatically. Some green parties have attracted substantial 
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proportions of the vote - gaining parliamentary representation and ultimately 
coalition status in national governments - while others have consistently 
performed dismally at elections. Of course, assessing a party's 'success' or 
'failure' solely on the basis of its electoral performance has its limitations. As 
Rose and Mackie point out, 'ideas of failure and success are relative; they only 
have meaning when judged by explicit criteria' (Rose and Mackie 1988: 534). At 
a minimal level, for example, success 'may only mean that a party persists, 
maintaining an organization to contest elections' (Rose and Mackie 1988: 533). 
A political party may also be considered to have 'succeeded' if it achieves its 
programmatic or organisational goals (Rose and Mackie 1988: 533-534). Despite 
there being several ways to define party 'success', this study will adopt one 
specific criterion - that of electoral success. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, measures of success such as 'durability' or 'survivability' are particularly 
difficult to apply to green parties since the vast majority have existed for a 
relatively short period of time. Passing judgement on the overall 'durability' or 
'persistence' of a green party formed in, say, 1987 may seem somewhat 
premature (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 513). Second, adopting a definition of 
'success' based upon achievement of party goals is problematic because the 
politics of green parties are characterised by the existence of a wide range of 
strategies, objectives and ideological tendencies. As well as inter-party 
differences of opinion on these questions, studies have drawn attention to intra-
party tensions - exemplified in the so-called 'fundi-realo' debate (Doherty 1992)-
considered to exist within a number of European green parties. In utilising the 
criterion of 'achievement of party goals' as a basis for assessing a political 
party's success or failure, a problem concerning the diversity of opinion that 
exists on the question of exactly what these goals should constitute is 
immediately encountered.23 Of the attempts to define party 'success' the criterion 
of electoral performance is thus the least ambiguous. Because political parties are 
13 This problem is by no means confined to green parties. For a discussion of the extent to which 
conflict over party goals has affected British political parties in recent years see Peele (1997). For a 
discussion of internal conflict in European social democratic parties see Kitschelt (1994: chapter 
5). 
22 
essentiany instruments for winning and administering power, and consequently 
display a commitment to fighting elections and obtaining the support of the 
electorate, it can be argued that electoral performance is a relatively 
uncontroversial and legitimate measure ofa party's 'success'. 
Two further issues require clarification. First, it is necessary to say 
something about the electoral focus of this study. While recognising the 
importance attached to sub-national and European elections by European green 
parties and academic commentators (Carter 1994; Harrison 1995), this study is 
predominantly concerned with green party electoral performance at the national 
parliamentary level. One reason for this is that the parties which will be 
examined in this study all claim, first and foremost, to be national parties 
committed to competing on the national electoral stage. It is also the case that, 
among most academic commentators, national parliamentary elections are 
considered to be the most significant in terms of the implications that their 
outcomes have for the character of politics and policy-making in different 
countries. Examining green party electoral success at the national level is thus 
justified on the grounds of green parties' clear identification as national parties 
and the elevated importance of national elections in contemporary European 
politics. 24 
Second, an acceptable means of assessing national green party electoral 
success needs to be established. Existing responses to this question have often 
been quite arbitrary. Party specialists have usually chosen to assess electoral 
'success' in terms of 'wimring' elections or, in the case of green and other small 
parties, according to the extent to which they have been able to surpass a 
particular electoral threshold in previous national elections (Mair 1991; Kitschelt 
1 988a; Muller-Rommel 1998). On this latter basis, commentators have 
distinguished between electorally 'significant' and 'insignificant' political 
parties. For the purposes of this study, electoral performance can be used as a 
24 In the British case, however, it will also be necessary to consider the Green Party's performan<:e 
in the 1989 European elections. This is because the result (14.9 per cent of the vote) was so at 
odds with the party's previous electoral performances and hence demands some sort of 
explanation. 
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simple means of assessing a party's 'significance', although it should be added 
that the former may often provide an indication of a party's 'significance' in a 
broader sense, e.g. in terms of the likelihood that it will be represented in 
parliament, enter into coalitions with other parties, able to have an impact on 
policy-making, receive significant media exposure, and be perceived as a 
'significant' political party within the minds of the electorate. According to 
Kitschelt, a green party may be considered 'significant' if it 'has received about 4 
per cent or more of the vote in a national parliamentary or presidential election at 
least once in the 1980s. Alliances among [green] parties are permitted to count 
toward the 4 per cent threshold' (Kitschelt 1988a: 198). The approach to the 
question of electoral significance adopted in this thesis is in broad keeping with 
this criterion although, in view of the fact that two of the green parties to be 
examined were not formed until the late 1980s, the period of assessment is 
extended to cover the years 1980-98. 
5. The Case Studies 
In order to throw light on the conditions that have resulted in public pressure to 
form green parties, and the factors which have impinged upon the latters' 
electoral success, the trajectory of green parties will be compared in three 
countries. One of the advantages of taking such a small sample is that a detailed 
assessment of the impact of social, environmental, political and institutional 
factors on the emergence and electoral performance of green parties is made 
possible. While studies of green parties based upon a large number of case 
studies have undoubtedly provided valuable insight into the collection of factors 
which may impact upon the emergence and electoral success of green parties 
(Kitschelt 1988a, 1989; Taggart 1996; MOller-Rommel 1998), they have for the 
most part been insensitive to the details of particular countries, and have not been 
24 
suited to an assessment of the interrelation between dynamics of social change 
and the political and institutional dimensions of political systems. 
The choice of case studies also requires some explanation. The definition 
of a green party in terms of a party that defines itself as <green' and which is a 
member of the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) meant that a total 
of 30 parties could theoretically stake a claim for inclusion. From this initial 
group it was decided to exclude those parties which had recently emerged in 
post-Communist states, i.e. the green parties of the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia and the Ukraine. While these 
countries would undoubtedly have made for an interesting comparative study, it 
was felt that the very different political, economic and social circumstances 
within which these parties emerged would make a coherent assessment of 
existing theories of green party development - which have primarily been 
formulated on the basis of events in Western Europe - impracticable. There were 
also the not inconsiderable problems of language, and the lack of adequate 
information sources on these parties.25 Thus, it was decided to limit possible 
cases for inclusion to the countries of Western Europe. 
Of the Western European green parties, those of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain were excluded because it was thought that their recent histories of political 
dictatorship - all three countries have undergone a transition to liberal democracy 
since the 1970s - would make an assessment of theoretical approaches to green 
party politics, which have been premised upon long-term processes of economic, 
social and cultural development in Western liberal democracies, problematic. 
The green parties of Cyprus, Denmark, Malta and Norway were also omitted, on 
the grounds that the parties were very small and insignificant, and because there 
was found to be a lack of comprehensive information about, and few information 
sources available on, the parties. This left the following possibilities: Austria, 
25 English language sources on green parties in the ex-Communist countries are very limited. 
Existing studies have focused on the Czech Greens (Jeh1icka and Kostelecky 1992, 1995) and the 
Hungarian Greens (Hajba 1994). More general studies can be found in Waller (1989) and Waller 
and Millard (1992). 
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Belgium26, Britain27, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands28, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The preoccupation of green party researchers with the situation 1D 
Germany led to a conscious decision not to include the German Greens in the 
study.29 It was felt that focusing upon the German case would do little to further 
advance understanding of green parties on a broader European scale. Finland, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland initially seemed promising, but it was discovered 
that the unavailability of party documents and literature made these cases 
unviable. For reasons of practicality, it was thus decided to include a green party 
which would be easy to contact for information purposes, and upon which there 
was likely to be a wealth of English language secondary sources, i.e. either the 
British or Irish Greens. Of the two, the British Green Party seemed the more 
practical and obvious choice. The Green Party was considered particularly 
interesting on account of its continued electoral marginality, despite having the 
status of being the first of its kind in Europe. It was also felt that placing an 
electorally insignificant green party alongside more electorally successful 
examples would enable a more fruitful investigation of the political and 
institutional factors impacting upon their electoral performance. 30 
The choice of the Austrian Greens (Die Grlinen) as a case study partly 
reflected a response to the comparative lack of interest in 'green' political 
developments in this country. Considerably less has been written on green party 
26 Two green parties exist in Belgium: the French-speaking Ecolo and the Flemish Agalev. 
27 In 1989 Scottish Greens obtained independence from the British Green Party. At present, there 
are two green parties operating in Britain: the British Green Party (England and Wales) and the 
Scottish Green Party. 
28 There are two green parties in the Netherlands: Green Left (GroenLinlcs) and the Greens (De 
GrcJenen). 
29 An analysis of the periodical literature has revealed that of the 42 articles published on green 
parties between 1978 and 1995, 23 dealt with the situation in Germany (Meadowcroft et aJ. 1999). 
Numerous texts have also been written on the German Greens. See, for example, HUlsberg (1988), 
Frankland and Schoonmaker (1992), Poguntke (1993a) and Wiesenthal (1993). 
30 Information on the British Green Party was obtained from a wide variety of sources including 
books and articles, party manifestos and publications, attendance at Green Party conferences and 
interviews (telephone and face to face) with academics and party activists carried out in 1996 and 
1997. 
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politics in Austria than in Italy, Belgium, Sweden or France.3) While relatively 
under-researched Austria was considered interesting because, despite having 
national 'green' parties present since 1982, it was not until 1986 that a significant 
green party - in the form of the Austrian Greens (Die Grone Alternative) -
appeared on the political landscape. Although the party has since managed to 
maintain parliamentary representation and secure a foothold in the Austrian party 
system, its electoral fortunes have fluctuated somewhat in recent national 
elections. It was thought that attention to the political and institutional 
circumstances under which the Austrian Greens have competed might yield 
further insights into the factors which have potentially influenced the electoral 
strength of green parties. One potentially interesting feature of the Austrian 
Greens is that the party has undertaken significant organisational reforms in 
recent years and this provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of 
changing internal dynamics - a hitherto neglected aspect of green party politics -
on green party electoral performance. 
Green parties in the Netherlands have also received only modest attention 
within the literature.32 Yet the Dutch case (GroenLinlcs - Green Left) is unusual 
among European green parties in that it developed out of four already existing 
'New Left' political parties in 1989/90. The late arrival of a significant green 
31 For example, arguably the most influential of comparative texts on Europe's green parties -
namely, Richardson and Rootes (1995) - did not include the Austrian Greens as a case study. 
English language sources on the Austrian Greens are limited to a small number of unpublished 
conference papers (Frankland 1992, 1993; Lauber and Miiller 1998), academic articles (Lauber 
1995, 1997a) and book chapters (Dachs 1989; Haerpfer 1989; Frankland 1994). However, there is 
a wealth of more mainstream literature on developments in Austrian politics. See, for example, 
Sully (1990), Fitzmaurice (1991), Lauber (1996b). The analysis in this study has been further 
supplemented by consideration of some German language sources, party documents and 
publications translated into English, and information supplied by Gerhard Jordan (international 
secretary of the Austrian Greens), Sue Miles (British Green Party international secretary) and 
Hazel Dawe (British Green Party's observer of the Austrian Greens). Useful studies of the Belgian, 
Italian, Swedish and French Greens can be found in Kitschelt (1989), Rihoux (1995), Rhodes 
(1995), Gaiter (1991), Bennulf(1995), Prendeville (1994), Szarka (1994), and Cole and Doherty 
(1995). 
32 The main studies of green parties in the Netherlands include Voennan (1992, 1995) and 
Lucardie et al.(1993, 1994). However, there is a considerable literature on the Dutch New Left, 
the Dutch Communist Party and the new social movements, all of which played an important role 
in the development of green party politics in the Netherlands. Further information for this study 
was obtained through English language party publications and interviews with Dutch academics 
and green party members carried out in 1996. 
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party in a country which has, since the 1960s, suffered from considerable 
environmental degradation and in which there have been high levels of 
environmental awareness and new social movement activism (van der Straaten 
1992; O'Neill 1997) has presented something of a paradox for green party 
researchers. The absence of a significant green party in the Netherlands 
throughout the 1980s is even more perplexing, considering the country's extreme 
version of proportional representation - a system which is thought to facilitate the 
electoral success of small parties (Lucardie 1991). The interest factor in Dutch 
green party politics is heightened by the presence of a second green party - De 
Groenen (The Greens) - on the political landscape. 33 Yet, unlike Green Left, this 
party has been an electorally insignificant political actor. The existence of two 
green parties in one country - one significant, the other insignificant - thus 
presented an added opportunity to explore the political and institutional factors 
impacting upon the electoral significance of green parties. 
One of the aims of this study was to examine the ways in which 
contrasting political and institutional arrangements might facilitate different 
patterns of green party emergence and levels of electoral success. In view of this, 
it was considered desirable that, as far as possible, there should be significant 
differences in terms of the features of the political systems within which the 
green parties have competed. Austria, Britain and the Netherlands clearly meet 
with these requirements. For instance, while Austria and the Netherlands conduct 
national elections under proportional representation, Britain does not. In addition, 
Austria has a federal system of government while Britain and the Netherlands are 
unitary states. And while Britain's political system has frequently been described 
as 'pluralist', the Dutch and Austrian have been defined in 'neo-corporatist' 
terms. The patterns of political competition also differ across the three case 
studies. For example, Britain's party system has had a clear 'two-party' quality to 
it whereas the party systems of both Austria and the Netherlands have - at least 
since the early 1980s - been characterised by increased competition and higher 
33 Both De Groenen and Groen Links are members of the European Federation of Green Parties. 
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levels of fragmentation. 34 The three countries display further important 
differences in terms of the internal dynamics of their respective green parties. 
The British Green Party has a long history of internal conflict over strategy and 
its ideology has been interpreted in 'dark' green terms (Bennie et al. 1994). In 
contrast, both the Austrian and Dutch parties have less turbulent histories and 
have embraced more moderate and less uncompromising ideological positions 
(Voerman 1995; Frankland 1994). It was felt that comparing the green parties 
along these differently constituted dimensions would enable the identification of 
certain elements and arrangements whose presence or absence have influenced 
their emergence and electoral performance. 
6. The Organisation of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the range of social, environmental, 
political and institutional factors that have shaped the context within which 
political parties with an explicitly ecological identity emerged, and the 
arrangements which have impacted upon the comparative electoral significance 
of these parties. Approaches to examining these questions can be divided into 
two main types: first, broad, macro-theories of social and cultural change 
developed by individual theorists which have been employed to describe the 
context within which there evolved heightened societal pressure to form and vote 
for green parties, and, second, perspectives which draw upon established 
concepts and themes within the political studies literature in the attempt to 
illuminate the political and institutional factors underpinning the emergence and 
electoral significance of green parties. 
The thesis is organised to allow as far as possible a critical assessment of 
these two dominant approaches to understanding the phenomenon of green 
34 While the Netherlands has a loog history of multi-partyisrn, Austria has gone through various 
phases of party system. The period 1966-1983, for example, falls into the category ofa 'two-party 
system'. Since 1983, however, Austria has had a 'multi-party' system characterised by 'moderate 
pluralism' (MOller 19968, 1996b). 
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parties. Because social or cultural change based perspectives pertaining to green 
parties tend to be associated with one or two prominent theorists, it was 
considered appropriate to examine these in relation to the arguments elaborated 
within these theorists' most influential publications. A critical examination of 
these arguments will also enable an appreciation of the sometimes different 
views of theorists associated with a particular theoretical perspective. Attention 
to these subtle differences of emphasis within the literature could possibly be 
missed if a more broadly based, thematic approach to the literature was adopted. 
Of the theoretical frameworks that have attracted the attention of green 
party commentators, it is Ronald Inglehart's theory of 'post-materialist' value 
change which has received the most overwhelming endorsement within the 
literature (Rudig 1990b; Franklin and Rudig 1995). Chapter 3 thus provides a 
detailed examination of the extent to which Inglehart's arguments can enhance 
understanding of the emergence and electoral significance of green parties. In 
chapter 4, the focus of attention shifts to two prominent theories of 'post-
industrial' society which have received scrutiny within the green party literature -
namely, those identified with Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine. Chapter 5 
represents something of a departure from the previous two chapters in that it 
engages with the arguments of two sociologists which have been largely ignored 
by green party commentators, but which are fast becoming favoured theoretical 
frames of reference within the wider sub-discipline of environmental politics. 
The related arguments of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens throw up the 
possibility that the emergence and electoral success of green parties may be 
linked to the existence of large-scale ecological risks and hazards arising from 
processes of social, scientific and technological change within the broad context 
of 'late modernity'. 
While chapters 3, 4 and 5 are approached from the perspectives of 
individual theorists, chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 are, in contrast, structured on a 
thematic basis. These chapters deal with concepts that have had more direct 
application in the political studies literature on social movements, electoral 
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studies and political parties than within the literature on social/cultural change. 
The political studies literature contains reference to a wide range of political and 
institutional factors which may impact upon the emergence and electoral success 
of green parties. Because of this diversity, and the association of concepts and 
arguments with a large number of academic authors, the thematic organisation of 
these chapters constitutes the most sensible means of accessing this literature. 
Chapter 6 considers the impact of political state-institutional structures on the 
emergence and electoral significance of green parties. In chapter 7, attention is 
turned to the role of electoral dealignment and patterns of political competition 
on the development of green parties. Chapter 8 considers the relationship 
between modes of interest representation - primarily neo-corporatism, pluralism 
and social movements - and green parties. While these three chapters assess the 
impact of 'external' political and institutional factors on the emergence and 
electoral success of green parties, chapter 9 considers the hitherto relatively 
unexplored influence of 'internal' party dynamics. The purpose of the final 
chapter - chapter 10 - is to demonstrate that a synthesis of social/cultural change 
and political studies based approaches is possible. Such a synthesis can facilitate 
an understanding of the social, cultural, environmental, institutional and political 
conditions underlying the emergence of green parties and the electoral 
significance of these parties. Before exploring these issues, however, the next 
chapter (chapter 2) provides necessary background information on the three 
green parties to be examined in this study. 
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Chapter 2 
The Career of Green Parties in 
Austria, Britain and the Netherlands 
Green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands have contrasting and 
complex histories. The aim of this chapter is to provide a preliminary overview 
of the career of green parties in these countries. The chapter 'sets the scene' for 
more detailed discussion and critical assessment of the principal research themes, 
i.e. the factors affecting the emergence and varying electoral success of green 
parties, to be examined in subsequent chapters. It provides background 
infonnation on such issues as the dates of party fonnation, the key actors 
involved in the development of the parties, the main periods of party change and 
conflict and, importantly, their electoral achievements to date. The discussion 
begins with an outline of green party politics as it has developed in Austria before 
moving on to consider the situation in Britain and the Netherlands. 
1. Green Party Politics in Austria 
The roots of green party politics in Austria can be traced back to the various 
citizen initiatives (Biirgerinitiativen) which sprung up in several cities during the 
early 1970s. The purpose of these groups was to organise local demonstrations 
and mount campaigns against urban projects considered to be damaging to the 
environment (Gottweis 1990: 51). Their first electoral breakthrough occurred in 
1977 when a citizen list (Burgerliste) in Salzburg won 6 per cent of the vote and 
two seats on the city council. This was followed in 1982 by greater success, as 
the same citizen list increased its representation to seven seats (17.7 per cent of 
the vote) and secured control of one municipal portfolio (Dachs 1989: 175). The 
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relative success of the Salzburg list gave a boost to the environmental movement 
in the rest of Austria and was followed by the founding of two rival national 
parties in 1982. The Alternative List of Austria (Alternative Liste Osterreich: 
ALO) developed out of the Alternative List of Graz (Alternative Liste Graz), a 
political group fonned in 1981 and, according to Frankland, was: 
open to the left, borrowed much of its programme from the West Gennan 
Greens', included a diversity of activists from environmental, feminist, 
peace and Third World movements and was organised according to the 
grass roots-democratic model. (Frankland 1994: 195) 
The United Greens of Austria (Vereinte Grone Osterreichs: VOO) grew out of 
the anti-nuclear movement l and aimed to promote, more exclusively, the 
ecological cause. Unlike the ALO, the vGO was conservative in outlook and did 
not make 'plans for radically changing Austrian society, economy or the state' 
(Lauber 1995: 315). Its organisational structure was similar to that of the 
established parties - hierarchical and publicity orientated (Dachs 1989: 179). 
Both parties contested the 1983 parliamentary elections although neither 
managed to win a seat in the National Council (Nationalrat). 2 Between 1983 and 
1986 the two parties continued to fight provincial elections separately with 
modest results (Sully 1990: 132). 
The year 1986 marked something of a turning point in the history of green 
party politics in Austria. A 'green' candidate, in the fonn of peace activist and 
former Socialist Party (Socialistische Partei Osterreichs: SPO) member Freda 
Meissner-Slau polled 5.5 per cent of the first round vote in the Presidential 
election which forced a second ballot between the sPO and the People's Party 
(Osterreichische Volkspartei: OVP) candidates (Sully 1990: 133). This was 
hailed as a moderate 'success' by the wider green movement. Since 1985 
Meissner-Blau had been active in a new organisation comprised of prominent 
I The vo<> was founded specifically by leading members of the 'Project Group No to 
zwentendorf (Dachs 1989: 178). 
2 The ALO polled 1.4 per cent of the vote, the VO<>, 1.9 per cent (Dachs 1989: 182). 
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green activists committed to the achievement of national parliamentary 
representation: the Citizens' Parliamentary Initiative (Biirgerinitiative Parlament: 
BIP). Her relative success inspired members of the A.LO and vGO to begin 
negotiations in order to 'produce the candidature of one single green party' which 
would compete at the next National Council elections, scheduled for Spring 1987 
(Haerpfer 1989: 27). When these negotiations broke down, however, it was left to 
the BIP to unite the ALO and vGO around a common programme in time for the 
'snap' election called for November 1986. The electoral alliance, Die GrUne 
Alternative-Freda Meissner-Blau, polled 4.8 per cent of the vote and gained eight 
seats (out of 183) in the National Council. This was the first time that a fourth 
party had sat in the National Council since 1959, the year in which the 
Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs: KPO) lost all of its 
parliamentary seats (Sully 1990: 133). It was also the point at which, after several 
years of political frustration, a significant green party finally materialised on the 
Austrian political landscape. 
During the months following the 1986 election, the then called Green 
Alternative (Die GrUne Alternative) embarked upon a process of organisational 
development.3 For the new party, one of the first tasks involved the founding of 
party groups and offices representing all nine provinces (LiJnder) and ethnic 
minority groups (representing a 'tenth province'). At its first national party 
congress in February 1987 an executive committee was elected and, in May, the 
party founded a Green Academy (GrUne Bildungwerlcstatt) to promote research 
and publicity (Die Grone Alternative n.d.). In terms of its organisational style, the 
Green Alternative was, from the outset, sensitive to the oligarchic tendencies of 
the major parties and sought to develop collective structures designed to 'prevent 
the development of a class of professional politicians' (Frankland 1994: 201-
203)." The Green Alternative's loose organisational structure was further 
3 From the outset, however, problems surfaced concernin8 the place of the vGO in the new party 
organisation. While the vast majority of former vGO members remained in the new party, a 
minority from its right wing quickly decided to split away from Green Alternative and began 
~tting up rival candidates in provincial and national elections (Lauber and MOller 1998). 
For a more detailed analysis of the party's organisational structure see Frankland (1994). 
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reflected in its emphasis on 'activism' and a reluctance to keep centralised 
records on membership levels. 5 
At least until 1990, the Green Alternative encountered some difficulties in 
developing a coherent party programme. This was partly a consequence of the 
party's preoccupation with organisational and parliamentary matters but also a 
result of the existence of 'sectarian disputes and personal rivalries' which led to 
the resignation of three MPs, including Meissner-Blau, in late 1988 (Frankland 
1994: 205~ Sully 1990: 134). In July 1990, however, the federal congress 
endorsed three reform programmes which together formed 'the party's first fully 
fledged manifesto with over 70 pages of principles, diagnoses and remedies' 
(Frankland 1994: 206).6 In the National Council elections of 1990, Green 
Alternative increased its representation from eight to ten seats, although its share 
of the vote remained constant at 4.8 per cent (Meth-Cohn and MUller 1991). 
As the new decade progressed, Green Alternative entered a period of 
'stagnation'. The party's poor performances in several provincial elections in 
1991 fuelled demands for a reforming of its 'amateurish' model of organisation. 
At its May 1992 Gmunden congress several important organisational changes 
were passed, which aimed to make the party more integrated and professional.7 A 
further important development occurred this year with the creation of a new post 
of federal speaker. This was largely a response to the problems encountered 
during the 1990 National Council election campaign in which the party's four 
'top candidates' struggled to compete effectively with the single leaders of the 
established parties (MUller 1994b: 58).8 The organisational transformation also 
5 A recent study claims that the party has approximately 2,000 members (Lauber and MOller 1998). 
6 In terms of content, the manifesto placed primary emphasis on environmental protection: 'the 
goal of the Green-Alternatives is above all the maintenance of life ... in diversity, dignity and health 
.,. '. It also called for fundamental democratic reforms including 'more direct democracy, less party 
dominance, 8 stronger parliament and more civic participation in schools and the workplace', 
although it did not use the term 'radical democracy'. The European Union (EU) was opposed both 
on environmental and democratic grounds, and the party called for the abolition of the Austrian 
anny. Concerning social policy, the manifesto advocated '8 guaranteed minimum income, 8 shorter 
working week (with full pay), a comprehensive pension system, health care reform, fair treatment 
of homosexuals and other social minorities'. The Greens also favoured more equality for women, 
ethnic minorities., foreign workers and refugees, and an open asylum policy (Frankland 1994: 206). 
7 For a detailed description of these reforms see Frankland (1994) and Lauber and MOller (1998). 
8 The post offederal speaker was filled initially by Peter Pilz, a strong 'media aware' personality. 
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involved a change of name for the party in 1993, from Green Alternative to the 
Greens (Die Grunen) (Lauber and MOller 1998: 16).9 
By the 1994 National Council elections the Greens had undergone 
considerable change. The party's election campaign, led by new federal speaker 
Madeleine Petrovic, proved a success as its share of the vote increased from 4.8 
per cent to 7.3 per cent and its parliamentary representation from ten to 13 seats 
(Luther 1995). Yet one year after this triumph, a surprise National Council 
election proved disappointing for the Greens. The party's share of the vote 
slumped back to its previous level of 4.8 per cent resulting in the loss of four 
parliamentary seats (Lauber and MOller 1998: 17). Pressures for a change of 
'leadership' began to grow and in March 1996 Christoph Chorherr - a keen 
advocate of further party reform - was narrowly elected to replace Petrovic as 
federal speaker. By October 1996, the Greens seemed to have recovered some 
lost ground as they secured 6.8 per cent of the vote and one seat at the European 
Parliament elections (Lauber 1997a: 186). Chorherr resigned in December 1997 
following intra-party criticism and was soon replaced by Alexander Van der 
Bellen. Despite Chorherr's resignation, the essence of his reform package -
designed to move the party further in the direction of professional, one-person 
leadership - was adopted at the time of Van der Sellen's election (Lauber and 
MOller 1998: 18). In 1999, the Greens improved on their European election result 
of 1996, gaining 9.3 per cent of the vote and two seats (The Economist, 19 June 
1999). A summary of the national electoral performance of the Austrian Greens 
(G) vis-a-vis other political parties is provided in Table 2.1. 
All the signs are that the Greens will continue to maintain their presence 
on the Austrian political map. Yet while it has achieved a modest degree of 
electoral success and influence, the party clearly has its sights set on government 
participation at the national and Land levels. The Greens have undoubtedly 
served as an effective vehicle for voicing protest against the ecological and other 
9 From this point on, and for the sake of clarity. the term 'Greens' will be used to refer to the 
Austrian party either in the guise of Die Grline Alternative or Die Grlinen. Separate reference will 
be made to the Greens' organisational predecessors, the ALO and vOl). 
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Table 2.1 National Parliamentary Election Results in Austria, 1983-95 (% vote and seats (s)) 
Parties 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 I 
% s % s % s % s % s I 
SPO 47.6 90 43.1 80 42.8 80 34.9 65 38.l 71 , 
I 
OVP 43.2 81 41.3 77 32.1 60 27.7 52 28.3 53 I 
FPO 5.0 12 9.7 18 16.6 33 22.5 42 21.9 40 
LF - - - - - - 6.0 11 5.5 10 
G 
- -
4.8 8 4.8 10 7.3 13 4.8 9 
ALO 1.4 - - - - - - - - -
VGO 1.9 - - - 2.0 - 0.1 - - -
KPO 0.7 - 0.7 - 0.6 - - - - -
-- .. -
--- -------~-
Sources: Luther (1987, 1995); Pulzer (1995); Sully (1996); Lauber and Muller (1998). 
shortcomings of the Austrian political system and public policy, but they have 
repeatedly stated their desire to be taken seriously as a party willing and able to 
assume government responsibility. The most pressing concern for the Greens is 
to carry forward their recent European success into the national electoral arena 
and to strengthen their bargaining position in relation to the other parties. 
Subsequent chapters consider in greater detail issues pertaining to the 
development of green electoral politics in Austria. 
2. Green Party Politics in Britain 
Founded as PEOPLE in February 1973 the British Green Party is noted as the 
oldest of its kind in Europe. Subsequently renamed the Ecology Party in 1975, 
then the Green Party in 1985, much of the party's history has been characterised 
by electoral frustration, political marginality and considerable internal wrangling 
(ROdig and Lowe 1986; Parkin 1989; Wan 1994; Rootes 1995a). Unlike the 
Austrian Greens, the British Green Party is electorally insignificant. It has failed 
to achieve a breakthrough at general elections and its best performances have 
been at the European level (in 1989 and 1999). This section provides a summary 
of the key episodes and events that have shaped the Green Party's history over 
the past 25 years. 10 
The origins of PEOPLE can be traced to a loose organisation calling itself 
the 'Thirteen Club,.l1 Fonned in 1972, this group set out to discuss issues raised 
in such publications as the Blueprint for Survival, the Limits to Growth Report 
and the writings of Paul Erlich (Parkin 1989). A clear difference of opinion soon 
developed within the group between those 'who simply wanted to read and learn 
and others who felt more had to be done' (Parkin 1989: 218). Four individuals, in 
particular, took the view that a new political party would form the best response 
10 For a detailed 'official' account of the history of the Green Party see Wall (1994). Other useful 
accounts can be found in ROdig and Lowe (1986); Parkin (1989) and McCulloch (1991, 1993). 
11 The name was a direct reference to the number of attendees at the first meeting (parkin 1989: 
218). 
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to the impending 'ecological crisis' .12 In February 1973 their proposal 
materialised with the founding of PEOPLE at a meeting that attracted over 50 
people (Parkin 1989: 218). By May of that year PEOPLE had set up ten 
constituency groups (Wall 1994). The new party's electoral baptism took place at 
the February 1974 general election, its five candidates averaging 1.8 per cent of 
the vote (Carter 1992a: 446). 
At its first national conference in June 1974 PEOPLE adopted A 
Manifesto for Survival and elected a National Executive Committee. However, 
ideological tension was evident during the former's ratification between those on 
the platform who seemed very right-wing on such matters as immigration, 
education and women's emancipation, and those coming from the Left, who 
sought to soften this perceived tendency.13 These internal tensions were the first 
manifestation of a phenomenon that would tonnent the party in years to come 
and left the party ill-prepared for the October 1974 general election. At this 
election, PEOPLE's average vote across four constituencies fell to 0.7 per cent 
(Carter 1992a: 446). 
In 1975, the party adopted the Manifesto for a Sustainable Society as its 
key policy document and changed its name from PEOPLE to the Ecology Party in 
an attempt to attract heightened media interest (Wall 1994: 24). However, the 
same year saw the departure of a number of members on the Left of the party in 
response to a 'growing concern that the Party had too many authoritarian-minded 
elements', and the withdrawal of two of the party's founding members, Tony and 
Lesley Whittaker. from national activity (ROdig and Lowe 1986: 272). According 
to several commentators, these developments very nearly resulted in the party's 
extinction (ROdig and Lowe 1986: 272; Wall 1994). 
13 TheIle were Tony and Leslie Whittaker, Michael Benfield and Freda Saunders (parkin 1989). 
13 ROdig and Lowe's analysis oftbis ideological tension suggests that the right wing of the party 
derived many of its policy proposals from the writings of Edward Goldsmith (Rildig and Lowe 
1986: 271). In contrast, the Left's proposals were far less authoritarian, and involved a more 
gradualist approach to the ecological crisis. which would prevent further industrialisation and 
wbaDisation, teeure people's basic needs. break-up the multinationals and bring industry into co-
ownership. In addition, the Left supported feminism and policies for the integration of ethnic 
minority groups and the maintenance of education (ROdig and Lowe 1986: 271). 
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The years 1977-80 saw the emergence of a new national leadership in the 
form of Jonathon Tyler, Jonathon Porritt and David Fleming. The aim of the new 
leadership was to make the Ecology Party more professional and electable via a 
remoulding of its ideology and organisation. An attempt was made to resolve the 
ideological conflict between figures such as Edward Goldsmith and the Left 'by 
formulating the party's philosophy not in terms of its relationship to capitalism or 
socialism, but rather in terms of new alternatives - principally decentralisation 
and an end to the pursuit of economic growth' (Byrne 1989: 102). The result of 
the reforms was the transformation of an organisation facing imminent collapse 
into a national political party (Wall 1994: 34). The 1979 general election saw the 
Ecology Party field 53 candidates, a number sufficient to allow it a five minute 
radio and television broadcast. While the party's support averaged only 1.5 per 
cent of the vote in the seats fought, the enhanced publicity received served to 
boost its membership levels from 550 recorded in 1978 to more than 5,000 in 
1980 (Carter 1992a: 446; Callaghan 1990: 3; Wall 1994: 36). 
One consequence of such increased membership was an influx of so-
called 'decentralists' committed to 'alternative' lifestyles and direct action 
strategies into the party. Ideological tensions between the former and the 
'electoralist' faction soon developed and much time at conferences was devoted 
to working out compromises between these two tendencies (Riidig and Lowe 
1986: 275). Increased membership also led to problems of administration and 
finance. In particular, the party found it difficult to cope with the scale of public 
enquiries and its decision to stand three candidates in the 1979 European 
elections 'almost bankrupted the party' (Kemp and Wall 1990: 21). 
By the end of 1982 Ecology Party membership had fallen to 
approximately 2,500 (Kemp and Wall 1990: 21). This problem was accompanied 
by a dismal showing in the 1983 general election - the party averaged 1.0 per cent 
of the vote in the 106 constituencies that it contested, a result lower than that of 
1979 (Carter 1992a: 446). The 1984 European elections saw the Ecology Party 
improve its performance slightly, averaging 2.6 per cent in the 16 constituencies 
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it contested, and gaining a best ever individual result of 4.7 per cent (Rootes 
1995a: 67). Shortly after these elections, Jonathon Porritt withdrew from national 
party activity to become director of Friends of the Earth (Parkin 1989: 226). 
At its September 1985 Annual General Meeting (AGM) the Ecology Party 
changed its name to the Green Party, partly as a result of the success experienced 
by other European parties with 'green' in their title, but also in an attempt to 
counter the growing efforts of other political traditions to claim the 'green' 
highground (Kemp and Wall 1990: 29; Parkin 1989: 224-225). Despite this 
change, the Green Party again failed to perform well in the 1987 general election; 
it polled an average of 1.3 per cent of the vote in the 133 constituencies that it 
contested (Carter 1992a: 446). Parkin notes that only ten Green Party candidates 
succeeded in gaining more than 2 per cent of the vote (parkin 1989: 225-226). 
The period 1987-89 is considered to form the Green Party's most 
successful phase to date. During this period the party celebrated growing 
membership, heightened media attention and 'sound organisation' (Wall 1994: 
64). At the 1989 European elections, the Green Party 'not only won almost 15 per 
cent of the national vote, but polled over 20 per cent in 17 divisions in England, 
came second ahead of Labour in six and ran third in all but two other divisions in 
England and Wales' (Rootes 1995a: 68). However, although the national figure 
of 14.9 per cent was the 'highest percentage of the national vote ever won by a 
Green party in any European state' (Rootes 1995a: 69), the mechanics of the 
British electoral system prevented the party from winning any seats in the 
European Parliament. The immediate aftermath of this election did, though, see a 
rapid rise in the party's membership, which peaked at 18,523 in July 1990 
(Young 1993: 38). The Green Party's period in the spotlight was, however, short-
lived. By the end of 1990, the party's opinion poll rating had dropped from its 
June 1989 figure of 10 per cent to a poor 2 per cent (Rootes 1995a: 74-75). 
Combined with this was a sharp decline in membership levels. 14 To compound 
these problems the Green Party once again found itself facing serious financial 
•• Green Party membership declined from 18,523 in July 1990 to 10,300 in 1991, and to 5,500 in 
early 1993 (Evans 1993: 328-329; Young 1993: 37). 
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difficulties (Wall 1994: 70). The Green 2000 initiative led by Sarah Parkin was 
an attempt to avert the party's slide into oblivion. The principal aim of Green 
2000 was the achievement of government for the Green Party within the next ten 
to 20 years (Young 1993: 38). According to Evans, the initiative took the form of 
'a stronger, simplified - and so, arguably, a more accountable and democratic -
management and leadership structure, which would work in a spirit of c0-
operation with the media' (Evans 1993: 328).15 Despite the passing of the Green 
2000 motion in 1991 by a four to one majority (Evans 1993: 328), its adoption 
was preceded by the resumption of the debate between centralists and 
decentralists, with the latter arguing that 'the proposed changes were going in the 
wrong direction: towards the hierarchy and centralisation characteristic of 
conventional parties' (Young 1993: 39). The internal wrangling continued 
throughout 1992, culminating in the resignation of Sarah Parkin and five other 
Executive members in the summer of that year, and formed the backdrop to the 
party's poor performance at the 1992 general election, in which it averaged only 
1.3 per cent of the vote in the 253 constituencies that it contested (Carter 1992a: 
446). Yet the 1992 election did provide the Green Party with its first, albeit short-
lived, connection with parliamentary politics. Cynog Dafis, a Plaid Cymru 
candidate who formed a local tactical alliance with the Green Party for the 1992 
election, was elected and effectively gave the Greens (half) an MP. However, 
tensions between local Greens soon led to the end of this experiment in political 
co-operation (O'Neill 1997: 305). In 1994 the party's decline from its 1989 
'heyday' was further underlined by a poor showing in the European elections -
3.2 per cent of the vote (Carter 1994: 496). 
Since the turbulent years of the early 1990s the Green Party has shifted 
towards a more 'decentralist' position, concentrating its minimal resources on 
cultivating support in local communities with limited success. For financial 
reasons, the Green Party decided to field a much reduced number of candidates -
9S - at the 1997 general election. The average share of the vote gained across the 
U In practice, the refonns would replace the party's 24 member Green Party Council with a 
streamlined nine-member Party executive including two Principal Speakers (Evans 1993). 
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constituencies was 1.4 per cent, a result that once again highlighted the marginal 
electoral position of the Greens in the British party system (Carter 1997b: 157). 
More recently, however, the Green Party has had some cause for modest 
celebration. At the 1999 European elections, conducted under a regional list 
system of proportional representation, the Green Party gained 6.3 per cent of the 
vote, securing it two seats in the European Parliament (The Economist, 19 June 
1999). Yet prospects of a Green breakthrough at the national parliamentary level 
remain slim. Table 2.2 charts the rather depressing career of the British Green 
Party from its initial flirtation with electoral politics in 1974 to 1997. 
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Table 2.2 National Parliamentary Election Results in Britain, 1974-97 (% vote and seats (s» 
Parties 1974 Feb 1974 Oct 1979 
% s % s % s 
Lab 37.1 301 39.2 319 37.0 269 
Con 37.8 297 35.8 277 43.9 339 
Liba 19.3 14 18.3 13 13.8 11 








• Liberals 1974-79; Liberal-SOP Alliance 1983-87; Liberal Democrats 1992-
b Average vote across 5 constituencies. 
• Average vote across 4 constituencies. 
d Average vote across 53 constituencies. 
• Average vote across 106 constituencies. 
( Average vote across 133 constituencies. 
I Average vote across 253 constituencies. 
h Average vote across 95 constituencies. 
Source: Butler and Kavanagh (1997); Carter (1992a, 1997b). 
1983 1987 1992 
% s % s % 
27.6 209 30.8 229 34.4 
42.4 397 42.3 376 4l.9 
25.4 23 22.6 22 17.8 
1.5 4 1.7 6 2.3 
1.0e - 1.3f - 1.31 
1997 
s % s 
271 43.2 418 
336 30.7 165 
30 16.8 46 I 




3. Green Party Politics in the Netherlands 
The historical development of the Dutch Green Left (GroenLinks) is complex. 
First, the party itself is the outgrowth of four initially opposed small political 
parties: the Communist Party of the Netherlands (Communistische Partij 
Nederland: CPN), Pacifist Socialist Party (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij: 
PSP), Political Party of Radicals (Politieke Partij Radicalen: PPR) and 
Evangelical People's Party (Evangelische Volkspartij: EVP). Second, these 
parties' eventual merger was the culmination of a rapprochement that had begun 
in the late 1970s and which intensified during the course of the 1980s (Voerman 
1995: 112-118). As well as providing basic information relating to electoral 
performance this section serves as an introduction to the key actors involved in, 
and events leading up to, the formation of Green Left. 
The CPN was founded in 1909 as the Social-Democratic Labour Party 
(Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij: SDAP). In 1918 the SDAP renamed 
itself CPN and, one year later, the latter joined the Comintem (Jacobs 1989; 
Voerman 1991: 461). The party's national electoral performance prior to World 
War II was modest16 although, owing to its prominent role in the Resistance, the 
CPN profited at the 1946 election gaining 10.6 per cent of the national vote and 
ten seats in the Second Chamber of parliament (Jacobs 1989). However, such 
progress was short-lived. The party's defence of Soviet foreign policy in a 
climate of heightened anti-Communism contributed to the whittling away of its 
'war-profit' and, between 1948 and 1959, electoral support slumped from 7.7 per 
cent to 2.4 per cent of the national vote (Voerman 1991; van der Linden and 
Wormer 1988). 
Following its break with Moscow in 1963 the CPN's electoral position 
gradually improved and, at the 1972 elections, the party gained 4.5 per cent of 
the vote (van der Linden and Wormer 1988). After heavy losses at the general 
election of 1977 the CPN entered a phase of 'de-Leninisation'. This process 
16 The party's best pre-war electoral performance was the 3.4 per cent of the vote gained at the 
1937 Dutch general elections (van der Linden and Wormer 1988: 81). 
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culminated in the adoption of a new party programme (1984), which abandoned 
'the notion of the class struggle as the sole engine of history' and rejected 
'democratic centralist' organisational tendencies in favour of a 'democratic, 
feminist party organization' (Voerman 1991: 115,466).17 
The PSP was founded in 1957 by a group of pacifists and leftist 
socialists. 18 The impetus for the formation of the PSP stemmed from 
dissatisfaction with the anti-neutralist and anti-pacifist stance adopted by the 
Labour Party (Parti) van der Arbeid: PvdA) and the CPN's resolute defence of 
Soviet foreign policy (Lucardie 1989: 7). In terms of its programme, the party 
emphasised three broad themes: disarmament, economic democracy and spiritual 
renewal (Lucardie 1980: 95). It expressed openly its opposition to both capitalism 
and Marxism-Leninism, although there was considerable disagreement with 
respect to how the party's socialism should be defined (Lucardie 1989: 7). 
During the 1960s, party activists lent their support to extra-parliamentary 
protest against war, imperialism and the monarchy and, from the late 1960s 
onwards, against pollution and nuclear power (Lucardie 1989: 7-8; Voerman 
1995). In 1980, the party adopted feminism as a source of inspiration although, as 
Lucardie et al. note, 'ecologism ... did not receive the same favour' (Lucardie et 
al. 1993: 43). Despite its avowed anti-statism and support for direct action the 
PSP did compete in Dutch parliamentary elections, although its best electoral 
performance was a very modest 3 per cent of the vote, gained in 1963 (Lucardie 
1991: 117).19 
The PPR was founded in 1968 by radical Christians who had become 
disillusioned with the existing Confessional parties.20 Unlike the PSP, the PPR 
oriented itself more towards government and accorded a supplementary status to 
17 For more detailed discussions of the history of the CPN see Fennema (1991), van der Linden 
and Wormer (1988) and Voerman (1991). 
18 For a precise breakdown of the social and political composition of this party see Lucardie (1980: 
94). 
19 For a detailed history of the PSP see Lucardie (1980). 
20 The majority of founding members came from the Catholic People's Party (Katholieke 
Volkspartij: KVP), while a minority came from the predominantly Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary 
party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij: ARP) (Jacobs 1989). 
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grass-roots activism (Voerman 1995: 113). The party displayed a willingness to 
co-operate with other parties - in particular, the PvdA and Democrats 66 
{Democraten 66: D66i1 - and, indeed, it participated in a national coalition 
government with them, along with the KVP and ARP, between 1973 and 1977 
(Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 119). Despite gradually becoming more secular and 
'New Left' in terms of its orientation, the PPR remained critical of socialist 
ideology and, particularly, neo-Marxism. Rather than being inspired by 
ideological principles the party focused instead on specific issues, chiefly those 
of peace, the environment, welfare and democratisation (Lucardie 1994: 5). 
Following its high point at the 1972 parliamentary elections (4.8 per cent of the 
vote), support for the PPR declined to a low of 1.3 per cent in 1986 (Lucardie 
1991: 117).22 
Much less has been written about the fourth party involved in the 
formation of Green Left - the tiny EVP. Founded in 1981 by left-wing members 
of the Anti-Revolutionary Party who opposed the party's merger into the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appel: CDA), and by 
members of the Progressive Evangelical Party (Evangelische Progressieve 
Volkspartij: PEP), the EVP won 0.7 per cent of the vote in the 1982 
parliamentary election. In terms of its programme, the party opposed the 
proposed stationing of Cruise missiles on Dutch soil as well as civil nuclear 
energy. Other policies included the advocacy of a shortened working week and 
the introduction of maximum and minimum incomes (Jacobs 1989: 282). 
The official founding of Green Left on 24 November 1990 was the 
culmination of a process of electoral co-operation between the CPN, PSP, PPR 
and EVP that had gradually intensified since the late 1970s. At the 1984 elections 
to the European Parliament, the CPN, PSP and PPR in collaboration with the 
21 D66 was formed in 1966 by Amsterdam intellectuals who supported constitutional reforms that 
would result in a more 'democratic' political system in the Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin 1993). 
For more information on D66 see Jacobs (1989: 269-272). 
II For a detailed history of the PPR see Lucardie (1980). 
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Green Party of the Netherlands (Groene Partij Nederland: GPNi3 fought under 
the banner of the Green Progressive Accord (Groen Progressief Akkord: GPA).24 
The alliance won 5.6 per cent of the vote and two seats. The issue of co-operation 
proved more problematic in 1986, however, as the PSP chose to reject proposals 
for an electoral alliance with the CPN and PPR at the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections. The disastrous electoral consequences experienced by the separate 
parties - particularly the CPN, PPR and EVP - at these elections fuelled demands 
for an end to small Left disunity and, in 1989, the CPN, PSP and PPR, along with 
various social movement activists, began negotiations for the founding of a 
'strong, left-green formation' (Voerman 1995: 117). Once again, however, 
deadlock was the consequence. Yet the fall of the Lubbers cabinet, and a sooner 
than expected parliamentary election, provided the necessary catalyst for 
reaching a consensus between the parties in May 1989. At the European elections 
in June of that year the three parties competed together under the name Rainbow 
(Regenhoog) and captured 7 per cent of the vote and two seats. In the September 
1989 parliamentary election they, along with the EVP, joined forces as Green 
Left, obtaining 4.1 per cent of the vote and six seats (Voerman 1995: 117). 
Following these elections, a series of organisational measures established 
closer links between the constituent parties.25 The first Congress of Green Left, at 
23 The GPN was registered in 1982 by two prominent members of the PPR - Bas de Gaay Fortman 
and Wouter van Dieren (parkin 1989: 180). However, the party existed 'mainly on paper'. Its 
objectives were twofold. First, 'to prevent possible abuse of the name "green" by extreme right-
wing parties'. Second, 'to create a platform for parties left of Labour [PvdA)' (Lucardie, Voerman 
and van Schuur 1993: 45). In view of this second objective. the GPN became known as the Green 
Platform (Groen Platform) and it was the latter which successfully brought together the CPN, PSP 
and PPR into an alliance in time for the 1984 European elections (Lucardie et al 1993: 45). The 
EVP did not participate in this alliance since it did not, at this stage, wish to be associated with the 
PSP or CPN (parkin 1989: 181). 
24 The emergence of the GP A resulted in a split within the Green Platform instigated by regional 
sreen parties who feared that association with the Left parties would lead to a loss of their identity. 
A new party, the Greens (De Groenen), was founded in December 1983 by some of these 
opposing actors. It competed in the 1984 European elections as 'European Greens' although only 
managed to gain 1.3 per cent of the vote. After renaming themselves 'Federative Greens' in 1985, 
the party fought in the 1986 general elections but only managed 0.2 per cent of the vote. In 1988, 
the Federative Greens merged with Green Amsterdam, a loc:aI green party, to form De Groenen -
the name adopted initially in 1983 (parkin 1989). The party exists to this day and has been a minor 
f:>litical rival of Green Left. 
5 See Voerman (1995) for precise details of these measures. 
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which the new party was officially founded, took place in November 1990. This 
was followed by the dissolution of the remaining CPN, PSP, PPR and EVP 
structures in 1991 (Voerman 1995: 117). In terms of its organisational structure, 
Green Left chose to adopt a 'mass party' model, as opposed to a more 
decentralised pattern of the kind displayed by some other European green parties 
(Koole 1994: 282). But Green Left is small in comparison to more established 
political parties in the Netherlands; in 1992 its membership totalled 
approximately 15,000 (CDA - 120,000 members; PvdA - 79,000; VVD - 56,000) 
(Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 64). One problem which caused some initial tension 
within the new party concerned the potential conflict between the dual pursuit of 
'red' and 'green' objectives. Yet Green Left appears to have resolved this issue 
and moved in a decidedly ecological direction. The party insists that ecological 
sustainability must determine the limits of economic development (Dickson 
1992: 6; Voerman 1995: 118). 
At the 1994 parliamentaIy elections Green Left performed 
disappointingly, its share of the vote falling to 3.5 per cent of the vote with the 
loss of one of its seats (Lucardie 1995). The European elections of that year also 
saw a poor performance by Green Left - the party could muster a mere 3.7 per 
cent of the vote and one seat (Carter 1994: 497). Yet more recently the party has 
achieved greater success. At the 1998 elections Green Left's share of the vote 
rose from 3.5 per cent to 7.3 per cent, securing it a 'best ever' 11 seats (out of 
150) in the Second Chamber (Irwin 1999: 275). Green Left's (GL) national 
electoral career is highlighted in Table 2.3. 
In its short history, Green Left has achieved moderate electoral success 
and managed to achieve some degree of influence at the national level, most 
notably in shaping political discussion within the field of eco-taxation.26 It has 
sought to present itself as an effective opposition party in the Second Chamber 
and it has carried out this role most effectively under its current leader, Paul 
RosenmOller (Wouters 1998). Yet Green Left's longer term aim is to supplant 
26 Interview with Green Left MP, Marijke Vos,29 March 1996. 
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Table 2.3 National Parliamentary Election Results in the Netherlands, 1989-98 (% vote and seats (s» 
Parties 1989 1994 1998 
% s % s % s 
PvdA 31.9 49 24.0 37 29.0 45 
VVD 14.6 22 19.9 31 24.7 38 
CDA 35.3 54 22.2 34 18.4 29 
D66 7.9 12 15.5 24 9.0 14 
GL 4.1 6 3.5 5 7.3 11 
SGP 1.9 3 1.7 2 1.8 3 
GPV 1.2 2 1.3 2 1.2 2 
RFP 1.0 1 1.8 3 2.0 3 
SP 0.4 - 1.3 2 3.5 5 
AOVIPU55 - - 4.5 7 0.5 -
CD 0.9 1 2.5 3 0.6 -
DG 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.2 -
Sources: Irwin (1999); Wolintez (1995). 
D66 as the coalition partner of the main political parties and to secure a place in 
the next Dutch government. The party's improved performance at the 1999 
European elections - 11.9 per cent of the vote and four seats - suggests that the 
party is making steady progress towards the achievement of this goal. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide some background information on 
each of the three main green parties to be examined during this thesis. In 
considering the career of green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands it 
is clear that there are differences with respect to the timing of the emergence of 
green parties and in relation to the range of political actors involved in the party 
formation process. The British Green Party was the first of its kind in Europe and 
formed much earlier than green parties in Austria and the Netherlands. Its 
formation was seemingly straightforward, involving a small number of activists 
committed to advancing the ecological cause through the medium of party 
politics. The uncomplicated character of the British case contrasts markedly with 
the complex patterns of social movement activism, party co-operation and 
eventual fusion of parties that formed the backdrop to the formation of the 
Austrian Greens and Dutch Green Left. The three green parties have also 
experienced varying electoral fortunes. While the British Green Party has 
remained insignificant in electoral and broader political terms, never having 
managed to surpass 1 to 2 per cent of the vote at general elections, green parties 
in Austria and the Netherlands have achieved greater electoral success. Each has 
surmounted the 4 per cent threshold of significance and gained representation in 
their respective national legislatures. With this has come modest political 
influence and a platform upon which to potentially build greater electoral 
success. The purpose of subsequent chapters is to assess the extent to which a 
number of perspectives and concepts drawn from the sociological and political 
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studies literature can cast light on the patterns of green party emergence in 
Austria, Britain and the Netherlands, and the factors which might impact upon 
green party electoral performance. The next chapter considers the most widely 
employed theoretical approach to understanding green parties: the theory of 
'post-materialist' value change. 
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Chapter] 
Green Parties, 'New Politics' and 
'Post-materialism' 
The notion of 'post-materialist' value change as developed in the work of Ronald 
Inglehart (lnglehart 1971, 1977, 1990b) has exercised considerable influence, 
particularly within the fields of new social movement and green party research. 
For Inglehart and his many converts, the emergence and growing significance of 
green parties reflects a broad shift in the value priorities of West em citizens away 
from 'materialist' towards 'post-materialist' values (HiUsberg 1988: 108-118; 
MOller-Rommel 1989a~ Poguntke 1987, 1993; Inglehart 1995). Green parties are 
considered to be symptomatic of a wider phenomenon instigated by such value 
change, termed the 'new politics' (Inglehart 1977; Hildebrandt and Dalton 1978; 
Inglehart 1990b). Inglehart goes so far as to argue that a new axis of political 
conflict, based on the polarisation between 'materialist' and 'post-materialist' 
values, is fast becoming important in advanced industrial societies. He contends 
that 'new politics' parties - a party family thought to include green parties - will 
assume increasing significance as traditional economic cleavages gradually give 
way to new, 'value-based' forms of political conflict (Inglehart 1987, 1995). 
It is undeniable that most studies of green parties have drawn heavily on 
Inglehart's theoretical framework (Rudig 1990b; Franklin and ROdig 1995: 413). 
Commentators claiming that the rise of 'post-materialist' values is primarily 
responsible for the emergence of green parties, and an important factor in 
determining party choice among voters, have pointed to ample survey data which 
purport to show that green party members and supporters are more 'post-
materialist' in outlook than those of established political parties (ROdig 1990b). 
Green party researchers' overwhelming reliance on the concepts of 'post-
materialism' and 'new politics' has meant that Inglehart's framework has been 
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virtually exempt from serious criticism. 1 The apparent reluctance to reflect 
critically upon the adequacy of this framework means that its core concepts have 
come to be considered as incontrovertible within the minds of many green and 
European party specialists. It is therefore essential that students of politics 
embark upon a more detailed and balanced assessment of Inglehart's arguments, 
and attend to the coherence of his theoretical model and to the adequacy of the 
empirical claims concerning the emergence and electoral strength of green 
parties. 
This chapter is therefore intended as a counterbalance to the numerous 
'post-materialist' interpretations of green party politics. In particular, it is argued 
that political researchers' confidence in the capacity of the theory of 'post-
materialist' value change to account for the emergence and varying electoral 
strength of green parties has been largely misplaced. A close examination of 
Inglehart's theory demonstrates that it provides an inadequate basis from which 
to begin to account for the emergence of parties with an ecological identity on 
the European political landscape in recent decades. Further, the proposed 
connection between levels of 'post-materialism' and the electoral strength of 
green parties is shown to be unfowded. The chapter is divided into four main 
sections. The first section outlines the core elements of Inglehart's theory of 
value change and deals with the proposed political consequences of the assumed 
process of intergenerational value shift. The second section considers the extent 
to which a shift towards 'post-materialist' values has actually taken place in 
Austria, Britain and the Netherlands since the early 1970s (the point at which 
survey data on the extent of 'post-materialism' was made available). In the third 
section, attention is focused on the impact of 'post-materialist' values on both the 
emergence and varying electoral fortunes of green parties in Austria, Britain and 
the Netherlands and upon the relationship between 'post-materialist' values and 
voting choice. Having highlighted several significant shortcomings, the 
1 In fact, social scientists have expressed some theoretical reservations with respect to the 'post-
materialist' thesis (see. for example. Martell (1994». However. with few exceptions, most notably 
RUdig (199Ob), these have either been dismissed or ignored by the bulk of green party researchers. 
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discussion then proceeds to the fourth section, which opens out into a broader 
critique of Inglehart's model and attempts to pinpoint the reasons why the 'post~ 
materialist' thesis comes up against empirical difficulties when employed in 
studies investigating the factors impacting on the emergence and electoral 
significance of green parties. 
1. The Theory of 'Post-materialist' Value Change 
The theory of 'post-materialist' value change, as originally developed by 
Inglehart2, is based upon two key hypotheses. The first of these ~ the 'scarcity 
hypothesis' ~ is comprised of two broad assumptions. First, that people place the 
highest subjective value on those things that are relatively scarce ~ this is akin to 
the principle of diminishing marginal utility in economic theory. Second, and 
based on Abraham Maslow's theory of the need-hierarchy of human motivation, 
there is the idea that 'people act to fulfill a number of different needs, which are 
pursued in hierarchical order, according to their relative urgency for survival' 
(Inglehart 1977: 22). Highest in order of rank are basic physiological needs, 
closely followed by the need for physical safety: 'its priority is almost as high as 
that of the sustenance needs, but a hungry man will risk his life to get food' 
(lnglehart 1977: 22). For Inglehart, once these basic 'material' needs are 
satisfied, human values will shift to 'post~materialist' concerns. Individuals will 
begin to pursue needs for love, belongingness, esteem, self~actualisation, and 
intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction. These 'post-materialist' needs form the 
apex of human endeavour and are only pursued with the satisfaction of 
'materialist' (economic and physical security-based) needs in the hierarchy 
(Inglehart 1977: 22-23). 
The second key hypothesis that makes up the theory of 'post~materialist' 
value change is the 'socialisation hypothesis'. According to Inglehart, this states 
1 The thesis found its first articulation in IngIebart (1971). More comprehensive elaborations of the 
thesis can be found in Inglehart (1977) and IngIehart (l990b). 
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that 'to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed 
during one's pre-adult years' (Inglehart I 990a: 47). Inglehart grounds this 
argument in studies of human development which claim that 'the likelihood of 
basic personality change declines after one reaches adulthood' (lnglehart 1990a: 
48). In terms of the predicted effects of these two central hypotheses, the 
'scarcity hypothesis' suggests that prolonged periods of economic prosperity will 
lead to the spread of 'post-materialist' values in society as a whole, while 
economic uncertainty would have the reverse effect. It is the 'socialisation 
hypothesis', however, which qualifies the 'scarcity hypothesis'. Since early 
socialisation is considered to have a more lasting impact on an individual than 
does later socialisation, it predicts that 'post-materialist' values are likely to 
persist throughout a given individual's life (lnglehart 1987: 1296; Eckersley 
1989: 215). 
In terms of the value structures of Western populations the theory of 
'post-materialism' outlined above implies that: 
as a result of the historically unprecendented prosperity and the absence 
of war in Western countries that have prevailed since 1945, the post-war 
generations in these countries would place less emphasis on economic 
and physical security than older groups, who had experienced the hunger 
and devastation of World War II, the Great Depression, and perhaps even 
World War I. Conversely, the younger birth cohorts would give a higher 
priority to non-material needs such as a sense of community and the 
quality of the environment. (Inglehart 1990a: 48) 
Ever since evidence of intergenerational value change began to be gathered on a 
cross-national basis in 19703, there has been a continuous stream of studies and 
reports that appear to further corroborate this theme.4 Such research has been 
based upon public opinion surveys in which respondents are asked to select what 
they believe their country's two primary goals should be from four alternatives: 
3 See Inglehart (1971) on the 1970 European Community surveys. 
4 Examples include the World Values Surveys of 1981-83 and 1990-93, and the EuroBarometer 
surveys sponsored by the Commission of the European Communities (Abramson and Inglehart 
1992; Inglehart 1995). 
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'maintaining order in the nation'; 'giving the people more say in important 
government decisions'; 'fighting rising prices'; 'protecting freedom of speech'. 
The following classificatory formula has generally been employed: 
Respondents who select 'maintaining order' and 'fighting rising prices' 
are classified as Materialists, while those who choose 'giving the people 
more say' and 'freedom of speech' are classified as Postmaterialists. The 
four remaining combinations - all of which are made up of one 
Materialist and one Postmaterialist response - are classified as 'mixed'. 
(Abramson and Inglehart 1992: 185-186) 
Broadly speaking, these studies suggest that there are marked differences 
between the values of older and younger generations. In particular, those age 
cohorts whose formative socialisation occurred during the post-war period of 
peace and prosperity display stronger levels of support for 'post-materialist' 
values than older generations. According to Inglehart, Western societies are 
undergoing a 'silent revolution' in which younger, 'post-materialist' generations 
are gradually replacing older, more 'materialist' ones (Inglehart 1977). 
It is this 'silent revolution' that Inglehart believes is causing important 
political system change in advanced industrial societies. Essentially, this change 
amounts to a shift away from the 'old politics' and towards a 'post-materialist' 
'new politics'. According to Hildebrandt and Dalton: 
The traditional bourgeoisie/proletariat cleavage taps the essence of ... the 
'Old Politics' - a conflict between the haves and the have-nots, and more 
broadly the problem of providing economic goods and security for all, 
during times of inflation, depression, unemployment and post-war 
reconstructions. (Hildebrandt and Dalton 1978: 71) 
By contrast, the rise of the 'new politics' implies a decline in the salience of 'old 
politics' issues and a heightened relevance of so-called 'lifestyle' issues such as 
'protection of the environment, the quality of life, the role of women, the 
redefinition of morality [and] drug usage' (Inglehart 1977: 13). A further 
consequence of this supposed upsurge in 'new politics' is considered to be a 
decline in support for established national institutions and governmental outputs. 
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According to Inglehart, this latter development occurs alongside a change in the 
prevailing styles of political participation, with an increased public willingness to 
engage in protest activity which challenges the dominant bureaucratic and 
oligarchical structures of existing mass political parties and organisations, and 
fulfils the 'post-materialist' need for a 'sense of belonging' (Inglehart 1977: 4-18, 
290). Inglehart argues that events such as the May 1968 uprising in France, and 
the phenomenon of student protest in America and elsewhere in the late 1960s, 
should be viewed as the point at which the 'new politics' fast began to attain 
significance in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1977: chapter 10). More 
broadly, Inglehart claims that value change has played a crucial role in the recent 
rise of other new social movements in these societies (Inglehart 1990a). 
However, perhaps the most profound change within political systems 
identified by Inglehart concerns the proposed development of a significant value 
cleavage with clear relationships to voting choice and important implications for 
realignment (Flanagan 1987: 1317). Inglehart argues that whereas in the 'classic 
model of industrial society, political polarization was a direct reflection of social 
class conflict .. , there is a growing tendency for politics to polarize along a new 
dimension that cuts across this conventional Left-Right axis' (Inglehart 1984: 
25). For Inglehart, the rise in prominence of so-called 'new politics' issues such 
as the quality of the environment, unilateral disannament, opposition to nuclear 
power, feminism and democratic participation confirms that a 'materialist/post-
materialist' cleavage occupies a central position within contemporary politics 
and threatens to supersede 'conflict over ownership of the means of production 
and the distribution of income' (Inglehart 1984: 25-26). Moreover, on the basis of 
95,000 interviews carried out in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, Inglehart concludes that 'since 1970 there has been a growing 
tendency for electoral behavior to polarize on the materialist-postmaterialist 
value cleavage' (Inglehart 1987: 1298-1299). 
It is at this juncture that the phenomenon of green parties becomes 
relevant. In Inglehart's view, the kinds of themes advanced by green parties, such 
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as minimising economic growth and maximising the quality of life and the 
physical environment, are entirely consistent with a 'post-materialist' - or 'new 
politics' - outlook. Other themes often emphasised by green parties, such as 
democratic participation and a more informal approach to political activity, can 
also be interpreted within the broad context of 'post-materialist' value change. In 
a recent study, Inglehart refers to the impact of value change on the rise of green 
parties in West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria. Switzerland, 
Sweden, France and Britain, pointing out that in each case their support comes 
from a disproportionately 'post-materialist' constituency (Inglehart 1995: 68). For 
Inglehart, green parties are clearly 'post-materialist' parties. He also maintains 
that the rise of green parties in Europe has had the knock-on effect of forcing 'the 
established parties to adopt stronger environmental protection policies in order to 
compete for their voters' (Inglehart 1995: 68). That Inglehart's thesis appears to 
account for a broad range of 'new politics' issues advanced by green parties, and 
the albeit more limited 'greening' of mainstream party politics in many European 
countries, forms the basis of its strong appeal within the green party literature 
(ROdig 1990b). In addition, the idea that Western societies have been 
experiencing a 'very fundamental and lasting' process of social change 'appears 
to suggest a good explanation for the persistence and continued success of green 
parties' (Rudig 1990b: 12-13). 
2. 'Post-materialist' Value Change in Three Countries 
In assessing Inglehart's thesis, it is useful to begin by examining the extent to 
which levels of 'post-materialism' - as measured by Inglehart's four items - have 
increased in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands during the period 1970-90. 
Table 3.1 presents available survey data relating to the changing proportion of 
'post-materialists' in these three countries.s As can be seen, each country has 
, Unfortunately there are less data available on Austria than on the Netherlands and Britain. This is 
because Austria was not included in the Eurobarometer surveys between 1970 and 1990. 
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experienced an overall increase in the percentage of 'post-materialists' among its 
population since the early 1970s. By 1990, 20 per cent of the British adult 
population could be classified as 'post-materialist' (compared with 8 per cent in 
1973). During the same period, the percentage of 'post-materialists' increased 
from 5 per cent to 25 per cent in Austria and from 13 to 27 per cent in the 
Netherlands. 
A further noticeable feature of the content of Table 3.1 concerns the 
comparatively high proportion of 'post-materialists' in the Netherlands in 1970-
71. As can be observed, 15 per cent of those surveyed at this point were classified 
as such. Indeed, there were more 'post-materialists' in the Netherlands at the 
beginning of the 1970s than in any other of the additional five Western European 
countries that Inglehart had studied at the time - West Germany, Britain, France, 
Belgium and Italy (lnglehart 1977). The rise of 'post-materialist' values in the 
Netherlands from the late 1960s onwards has been cited as a key contributing 
factor to the emergence of a new cultural setting during this period, characterised 
by a process of 'depillarisation', which refers to the breaking down of the rigid, 
'pillarised' social order that had dominated Dutch society since 1945 and to 
which almost everyone had seemed to conform, and a rise in protest activity 
around themes of the 'environment, self-realization and women's liberation' 
(Voerman 1995: 110).6 
Since this period of transformation, however, levels of 'post-materialism' 
in the Netherlands underwent certain periods of decline. The first period, as can 
be seen from Table 3.1, occurred in 1973. The second wave of decline was more 
significant, however. Between 1978 and 1980, levels of 'post-materialism' fell 
from 23 to 14 per cent. In light of such discrepancies Inglehart has more recently 
However, there are some limited data available which enable at least some degree of evaluation 
and comparison. Figures for levels of 'post-materialism' in Austria in 1973 were included in the 
Political Action study (Inglehart 1979). A study by Plasser and Ulram presents data on levels of 
'post-materialism' for the year 1984 (Plasser and Ulram 1985). Finally, Austria was included in the 
World Values Survey 1990-93 and figures for 1990 can be found in Inglehart et 01. (1998). In each 
of these cases, 'post-materialism' was measured according to Inglehart's original four-item index 
as employed in the Eurobarometer surveys 1970-90. 





Table 3.1. Distribution of 'Post-materialist' Values in Austria. Britain and the Netherlands, 1970-90 
1970- 1973 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
71 
5% 15% 25% 
Britain 7% 8% 8% 5% 8% 11% 9% 8% 14% 12% 17% 14% 14% 17% 20% 21% 20% 
Netherlands 15% 13% 14% 15% 23% 19% 14% 15% 19% 21% 19% 24% 23% 24% 25% 29% 27% 
Note: British and Dutch data based on Abramson and Inglehart (1992). Austrian data based on Inglehart (1979); Plasser and Ulram (1985); Inglehart et al. (1998). 
conceded that values may be subject to what he terms short-term 'period effects' 
(Inglehart 1990b: 77-81). He claims that the dips observed during the early to 
mid-1970s and early 1980s were 'attributable to the two recessions set off by the 
OPEC-engendered crises of 1974-75 and 1980-81' both of which caused high 
levels of inflation, a decline in real incomes, increasing unemployment and the 
halting of economic growth (Inglehart and Andeweg 1993: 347). For Inglehart, 
such 'period effects' can have a temporary negative impact on overall levels of 
'post-materialism' (Inglehart 1979: 337~ Inglehart and Andeweg 1993). In his 
view, such effects are 'consistent with the theory, which links Postmaterialist 
values with economic security' (Inglehart 1995: 63). What is problematic, 
however, is that this argument sits uneasily with Inglehart's original 
'socialisation hypothesis' which, as was described earlier, predicts that 'post-
materialist' values are likely to persist in periods of economic recession. This 
point will be developed as part of a broader critique of Inglehart's thesis later in 
the chapter. 
A similar examination of the consistency of value change over the same 
time period in Austria is prevented by a lack of data for all but three years. Yet 
bearing in mind that data are available only for the years 1973, 1984 and 1990, it 
is apparent that, taken as a whole, the period does show a substantial increase in 
levels of 'post-materialism' in Austria - from 5 per cent in 1973, to 15 per cent in 
1984, to 25 per cent in 1990 (Table 3.1). Sully has documented the extent to 
which the Kriesky era (1970-83) 'brought unprecedented aft1uence, 
modernisation of the infra-structure and the introduction of advanced social 
welfare schemes, more consumer durables and increased leisure time' (Sully 
1990: 429). Prior to the early 1970s, both the Austrian economy and society were 
characterised by social and economic 'backwardness' (Gottweis 1990: 50; 
Preglau 1994: 37). From an Inglehartian perspective, it could be argued that it 
was the generation that underwent pre-adult socialisation in Austria during the 
modernising years of the early 1970s which proceeded to become the 'post-
materialist' generation of the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, the increase in 
62 
levels of 'post-materialism' observable in Table 3.1 was a result of conditions of 
unprecedented affluence and 'material' security experienced by the relatively 
young from the early 1970s onwards. The late development of a sizeable 'post-
materialist' stratum in Austrian society could potentially explain why Austria, as 
compared with countries such as the Netherlands or West Germany, lacked a 
broad student movement during the late 1960s, and why ecological conflicts 
exemplified by that witnessed over nuclear power only gained prominence in 
Austria from the late 1970s onwards (Gottweis 1990). 
Parallel with Austria, lower levels of 'post-materialism' have been cited 
as the main reason why new social movements in Britain - for example, the 
student movement - were weak in comparison with those in other European 
countries during the late 1960s (Inglehart 1977: 262). Yet the British example 
clearly shows that the rise of new social movements need not be linked to 'post-
materialism'. As early as 1958, i.e. well before the period when 'value change' 
was assumed to be reshaping British citizens' political priorities, New Left 
intellectuals had launched the 'prototype of a new social movement' - the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Between 1958 and 1963 the British 
peace movement was 'an impressive mobilisation', and employed a range of new 
tactics - including non-violent direct action, mass rallies and civil disobedience -
which were to become synonymous with the so-called 'new politics' style 
(Rootes 1992: 177). The rise of the peace movement during this period was 
clearly more a reflection of public concern about threats to material security in a 
changed international political climate than it was of abstract 'post-materialism'. 
As Kenny comments, the peace movement of the late 1950s 'attracted many in a 
period of international tension and widespread fear about the capacities of 
nuclear weapons' (Kenny 1995: 186). The idea that much movement protest may 
have its basis in the rise of new problems in modem society which pose a threat 
to 'material' security is a point developed later in this chapter and, further, in 
chapter 5. 
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As in the Netherlands, there are also some erratic periods discernible with 
respect to levels of 'post-materialism' in Britain. For example, between 1973 and 
1977 levels of 'post-materialism' dropped from 8 to 5 per cent (Table 3.1). 
Presumably, Inglehart would attribute this 'blip' to the major recession of the 
1970s (Kavanagh 1990: 123-150); in other words 'period effects' came into play 
at this point. The same might be said of the period 1979-81, during which Britain 
experienced a massive recession (Kavanagh 1990: 209-242) and witnessed an 
overall decline in levels of 'post-materialism' (from 11 to 8 per cent). Again, 
however, the employment of this argument serves to highlight the weakness of 
Inglehart's original 'socialisation hypothesis'; a basic plank of his theory of value 
change. Since the mid-1980s, however, levels of 'post-materialism' in Britain 
have risen fairly steadily and, by 1990, 20 per cent of survey respondents were 
classed as 'post-materialist' in terms of their value orientation. 
This initial examination of Inglehart's thesis demonstrates that while 
value change seems to have taken place since the early 1970s, the supposed value 
shift, at least in the cases of Britain and the Netherlands, has not followed a 
straightforwardly linear pattern. Unfortunately, data on levels of 'post-
materialism' in Austria are limited to three years only and do not enable a firm 
conclusion with regard to the overall pattern of value change to be reached one 
way or the other. However, despite Inglehart's reference to 'period effects' as a 
means of explaining certain discrepancies, it has been argued that reliance on 
such a concept weakens a central component of the theory of value change; 
namely, the 'socialisation hypothesis', which claims that 'post-materialist' values 
should persist in times of economic decline. 
Further problems concerning the claim that higher levels of 'post-
materialism' are good predictors of the rise of new social movement protest in 
the three countries have also been identified. In particular, the fact that Britain 
saw the rise of new social movement type protest during the late 1950s - i.e. 
before the key value change periods of the late 1960s and 1970s - casts doubt 
upon the claim that Inglehart's thesis can necessarily account for cross-national 
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manifestations of new political activity. The next section expands upon this point 
by focusing more directly on the proposed relationship between 'post-materialist' 
value change and the emergence and varying electoral success of green parties. 
3. 'Post-materialism' and Green Parties: 
Emergence and Significance 
Advocates of the value change perspective have argued that green parties are a 
symptom of the rise of 'materialism/post-materialism' as a new source of 
political conflict in Western societies. According to this view, green parties are 
located near the 'post-materialist' end of the political spectrum and their 
ideology incorporates a broad range of 'new politics' issues. If such 
commentators are right, then, in terms of the three case studies, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the following developments should have taken place. 
First, given that the 'materialist/post-materialist' conflict line was considerably 
more developed in the early 1970s in the Netherlands than in either Austria or 
Britain, public pressure to form a green party during this period should have been 
greater in the former than in either of the latter countries. In addition, that 'post-
materialism' in Austria became much more widespread during the period 1973-
1984, and between 1984 and 1990, implies that these periods might have 
witnessed growing pressure to form a national green party in this country. 
In fact, despite comparatively high levels of 'post-materialism' during the 
early 1970s, a green party was not formed in the Netherlands until December 
1983 (De Groene,,) (Parkin 1989). A Significant green party, in the form of Green 
Left, was not officially founded until much later - November 1990 (Voerman 
1995). Inglehart's response to this problem has been to argue that a climate of 
increasing 'post-materialism' provides a favourable context for the emergence of 
other 'new politics' parties in addition to 'ecology' parties (Ioglehart 1987; 
Inglehart and Andeweg 1993). It is certainly the case that 'new politics' parties, 
65 
defined in this broader sense, did emerge in the Netherlands during the course of 
the late 1960s, the period during which 'post-materialist' value change is alleged 
to have established a hold on Dutch political culture.7 However, as was argued in 
chapter 1, a distinction should be made between green parties - which have an 
explicitly ecological identity - and 'new politics' parties for whom the ecological 
issue forms but one component of a much broader political programme. In 
chapter 5, it will be argued that green parties emerged against the backdrop of a 
new social climate characterised by the presence of large-scale ecological risks 
and problems. This interpretation is far removed from the 'post-materialist' 
perspective, which emphasises the essentially 'aesthetic' basis of green party 
politics. 
The British case casts further doubt on the 'post-materialist' thesis since, 
in this context, a green party was formed in the early 1970s despite very low 
levels of 'post-materialism' among the population as compared to the 
Netherlands. Again, it will be argued that the emergence of PEOPLE - the 
forerunner of the Green Party - in 1973 had much less to do with 'post-
materialist' values than with a sense of anxiety about the ecological crisis 
exemplified on this occasion by the 'limits to growth' debate that came to 
prominence in the early 1970s. Turning to Austria, it would at first glance seem 
that this example is entirely consistent with the claims of 'post-materialist' 
theory. As has been documented, the period 1973-90 witnessed a marked 
increase in the proportion of 'post-materialists' in Austria and, in addition, the 
emergence of green 'citizen lists' in the late 19708, two national 'green' parties 
in 1982 (the ALO and VOO), and a significant green party in the form of the 
Greens (Die Grlinen) in 1986n. This could be viewed as evidence in support of 
the view that a 'materialist/post-materialist' value cleavage took shape in the 
Austrian party system during this period. But again, reliance on 'post-materialist' 
theory ignores the extent to which awareness of large-scale ecological risks and 
7 For example, both D66 (funned 1966) and the PPR (fonned 1968) gave expression to 'new' 
issues, such as democratisation, peace and the environment, which would, from lngIehart's 
petspective, be interpreted in 'post-materialist' terms. 
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degradation was crucial in defining the social setting within which green parties 
emerged in Austria. The problem of using 'post-materialism' as a predictor of the 
emergence of green parties has been further highlighted in a study carried out by 
Harmel and Robertson. Their study of new parties formed in 19 Western 
European and Anglo-American countries between 1960 and 1980 found that 
'higher post-materialist societies seem no more likely to produce at least one new 
ecology party than societies with lower post-materialism' (Harmel and Robertson 
1985: 516). Contrary to Inglehart's view, 'post-materialist' values do not.seem to 
form a consistent predictor of the presence/absence of green parties in different 
countries. 
Given these problems, it is perhaps unsurprising that studies have also 
failed to find any great difference between the levels of 'post-materialism' in 
countries with and without significant green parties (Kitschelt 1988a; Jahn 1986). 
While both Austria and the Netherlands have produced significant green parties, 
the case of Britain demonstrates clearly that rising levels of 'post-materialism' 
have not improved the electoral prospects of the Green Party. Here, the Green 
Party has consistently failed to attract more than the average 1.8 per cent of the 
vote secured by its five candidates in February 1974 (Rootes 1995a) despite 
increases in levels of 'post-materialism' from one general election year to the 
next. Contrary to Inglehart's predictions, the traditional parties have continued to 
maintain a firm grip on the party system throughout the alleged 'silent revolution' 
in Britain. There is little evidence to suggest that the British party system has 
been significantly affected by the rise of 'post-materialist' values.8 However, 
Inglehart recently claimed that, in the light of the unprecedented 14.9 per cent of 
the vote achieved by the British Green Party at the 1989 European elections, 
green parties 'are beginning to show significant levels of support in Great 
8 Although it is possible that the centre parties in Britain - the Liberal Party, the Social Democratic 
party (SDP) and, more recently, the Liberal Democrats - may have benefited to some extent from 
the rise of 'post-materialist' values. In fact, it could be argued that the two items that Inglebart 
employs to 'tap' 'post-materialism', i.e. 'giving the people more say in important government 
decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech' are essentially 'h'beral' values, and that 'post-
materialists' might be attracted to liberal parties which voice these sentiments (RUdig et aI. 1995). 
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Britain' (Inglehart 1995: 68). But at subsequent general elections, Green Party 
support in Britain collapsed back to their previously poor levels. 
That there are important problems in linking the electoral significance of 
green parties with the extent of value change can be further seen by the 
inconsistency of available survey data on the relationship between 'post-
materialist' values and voting choice. Although data relating to Green Party 
voting patterns at British general elections are unavailable, a study of the 1989 
European Election concludes that: 
Post-materialist values are only very weakly correlated with green voting. 
There are lots of non-postmaterialists voting green, and lots of 
postmaterialists not voting green. (RQdig et al. 1993: 33) 
In terms of results the authors found that, of those who voted for the Green Party 
in 1989, only 32.1 per cent were classified as 'post-materialist' according to 
Inglehart's formula. Of the remaining green voters, 53.1 per cent were 'mixed', 
14.8 per cent 'materialist' (ROdig et al. 1993: 41). This means that 67.9 per cent 
of those who voted for the Green Party in 1989 were not pure 'post-materialist' in 
terms of their value orientation. This lends further support to the argument that 
'post-materialism' was not the primary factor which underlay Green Party 
'success' in 1989. Two alternative explanations for the 1989 result are advanced 
in the literature. For RUdig et al., Green Party voting in 1989 'was quite clearly a 
reflection of rising environmental concern' (ROdig et al. 1993: 62). The 
theoretical grounding of this particular argument will be explored in more detail 
in chapter 5. For authors such as Rootes, however, the Greens' 'success' in 1989 
can be linked to the 'extraordinary state of political competition' that prevailed at 
the time of the election (Rootes 1995a: 75). This possibility will be examined in 
more depth in chapter 7. 
The evidence with respect to Austria is also somewhat problematic. A 
study by MQller and U1ram demonstrates that, on the whole. green party 
supporters in 1985 and 1993 were predominantly drawn from the younger 
sections of the population - principally the under 30 and 30-44 age groups 
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(Muller and Ulram 1995: 152).9 This finding would initially seem to be 
consistent with the argument considered above: that it is young adults who 
underwent pre-adult socialisation during the relative affluence of the Kriesky era 
(1970-83) that became 'post-materialist' green party voters during the 1980s and 
1990s. However, considerable caution must be exercised before forming such a 
conclusion. A survey of • green party' supporters in 1984 found that, of the 
sample, 43 per cent could be classified as 'post-materialist' according to 
Inglehart's criteria (Kreuzer 1990: 14).10 While a considerable portion of green 
voters in Austria may be 'post-materialists', it is likely that many do not fall into 
this category. A significant green party has emerged in Austria, but it is no means 
clear that 'post-materialist' values have been the principal force behind the green 
vote. 
Compared with their counterparts in Austria and Britain, however, Dutch 
Green Left voters appear to be considerably more ·post-materialist'. In 1989, 84 
per cent of such voters were classed as 'post-materialist' according to Inglehart's 
measure, compared with 36 per cent of the whole sample)). Yet overall, it is not 
clear from the limited evidence presented on the three case studies that 'post-
materialists' are necessarily attracted to green parties nor that rising levels of 
'post-materialism' facilitate the emergence of significant green parties. 
9 In 1985, 45 per cent of 'green' supporters were under the age of 30; 32 per cent were between 
30 and 44. In 1993, the respective figures were 41 per cent and 39 per cent. Therefore, the vast 
majority (more than three quarters) of green supporters was under the age of 45. The only other 
Austrian party that comes remotely close to the Greens in terms of the age profile of its supporters 
is the Liberal Forum - 70 per cent of its supporters in 1993 were under the age of 45 (MUlier and 
U1ram 1995). 
10 The 1984 survey combined the results of the ALO and VOO in order to derive an average 
~e. Data are not available on the value profiles of Austrian Green voters. 
I Information supplied by Paul Lucardie, Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties, 
University of GroningCD. 
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4. 'Post-materialist' Theory and Green Parties: 
A Critical Assessment 
So far aspects of 'post-materialist' theory have been employed in an attempt to 
establish the extent to which they can provide insight into the emergence and 
varying electoral success of green parties in three countries. The discussion above 
suggests that there are problems with the value change theory in terms of these 
issues. In this section a variety of additional difficulties and problems associated 
with Inglehart's 'post-materialist' theory will be highlighted. These have to do 
with the problematic nature of some of the key methodological and theoretical 
assumptions underpinning the theory of 'post-materialist' value change. The aims 
are essentially twofold. The first is to raise questions as to the coherence of 
certain key concepts in Inglehart's thesis which have been implicitly accepted by 
green party researchers working within the 'post-materialist' framework. This 
leads to the second aim: to argue that the empirical difficulties encountered in 
attempting to relate the emergence and varying electoral success of green parties 
to levels of 'post-materialism' are a reflection of the conceptual problems 
inherent within Inglehart's framework and a misunderstanding of the nature of 
green party politics. 
It was previously argued that Inglehart's integration of the 'socialisation 
hypothesis' with the concept of 'period effects' contains a contradiction: the 
former assumes that values acquired in childhood will endure throughout an 
adult's life while the latter asserts that value priorities may fluctuate according to 
changing economic conditions. Besides undermining the strength of his original 
theory, the introduction of 'period effects' into the 'post-materialist' equation 
means that Inglehart's theory is very difficult to falsify, since declining levels of 
'post-materialism' do not necessarily mean that long-term value change is not 
taking place (Lowe and ROdig 1986: 517). It has also been argued that Inglehart's 
combination of the 'scarcity hypothesis' - which assumes that 'people change 
their values according to the relative fulfilment of different needs' - with the 
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'socialisation hypothesis' - which implies value system stability once it has been 
acquired - represents a further contradiction at the heart of his thesis (Lowe and 
Rudig 1986: 517). Most green party researchers have seemingly been unwilling to 
acknowledge these clear conceptual tensions within 'post-materialist' theory. 
Further critics have challenged, more directly, Jnglehart's reliance upon 
Maslow's hierarchy of human need. According to Maslow, the pursuit of needs 
follows a hierarchical pattern determined by the extent to which such needs are 
considered to be necessary for survival. Building upon this premise, Inglehart is 
able to argue that as people are freed of the urgency of their basic 'material' 
needs, so they are able to pursue 'higher-order' needs and thus develop 'post-
materialist' value profiles. However, several authors have Questioned the basic 
assumptions that lie at the heart of such a theory of human motivation. Martell, 
for instance, raises doubts as to whether the satisfaction of 'material' needs 
should necessarily lead to 'post-materialism'. In particular, he is critical of the 
'post-materialist' thesis because it is 'based on a fixed idea of basic material 
needs and a hierarchy of "higher" needs which build on these' (Martell 1994: 
125). Martell suggests that rather than leading to a shift towards the widespread 
pursuit of 'post-materialist' values, increased standards of living in Western 
societies appear to have led to an elevated conception of what actually count as 
basic 'material' needs. Thus he refers to 'the evidence of a growing range of 
consumer goods which are deemed to be 'standard' in developed industrial 
nations (colour TVs, videos, computers, microwaves etc.)' (Martell 1994: 125). 
This is an important point, because it calls into Question the central idea that 
people will inevitably pursue 'higher-order' needs once certain basic safety and 
'material' needs have been satisfied. It also offers a potential explanation for why 
many individuals who enjoyed 'material' comfort and security in their childhood 
'tend strongly to support material values and oppose the goals of new social 
movements' and choose not to join or vote for green parties (Eckersley 1989: 
218). 
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In light of such criticism, some theorists have argued that Inglehart's 
thesis would be more plausible if it took account of the extent to which 'new 
values' may be more the product of the higher education experience of his post-
1945 cohort, rather than that of childhood socialisation. Lipset notes that 'both 
contemporary commentators and later historians have attributed a major role to 
the intellectuals in undermining the legitimacy of existing orders and in providing 
the vision of a new social system' (cited in Eckersley 1989: 218). For Eckersley, 
higher education: 
not only increases an individual's ability to acquire information but also 
helps to cultivate the ability to think critically, question everyday 
assumptions, form an independent judgement and be less influenced by 
the judgement of others. (Eckersley 1989: 221) 
While Eckersley does not deny that childhood socialisation may have some 
bearing on adult values, she implies that higher education has been an important 
factor in explaining the appeal of green party politics. This conclusion is 
consistent with Betz's study of the German Greens, which found that it is 
education, rather than class or income, which most strongly correlates with 'post~ 
materialist' values (Betz 1990). The potential role that factors such as the 
expansion of higher education and other 'post-industrial' trends in the emergence 
of green party politics is explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
A further line of criticism has been levelled against the items actually 
used to measure 'materialism' and 'post-materialism'. According to Inglehart, an 
affirmative response to the item 'maintaining order in the nation' is an indication 
that an individual gives priority to the 'materialist' goal of physical safety. But, as 
Flanagan suggests, there is no good reason why this should be the case since such 
an item could just as easily tap what he terms an 'authoritarian value orientation' 
(Inglehart 1987). There is, it seems, an element of ambiguity with respect to 
Inglehart's measure of certain value priorities. Such ambiguity also characterises 
one of the two items employed by Inglehart in an attempt to capture 'post-
materialism'. i.e. 'giving the people more say in important government 
72 
decisions'. As Marquand has pointed out, '[s]upport for a bigger say in political 
decisions or at the workplace is not necessarily evidence of such ['post-
materialist'] values' (Marquand 1988: 201). He quite reasonably suggests that 
'one might want more say in order to pursue materialistic purposes more 
effectively' (Marquand 1988: 201). In short, there are many general conceptual 
problems and unresolved tensions associated with the 'post-materialist' thesis. 
Taken together, these raise important questions concerning the overall coherence 
of Inglehart's theory and thus its suitability as a framework with which to 
examine broad issues of political and social change. 
When it comes more directly to the question of interpreting green parties 
within the framework of 'post-materialist' theory, more intractable problems 
surround its treatment of environmental attitudes. With respect to this issue, 
Inglehart's indices for measuring 'post-materialism' simply do not capture what 
is unique about Europe's green parties: their profound ecological concern and 
understanding of events. In the four-item index employed in the European 
Community surveys between 1970 and 1990, i.e. 'maintaining order in the 
nation'; 'giving the people more say in important government decisions'; 
'fighting rising prices'; 'protecting freedom of speech', no item comes remotely 
close to tapping the growth in environmental concern which has played a central 
role in the emergence and electoral appeal of green party politics. Even 
Inglehart's attempt to construct a 'more broadly based values indicator' in the 
form of a twelve-item index provides at best an extremely limited and 
conservative measure of public attitudes towards the environment, nameJy, 
'trying to make our cities and countryside more beautifu)' (Inglehart 1977: 39-53; 
Abramson and IngJehart 1992).12 It is even questionable whether expressing 
support for this statement should necessarily be viewed as an indication of 
genuine environmental concern. As Marquand has argued, far from supporting 
the claims of 'post-materialist' theory, 'support for beautifying the countryside 
may have materialistic roots: [to the extent that] behind the environmental 
12 In the World Values Survey 1990 a 12-item version of the Materia1istJPost-materialist values 
index was utilised. For precise details on this measure see Inglehart el 01. (1998). 
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enthusiasms of the suburban amenity group may lurk a less Wordsworthian 
concern for property values' (Marquand 1988: 201).13 A clear problem has thus 
arisen in attempts to apply the 'post-materialist' framework to questions of the 
emergence and electoral success of green parties. Since conventional measures of 
'post-materialism' do not in any way reflect the ecological profile of green 
parties, it is hardly surprising that political analysts have failed to find a link 
between the extent of 'post-materialism' in a society and the timing of the 
emergence of green parties, or indeed their comparative electoral strength. But 
what of the oft-cited relationship between 'post-materialist' values and green 
party voting? Does this not show that green parties are essentially 'post-
materialist' parties? One possibility advanced by Franklin and Rudig is that while 
green voting is primarily a reflection of ecological concern, this concern may 
'link up with postmaterialist and New Left forces to different degrees in different 
countries' (Franklin and Rudig 1995: 430). This would perhaps explain why 
Dutch Green Left voters are more 'post-materialist' - or more broadly 'new 
politics' orientated - than their British and Austrian counterparts. 
According to Benton, much ecological concern is often deeply motivated 
by 'materialist' rather than 'post-materialist' concerns. In other words, his 
argument is in direct opposition to Inglehart's point of view. As he puts it: 
much environmental concern is about the most basic conditions for 
survival itself. Concern about the poisoning of food and water supplies, 
about the quality of the air we breathe, about the danger of industrial 
accidents, about the unpredictable alteration of global climates and eco-
systems - these could hardly be more 'materialist'. (Benton 1997: 42) 
This insight has, it seems, been unjustifiably marginalised within the literature 
and should be accorded a more central position in contemporary accounts of 
13 In addition, the statement 'trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful' is extremely 
vague and open to interpretation. Thus, for one person, making 'the city' more beautiful might 
involve destroying an open space and replacing it with a new shopping centre - hardly an indication 
of a high level of environmental concern. The statement 'trying to make our countryside more 
beautiful' is also ambiguous. For example, destroying a species' natural habitat to make way for a 
rural tourist development - e.g. an artificial lake - could be construed in terms of 'beautifYing' the 
countryside but, clearly, such an attitude would be opposed by many environmentalists. 
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green party politics. Inglehart's theory misleadingly implies that ecological 
concern is always remote, abstract and perceived purely in 'aesthetic' terms. In 
doing so, it ignores the reality that green parties first and foremost reflect 
heightened perception and concern about new ecological problems and large-
scale environmental risks. The 'post-materialist' argument's emphasis on shifting 
value 'priorities' is, therefore, an inadequate starting point from which to 
investigate the origins and appeal of green party politics. 
The arguments deployed so far suggest that 'post-materialist' theory does 
not go far enough in accounting for the social and cultural conditions that gave 
rise to green party politics. To the extent that such a theory is unsuited to the task 
of accounting for the ecological aspects of green party politics, it should come as 
no real surprise to find that there is no clear-cut relationship between levels of 
'post-materialism' and the emergence and varying electoral strength of green 
parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands, nor between possession of 'post-
materialist' values and electoral support for these parties. The point here is that, 
given green parties' fundamental concern with the ecological crisis, the abstract 
and aesthetically-based focus of 'post-materialist' theory simply does not accord 
with the origins of many European green parties in controversies surrounding 
large-scale ecological risks and problems (Parkin 1989; Rudig 1990b). 
5. Conclusion 
Political researchers have often argued - or assumed - that the emergence and 
electoral success of Europe's green parties occurred against the backdrop of a 
shift towards 'post-materialist' values in advanced industrial societies. The 
purpose of this chapter has been to show that the widespread reliance on 'post-
materialist' theory has been misguided. Increasing levels of 'post-materialism' 
have not proved to be good predictors either of the timing of the emergence of 
green parties, nor - as highlighted most graphically by the plight of the British 
75 
Green Party - of their comparative electoral strength. The principal explanation 
offered for why 'post-materialism' does not work with respect to these two issues 
is that it is premised on a non-ecological conception of green party politics. The 
indices used to measure 'post-materialist' values do not reflect green parties' 
ecological identity - i.e. their fundamental concern about the ecological crisis -
and thus such values cannot reasonably be expected to be linked to the 
emergence and/or varying electoral fortunes of these parties. In addition, 
Inglehart's framework contains many conceptual shortcomings which place 
further question marks over its suitability as a basis from which to carry out 
research into political and social change. 
Over the past few decades 'post-materialist' theory has been employed in 
a wide range of studies dealing with the rise of green parties and new social 
movements. But as Lowe and ROdig point out, it was only in the late 1970s that 
Inglehart picked up on the idea that 'post-materialist' values might be linked to 
the rise of environmental protest in Western societies. Several years earlier, when 
Inglehart was first articulating his theory, there was no mention of the 
environmental movement as being 'an expression of post-materialist value 
change' (Lowe and ROdig 1986: 515). It is possible that Inglehart's already well-
known theory was one of the few approaches available to students of politics 
intent on understanding the rise of green parties across Europe from the late 
1970s onwards, and that this to some extent accounted for its widespread appeal. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s political analysts have continued to adopt the 
'post-materialist'I'new politics' framework, with comparatively few willing to 
work outside this paradigm. However, it should be stressed again that Inglehart's 
original theory was not formulated with environmental protest, let alone green 
party politics, in mind. This raises the question of whether his theoretical 
approach - which was initially used to explain the rise of radical student protest 
and the New Left in Europe during the late 1960s - could reasonably be expected 
to explain a phenomenon which has been more an outcome of the large-scale 
ecological risks and problems which have been attendant with processes of 
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scientific and technological change that have taken place during the post-war 
period. This argument is developed further in chapter 5. 
While the 'post-materialist' framework does not offer a plausible account 
of the rise of green party politics, the final chapter considers the extent to which a 
key theme raised by the value change thesis - that of the relative economic 
affluence of the post-war period - might be salvaged and integrated into a more 
ecologically informed theory of the emergence of green parties. However, in the 
next chapter, attention will be focused on two theories of 'post-industrial' society 
and, in particular, on their contribution to an understanding of the emergence and 
varying electoral success of green parties. 
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Chapter 4 
Green Parties and the Politics of 
'Post-industrial' Society 
This chapter considers the argument that elements of so-called 'post-industrial' 
society - such as rising levels of formal education and 'technocratic' decision-
making - have played a role in shaping the context within which green parties 
emerged. The purpose is to show that while - like 'post-materialist' theory -
theories of 'post-industrial' society cannot account for the origins of the 
ecological identity which all European green parties share, they are useful insofar 
as they highlight a number of structural and cultural changes in the fabric of 
society which have undoubtedly contributed to a new climate which has 
facilitated the emergence of these parties. Without these changes, it will be 
argued, there would have been markedly less scope for the emergence of green 
parties whose support is firmly rooted in the 'highly educated', 'new middle 
class', participation orientated and ecologically concerned, cohorts of society. 
The claim is that an understanding of the emergence of Europe's green parties 
developed around the central themes of ecological risk and degradation can be 
significantly enhanced through a consideration of a series of changes which have 
accompanied the shift from industrial to 'post-industrial' society. 
1. Tbeories of 'Post-industrial' Society 
There are several ways in which 'post-industrial' society has been defined within 
academic circles. For example, Marien points to a vision of 'post-industrial' 
society based upon a 'decentralised and ecologically conscious agrarian society 
... following in the wake of a failed industrialism' (Marien 1977: 415-416). Early 
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references to this particular view of 'post-industrial' society can be found within 
the writings of the Guild socialist A.J. Penty. In 1917, he published Old Worlds 
for New: A Study of the Post-Industrial State in which industrial societies were 
denounced 'as alienating, ugly and undemocratic' (Schecter 1994: 150). Penty 
argued for a return to small-scale production and a more just society based upon 
equality, creativity and participation (Schecter 1994: 150-151). During the 1960s 
and 1970s, decentralist political thought found expression in such publications as 
Resurgence1 and A Blueprint for Survival (1972) as well as through the writings 
of Theodore Roszak and Paul Goodman (Marien 1977). Richardson has drawn 
attention to the comparability of the decentralist view of 'post-industrial' society 
to the kind of society advocated by many greens; thus, 'it is that of the conserver 
society, with its decentralized economy in which manufacturing is no longer 
dominant' (Richardson 1995: 14). 
To what extent should the decentralist vision of 'post-industrial' society 
form a conceptual focus of the present chapter? It has certainly been argued that 
publications which stressed the 'ecological goal' of the decentralisation of social 
and political life, such as The Ecologist's A Blueprintfor Survival (1972), played 
a catalytic role in the emergence of the British Greens insofar as the new party 
based its political programme on the book's four principles for a 'stable society' 
(Parkin 1989: 218). In other words, the possibility that documents advancing 
decentralist visions of 'post-industrial' society may in some cases have 
influenced the formation of green parties cannot be discounted. However, it is 
also apparent that exclusive reliance on such a possibility cannot take students of 
politics very far towards developing an understanding of why such ideas might 
have gained widespread appeal in the first place - to the extent that many 
European green parties are sympathetic towards decentralisation as a goal of 
political and ecological reform (EFGP 1993a). Thus it may be more fruitful to 
1 Resurgence was founded in 1966. In 1969, Resurgence added a subtitle, 'Journal of the Fourth 
World'. This world was defined as 'the world of decentralized. small-scale forms of organj7.8tion, 
structured organically rather than mechanically and directed towards the fulti1ment of human values 
rather than materialist objectives' (cited in Marien 1977: 423). 
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utilise alternative theories in the effort to consider more satisfactorily the nature 
of the 'post-industrial' context within which green parties may have emerged. 
The idea that we are actually undergoing a transition from industrial to 
'post-industrial' society has been the focus of much discussion by social theorists 
situated both on the Right and Left of the political spectrum (Frankel 1987: 3-11). 
On the one hand, certain theorists associated with a conservative perspective -
most notably Daniel Bell - have tended to view the emergent society in broadly 
'affirmative' and 'non-critical' terms (Schroyer 1974: 163), arguing that 
developments such as the shift to a knowledge and information dependent 
'service' economy, the rise of a new middle class of technocrats and managers, 
an expanding educational sector, and greater affluence and leisure time will 
eventually lead to the disappearance of the 'proletariat' and the central societal 
conflict between capital and labour (Bell 1974). On the other are left-wing 
theorists such as Alain Touraine, who comment on the degree to which the shift 
to a 'post-industrial' - or 'programmed' - society is associated with a 
supersession of the traditional conflict between labour and capital by new forms 
of conflict, based not upon the ownership and control of private property, but, 
rather, on access to information and its uses (Touraine 1971, 1981). For 
Touraine, it is the so-called 'new social movements' that perform the central task 
of leading opposition to the new 'enemy' in 'programmed' society - the 
controllers of information - and the search for alternative forms of social and 
cultural life (Touraine 1985, Touraine 1981). Touraine saw his task as one of 
pinpointing the new social movement 'which will come to dominate the whole 
stage in our programmed society. as we move more completely into the post-
industrial era'~ that is, the movement that will come to replace the working class 
movement of industrial society (Touraine 1983: 4-5). Thus a key point of 
difference between conservative and left-wing theories of 'post-industrial' 
society tends to consist in the relative importance that each attaches to the theme 
of social conflict. 
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This is not to suggest that Bell provides no treatment of potential sources 
of political change within the context of 'post-industrial' society. Thus, while not 
ascribing social conflict a pivotal position in his theory, Bell clearly foresaw the 
possibility of a 'participation revolution' occurring in 'post-industrial' society, in 
response to the heightened professionalisation of society and dominance of 
'technocratic' decision-making (Bell 1974: 365-367). This theme was echoed by 
Samuel P. Huntington, who further argued that a 'revolution' of this sort might 
'lead to new forms of political party organization, in which ideological and civic 
motivations playa key role' (Huntington 1974: 176). Since there are growing 
literatures which stress the importance of the participatory theme to green party 
ideology and organisation (Kitschelt 198880 1989; Poguntke 1987, 1993a; 
Moller-Rommel 1990), and the relationship between other 'post-industrial' 
trends such as expansion of the service and higher education sectors and the 
emergence of green parties (Chandler and Siaroff 1986; Taggart 1996; Frankland 
and Schoonmaker 1992), the third part of this chapter will be devoted to Bell's 
theoretical framework assessing, in particular, the degree to which it can 
facilitate an understanding of the emergence and varying electoral success of 
green parties. 
The work of Touraine has also received some attention within the green 
party literature.2 Of particular interest to commentators has been his claim that a 
wide range of contemporary struggles - including those waged by greens - are 
symptomatic of the broader resistance to 'technocratic' power which develops in 
'programmed' society (Touraine 1981; Papadakis 1989). The next section 
considers the extent to which Touraine's social movement framework offers a 
plausible account of the emergence of green party politics. The investigation 
begins by outlining Touraine's social movement theory. From here, and based 
upon the core elements of the former, it proceeds to develop and then critically 
examine three hypotheses relating to the expected character of green party 
:1 For an example ofa study which uses Touraine's theoretical framework as a basis for analysing 
the German Greens, see Papadakis (1989). For a more critical treatment of Touraine's thesis as it 
applies to green parties, see Doherty (1994). 
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politics in Austria. Britain and the Netherlands. On the basis of several observed 
shortcomings, it is argued that Touraine's theoretical framework is largely 
unsuited to the development of an explanation of the emergence of green parties. 
However, it will be suggested that his framework offers limited insight into the 
nature of the social groups that might be more inclined to become involved in 
green party politics. 
2. 'Post-industrialism' and the Politics of the Left: 
the Sociology of Alain Touraine 
(a) Touraine's Social Movement Theory 
The work of Alain Touraine forms a key part of what has become known as 'new 
social movement' theory (Jennet and Stewart 1989: 2; Scott 1990; Gladwin 
1994). A central concern of new social movement theorists has been the 
identification of 'the conditions which have given rise to "new" forms of 
collective action; forms which seem to question prior assumptions within 
Marxism about the nature of the revolutionary subject' (Gladwin 1994: 61).3 In 
such works as The Post-Industrial Society (1974) and The Voice and the Eye 
(1981), Touraine sets forth his claim that the contours of a new society are 
developing around us, and that these form the context within which new social 
conflicts will emerge. In this part of the chapter, attention is focused firstly upon 
the character of what Touraine terms the 'post-industrial' 'programmed' society 
and on the nature of the 'new conflicts'. The question to which the subsequent 
discussion is directed concerns the extent to which the emergence of political 
parties with a distinctly ecological identity should be viewed as representative of 
a new - and central - social conflict peculiar to the 'programmed' society. These 
3 As well as the work of Touraine see, for example, Habennas (1981), Offe (1985). Melucci 
(1989) and Laclau and Mou1fe (1985) on this particular point. 
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preliminary remarks, however, go to the very heart of Touraine's general 
theoretical framework. 
The roots of Touraine's 'action theory' can be partially traced to the 
events of May 1968 in Paris and to the subsequent emergence of a variety of 
single issue protest movements which sought to challenge the fabric of French 
politics and society (Hannigan 1985: 437). However, that Alain Touraine was 
also inspired by the writings of Marx is demonstrated by his claim that social 
movements should be analysed within the context of power relations and 'treated 
as an aspect or reflection of class struggle' (Pakulski 1991: 20). Having said this, 
it is important to stress the degree to which his theoretical framework departs 
from classical Marxism. Thus, with Marxism very much in mind, Touraine 
wishes: 
to break down the teleological thinking which infects so much twentieth 
century sociology as a legacy from the nineteenth century. He rejects the 
view that society moves towards ends of which the members are unaware; 
he rejects the notion that a human lifetime is merely an incident in the 
march of history. (Sennett 1981: ix) 
In contrast to structural Marxist accounts - which tend to reduce social action 'to 
structure or to relations of pure domination (Scott 1990: 61) - Touraine takes as 
his starting point the idea that: 
human societies have the capacity not only to reproduce themselves or 
even adapt themselves through mechanisms of learning and political 
decision-making to a changing environment, but also - and especially - to 
develop their own orientations and to alter them: to generate their 
objectives and their normativity. (Touraine 1981: 59) 
Human societies, therefore, have a 'reflexive' capacity; that is, a capacity to 'turn 
in on themselves, to work upon themselves' and to this extent they are 'self-
produced' (Touraine 1981: 59). Accordingly. a central theme within Touraine's 
writings is that of the 'intentionality' of social action, whether individual or 
collective (Eyerman 1984: 78). As will be seen shortly. the presumed shift from 
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industrial to 'post-industrial' 'programmed' society is considered to be marked 
by an enhancement of this 'reflexive' - or 'self-productive' - capacity, with 
profound implications for both the nature and foci of social action. 
It is at this point that Touraine's concept of 'historicity' becomes 
important. By 'historicity' Touraine refers to the orientating frameworks within 
which human society's capacity for 'self-production' takes place; that is, 'the set 
of cultural models a society uses to produce its norms in the domains of 
knowledge, production and ethics' (Touraine 1995: 368). Touraine's thesis is 
based upon the idea that conflict in society consists in the struggle to control the 
development of, and ultimately reformulate, that society's 'historicity' (Touraine 
1981: 62). According to Touraine, such conflict is a basic feature of all social 
orders and essentially takes the form of a struggle between two classes. 
A crucial feature of this state of affairs is that of social movements. For 
Touraine, social movements represent 'the organized collective behaviour of a 
class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of 
historicity in a concrete community' (Touraine 1981: 77). Touraine argues that a 
social movement has three essential components. First, a social movement must 
possess an identity (I). This means that it must define itself in tenns of a 
'committed population' in whose interest it fights. Second, the movement must 
identify its opponent (0). Third, it must recognise the 'stakes' over which both 
movement and opponent are in conflict. This is the principle of totality (T) and 
essentially amounts to the struggle for the control of 'historicity' itself (Touraine 
1985: 760-761). Touraine claims that the extent to which a movement is able to 
assume a central position within a given 'societal type' depends upon whether it 
acts according to the I-O-T formula. Below, Touraine's notion of 'social 
movement' is examined in more detail by referring to their characteristic features 
within specific social systems. 
Touraine identifies two social systems within which social movements 
playa key role: the industrial and the 'post-industrial' 'programmed' society. In 
industrial society, 'historicity' centres upon 'perspectives functional to the 
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organization of labour for the production of a steadily expanding quantum of 
goods and services' (Ross 1978: 184). In other words, the orientating framework 
- or cultural model - of such a society is primarily economic. It follows, therefore, 
that social conflict will centre upon economic issues; specifically, it takes the 
form of a struggle between management and workers concerning the social 
control of industry (Touraine 1985: 761). Touraine argues that the workers' 
movement of industrial society fulfils his three criteria for a social movement: 
first, the movement clearly possesses an identity (I), i.e. it fights with a particular 
group's 'interests' in mind; secon~ it provides a clear definition of its opponent 
(0), i.e. those who control economic institutions; thir~ the movement recognises 
the totality (T) or 'stakes' of its struggle, i.e. the control of 'historicity' itself 
(Touraine 1985: 760-761; Touraine 1981: 77). 
Central to Touraine's thesis, however, is the claim that the hitherto 
dominant pattern of social conflict is in decline as a profound historical shift 
takes place from industrial to 'post-industrial' 'programmed' society. Important 
features of this transition period are changes in the relations of production as well 
as in the investment strategies of the managers of capital. According to Touraine, 
these developments have led to the fragmentation of the workers' movement, its 
adoption of defensive strategies and the gradual institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict (Eyerman 1984: 79). The main consequence of all this is that while the 
workers' movement has gained considerable political influence in most 
industrialised countries, it has lost 'its role as a central social movement' 
(Touraine 1981: 12). 
Touraine argues that 1968 marked the beginnings of the 'crisis and decay 
of industrial society, its cultural fiel~ its social actors and its forms of political 
action'; a crisis which 'reached its climax at the beginning of the 1980s' 
(Touraine 1995: 360). It is important to be clear about the meaning and 
significance of the 'post-industrial' or 'programmed' society that Touraine 
believes is gradually replacing industrial society. A central feature of the 'post-
industrial' society is considered to be its heightened 'reflexive' capacity; that is, 
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its total capacity for 'self-production' (Cohen 1985: 701-702). The development 
and dominance of new and innovative 'knowledge' sectors of the economy such 
as 'research and development, information processing, biomedical science and 
techniques, and mass media' have resulted in the increased capacity of humans to 
transform their 'representation of human nature and of the external world' 
(Touraine 1985: 781). The 'programmed' element of the 'post-industrial' society, 
therefore, lies in the ability of 'managers' to manipulate public opinion, attitudes, 
modes of behaviour, personalities and culture by controlling the patterns of 
information and knowledge production, and thereby attempting to secure the 
predictable management of the social system (Touraine 1995: 244). For Touraine, 
then, power in 'programmed' society is located not so much within the economic 
sphere as 'at the level of cultural production itself (Cohen 1985: 701-702). 
As has been hinted, the shift from industrial to 'post-industrial' society is 
thought to have implications for the potential patterns of social conflict. In 
Touraine's view, the central conflict in 'post-industrial' society will be between 
the new dominant class - which he terms the 'technocracy' - and those social 
groups who resist and struggle against domination by 'the great management and 
data-processing apparatus' (Touraine 1981: 7). Touraine suggests that whereas in 
industrial society conflict occurs within the socio-economic sphere, contlict in 
'programmed' society will extend to all realms of social and cultural life; in 
short, it will extend to those fields of social and cultural life in which individual 
and collective actors are subject to technocratic domination. The 'technocracy' 
can thus be defined as 'those who have power over the livelihood and lifestyle of 
social groups within and beyond the sphere of economic production' (Hall et al. 
1990: 175). 
This process clearly has implications for both the identity and kinds of 
movements that will develop. According to Touraine, the interests in whom 
'post-industrial' social movements fight are not skilled 'workers' but rather 
'citizens' or 'consumers' who are subject to technocratic control and who seek 
'self-management'. As a consequence, conflicts have the potential to emerge in 
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many areas of social and cultural life, including those of education, the health 
sector, sexuality and energy production (Touraine 1981: 7; Touraine 1985: 778). 
Indeed, he points to a whole range of protest campaigns - centred on such issues 
as consumer rights, freedom of information, regional autonomy, nuclear power, 
the environment and the position of women in society - as examples of the kinds 
of conflicts that are thought to be part of the larger struggle against technocratic 
power (Touraine 1983: 175). 
On the subject of which social groups will form the vanguard of the 
struggle against 'technocracy', Touraine writes: 
The struggle is not led by marginal social elements who can only rise up 
for brief periods or support offensive action with their mass, but by 
central social elements who, in their opposition to those who hold power, 
use the instruments of production which their opponents claim to control. 
This used to be the role of the skilled workers; today, it is the role of 
those who possess scientific and technical competence. They are closely 
connected with the great organizations but their identity is not defined by 
the hierarchical authority in them. Often they even enjoy great 
independence from the organizations that utilize their services. They are 
agents of development, for their work is defined by creation, diffusion, or 
application of rational knowledge; they are not technocrats, because their 
function is defined as service, not as production. (Touraine 1971: 64) 
Particular groups which are understood to fall into this broad category include 
professionals working in the fields of teaching and public health, students, 
research technicians and maintenance workers (Touraine 1971: 63-70). However, 
in his later study of the French anti-nuclear movement, Touraine also stressed the 
importance of dissident scientists within the establishment in providing both the 
knowledge and necessary competence to challenge 'technocracy' 'on the 
adversary's own ground' (Touraine 1983: 20-21). 
In terms of the character of social movements, Touraine suggests that, 
unlike the workers' movement of industrial society, the aim of 'post-industrial' 
social movements is not to obtain control of state institutions but rather to defend 
and extend 'civil society against a potentially all consuming state' (Scott 1990: 
66). 'Post-industrial' social movements, therefore, resist established power 
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systems, refuse to 'play by the rules' and concern themselves with the struggle 
for the democratisation of society and 'participatory forms of association' (Cohen 
1985: 702). The heightened 'reflexive' capacity of actors in 'post-industrial' 
society means that social movements are increasingly able 'to develop along a 
logic which is relatively autonomous from the logic of social systems' (Eyerman 
1984: 78), and to generate new meanings and produce new visions of how life 
could be in the future (Touraine 1983: 178). 
Much of Touraine's work has centred upon the identification of 'that 
popular social movement which will come to dominate the whole stage in our 
programmed society' (Touraine 1983: 5). As was mentioned earlier, in order to 
achieve the status of a 'genuine' social movement, actors involved in a social 
struggle must fulfil three criteria: they must identify a social group in whose 
interests they act; they must clearly identify their opponent; and they must 
recognise the 'totality', or stakes, of the struggle in which they are engaged. In 
the 'programmed' society, then, a 'genuine' new social movement would act in 
the interests of citizens subject to technocratic control; its opponent would 
constitute the 'technocracy'; and it would recognise that society's cultural model 
- its 'historicity' - was at stake in the struggle. Touraine argued that, in 1968, the 
student struggle in France contained traces of a potential social movement but 
ultimately failed because it was 'unable to recognise its true meaning' (Touraine 
1983: 180). The French anti-nuclear struggle of the 1970s, whose leaders (e.g. 
Brice Lalonde) had their roots in the May 1968 movement, experienced a similar 
fate in Touraine's view. In this case, despite employment of his controversial 
method of 'sociological intervention' - in which researchers attempt to stimulate 
the 'self-analysis' of activists and thereby bring the latters' struggle up to the 
level of a 'full' social movement • the anti-nuclear movement eventually 
collapsed as a result of its inability to 'tum the conflict against a precise 
adversary' and to raise its definition of the 'stakes' to the societal level (Touraine 
1983: 183). 
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(b) Green Party Politics in the 'Programmed' Society 
Touraine argues that a whole range of emergent struggles (ecological, anti-
nuclear, feminist, human rights, etc.) are symptomatic of the 'central conflict' of 
'programmed' society; namely, between the 'technocracy' and those who lack 
control over the decisions which shape their lives. In terms of the present 
discussion, it is significant that Touraine has cited the 'ecological' movement as 
embracing almost all of these struggles simultaneously (Touraine 1981: 24). 
From this perspective, then, the emergence of an 'ecological' political identity 
witnessed across Europe during the 1910s and 1980s was, first and foremost, a 
reflection of this 'post-industrial' social conflict. To the extent that green parties 
often display commitment to such principles as individualism, participatory 
democracy, anti-elitism, gender equality and minority rights, it could be argued 
that they are a 'new type of party' (poguntke 1981) for the coming post-industrial 
'programmed' age. 
If green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands are representative 
of a 'post-industrial' new social movement, then the following criteria would 
need to be fulfilled. First, an examination of the emergence of all three parties 
should reveal that 'technocracy' - i.e. those who have the power to make 
decisions which shape the livelihood and lifestyle of social groups - has formed 
the main theme which activists and supporters have identified as constituting the 
force to which they are opposed. Second, the green parties' battle for the control 
of 'historicity' should have been primarily fought within the sphere of civil 
society. In other words, the parties should not aim to achieve state integration or 
power but, rather, concentrate on the development and advancement of 
participatory forms of association, new lifestyles and cultural possibilities. Third, 
in line with Touraine's claim with respect to which social groups will lead the 
struggle against the 'technocracy', service sector professionals, students, research 
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technicians and maintenance workers would be expected to form the core of the 
green parties' membership base.4 
At first sight, the notion that opposition to the 'technocracy' - as defined 
above - might have played a part in shaping the critical stance of those 
movements which proved catalytic in the emergence of the Austrian Greens 
appears promising. For example, many of those who participated in the anti-
nuclear movement of the 1970s - and who were later involved in the formation of 
the vGO and ALO - developed a view of their struggle based upon the defence of 
'the people', i.e. not one specific class, against the highly integrated system of 
elite co-operation between the two major political parties (SPO and OVP) and 
the social partners representing the interests of labour and capital, which had 
characterised the Austrian political system during the post-war period (Preglau 
1994~ Gottweis 1990). Criticism was directed against the dominant culture of 
decision-making which had tended to exclude citizen participation and foster 
passivity among the population (Preglau 1994: 45). Similarly, the 1984 struggle 
over the proposal to build a hydroelectric dam on the Danube at Hainburg, which 
resulted in mass civil disobedience, a government U-turn on the issue, and an 
impetus to green politics at the national level, could be viewed as an example of 
'the people' doing something 'against those in power' (parkin 1989: 32). The 
practice of attacking the elitist workings of the established political system was 
4 There is a fourth possible hypothesis relating to Touraine's theory which could be applied to 
green parties - that the green parties should stress their self-identity in 'oon-class' terms. In other 
words, they should see themselves as representing the interests of 'citizens', 'the people' or 
'consumers'. An adequate 'testing' of this hypothesis would involve examining and comparing the 
'class identity' of green party supporters and members. Unfortunately, comparable data that would 
enable a detailed assessment of this hypothesis are unavailable. However, in the case of the British 
Green Party, a survey of party members showed that whilst a significant proportion (39.5 per cent) 
viewed themselves in 'non-class' terms, a clear majority (60.5 per cent) identified with a particular 
social class (RUdig el al. 1991: 28). The historical origins of the Dutch Green Left suggest that a 
significant proportion of its members - particularly within the ex-Communist cohort - may still 
believe 'class' to be an important issue in Dutch society. In fact, Green Left's 'Leftism' has been 
characterised by a strong emphasis on the need to address economic and social inequalities in 
capitalist society (GroenLinks I99Oc, 1993), and this means that caution should be exercised in 
interpreting its identity in 'non-class' terms. 
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also very much an activity which preoccupied the first Austrian Green MPs5 
(Lauber 1995: 317). 
But should such opposition be viewed as symptomatic of a fundamental 
struggle against 'technocracy' to which Touraine refers? It is surely stretching 
things to claim that the protests waged by Austrian citizens mentioned here were 
expressive of opposition to a 'technocratic' class which was engaged in an 
attempt to dominate all areas of the lives of certain social groups (as Touraine's 
theory implies). A more plausible account would emphasise the degree to which 
these protests were a focused response to the system of 'social partnership' 
(Sozialpartnerscha[t) which had for decades allowed the large interest 
associations of business and labour to dominate the political decision-making 
process and to pursue economic development objectives that were ecologically 
risky and damaging. The Austrian system of social partnership has been 
characterised by the maintenance of a consensus on economic issues and the 
exclusion of ecological interests which challenge this consensus, but this does not 
imply that the former reflects a new and broad 'technocratic' class concerned 
with the large-scale manipulation of public opinion, attitudes, modes of 
behaviour and culture. Moreover, the Austrian social partnership has very much 
been rooted in the desire to resolve the core worker-management conflict of 
industrial society - it was not in any sense related to the dawning of the so-called 
'post-industrial' 'programmed' age. 
A further problem with the 'technocracy' argument is that the Austrian 
Greens have quite simply not defined their 'enemy' in these terms. The Greens 
have certainly been highly critical of 'industrialism' in the past - indeed, in the 
public eye they have often been portrayed in 'anti-industrialist' terms - but there 
is no evidence to suggest that they have conceptualised their' opponents' in terms 
that would be consistent with the 'technocratic class' as defined by Touraine. It 
could be argued that the Greens have recently shifted away from an oppositional 
stance and embraced a more compromising strategy based on the development of 
, Eight Green MPs were elected to the National Council in 1986. 
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'initiatives in favour of the ecological modernisation of industrial society' 
(Lauber 1997a: 188). These considerations serve to further underline the 
irrelevance of Touraine's arguments to the case of green party politics in Austria. 
During the late 1960s the Netherlands underwent fundamental change as 
a process of'depillarisation' began to take place. This saw the weakening of the 
traditional 'pillarised' society in which all social organisations, including 
political parties, trade unions, employers' organisations, broadcasting companies, 
hospitals, schools, universities and newspapers were based on one of the major 
religions (Catholic, Protestant) or ideologies (socialism, liberalism) (Andeweg 
and Irwin 1993: 30). According to van der Heijden, this process was 
characterised by 'a widespread rejection of the rigid social order of the earlier 
years and of the lack of transparency and the depoliticised character of political 
decision-making' (van der Heijden 1994: 106). The process of depillarisation 
contributed to a climate characterised by greater 'openness' and made room for 
the emergence of new political parties advocating political reform (D66 and 
PPR), as well as a wide variety of protest groups concerned with environmental, 
peace and feminist issues (van der Heijden 1994: 106). These latter groups 
flourished during the 1970s and early 1980s, initially working alongside 'New 
Left' parties such as the PPR and PSP - but later, with the CPN - in extra-
parliamentary protest activities (Voerman 1992, 1995). The development of 
common political positions on the part of the PSP, PPR and CPN with regard to 
peace, environmental, anti-nuclear and gender issues is generally considered to 
have been facilitated by these joint actions. During the course of the 1980s, 
movement activists began to apply pressure on the three parties to intensify their 
efforts at electoral co-operation. Such pressure was an important factor in the 
decision of the parties to take part in the 1989 Dutch national elections as Green 
Left. 
To the extent that several of the parties and movements that eventually 
formed Green Left developed within a climate of 'depillarisation', in which the 
hitherto dominant and 'conformity demanding' power structures were 
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substantially weakened, it may seem reasonable to argue that the roots of the 
party's identity can be partially traced to demands by citizens to free themselves 
from a form of 'technocracy'. Yet this 'Tourainean type' interpretation comes up 
against a fundamental problem of 'timing'. The patterns of elite rule in the 
Netherlands - according to which the divisions which traditionally characterised 
Dutch society were offset by a 'politics of accommodation' based upon the 
construction and maintenance of a basic consensus - were quite simply not linked 
to the rise of a 'post-industrial', 'programmed' society. Indeed, the stable 
political system stemming from such elite behaviour had its origins in the 
'Pacification of 1917', which established a system of 'consociational democracy' 
and in which the classes of industrial society and dominant religious groups 
would co-operate (Lijphart 1975). As in Austria, the idea that an emergent 
'technocratic' class of the 'programmed' society formed the oppositional focus 
for the new protest groups and parties of the late 1960s receives little support. 
These protest groups developed within a climate characterised by the breaking 
down of 'old' identities and loyalties and not by citizen resistance to a 'new' 
dominant class intent on imposing its technocratic will on the lives of 'the 
people'. 
Turning more directly to the case of green party politics in the 
Netherlands, there is no evidence to suggest that Green Left has based its critique 
of society around the theme of 'technocratic' power. An examination of party 
documents shows that while Green Left is critical of state centralisation and 
bureaucracy - a theme explored more fully later in this chapter - it also devotes 
much space to attacking the growth orientated and ecologically destructive 
effects of the 'capitalist market economy' (GroenLinks 1990c, GroenLinks 1993). 
Interpreting the emergence of the British Green Party in terms of a 
response to the actions of a 'technocratic' class is also highly problematic. The 
founding members of PEOPLE were not primarily motivated by the struggle for 
freedom from the domination of a 'new class', but rather by a deep concern 'that 
the collapse of society was imminent unless swift action was taken' (Wall 1994: 
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16). As Parkin has argued, the emergence of the Green Party must be understood 
within the context of 'much debate over the incompatibility of increased 
consumption of resources and a rising population in the context of a finite planet' 
(Parkin 1989: 214). During the party's early years, debate centred not on the 
problem of 'technocratic power', but primarily took place between those on the 
Left, who identified capitalism as being the main source of ecological decline, 
and those on the Right, e.g. Edward Goldsmith, who were more inclined to blame 
industrialisation for the 'disintegration' of society (Rudig and Lowe 1986: 271; 
Byrne 1989: 101). Following the emergence ofa new leadership in 1977 the party 
made efforts to transcend the Left-Right dispute and has since based its critique 
around the 'relentless pursuit of economic growth, accompanied by rising 
material expectations within an ever increasing world population' (Green Party 
1995). The 'technocracy' - defined as those who have power over the lives of 
subordinate groups - has not, therefore, constituted the main 'opponent' for the 
Green Party either during its formative years, or its later periods of development. 
With respect to the first hypothesis, then, opposition to a 'technocratic' class does 
not seem to constitute the theme that has shaped the identity of green parties in 
Austria, Britain or the Netherlands. 
As noted, a second hypothesis inferred from Touraine's theory concerns 
the location and aims of green party activity. If green parties are representative of 
a 'post-industrial' new social movement, as defined by Touraine, then they 
should define their aims principally in terms of the defence of culture and civil 
society, and refuse to pursue state power or integration into established structures 
of political decision-making. It is certainly the case the key green parties in this 
study have embraced a definition of politics which accords a central role to extra-
parliamentary initiatives and movements within civil society in their struggle to 
achieve radical change.6 However, the crucial point here is that none of the green 
6 Consider the following statements. In the case of the Dutch Green Left 'politics ... cannot and 
must not remain limited to state politics. The Green Left regards itself as a political movement 
which commands a wider terrain than merely that ofparliamentaJy politics' (GroenLinlcs 1993: 14-
IS). The British Green Party stresses that its 'members organise and participate in political 
lobbying. demonstrations and non-violent direct actions. All these things show the relevance of 
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parties currently under discussion conforms mainly to this pattern. All three 
parties have, throughout their history, been committed to mounting some form of 
electoral challenge, and all have sought, with varying levels of success, to acquire 
some degree of political power whether at the local, national or European level. 
The fact that greens across Europe have collectively made the decision to engage 
in electoral politics, and to embrace this more direct method of achieving 
political influence, suggests that they do not solely define the site of their 
struggles in terms of civil society (Doherty 1994). To be sure, many green parties 
- including the Austrian and British Greens - have experienced sometimes bitter 
internal struggles concerning the issue of what the appropriate balance between 
pursuing a 'decentralist', extra-parliamentary strategy and one based upon 
parliamentary politics and power-sharing should be (Rudig and Lowe 1986; 
Lauber 1997a: 190; Lauber and Muller 1998; Doherty 1992). Yet it is important 
not to lose sight of the fact that such green parties are, by definition, political 
parties and are thus committed to mounting an electoral challenge to the 
traditional political parties; a strategy that Touraine would regard as 'deviant' in 
social movement terms. It is for this reason that the second hypothesis (which 
states that green parties resist the pursuit of state integration and formal political 
power) can be rejected. 
It is further necessary to consider the extent to which the occupational 
profiles of green party activists meet with Touraine's predictions (hypothesis 
three). On this level, the evidence is more supportive. A 1990 study of Dutch 
Green Left delegates demonstrates that, of the respondents, 24 per cent worked in 
the service sector, 26 per cent in (semi-) public service, 11 per cent in teaching 
and 5 per cent were students. Skilled manual workers made up less than 10 per 
cent of the respondents (Voennan 1995: 120-121). Turning to Britain, a 1990 
study of Green Party members indicates that 50 per cent - by far the largest 
Green politics to everyday life and inspire people to get involved' (Green Party n.d.). The Austrian 
Greens also view themselves as 'the arm of the extra-parliamentary movements' (Frankland 1993: 
6) and. in their 1987 party charter 'stated that they did not intend to be a party organization in the 
traditional sense but a broad democratic organization of those engaged in ecological, democratic, 
social, cultural, peace and women's issues' (Frankland 1994: 201). 
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proportion - were employed in a professional or technical occupation (e.g. doctor, 
teacher, social worker, accountant, computer programmer). Students made up a 
further 10 per cent of members. As in the Netherlands, skilled manual workers 
comprised a very small proportion of the Green membership (5.1 per cent). 
(Rudig et 01. 1991: 24-26). The support base of the Austrian Greens broadly 
follows the pattern described so far. Thus, in 1993, by far the largest occupational 
milieu from which the Greens drew support were 'white-collar' workers (66 per 
cent). This compares with a figure of 19 per cent for those employed in 'blue-
collar' occupations (Muller and Ulram 1995: 152). Students have also proved to 
be a strong source of support for the Austrian Greens. Frankland has noted that in 
both the 1986 and 1990 parliamentary elections the Greens drew their highest 
support from this social group (23 per cent of Green voters in 1986 were 
students; 28 per cent were so in 1990) (Frankland 1994: 199). That green party 
members and supporters are drawn less from the ranks of 'skilled workers' and 
more from those of 'service' workers and students therefore seems clear. Thus, of 
the hypotheses formulated at the beginning of this section, only the third receives 
consistent support across the three case studies. 
(c) Criticisms of Touraine's Theory 
As well as the general lack of support for Touraine's thesis documented above, 
there are additional problems that would cast further doubt on its potential use as 
a theoretical framework with which to explain the emergence of green parties. 
One problem relates to Touraine's claim that, in any historical period, there is 
only one pair of social movements, which amount to 'unified actors playing out a 
role on the stage of history' (Melucci 1989: 202). This glosses over the fact that 
social movements in 'post-industrial' society are characterised by their 
differentiation in terms of aims and modes of activity (Melucci 1989: 202-203). It 
is for this reason that the validity of Touraine's methodology of 'sociological 
96 
intervention' can be questioned. The methodology involves a 'missionary-
teacher' (Melucci 1989: 239) confronting activists with ideas relating to the 
'highest meaning' of the particular struggle in which they are engaged, and 
thereby 'helping' them to achieve the status of a 'true' social movement. In the 
'programmed' society this 'meaning' amounts to the struggle against the 
'technocracy' for the control of 'historicity'. Touraine thus appears unwilling to 
acknowledge either the diversity of social movement conflict or the possibility 
that people might have different motivations for choosing to participate in 
various kinds of protest activity, e.g. basic concern about environmental 
problems. For these reasons, Touraine's methodology has been accused of 
displaying elements of 'authoritarianism' (ROdig 1990a: 20), Leninism and, to 
the extent that there is only one 'true' hypothesis, i.e. Touraine's, of lacking 
rigour and proper empirical testing (pakulski 1991: 24~ ROdig 1990a: 21). 
And there are further problems. To begin with, despite his critique of 
teleological and deterministic thinking, Touraine's theory appears to display such 
overtones~ this is particularly evident in considering the claim that 'there is only 
one true movement for any given era' (Scott 1990: 69). Touraine's central theme 
of the 'post-industrial' 'programmed' society can also be criticised. In particular, 
the lack of a detailed description of the precise contours of the 'programmed' 
society makes a judgement on the extent to which a society is undergoing a shift 
towards the latter extremely difficult to make. Thus, even before attempting to 
apply the conceptual framework of 'post-industrial' society to the case of green 
party politics, the former can be criticised on the grounds of its general haziness. 
This same criticism has been made of other Tourainean concepts, such as 
'historicity', 'conflict' and 'movement' (pakulski 1991: 24). In sum, the 
problematic nature of Touraine's thesis in terms of its exclusive concern with the 
'significance' of opposition to technocratic power~ its focus on the sphere of civil 
society to the neglect of political parties and the electoral sphere; and its 
questionable methodological and conceptual framework, means that it provides 
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an unsatisfactory framework within which to investigate the emergence of green 
parties in recent decades. 
3. A Conservative Perspective on the 'Post-industrial' Society: 
the Sociology of Daniel Bell 
(a) The Dimensions of Bell's 'Post-industrial' Society 
An alternative approach to 'post-industrial' society can be found in the work of 
Daniel Bell (Bell 1974). The starting point of Bell's theory is a 'stages' model of 
development in which there are three successive phases of economic progress: 
pre-industrial, industrial and 'post-industrial'. According to Bell, the 'design' of 
the pre-industrial phase is a 'game against nature'; thus, 'its resources are drawn 
from extractive industries and it is subject to the laws of diminishing returns and 
low productivity' (Bell 1974: 116). Agriculture, mining, fishing and timber 
therefore form the main economic sectors within this societal stage. In contrast, 
the 'design' of industrial society is a "'game against fabricated nature" which is 
centred on man-machine relationships and uses energy to transform the natural 
environment into a technical environment' (Bell 1974: 116). The dominant 
economic sectors in this phase are those of mechanical production and the 
manufacture of goods. Finally, Bell describes the 'design' of 'post-industrial' 
society as a "'game between persons" in which an "intellectual technology", 
based on information, rises alongside of machine technology' (Bell 1974: 116). 
This type of society has an economic sector largely based upon services, defined 
as trade, mass media, finance, transport, health, recreation, research, education 
and government (Bell 1974: 15, 116). 
Writing in the 1970s, Bell argued that the United States was the country 
that was witnessing the most marked shift towards the 'post-industrial' phase of 
development, but that this new social form would be a 'major feature of the 
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twenty-first century, in the social structures of the United States, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, and Western Europe' (Bell 1974: X). However, the main point here 
is that, at its most basic level, Bell's theory of historical progress describes shifts 
in the composition of the workforce with the majority moving from extractive 
industries to manufacturing production and then to the service sector. Generally 
speaking, then, a 'post-industrial' society can be described as one in which more 
than 50 per cent of the workforce is employed in the service sector (Bell 1974: 
15). Using this criterion, political analysts have also distinguished between 
societies which are more or less 'post-industriar (Kitschelt 1988a: 208; Taggart 
1996: 55). That is to say that a state with, say, 75 per cent of its workforce 
employed in the service sector can be viewed as being more 'post-industrial' than 
one in which only 55 per cent is employed in this economic sector. 
Turning to the DEeD data in Table 4.1 it can be seen that Austria. Britain 
and the Netherlands have, since 1970, experienced a decline in the level of 
industrial employment alongside a steady increase in the size of the service 
sector. It is clear that the three countries in this study are, according to Bell's 
most basic criterion, 'post-industrial' societies. It is also the case that green 
parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands have emerged within this climate 
of increasing 'post-industrialisation'. The possible links between 'post-
industrialisation' and the emergence of green parties will be explored at a later 
stage in this chapter. It can further be observed from Table 4.1 that there are 
differences concerning the point at which the 'post-industrial' threshold was 
surpassed, and in terms of the size of each country's respective service sector. 
What is particularly noticeable from Table 4.1 is that the Austrian economy 
entered the 'post-industrial' phase considerably later than either the Netherlands 
or Britain, and that it has consistently lagged behind the latter in terms of the size 
of its service sector. The potential consequences of these differences for the 
comparative electoral strength of green parties in Austria, Britain and the 















Table 4.1 Occupational Composition ofthe Workforce in 
Austria, Britain and the Netherlands, 1970-94 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 
18.3 12.5 10.5 9.0 7.9 7.2 
41.0 40.9 40.3 38.1 36.8 33.2 
40.7 46.6 49.2 52.9 55.3 59.6 
2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.27 
46.5 40.9 38.0 32.4 29.0 26.28 
50.6 56.4 59.4 65.0 68.9 71.69 
7.2 6.6 6.0 4.9 4.6 4.0 
41.0 34.8 31.8 28.1 26.3 23.0 
51.8 58.6 62.2 67.0 69.1 73.0 












Yet there is more to Bell's 'post-industrial' society than a simple shift 
away from goods production towards services. For Bell, 'post-industrial' society 
is characterised by a different 'axial principle', or driving force, to that of 
industrial society. Whereas the 'axial principle' of industrial societies is the 
pursuit of economic growth by means of the application of energy and 
machinery, the driving force of 'post-industrial' societies is considered to be the 
'centrality ... and codification of theoretical knowledge' (Bell 1974: 117). It is the 
latter which forms the 'axis around which new technology, economic growth and 
the stratification of society' will be organised in the 'post-industrial' era (Bell 
1974: 112). As will be shown, the centrality of theoretical knowledge has 
7 Figure is for 1993. 
8 Figure is for 1993. 
9 Figure is for 1993. 
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important consequences for the emergent social structure of the 'post-industrial' 
phase, and forms the potential backdrop for changes in the political configuration 
of society. 
The centrality of theoretical knowledge in 'post-industrial' society is 
thought to lead to a transformation in the kind of work that people do (Bell 1974: 
134). Bell argues that the knowledge-driven development of new technologies, 
and the emergence of a more affluent population which increasingly defines its 
'quality of life' in terms of access to services and amenities such as health, 
education, recreation and the arts, leads to a decline in the number of manual, 
manufacturing jobs and a shift to 'white-collar' occupations (Bell 1974: 17, 127). 
Of the latter, Bell argues that it is those in the 'professional' and 'technical' 
categories - such as teachers, engineers, engineering and science technicians and, 
most importantly, scientists - that will emerge 'as the predominant occupational 
group in the post-industrial society' (Bell 1974: 41). A consequence of increased 
reliance upon these 'knowledge elites' will be the 'democratisation' of higher 
education, as society struggles to gain 'adequate numbers of trained persons of 
professional and technical caliber' (Bell 1974: 232). The university therefore 
becomes the primary institution of 'post-industrial' society (Bell 1974: 44). In 
addition to these developments, Bell foresees a change in the nature of power in 
'post-industrial' society. He argues that power in 'post-industrial' society is 
increasingly based on the control of technical skill (education being the mode of 
access to such power), and less upon the control of property or political office 
(Bell 1974: 358-359). The source of the power of what Bell terms the 'new 
inteJligensia' lies not in their direct wielding of it, but in the extent to which they 
'have now become essential to the formulation and analysis of decisions on 
which political judgements have to be made' (Bell 1974: 362). 
Bell's theory has been subject to much criticism (Turner 1989). It has for 
instance been argued that his predictions that Western societies are becoming 
more 'affluent' have fallen wide of the mark. Contrary to Bell's claims 
concerning the rise of the 'affluent society', commentators have suggested that 
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recent decades have witnessed rather the emergence of a 'fragmented, divided 
society riven by social exclusion in which the affluence created is hived off and 
distributed within a small, compartmentalised elite' (Little 1997: 250). Though 
the size of the service sector has undoubtedly increased, this has not led to the 
large-scale creation of highly skilled jobs. As Ritzer has argued, 'in contrast to 
Bell's thesis, low-status blue collar and service occupations show no signs of 
disappearing' (Ritzer 1993: 153). Bell's optimism has been described as 
'misguided' and disregarding of new divisions within the labour market in 
capitalist societies between core and peripheral workers, and non-workers. 
Critics on the Left have generally been dismissive of Bell's theory of 'post-
industrial' society on the grounds that 'it does little to challenge the logic of 
capital accumulation or the fragmentation of the labour market' (Little 1997: 
251). 
Despite such criticism, it will be argued that certain themes emphasised 
by Bell - relating to the elitist character of decision-making in 'post-industrial' 
society, the changing class structure and the expansion of higher education - can 
throw light on the changing social context within which new political actors such 
as green parties have emerged. It will be maintained that these processes have 
contributed to a new social climate that has been more conducive to rising levels 
of ecological awareness and to demands for participatory forms of politics, both 
of which have helped to create a more favourable environment for the emergence 
of green parties. 
(b) Politics in 'Post-industrial' Society 
Before directly considering green parties, the impact of the previously mentioned 
changes on the general character of politics in 'post-industrial' society needs to 
be examined. As will be shown, political consequences concomitant with the 
shift to 'post-industrial' society have contributed to the emergence of a more 
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participatory form of politics associated with organisations such as green parties. 
Bell devotes relatively little space in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society to the 
question of 'post-industrial' politics, but he does hint at some of the potential 
political problems that may prove central in 'post-industrial' society (Bell 1974: 
341-367). A more detailed assessment of the politics of 'post-industrialism' has 
been undertaken by Samuel P. Huntington (Huntington 1974) and it is this, along 
with Bell's evaluation, which forms the main focus of this section. It is important 
to point out that both Bell and Huntington were writing 25 years ago, and thus it 
would be unreasonable to expect them to have foreseen the precise nature of the 
political problems - ecological and otherwise - that have confronted 'post-
industrial' societies in later decades. Yet their work does succeed in drawing 
attention to a political theme that has becoming increasingly salient in recent 
years, namely, that of 'participation'. 
According to Bell, one political consequence of the coming societal shift 
will be a 'participation revolution' which represents a 'reaction against the 
"professionalization" of society and the emergent technocratic decision-making 
of a post-industrial society' (Bell 1974: 365-366).10 Bell argues that the elevated 
position of 'knowledge elites' in processes of decision-making in 'post-
industrial' society, and broader transformations in the social structure, mean that 
political conflict will occur less and less between bourgeoisie and proletariat, and 
more around 'the bureaucratic and authority relations between those who have 
powers of decision and those who have not, in all kinds of organizations, 
political, economic, and social' (Bell 1974: 119). Huntington further suggests 
that demands for such participation may to some extent be intensified by the 
'growth in education' documented earlier, on the grounds that the latter leads to a 
10 It is important to point out that Bell does not attach the same meaning to the term 'technocratic' 
as Alain Touraine. For Bell, the term 'technocratic' refers to the extent to which political decisions 
in 'post-industrial' society are increasingly made on the basis of the technical knowledge wielded 
by 'elite' groups, e.g. scientists, researchers (Ben 1974: 362). Essentially, Bell is referring to a 
particular 'style' of elitist decision-making. In contrast, Touraine defines the terms 'technocracy' 
and 'technocratic' in a more fundamental sense, i.e. in order to identify and describe the actions of 
a new 'dominant class' which seeks to control the lives of ordinary people (Touraine 1981). 
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'sense of political efficacy' and, therefore, 'an increase in the knowledge of 
political and social problems and of the desire to do something about those 
problems' (Huntington 1974: 177).11 A further symptom of the 'information 
society' - namely, developments in media and communications - may also affect 
levels of political participation insofar as these developments have the potential 
to 'multiply tremendously the impact of anyone event throughout the society' 
and to raise overall levels of political and social awareness (Huntington 1974: 
165). These issues will be considered in more detail with respect to green party 
politics at a later point in the chapter. 
There are, it seems, certain similarities between the general argument 
outlined here and the position of Alain Touraine discussed earlier. Like Touraine, 
Bell and Huntington focus on the shift away from conflict in the workplace, a 
weakening in the position of the industrial working class, and a growth in citizen 
protest against the 'technocratic' character of decision-making in 'post-
industrial' society. However, there are also important differences. For example, 
whereas Touraine's approach is based quite explicitly on the idea that, in 'post-
industrial' society, there is only one 'true' social movement whose sole aim is to 
defend civil society against the 'enemy' of 'the technocracy', Bell and 
Huntington seem more open to the possibility that phenomena other than social 
movements might form the media through which citizen demands for 
participation will be channelled in 'post-industrial' society. According to 
Huntington, one possible form of 'post-industrial' participation may well be 'job 
oriented ... in the bureaucracies where most of the post-industrial society's white-
collar workers are employed' (Huntington 1974: 176). To this extent, Huntington 
argues that society may witness a 'simple intensification of existing trends 
toward white-collar unionism' (Huntington 1974: 176). 
In addition, Huntington suggested that there may be a growth in 'middle-
class suburban political participation' in the form of 'civic and community 
\1 Frank Parkin's piooeering study of eND in the 19608 made a similar connection between 
education and political activism; thus he claimed that 'higher education has something of a 
radicalizing effect on many of those who experience it' (parkin 1968: 171). 
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oriented organizations' (Huntington 1974: 176). For Huntington, these 
organisations will probably be 'issue organisations', often of an ephemeral 
character. However, there is also the possibility that heightened levels of political 
awareness and demands for participation will lead to 'new forms of political 
party organization, in which ideological and civic motivations play a key role' 
and, more generally, 'new types of political tactics, organization and style' 
(Huntington 1974: 176). Huntington does not specify what the precise 
organisational composition of these new phenomena will be, but, to the degree 
that green party organisations are considered by most commentators to provide 
new structures and opportunities for citizen participation, it seems plausible to 
suggest that they might, to a certain extent, be representative of public demands 
for greater political participation in 'post-industrial' society. While such a theory 
of 'post-industrial' politics cannot account for the origins of the core ecological 
dimension of green party politics, insofar as it highlights the elitist character of 
decision-making in 'post-industrial' society, it may help to account for why 
ecologically concerned citizens have frequently embraced the goal of enhanced 
participation as a step towards tackling the ecological crisis. To the extent that 
green parties seek democratic reform, and to develop more decentralised, 
participatory forms of politics, this could be interpreted in terms of an attempt to 
facilitate greater citizen involvement in and control over 'the complex interplay 
of social, ecological, economic, and political forces' (Spretnak and Capra 1985: 
45). If the emergence of green party politics is indeed partially a response to 
elitist decision-making in 'post-industrial' society then it can be hypothesised 
that the three green parties in this study should have made 'participation' a key 
theme within their organisation and programme of political reform. This 
hypothesis is examined in the next section. 
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(c) The Participatory Dimension of Green Party Politics: 
Evidence from Three Case Studies 
The extent to which the Austrian Greens have advocated decentralised forms of 
organisation and engaged in new, more participatory styles of politics is difficult 
to assess. It is certainly the case that the three main organisational sources of the 
party displayed very different attitudes towards the issue of participatory 
democracy. In the case of the VGO, there was no attempt to incorporate the kinds 
of 'anti-hierarchy' measures considered to be symptomatic of a participatory 
party organisation (Poguntke 1987). On the contrary, the party's organisational 
structure was hierarchical and its decision-making style authoritarian (Frankland 
1992: 12). Ideologically, the vGO expressed broad support for existing political 
and economic structures and hence did not call for the radical decentralisation of 
politics in Austria (Dachs 1989: 178-179). Similarly, the BIP - the organisation 
formed with the aim of achieving a green alliance for the 1986 national elections 
- largely consisted of an alliance of green party leaders from Vorarlberg, 
Salzburg, Graz and Vienna, who paid little attention to the views of 'grass-roots' 
activists with respect to the unification process (Haerpfer 1989: 27). The ALO, by 
contrast, conformed quite closely to the participatory model of party 
organisation, incorporating 'anti-elite' procedures (such as rotation) and 
emphasising collective leadership (Frankland 1994: 201). Further, in terms of its 
programmatic commitments, the ALO called for the widespread decentralisation 
of social and political life in order to ensure the maximisation of citizen 
participation in the shaping of decisions which affect people's lives (Dachs 1989: 
180). 
Second, following the election of eight Green MPs in November 1986, a 
parliamentary group (Grline Klub) was formed. The next stage was the forging of 
a unified party organisation - the 'Green Alternative' - in February 1987 (Jacobs 
1989: 496). Lauber and MUller have pointed out that the decisive push for the 
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formation of the new party was very much instigated from the 'top'. It could be 
argued that this to some extent goes against the participation hypothesis outlined 
above. The 'top-down' outlook of the new MPs was further reflected in their 
favouring a strong and centralised party created by and supportive of the 
parliamentary party. This view was in direct opposition to that of the 'grass-roots' 
activists, who advocated decentralised party structures and greater levels of 
participation. In view of these tensions, the parliamentary party chose to maintain 
a high degree of autonomy from the party organisation, an arrangement which 
stood until 1992. This of course meant that the party organisation was unable to 
exert control over its representatives, or even to issue instructions to them 
(Lauber and MUller 1998). 
In terms of the party organisation that actually developed, however, it 
should be stressed that the Greens were widely regarded as having an 
organisational structure that was the 'antithesis' of the traditional Austrian 
political parties. Thus in their 1987 constitution the Greens claimed that they did 
not intend to be a traditional party organisation, but, rather, 'a co-ordinating 
group, reinforcing the work of citizens' initiatives and movements, with whose 
autonomy they [would] interfere to the minimum extent' (Jacobs 1989: 496). The 
Greens also developed an 'open' approach to participation, rejecting the idea that 
formal membership and payment of a fixed membership fee should be 
prerequisites for being active in the organisation. As Frankland has documented 
'half of those who worked in the 1991 Viennese election campaign were not 
members' (Frankland 1994: 201). In addition, emphasis was placed upon such 
measures as collective federal and provincial leadership; the restriction of the 
simultaneous holding of certain party functions and elected offices; limiting the 
time that Green MPs could serve to two legislative periods; giving each party 
member the right to propose motions at the federal congress; and ensuring gender 
parity at all levels of the party (Frankland 1992; MOller 1996b; Lauber and 
MUller 1998). Frankland suggests that the 'organizational contrasts with the 
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major parties were sharp enough that one can conclude that they ... constituted an 
alternative model' (Frankland 1992: 15_16).12 
The programmatic commitment of the Austrian Greens to greater 
democracy is shown by their 1990 manifesto commitment to 'more direct 
democracy, less party dominance, a stronger parliament and more civic 
participation in schools and the workplace' (Frankland 1994: 206). The Greens 
have clearly incorporated within their political programme demands for greater 
participation and democracy, and directed some of their criticism at the 'elitist' 
character of political decision-making in contemporary society. For many 
Austrian Greens, these structures constitute the institutional framework which 
has developed alongside and reinforced the logic of industrial growth largely 
responsible for ecological deterioration, and must be replaced by a system more 
open to the representation of citizen viewpoints advocating ecological and social 
reform. 
Ideas of enhanced democracy and participation played an important role 
in several of the parties and movements involved in the formation of the Dutch 
Green Left, and have since featured as central themes within the party's political 
programme. Activists involved in various social movements pressed for the 
formation of a new political party that would allow for the expression and 
advancement of political interests which had hitherto received ineffective 
representation in the Dutch political system. Both the (electorally declining) 
Pacifist Socialist Party and Political Party of Radicals had long advocated 
decentralisation and greater participation as political goals and, while the 
12 However, more recent developments suggest that the Greens have undergone a certain degree of 
'normalisation', particularly with respect to their 'participatory' model of party organisation 
(MuDer 1996b: 81). By 1991, a feelin8 had emerged amongst leading parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary Greens that certain elements of the 'grass-roots' organisational model were proving 
a liability within the context of party competition. Thus, at two party congresses in 1992, the 
Greens agreed to relax the rotation rule (allowing MPs to serve up to four legislative periods) and 
remove the incompatibility rule which had hitherto prevented the simultaneous holding of elected 
offices and party functions (Frankland 1994: 208-209). Further, in the run-up to the 1994 national 
elections, the Greens proposed a 'top candidate' - Madaleine Petrovic - to represent their national 
'face' and, since then, the party has taken further steps towards 'professional, one-person 
leadership' (Lauber and Muller 1998: 18). 
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Communist Party had for much of its history adhered to 'democratic centralism', 
it had, by the mid-1980s, undergone a process of organisational reform which 
transformed the party into a more democratic and participatmy organisation. 
A glance at the Dutch Green Left's political programme reveals that 
enhancing opportunities for democratic participation constitutes an important 
ideological element of the party. Thus, as well as demanding that people be given 
'some influence on the content of their work and on the circumstances and 
conditions under which they do the work', Green Left calls for the delegation of 
'as many tasks and powers to local authorities as possible or ... to social 
institutions and organizations, wherever decentralization does not hamper the 
efficacy of these tasks' (GroenLinb 1993: 10). Yet at the level of party 
organisation, Green Left from the outset 'failed to include many of the elements 
of direct democracy ... which many Green parties in other rountries had ... 
incorporated' (Koole 1994: 282). Indeed, the organisational composition of 
Green Left has been described as conforming to the 'mass party model', to the 
extent that it adopted a 'vertical' structure and has a single party leader whose 
influence within the party has become more decided in recent years (Koole 1994: 
282; Voerman and Lucardie 199-8). Involvement of the rank and file in important 
policy decisions has been limited; the latter have been taken by the party 
congress (comprising delegates from local party branches), to which individual 
Green Left members have not been entitled to attend (GroenLin!cs 1993). Other 
measures designed to minimise careerism and maximise participation, such as 
the frequent rotation of parliamentary seats, have not been taken on board 
wholeheartedly by Green Left. In 1996 the establishment of a new party council 
was accompanied by the fonnatioll of an additional body - the Green Left Forum 
- which enabled rank and tHe as well as non-party members to discuss political 
issues and make recommendations to the new council. However, given that it is 
ultimately left to the party council to decide whether the recommendation(s) 
should be accepted as official-party policy, the extent to which this innovation 
empowers ordinary activists can be questioned (Voerman and Lucardie 1998). 
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Although Green Left has not been prepared to go as far as some green parties in 
terms of adopting a participatory model of party organisation, its ideological 
stance has undoubtedly been shaped by participatory themes and a critique of the 
over-centralisation of processes of political decision-making in Dutch society. 
Of the three case studies it is the British Green Party which has embraced 
decentralist and participatory goals to the greatest extent. Ideologically, the 
Green Party is strongly committed to the idea of a 'decentralised society' based 
around the principle of direct democracy - hence, it demands that people 'be able 
to make decisions themselves, not just through representatives' (Green Party 
1994: 14). Measures designed to enhance citizen participation in such a society 
would include a transition to smaller, more self-sufficient, communities; the 
devolvement of power from central government to local government; the 
introduction of a system of Citizens' Inititiatives whereby voters would be able to 
initiate new laws and policies; proportional representation aimed at maximising 
the range of political opinion in elected bodies; use of local referenda and a 
system of industrial democracy (Green Party 1995). Thus, for the Green Party, an 
important objective is the devolution of power to the 'lowest appropriate level, 
thereby rendering participants in the economy at all levels less vulnerable to the 
damaging effects of economic decisions made elsewhere and over which they 
have no control' (Green Party 1995). 
The Green Party's strong commitment to decentralisation and 
participation is reflected in the structure of its party organisation. Despite 
attempts to streamline the party's organisational structure, the British Greens 
have retained their commitment to decentralisation with local party organisations 
enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy from the national party organisation. 
Participation is seen to be an important theme within the organisation of the 
Green Party. For example, members are actively encouraged to take part in its 
policy community network, in which the party's ecological policies are 
developed (Green Party 1994). However, it should be noted that the Green 2000 
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reforms have, to some extent, reduced opportunities for the participation of rank 
and file members in processes of decision-making. 13 
All three green parties have attached some importance to the need for 
democratic reform and enhanced opportunities for citizen participation within a 
range of social, political and economic institutions. An important theme within 
the parties' critique of existing patterns of political decision-making is the idea 
that the 'closed' and far removed nature of these structures restricts citizens' 
capacity to control the forces which affect their quality of life, and thwarts 
initiatives which could play a positive role in the transition to an ecologically 
sustainable society. To the extent that 'post-industrial' societies are characterised 
by such structures, the emergence of green parties can be partly interpreted as 
symptomatic of the 'participation revolution' envisaged by Bell and Huntington. 
(d) Higher Education and Green Party Politics 
As was mentioned earlier, Huntington argues that, as well as a reaction against 
elitist decision-making, demands for greater participation in 'post-industrial' 
society are fuelled by the higher levels of education achieved by citizens within 
this context. This is because the higher education experience is believed to 
enhance political awareness among citizens and the desire to become directly 
involved in the political process. The periods during which green parties emerged 
in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands were also marked by an expansion of 
educational opportunities in these countries (Dachs 1989; Andeweg and Irwin 
1993; Byrne 1997). It is likely that the expansion of higher education in recent 
decades has contributed to the new social climate within which many green 
parties emerged, insofar as it has facilitated a greater awareness and 
13 For example, fonowing Green 2000, the system whereby any member could vote at the party 
conference was replaced by a delegate system in which only representatives of local parties would 
be entitled to vote (RUdig 1998). For more details of Green 2000, see chapters 1 and 9. 
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understanding of large-scale ecological risks and problems, and involvement in 
political organisations which address these issues. 
If a deeper understanding and awareness of ecological risks and problems, 
along with a heightened participatory disposition, are linked to the higher 
education experience then it would be reasonable to expect green parties - which, 
after all display these credentials - to draw their support disproportionately from 
the more 'highly educated' sectors of society. As can be seen from Table 4.2, 
green party supporters and members are 'well-educated' when compared with 
those of other political parties or the population at large. In the case of Austria, 
green supporters in 1985 and 1993 were both more likely to have passed the 
Abitur or Matura'4 than supporters of other parties and to have obtained a 
university degree. In the Netherlands, Green Left votes at the 1989 national 
elections were disproportionately drawn from university or other graduates. In 
addition, Green Left delegates in 1990 had attained a very high level of formal 
education, with over 80 per cent having experienced some form of higher 
education (university or higher vocational). The British example shows a similar 
pattern, with a comparatively greater proportion of Green Party voters in 1989 
having experienced further or higher education. As was the case with the Dutch 
Green Left, British Green Party members in 1990 seem very well educated with 
66.9 per cent having studied or studying for a degree. 
Despite the evidence presented here, there are a number of complex 
questions and issues that can be raised with respect to the proposed links between 
levels of formal education, ecological awareness and demands for political 
participation. For example, it is not immediately clear why experience of higher 
education should necessarily lead to a more sophisticated understanding of social 
and/or political problems and a heightened desire to participate in political 
activity. Clearly, there are those among the so-called 'well educated' who are 
politically apathetic and, conversely, those with lower academic qualifications 
14 This is the certificate obtained from a 'upper-track' secondary school which enables access to 
university in Austria. 
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Table 4.2 Levels ofFonnal Education among Green Party Supporters and 
Members in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands 
Country Educational Characteristics 
Austria (I) In 1985,29 per cent of ALONGO supporters had passed the Abitur or 
Matura compared with 6 per cent of SPO supporters and 12 per cent of OVP 
supporters. 
In the same year, 10 per cent of AL6NGO supporters had obtained a 
university degree compared with 1 per cent of SPO supporters and 4 per 
cent of OVP supporters. 
(2) In 1993,36 per cent of Green supporters had passed the Abitur or 
Matura compared with 8 per cent of SPO supporters, 14 per cent of OVP 
supporters, 11 per cent of FPO supporters and 31 per cent of LF supporters. 
In the same year, 13 per cent of Green supporters had a university degree 
compared with 2 per cent of SPO supporters, 5 per cent of OVP supporters, 
3 per cent of FPO supporters and 12 per cent of LF supporters. 
Britain (1) In 1989, 19.8 per cent of Green Party voters left full-time education 
between the ages of 18 and 20 compared with 11.4 per cent of the 
population; 23.5 per cent left aged 21 or above compared with 14 per cent 
of the population. Thus, 43.3 per cent of Green Party voters had experienced 
some form of further or higher education compared with 25.4 per cent of the 
population. 
(2) In 1990,66.9 per cent of Green Party members had studied, or were 
studying, for a degree. In 1988,7 per cent of the UK population had a 
degree. 
Netherlands (1) In 1989,41 per cent of Green Left voters were graduates of either a 
university or other tertiary educational institution compared with 22 per cent 
of the whole sample. 
(2) In 1990,81 per cent of Green Left congress delegates had experienced 
some form of higher education, a high proportion in comparison with other 
Dutch political parties. 
Sources: Austria: Muller and Ulram (1995); The Netherlands: (1) Information supplied by Paul 
Lucardie, Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties, University of Groningen; (2) 
Voerman (1995); Britain: (1) Rudig et al. (1993), (2) RUdig, et al. (1991). 
who are highly committed to participating in political protest activity (Byrne 
1997). It is also important to acknowledge the extent to which the expanding 
mass media has fostered public awareness of ecological issues and it is possible 
that this has given a broader impetus to green party politics and other forms of 
environmental protest in 'post-industrial' societies (Lowe and Morrison 1984). 
Even if it is accepted that higher education increases the lilcelihood that a 
person will participate in and/or support a green party, this overlooks the 
possibility that it might be a particular kind of higher education that has a more 
positive effect upon the latter. Eckersley, for instance, has argued that it is 
graduates in the humanities and the liberal arts - collectively referred to as 
'humanistic intellectuals' - as opposed to the 'technical intelligensia', who are 
more inclined to sympathise with green parties, by virtue of their educationally 
acquired 'enhanced capacity' to adopt a critical stance towards the existing order 
and to suggest alternative models of social and political organisation (Eckersley 
1989). 15 While further research is needed to satisfactorily evaluate this theory, 
there is some limited evidence which seems to lend it support, at least as far as 
green party members in Britain and the Netherlands are concerned. A study of 
British Green Party members in 1990 found that, of those who had studied or 
were studying for a degree, 60.1 per cent had chosen arts or social science 
subjects. Social scientists were well represented among Dutch Green Left 
congress delegates in 1990 - 42 per cent of the 'highly educated' had studied a 
social science subject (Voerman 1995: 120). Rising levels of education have 
probably contributed to the new social climate within which green parties 
emerged, but it is possible that it is a particular form of higher education - i.e. 
social science or arts-based - which is most linked to membership and/or support 
for these parties. 
Aspects of 'post-industrial' theory - the changing class structure, elitist 
patterns of decision-making, increased educational opportunities, media 
1$ Lucardie employs the term 'Iogocrat' to describe the kind ofweU-educated person most likely to 
support a green party. 'Logocrats' are defined by their 'sociological humanism', a characteristic 
they have developed through studyins social science or related disciplines (Lucardie 1989). 
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developments - can contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the 
context within which green parties emerged. These processes have contributed to 
the development of a more ecologically aware citizenry less wedded to 
traditional class identities and more committed to enhancing political 
participation and democracy with a view to solving the ecological crisis. Theories 
of 'post-industrial' society are less useful when it comes to the question of the 
electoral significance of green parties. For example, despite having the lowest 
overall levels of 'post-industrialism' among the three countries (see Table 4.1 
above), it is Austria which has produced the strongest green party in electoral 
terms, achieving an electoral 'low' of 4.8 per cent of the national vote (1986, 
1990, 1995) and a 'high' of 7.3 per cent (1994). In Britain, the Green Party 
remains electorally insignificant despite levels of 'post-industrialism' on a par 
with those of the Netherlands (see Table 4.1 above), which has produced a 
significant green party.16 The principal contribution of sociological theories of 
'post-industrialism' lies in the extent to which they can illuminate the nature of 
some of the broad social changes which have created a more favourable climate 
for the emergence of green parties. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that attention to the 'post-industrial' society literature 
can yield important insights into the nature of the social context within which 
green parties emerged. The decline of traditional class loyalties and the rise of 
the 'post-industrial' economy have contributed to the creation of a changed 
political climate within which new political identities have been able to develop. 
16 No study has yet explicitly focused on the relationship between levels of 'post-industrialism' and 
green parties. However, Kitschelt has investigated the impact of the size of the service sector and 
levels of higher education - the latter measured by the relative size of the student population - on 
the electoral significance of 'left-libertarian' parties in 18 countries. He could find no link. between 
either of these variables and the electoral significance of 'left-libertarian' parties (Kitschelt 1988a: 
206). 
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The socio-economic changes of recent decades have broken down established 
patterns of political allegiance and provided new organisations such as green 
parties with an opportunity to emerge on the political landscape. Green parties 
have clearly drawn their support from the ranks of service, often public sector, 
workers making up the so-called 'new middle class' of the 'post-industrial' 
society. 
Yet 'post-industrial' society theory can also shed light on the character of 
green party politics. It has been argued that green parties' heightened concern 
with issues of participation - in terms of their party organisations and/or demands 
for democratic reform in a wider sense - in part arises as a response to the elitist 
character of decision-making in 'post-industrial' society. For green parties, 
resolving the ecological crisis requires a radical decentralisation of political 
power and the maximisation of citizen involvement in decision-making processes 
which impact upon the human and non-human environments. The problem with 
much political decision-making in 'post-industrial' society is that it has tended to 
take place within elite circles, whose associates are committed to the 
continuation of the patterns of economic development which have precipitated 
the ecological crisis. Green parties wish to break down these structures by 
increasing democratic opportunities and through the provision of more open 
decision-making forums within which the ecological case can be properly 
debated and heard. 
The participatory demands voiced by green parties have to some extent 
been intensified by higher levels of ecological awareness brought about by the 
expansion of higher education and developments in communications in 'post-
industrial' society. The relationship between attainment of higher than average 
levels of education and green party support has been shown to hold with 
reference to the three green parties in this study and in a host of other European 
countries (O'Neil11997: 5). Yet it is possible that it is a particular form of higher 
education - social science or arts based - which most facilitates the development 
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of a more critical and systemic analysis of the causes and potential consequences 
of the ecological crisis. 
These insights have been more an outcome of a consideration of Bell's 
'post-industrial' framework than of Touraine's, however. In this chapter, 
Touraine's theory has been subjected to a good deal of criticism and it is clear 
that his overall framework is unsuited to the case of green parties. Contrary to 
expectations, the green parties in this study have not conformed to Touraine's 
definition of a social movement insofar as they have not sought to define their 
identity in terms of defending the 'people' against a 'technocratic' class, nor have 
they rejected electoral politics as a strategy for achieving change. 
Of the two theories examined, then, it is Bell's which can be most 
usefully applied to the case of green party politics. Yet it is clear that Bell's 
formulation of the 'post-industrial' society thesis cannot reasonably be expected 
to throw light on the question of why there has been pressure to form political 
parties with an explicitly ecological identity in recent decades. The discussion 
needs to be broadened out further to encompass a consideration of the 
relationship between social, political and ecological change. This is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Green Parties, 'Reflexive Modernity' and the 
Politics of 'Risk Society' 
To argue that the rise of green parties is linked to the existence and heightened 
perception of new, global environmental problems is to advocate something of a 
'common-sense' interpretation of the phenomenon in question. It is therefore 
surprising that so few academics should have chosen to pursue this possible 
connection in any great depth. The previous two chapters have shown that most 
commentators have preferred to rely on theories of 'post-materialism' or 'post-
industrialism' in describing the conditions within which green parties emerged 
and developed electorally.l In this chapter, however, it will be argued that a more 
satisfactory understanding of the ecological identity of green parties can be 
obtained by considering certain sociological perspectives which explore the 
relationship between environmental, social and political change. In particular, it 
will be maintained that the rise and heightened perception of 'high-consequence' 
risks and problems emanating from processes of social, scientific and 
technological development have played a significant role in the emergence and 
electoral appeal of green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. In 
pursuing this line of argument the concepts of 'risk society' and 'reflexive 
modernisation' as initially developed by Ulrich Beck but, more recently, within 
the work of Anthony Giddens will be utilised (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1990a, 1991, 
1994a). Before turning to these authors' specific arguments, however, it is 
important to say something about the general scope of their work. 
It has often been observed that the work of Anthony Giddens has two 
main theoretical foci. On the one hand, and particularly within his earlier 
1 An exception to this dominant trend can be found in Rudig (l990b). 
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publications (Giddens 1976, 1979, 1984), there is a distinct concern with the 
resolution of certain problems of a general theoretical nature (Held and 
Thompson 1989: 1-2). Here the central aim has been to undertake a detailed 
critique of the major traditions of classical and contemporary social theory, and 
to seek to 'move beyond the apparent opposition between perspectives which 
emphasize structure and perspectives which emphasize action' (Held and 
Thompson 1989: 3-4). His 'theory ofstructuration' - which points to the internal 
relatedness of structure and agency in social practices - forms the centrepiece of 
this theoretical project and is generally considered to form an important 
theoretical development within social theory and social science (Hay 1995).2 
On the other hand, much of Giddens' more recent work has concentrated 
upon the analysis of developmental trends and institutional features associated 
with modem industrial societies (Held and Thompson 1989: 2). A particular 
concern has been to examine the characteristics, consequences and changes 
associated with the development of 'modernity' (Giddens 1990a, 1991, 1994a, 
1998a). In terms of the present chapter, attention will focus on Giddens' 
explanation of the emergence of social - and particularly environmental -
movements. This will involve a consideration of his institutional account of 
modernity, attention to the character and perception of 'high-consequence' risks, 
as well as the rise of a so-called 'life politics' considered to have arisen within 
the context of 'reflexive' or 'late' modernity. 
While the ideas of Giddens and Beck have developed along remarkably 
similar lines in recent years, it is Beck with whom the term 'risk society' has 
become synonymous, his Risikogesellschaft being published originally in Gennan 
in 1986. The theory of 'risk society' essentially amounts to a radical critique of 
what Beck sees to be the social consequences of environmental change. Like 
Giddens, Beck argues that Western societies are entering a new phase of 
modernity - 'reflexive modernity' - 'characterised by the pervasiveness of risk: of 
2 An excellent outline of the 'theory of structuration', as developed within Giddens' writings, can 
be found in Thompson (1989). 
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uncertainties, insecurities and hazards' (Jacobs 1997: 6-7). Of the risks that are 
thought to pervade this new phase, ecological hazards are considered to be of 
particular importance. This is because, for Beck, they bring with them the 
possibility 'of the self-destruction of all life on this earth' (Beck 1995: 67). Given 
the considerable overlap between the two authors, this chapter begins by 
outlining Beck's perspective before proceeding to compare and contrast it with 
the arguments of Giddens. After applying elements of Beck and Giddens' theses 
to the case of green party politics in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands in the 
third part of the chapter, it will be argued in the fourth part that the 'risk society' 
framework provides considerable insight into the context within which green 
parties emerged, but that it also possesses certain shortcomings that require 
redress. The conclusion offers an assessment of the contribution of the 'risk 
society' perspective to an overall theory of the emergence and electoral success 
of green parties. 
1. Ulrich Beck on 'Reftexive Modernisation' and the 'Risk Society' 
A suitable point from which to begin an exploration of Beck's work on 'risk 
society' is his theory of social change. In Beck's view, historical development 
can be understood in terms of a linear sequence of three stages: pre-modernity, 
followed by • simple , modernity, then 'reflexive' modernity.3 For Beck, the phase 
of simple modernisation begins in the nineteenth century and takes the form of 
3 As was explained in chapter 4, Daniel Bell's approach to historical development also 
encompasses three stages: pre-industrial, industrial and 'post-industrial', A key difference between 
Bell and Beck lies in the emphasis placed upon the role of science and technology in the process of 
historical development. For Beck, principal importance is attached to the impact of developments 
in science and technology upon the creation oflarge-scale environmental risks. For BelL the role of 
science and technology is more explicitly linked to changes in the nature of work in 'post-
industrial' society. Beck's idea of human societies becoming more 'reflexive' also has parallels 
with the work of Alain Touraine. Yet while for Touraine 'reflexivity' is constituted in the 
enhanced capacity of humans to 'programme' social reality, for Beck the reflexive aspect of 
'modernity' is employed mainly within the context of his discussion of the character of 'risk 
society', This point is developed in due course. 
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the 'project of industrial society' (Beck 1992a: 10).4 Beck argues that in this 
simple or 'classical' phase there evolves a social consensus on the necessity of 
progress as defined in terms of scientific and technological development. The 
social legitimation of science and technology is thought to derive from the 
widespread belief that these processes will ultimately alleviate material needs 
and bring about material prosperity (Beck 1997: 28; Mol and Spaargaren 1992: 
441). 
Beck's crucial point, however, is that society is currently undergoing a 
transition from simple to 'reflexive' modernity. According to Beck, 'reflexive 
modernisation' essentially describes 'a radicalization of modernity, which breaks 
up the premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another 
modernity' (Beck 1994: 3). Two processes of change are considered to be of 
particular importance in marking the shift towards 'reflexive' modernity. First, 
societies have recently undergone processes of individualisation in the spheres of 
'work, family life and self-identity' (Beck 1998: 10). This reflexive aspect of 
modernity relates to the observation that people are increasingly being 'set free 
from the social forms of industrial society' and, consequently, having to make 
more decisions and choices with respect to their lives (Beck 1992a: 87). As Beck 
puts it, '[i]ndividualization ... means that each person's biography is removed 
from given determinations and placed in his or her own hands, open and 
dependent on decisions' (Beck 1992a: 135). 
The second important change can be defined as the 'ascendance of the 
risk-society' (Mol and Spaargaren 1992: 440). Put simply, the 'risk society' is a 
society in which it becomes increasingly apparent that the very motors of the 
modernisation process itself - science and technology - have unleashed 'hazards 
and potential threats ... to an extent previously unknown' (Beck 1992a: 19). In 
Beck's view, the 'latent self-endangerment' produced by these processes 
eventually begins 'to dominate public, political and private debates and conflicts' 
4 Of course, there is considerable disagreement within the literature with respect to the origins and 
definition of 'modernity'. See Hall et 01. (1990) on this issue. 
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(Beck 1997: 27). The 'reflexivity' of modernity is, in this sense, constituted in the 
widespread concern with its unintended 'consequences, risks and foundations' 
(Beck 1998: 20). It is this aspect of Beck's theory of 'reflexive modernisation' 
that forms the main focus of this section, since it the one which deals most 
directly with the causes and perception of 'high-consequence' risks. 5 
One issue that requires immediate clarification concerns the sense in 
which Beck uses the term 'risk' within his work. It is important to point out that 
Beck's definition of risk refers to a 'systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself (Beck 1992a: 21). 
Beck's theory of 'risk society', therefore, relates almost solely to so-called 'risks 
of modernisation' (Beck 1992a: 21). Used in this sense, argues Beck, risk can be 
distinguished from pre-industrial hazards - such as plagues, famines and natural 
disasters - which were seen as "'strokes of fate" raining down on mankind from 
"outside" and attributable to an "other" - gods, demons or Nature' (Beck 1992b: 
98). The discussion below seeks to explore the ways in which Beck employs this 
notion of risk in order to develop his arguments on the character of classical 
industrial society and then (industrial) 'risk society'. 
According to Beck, one outcome of the development of classical 
industrial societies was the establishment of 'institutions and rules for coping 
with unforeseen, unintended consequences and the risks they produce' (Beck 
1998: 15). For Beck, the 'calculus of risk' became the principal means through 
which classical industrial societies were able to 'control' localised risks and 
dangers (Beck 1992b: 100). In short, it represented an effective means of dealing 
with the uncertainties brought about by the advent of simple modernity. With 
regard to this matter, Beck has claimed that: 
, However, it should be noted that Beck's theory of the 'risk society' has a further dimension 
connected to the processes of individualisation referred to earlier in this section. Thus processes of 
individualisation in the sphere of work are considered to have led to the sense of economic 
insecurity experienced in unemployment, threat of redundancy, loss of rights, etc. For a fuller 
discussion of these connections see Beck (1992a) and Blowers (1997: 857-858). 
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The welfare state can be seen as a collective and institutional response to 
the nature of localized risks and dangers, based on the principles of rule-
governed attribution of fault and blame, legally implemented 
compensation, actuarial insurance principles and collectively shared 
responsibility. The classic example of this would be the creation of 
compensation and insurance schemes for accident and injury at work and 
unemployment. (Beck 1998: 15-16) 
In contrast to this scenario, Beck claims that the very foundations of the 
established risk logic are now being 'subverted' as society enters a second stage 
of risk: 'manufactured uncertainty'. This new climate of uncertainty, claims 
Beck, is a basic feature of 'risk societies' and is related to certain scientific and 
technological developments including nuclear power, the rise of the chemical 
industry, biotechnology and human genetics. Beck argues that the risks and 
threats produced by these developments are qualitatively different from those of 
classical industrial society for the following reasons (Beck 1992b: 101 ~ Beck 
1998: 12). 
First, many contemporary risks and threats, e.g. radioactivity, trace toxins, 
are imperceptible to the senses. Thus '[ m ] ore and more, the center comes to be 
occupied by threats that are neither visible nor tangible to the lay public, threats 
that will not even take their toll in the life-span of the affected individuals' (Beck 
1992a: 162). Second, these risks derive from the 'inexorable motion of 
autonomous modernisation processes that are blind to their consequences and 
deaf to their hazards' (Beck 1997: 28). Beck even goes so far as to argue that the 
hazards of 'risk society' are 'nobody's responsibility' (Beck 1998: 15). The main 
cause of this state of affairs, claims Beck, is the breaking down of existing 
methods of assigning responsibility. He argues that traditional state bureaucracies 
amount to a fonn of 'organised irresponsibility' to the extent that they 
consistently fail to keep pace with technological developments, leaving industry 
'with the role of primary decision-maker without responsibility for risks to the 
public' (Beck 1998: 15). This leads to a third point: that scientists have become 
'lay people in their own fields' who cannot generally foresee what the 
consequences of their technological experiments might be (Beck 1997: 24). He 
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suggests that in some areas of research the 'old logic' in which theories were first 
tested in laboratories has been abandoned as society itself becomes the scientists' 
laboratory, i.e. the site upon which theories and assumptions with respect to 
nuclear reactor safety, genetic engineering, etc. are tested (Beck 1997: 24).6 
Fourth, current risks are global in terms of their threat; as Beck puts it, they 
cannot be limited to specific localities or groups and 'endanger all forms of life 
on this planet' (Beck 1992a: 13, 22). Fifth, they are considered irreversible and 
cannot be compensated for or insured against (Beck 1992a: 22). 
Beck has devoted much space to the discussion of nuclear risk - a case 
which appears to match perfectly the characteristics of contemporary risks 
outlined above. However, Beck is also interested in the social, cultural and 
political explosiveness of hazard (Beck 1998: 19). A major reference point here 
for Beck has undoubtedly been the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986. In 
particular, Beck argues that shortly after the nuclear accident a 'transformation of 
consciousness' amounting to an 'anthropological shock' occurred. He claims that 
an important consequence of Chernobyl was a kind of 'mass awakening' among 
Western publics as to the potential destructiveness of relatively recent 
technological developments such as nuclear power. As well as this, Chernobyl 
had the effect of exposing Western populations to the scientific uncertainty that 
surrounds much technological development and to the 'generalized lack of 
knowledge in the face of the danger and the extent to which we are at its mercy' 
(Beck 1987: 156). 
Indeed, it is precisely this heightened risk perception that is believed to 
have contributed to the 'demystification' of science in 'risk society'. In the 'risk 
6 Against Beck, however, it can be argued that human society has long formed a 'laboratory' for 
the testing of innovations in science and technology. One could point to the example of the steam 
engine, which was first 'tested' on a wide scale across industrialisin8 societies durin8 the 
nineteenth century. The safety of steam travel could only truly be established by its widespread and 
IOD8-term utilisation within the 'laboratory' of society. Further, the Industrial Revolution initiated 
in the eighteenth century was made possible by a variety of technological changes - including the 
invention of new machinery - the safety of which could only be established by long term use by 
factory workers. In other words, contrary to Beck's viewpoint, it is likely that there have always 
been risks to society as a result of the introduction of new technologies. 
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society', states Beck, the critique of science and technology become widespread 
as a result of the failure of scientific rationality in the light of growing threats and 
risks (Beck 1992a: 59). Science, therefore, becomes less a source of 'security' 
and more a source of 'reflexive insecurity' (Beck 1997: 23). Commentating on 
the problematic position of science, Beck states that: 
the sciences are entirely incapable of reacting adequately to civilizational 
risks, since they are prominently involved in the origin and growth of 
those very risks ... the sciences become the legitimating patrons of a 
global industrial pollution and contamination of air, water, foodstuffs, 
etc., as well as the related generalized sickness and death of plants, 
animals and people. (Beck 1992a: 59) 
In his analysis of the political significance of science's 'demystification' in the 
'risk society', Beck refers to several likely developments. In terms of the present 
discussion of green parties, however, two seem potentially relevant. The first is 
that society gradually undergoes a change in terms of the kinds of problems and 
conflicts that lie at the heart of its politics. In short, Beck argues that traditional 
conflicts over the distribution of wealth become less important as society 
becomes increasingly preoccupied with the distribution of 'techno-scientifically 
produced risks' (Beck 1992a: 19). The second development relates to the 
emergence of various forms of 'sub-politics' reflecting a change in the political 
culture of contemporary society. 'Sub-politics', for Beck, represents the call by 
various social groups for heightened levels of democratic participation in 
decision-making processes concerning the direction and large-scale consequences 
of social and technological change, and their attempt to shape society from the 
grass roots (Beck 1994: 23). To the extent that new social movements and 
citizens' initiatives are concerned with such issues, they can be viewed as 
important centres of 'sub-politics' (Beck 1992a: 223).7 
7 There are clear parallels here between Beck's characterisation of decision-making in the 'risk 
society', and Daniel Bell's elitist description of this process in 'post-industrial' society outlined in 
the previous chapter. The key difference is that while Bell defines such decision-making processes 
125 
Of the new social movements, Beck attaches particular significance to the 
environmental movement. This is because, in calling attention to and protesting 
against manufactured risks and hazards, it is the one which most directly 
questions science and technology; that is, 'the conditions and prerequisites of 
industrialization itself (Beck 1992a: 162). But Beck also stresses the extent to 
which environmental activists are, at the same time, 'credulous' of science. Thus: 
A solid background of faith in science is part of the paradoxical basic 
equipment of the critique of modernization. Thus, risk consciousness is 
neither a traditional nor a lay person's consciousness, but is essentially 
detennined by and oriented to science. (Beck 1992a: 72) 
What this means, essentially, is that risk consciousness (and potentially 
environmental activism) is largely a function of scientific knowledge. As Beck 
puts it, '[ c ]hemical formulas and reactions, invisible pollutant levels, biological 
cycles and chain reactions have to rule seeing and thinking if one wishes to go to 
the barricades against risk' (Beck 1992a: 72). In light of this, he suggests that 
members of groups that tend to be most concerned about contemporary risks are 
often 'better educated' and hence more able to 'actively inform themselves' 
(Beck 1992a: 53). 
The facilitatory role of higher education in the emergence of green parties 
was a theme explored in the previous chapter. Other groups that are considered 
more likely to develop a sense of 'risk consciousness' and perhaps take part in 
environmental activism include the more affiuent, 'new middle class' on account 
of their being under less pressure to 'make a living' than the unemployed or less 
well-paid workers (Beck 1992a: 53). Indeed, it was precisely these social groups 
that Beck argues lay behind the rapid growth of the green movement in Gennany 
in the 1970s (Mol and Spaargaren 1993: 444). As was demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, members of the 'new middle class' do make up a considerable 
in very broad terms, Beck emphasises the extent to which such patterns are intimately bound up 
with the production of large-scale ecological risks. 
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proportion of green party members and supporters in Austria, Britain and the 
Netherlands. It has, however, been argued that of the 'new middle class' it is 
those working in 'human services' - teaching, healthcare, social work, etc. - who 
are more likely to be supportive of environmental movements (Eckersley 1989). 
For Eckersley, this is because such individuals are considered less likely to have 
a personal stake in the production process than those working in the industrial 
and/or scientific sectors (Eckersley 1989). The limited evidence available 
suggests that the membership of the Dutch Green Left and British Green Party 
does encompass a significant number of individuals drawn from these 
occupational groups.s However, further research is necessary in order to establish 
the strength of the proposed link between individuals working in human services 
and membership and/or electoral support for green parties. 
In addition to these factors, however, Beck points out that 'personal 
experience' - for example, proximity to toxic waste spillages, proposed nuclear 
power plant sites, etc. and media reporting on these kinds of issues - can also lead 
to heightened public awareness of ecological risks. In terms of green parties, 
therefore, it might be that a significant section of their membership/support base 
can be explained in terms of these latter factors. If this was the case, it could 
possibly explain why green parties frequently attract pockets of electoral support 
from within those social groups which do not fall into the 'highly educated' 
and/or 'new middle class' categories. 
In summary, Beck's work raises some interesting lines of inquiry with 
respect to green parties. In general terms, it suggests that they may represent a 
symptom of the heightened reflexivity of modernity; that is, of a society that has 
become increasingly preoccupied with the risks and hazards associated with the 
very motors of modernity itself: science and technology. More specifically, 
Beck's thesis raises interesting questions concerning their emergence and the 
factors which may underlie their electoral appeal. In particular, it raises the 
8 See chapter 4 of this thesis for the green party membership data. A precise breakdown of the 
occupational background of Austrian Green members is unavailable. 
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possibility that the heightened public perception of ecological risks and hazards 
which has developed during recent decades may have been a principal factor 
which led to the emergence of green parties and which, further, constitutes a key 
reason for casting a vote for a green party. These questions are examined at a 
later point in the chapter. The section below introduces the arguments of 
Giddens, comparing and contrasting them with those of Beck where appropriate. 
2. Anthony Giddens on Modernity, Globalisation and Risk 
(a) The Institutional Dimensions of Modernity 
In the introduction to The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens provides a 
working definition of 'modernity' , equating it in very general terms with 'modes 
of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the 
seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less 
worldwide in their influence' (Giddens 1990a: 1).9 Giddens' task then becomes 
one of developing • an institutional analysis of modernity with cultural and 
epistemological overtones' (Giddens 1990a: 1). This begins with a discussion of 
the attempts made by classical social theorists to identify the 'single overriding 
dynamic of transformation' which shaped the 'core institutional nexus' of 
modem society (Giddens 1990a: 11,55). For Marx, it was capitalism that formed 
the principal 'transformative force shaping the modem world' (Giddens I 990a: 
11). Other prominent theorists, notably Durkheim and Raymond Aroo, claimed 
that industrialism, not capitalism, gave modem societies their characteristic 
shape. For these authors, capitalism was viewed as a 'temporary phase in the 
longer development of industrial societies or a specific variant of a causally prior 
industrialism' (Goldblatt 1996: 17). This was in direct contrast to the Marxist 
9 The contrast with Beck's account of modernity - which roots the latter in the 19th Century - is 
evident here. 
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viewpoint, which saw industrialism in tenns of 'the outcome of a developing 
capitalist society that both temporarily predates it' and which was therefore a 
condition of the fonner's emergence (Goldblatt 1996: 17). 
Giddens is critical of the 'reductionist' tendencies of these accounts of 
modernity and proposes that the latter should be viewed in multi-dimensional 
tenns on the level of institutions. Unlike Beck - for whom simple modernity is 
equated with the rise of industrial society (Beck 1992a: 10) - Giddens claims that 
the former is characterised by the complex interaction of four institutional 
dimensions which, for analytical purposes, can and should be separated. Giddens 
argues that these dimensions have, through the course of the twentieth century, 
become 'world-historical in their impact' (Giddens 1991: 15). As will be seen, 
this view of modernity leads to a different analysis to that of Beck on the scope of 
risk in contemporary society and, potentially, to the kinds of political conflicts 
that characterise the latter. 
The first institutional dimension - capitalism - is defined as 'capital 
accumulation in the context of competitive labour and product markets' (Giddens 
1990a: 59). The second is industrialism, which implies the application of 
inanimate sources of material power in production processes: it is, states 
Giddens, associated with the 'transformation of nature' and the development of 
the 'created environment' (Giddens 199Oa: 55-59). The third aspect - surveillance 
- is taken to mean the 'control of infonnation' and the 'supervision of the 
activities of subject populations in the political sphere' by states and other 
organisations (Giddens 1990a: 58-59). The fourth institutional dimension of 
modernity is identified as military power, defined as state 'control of the means 
of violence in the context of the industrialisation of war' (Giddens 1990a: 59). 
Giddens argues that these four aspects of modernity cannot be reduced to one 
another and that, when combined, provide a framework for understanding some 
of the key tensions that exist in modem societies (Held 1992: 33). 
An important part of this aspect of Giddens' work concerns the 
connections he draws between these institutional dimensions and the kinds of 
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social movements that tend to develop in conditions of modernity. Thus, for 
Giddens, labour movements, whether of a reformist or revolutionary character, 
developed in response to the spread of capitalist enterprise. Environmental 
movements, in turn, can be linked to the rise of industrialism 'which has not only 
helped bring about environmental degradation, but has dominated human 
relations with nature in the modem period' (Giddens 1990b: 57). Such 
movements can be distinguished from civil and human rights movements, whose 
origins can be traced to the surveillance operations of the modem state. Peace 
movements, by contrast, are considered as both a product of and force against the 
expansion of military power (Giddens 1990a: 158-163).10 The possibility that 
green party politics might represent a kind of 'crystallisation' of these social 
movement concerns is an issue that will require some discussion later in this 
chapter. However, it is also important to provide a more detailed account of 
Giddens' explanation for the rise of contemporary environmental movements, 
one that shifts from a simple concern with the alienating effects of industrial 
society, to a consideration of the facilitative role of two important features of 
'late' modernity: the existence of 'bigh-consequence' risks and 'life politics' . 
(b) Environmental Movements, 'High-Consequence' Risks and 'Life Politics' 
in Conditions of 'Late' Modernity 
Giddens developed his initial ideas on environmental movements in works such 
as The Nation State and Violence (1985). In this work, the author offered an 
explanation for the rise of 'green' movements - from the nineteenth century 
onwards - which stressed the degree to which the latter represented a response to 
'the cultural alienation and spiritual vacuum that the contemporary urban 
lOA conspicuous omission within this framework, and one which is acknowledged by Giddens 
himself, is that of the feminist movement (Giddens 199Oa: 161). Giddens has since developed a 
theory of 'life politics', a category in which he places feminism, which will be discussed in due 
course. 
130 
landscape generates' (Goldblatt 1996: 68). On this reading, such movements aim 
to reshape the created environment and seek to restore the sense of 'ontological 
security' experienced among people in pre-modem times. A major problem with 
this interpretation, however, is that it tends to overstate 'the contrast between the 
cultural experience of individuals and their perception of the environment in the 
premodern and modem worlds' (Goldblatt 1996: 69). In particular, it fails to 
explain why the character of 'ontological security' should necessarily be more 
fragile in modem times than in pre-modem ones. As Saunders asks: 
Is nature - the nature of failed crops, fatal diseases and untamed 
wilderness ... not at least as threatening and disturbing of ontological 
security as any created environment? ... Does it really make sense to see 
people in their caves or mudhuts or primitive shacks as enjoying a 
"symbiotic" relationship with nature, when half the time they were 
threatened with extinction? Is not the likelihood of imminent demise 
likely to raise in particularly acute form the issue of one's ontological 
security? (Saunders 1989: 225) 
In a reply to his critics, Giddens accepts that his argument has certain 
weaknesses, and he is particularly sensitive to the possibility that it might be seen 
as supportive of a rather conservative romanticism which compares the 
'harmonious' life of pre-modem times with one of alienation and 
meaninglessness in the modem era (Giddens 1989: 278). Thus, Giddens has since 
revised his views on the origins of environmental movements and it is to this 
reworked explanation that the discussion now turns. 
In The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens, in line with the previously 
discussed reasoning of Beck, develops the thesis that the 'late' modem era - a 
period which is considered to have taken hold at some point during the past 40 to 
50 years - brings with it a new 'risk profile'. Giddens argues that human life has 
always been a dangerous and risky affair. In pre-modem times. the risk 
environment 'was dominated by the hazards of the physical world' (Giddens 
1990a: 106). As well as having extremely high rates of infant mortality, chronic 
illness, infectious disease and human violence '[a]11 types of pre-modem social 
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order were affected, often in drastic ways, by the vagaries of climate and had 
little protection against natural disasters such as floods, storms, excessive 
rainfall, or drought' (Giddens 1990a: 106). In conditions of 'late' modernity, 
however, 'the dangers we face no longer derive primarily from the world of 
nature' (Giddens 1990a: 110). Like Beck, Giddens stresses the extent to which 
the transformation of the relation between humans and the physical environment 
through the progress of industry, science and technology has lead to the 
'socialisation' of nature and the creation of new risk environments (Giddens 
1990a: 127). 
However, Giddens' account of the unique risk profile of 'late' modernity 
is further extended to encompass a consideration of the latter's inherently 
globalising character; a process that Giddens links to higher levels of 'time-space 
distanciation' in the modern era (Giddens 1990a: 64). 'Time-space distanciation' 
has been facilitated and accelerated by the development of 'disembedding 
mechanisms', such as symbolic tokens (money) and expert systems, which lift 
social relations out from localised contexts and rearticulate them across time and 
space (Giddens 1991: 18). According to Giddens, it is accelerating 
'globalisation,lI which is primarily responsible for changing the intensity, the 
type and the range of 'manufactured' risks that humans now face in the 
contemporary world. For Giddens, it is one particular variety - 'high-
consequence' risks - that is considered to occupy a central position in the risk 
profile of the 'late' modem era. Giddens' reasoning here broadly follows that of 
Beck as discussed earlier. Thus, 'high-consequence' risks reflect, first and 
foremost, the 'globalisation of risk in the sense of intensity' (Giddens 1990a: 
124). By this, Giddens is referring to the fact that risks such as the possibility of 
nuclear war or ecological disaster 'provide an unnerving horizon of dangers for 
everyone' and, ultimately, 'threaten the survival of humanity' (Giddens 1990a: 
11 Giddens defines 'globalisation' as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles 
away and vice versa' (Giddens 199Oa: 64). 
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124-125). Such risks are also surrounded by high levels of uncertainty. Since they 
refer to 'situations which are always liable to involve factors that have not been 
encountered before' (Giddens 1994a: 221), assessing the precise dangers 
involved tends to prove elusive for individuals as well as large organisations 
including states. Giddens claims that they form a key part of the 'runaway, 
juggernaut character of modernity, and [that] no specific individuals or groups 
are responsible for them or can be constrained to "set things right'" (Giddens 
1990a: 131). Like Beck, Giddens argues that it is accurate to claim that a new 
society is currently in the process of formation: the 'risk society' (Giddens 1998a: 
25). 
The theme of 'high-consequence' risks recurs time and again in Giddens' 
latest work (Giddens 1991, 1994a, 1998a). One interesting difference between 
Beck and Giddens is that the latter has adopted a definition of contemporary risks 
that moves beyond the former's almost exclusive concern with the ecological 
hazards associated with modem science and technology. In Beyond Left and 
Right, Giddens draws connections between four types of 'high-consequence' risk 
and the global institutional dimensions of modernity outlined earlier in this 
chapter. Thus, the 'progression' of industrialism is thought to have led to the 
emergence of 'high-consequence' risks of an ecological variety. Such risks 
include global warming, ozone layer depletion, destruction of the rainforests, 
nuclear disasters, desertification and the 'poisoning of waters to a degree likely to 
inhibit the processes of regeneration they contain' (Giddens 1994a: 98). The 
second category of 'high-consequence' risk involves the development of poverty 
on a global scale and relates broadly to the spread of capitalist markets within the 
modem world; that is, to the extent that the latter 'often have a polarizing effect 
on the distributions of wealth and income' (Giddens 1994a: 98).12 Military 
power, in tum, forms a further context for 'high-consequence' risks. These risks 
relate to the threat to humanity caused by the widespread existence of weapons of 
12 Insofar as global poverty is a reality (WeED 1987), it is certainly questionable whether Giddens 
is correct to argue that it should be solely understood in 'risk' tenns. 
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mass destruction together with problems of violence on other levels, e.g. male 
violence against women. Finally, and related to the surveillance capabilities of 
states and other organisations in late modernity, are potentially huge problems 
relating to the issue of democracy, in particular, the 'large-scale repression of 
democratic rights' (Giddens 1994a: 98). 
As well as defining the nature and scope of 'high-consequence' risks, a 
further component of Giddens' work relates to the latters' perception by lay 
actors. In particular, Giddens claims that individual risk perceptions have been 
transformed as a result of the intensified social reflexivity of modernity. One 
reason for this is that, in conditions of modernity, the practice of 'sealing over the 
uncertainties entailed in risky endeavours' through religion or magic is replaced 
by heightened levels of self-questioning and an awareness of risk as risk. The 
reflexivity of modernity also provides the key to understanding the 'well-
distributed awareness of risk' among human beings of the present age. Here, 
Giddens is referring to the fact that, in the 'late' modem era, people are likely to 
have greater access to information relating to modem risk environments. This, in 
tum, has led to an awareness of the limitations of expert systems of knowledge 
and public relations problems 'by those who seek lay trust in expert systems' 
(Giddens 1990a: 130). 
But what, exactly, does all this mean in terms of the explanation of the 
rise of environmental movements? For Giddens, importance is now attached to 
the character and perception of ecological problems in conditions of 'late' 
modernity. Rather than representing a reaction to the alienating character of the 
'created' environment, environmental movements now reflect 'the heightened 
awareness of high-consequence risks which industrial development, whether 
organised under the auspices of capitalism or not, brings in its train' (Giddens 
1990a: 161). This would imply that growing public perception of ecological risks, 
such as global warming or nuclear disaster, are the main factors which explain 
the rise of such movements. Environmental movements might be viewed as an 
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example of an adaptive reaction to the risk profile of 'late' modernity defined as 
'radical engagement'. By this, Giddens means: 
an attitude of practical contestation towards perceived sources of danger. 
Those taking a stance of radical engagement hold that, although we are 
beset by major problems, we can and should mobilise either to reduce 
their impact or to transcend them. (Giddens 1990a: 137) 
Apart from Giddens' analysis of the existence and perception of 'high-
consequence' risks, there is a further dimension to Giddens' account of 
environmental movements. Thus, in Modernity and Self-Identity and Beyond Left 
and Right, Giddens argues that environmental politics are also a symptom of the 
increasing centrality of a broader 'life politics' agenda in 'late' modernity. 'Life 
politics' can be contrasted with the main theme that has, since the early 
development of the modem era, shaped the political agenda of the Left (and thus, 
in counterreaction, the Right); namely, that of 'emancipation'. For Giddens, 
'emancipatory politics' has centred on reducing or eliminating 'exploitation, 
inequality and oppression', and has made 'primary the imperatives of justice, 
equality and participation' (Giddens 1991: 211-212). In all its forms, states 
Giddens, the aim of emancipatory politics has been 'either to release 
underprivileged groups from their unhappy condition, or to eliminate the relative 
differences between them' (Giddens 1991: 211). It can thus be characterised as a 
politics of 'life chances' and has been central to the enhancement of 'autonomy 
of action' (Giddens 1991: 90). 
While Giddens affirms the continuing significance of emancipatory 
politics 'to any radical political programme'. he claims that issues of 'life 
politics' are assuming heightened prominence in the contemporary world 
(Giddens 1 994b: 90). 'Life politics', states Giddens, 'is not a politics of life-
chances [but] is linked to wider questions of identity and life-style choice' 
(Giddens 1994b: 30). Its origins are thought to lie in the transformation of 
tradition and nature, and the process of rapid globalisation which are 
characteristic of the 'late' modem age. For Giddens, the disputes and struggles 
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connected with 'life politics' are concerned with the question of how humans 
should live in a world in which the 'certainties' of nature and tradition have been 
eclipsed by transformations in global society and the rise of a 'post-traditional' 
order. It is what Giddens calls the politics of a 'reflexively mobilised order' 
(Giddens 1991: 214). He offers the following definition: 
life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-
actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalising influences 
intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where 
processes of self-realisation influence global strategies. (Giddens 1991: 
214) 
Given all this, Giddens argues that to the extent that environmental movements 
raise questions of the link between contemporary modes of life in the 
industrialised world and ecological degradation, and propose the adoption of new 
lifestyle patterns in order to reverse such degradation, they can be positioned 
within the broad context of 'life politics'. Thus, according to Giddens, an 
adequate account of environmental movements must take account of the 
heightened capacity that humans have developed in 'post-traditional' contexts to 
reflect upon questions of lifestyle, as well as the existence and heightened 
awareness of 'high-consequence' risks examined earlier in this section. However, 
it is important to note that the concept of 'life politics' is not limited solely to the 
case of environmental movements. Indeed, Giddens argues that other movements 
- most notably the feminist movement - can be considered as displaying elements 
of 'life politics', to the extent that they call into question dominant identities and 
lifestyle patterns, e.g. relating to women, and raise issues of how 'we should live 
in a world where what used to be fixed by either nature or tradition is now 
subject to human decisions' (Giddens 1994a: 91). 
It is clear that other thinkers have taken a different stance on the nature 
and significance of environmental movements. From the standpoint of many 
green theorists and activists, and in direct contrast to Giddens' position, green 
politics are fundamentally to do with issues of emancipation, and thus cannot be 
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seen as 'lifestyle' questions. Eco-socialist thinkers, for example, have argued that 
green politics are part of the larger struggle against capitalism. It is the latter 
which is viewed as being responsible for social injustice and ecological 
degradation (Gorz 1983~ Weston 1986; Peppet 1993; Red-Green Study Group 
1995). From this perspective, green politics must be viewed as an emancipatory 
project; a project which defines the 'environment' in the broadest terms possible, 
and one which concerns itself with the emancipation of the human and non-
human natural world from the oppressive and exploitative system of capitalism. 
The interpretation of green politics as an emancipatory discourse is not solely 
restricted to abstract, eco-socialist analyses, however. In more 'concrete' terms, 
Europe's green parties could possibly be understood in terms of political vehicles 
through which emancipation from the exploitative politics associated with the 
anthropocentric outlook of established political ideologies - that is 'the politics of 
alienation and destruction, of both people and planet' - might be achieved 
(Richardson 1995: 11). The point here is that Giddens has perhaps overplayed the 
'life politics' dimension of contemporary environmental protest, and underplayed 
the extent to which much protest activity is motivated by issues of emancipation 
in a broad sense. These issues are taken up further with respect to green parties at 
a later point in the chapter. 
3. Green Parties and The Politics of 'Risk Society' 
Thinkers like Beck and Giddens have contributed significantly to an ecologically-
guided discussion about the dynamics of social change and the kinds of politics 
that might emerge in response to the rise of 'risk society' (Franklin 1998). In 
returning to the three case studies, this part of the chapter assesses how far Beck 
and Giddens' arguments can be used to illuminate the conditions under which 
green parties emerged. First, the extent to which an awareness of 'high-
consequence' risks has been catalytic in the emergence of green parties in 
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Austria, Britain and the Netherlands is examined. Here, the tenn 'high 
consequence' risks is taken as a broad category encompassing ecological risks, 
but also those risks considered to emanate from Giddens' institutional 
dimensions of capitalism, militarism and surveillance. The second section 
examines the usefulness of the categories of 'life politics' and 'sub-politics' in 
capturing certain aspects of green party politics. Attention to these questions is 
then followed by a more general critical consideration of the 'risk society' thesis. 
(a) The Role of Risk Perception in the Emergence of Three Green Parties 
One controversy that has been cited as having played an important role in the 
emergence of green party politics in Austria is that of nuclear power. The central 
claim by academic commentators has been that it was anti-nuclear activists from 
both the conservative and left wings of the movement who played a significant 
part in the fonnation of the vGO and ALO in 1982 (Dachs 1989; Preglau 1994: 
63-65). The view linking the intensity of the nuclear power issue to the early 
development of the Austrian Greens is one that is also stressed by the party itself 
(Die Grone Alternative n.d.; Parkin 1989: 31). The question that needs to be 
examined is whether the emergence of conflicts concerning issues such as 
nuclear power in Austria, and the subsequent emergence of green parties, can be 
interpreted within the broad theoretical framework of 'risk society' as fonnulated 
by Beck and Giddens. However, before directly addressing this question, it is 
necessary to provide some historical background infonnation about the nuclear 
power controversy itself. 
The Austrian nuclear power controversy had its origins in the policies of 
'forced modernisation' established by the OVP government of 1966-70 and 
continued by the SPO government from 1970 onwards. At the heart of the 
modernisation drive was an industry, political party, interest group and state-
backed nuclear energy programme that would, in theory, see the construction of 
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three nuclear power plants by 1990. Nuclear energy was an attractive option to 
government and industry at the time because it seemed to offer a 'solution' to 
certain problems highlighted during the energy crisis of 1973-74; namely, those 
of the finiteness of conventional fossil fuels and the dependency of Austria on 
other nations for its oil and gas supplies. In an attempt to try and persuade a 
sceptical population of the wisdom of nuclear power at a time when the first 
nuclear plant at Zwentendorf was nearing completion. the SPO government 
instigated an Atomic Energy Information Campaign in 1976 (Preglau 1994: SO). 
This campaign elicited a response in the form of a nationwide coalition of anti-
nuclear activists - the Initiative of Austrian Nuclear Power Plant Opponents 
(Initiative oste"eichischer Kemkraftsgegner - IoAG) • during the same year 
(Preglau 1994: 50). During the course of 1976-77. the anti-nuclear movement 
campaigned against Zwentendorfthrough a 'strategic initiative' which effectively 
involved using the 'official' information campaign to expose what it saw to be 
the uncertainties and dangers associated with nuclear power (Preglau 1994: 51). 
As well as an anti-nuclear movement which could claim to have approximately 
500,000 supporters, the government was soon faced with additional problems 
arising from its failure to secure the parliamentary support of the OVP on the 
question of the future of Zwentendorf and to prevent the rise of oppositional 
voices within its own ranks (Gottweis 1990: 52; Pelinka 1983: 256). The resultant 
deadlock led to the government calling a referendum on the question of whether 
a law authorising parliament to commission the nuclear plant at Zwentendorf 
should be passed. On November 5, 1978, 50.5 per cent of those who voted said 
'no' to Zwentendorf, 49.5 per cent 'yes' - a narrow defeat for the government and 
its social partners. (Pelinka 1983: 255). This led to the passing of the Nuclear 
Energy Prohibition Act (1978) which states that '[p]lants, in which electric 
energy is to be produced by atomic fission for the purposes of electric power 
supply, are not to be constructed in Austria. In so far as such plants already exist, 
they are not to be put into operation' (cited in Preglau 1994: 59). The successful 
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campaign against Zwentendorf undoubtedly gave a boost to the green movement 
and facilitated the emergence of green parties in Austria. 
In referring to the arguments of Beck and Giddens, a number of key 
points concerning the Austrian case can be made. First, opposition to nuclear 
power - the technological centrepiece of Austria's modernisation drive - was 
motivated to a considerable extent by a widespread awareness of and 
unwillingness to accept the risks associated with this technology (Preglau 1994: 
52). Second, regarding Beck's claim that 'well-educated' citizens are most likely 
to be concerned about ecological risks, it is worth noting that the trend against 
nuclear energy at the Z wentendorf referendum was significantly correlated to 
higher education (Pelinka 1983: 256). Third, the nuclear power controversy in 
Austria displays certain features of the reflexive social order that Beck and 
Giddens argue is developing in Western and industrialised countries. For 
example, during the government's Atomic Energy Information Campaign of 
1976-77, disagreements among 'experts' fuelled public scepticism towards 
nuclear power and the modernisation project in general (Preglau 1994: 52). It can 
also be argued that heightened social reflexivity in Austria was a function of 
processes of individualisation and 'post-industrialisation' (chapter 4) which 
gradually unfolded during the 1970s. In particular, the expansion of higher 
education, altered work patterns, and the undermining of traditional values and 
class as a basis for political action, resulted in the rise of a significant portion of 
the population that was less willing to accept the decisions of traditional political 
elites and more willing to consider alternative lifestyles and modes of political 
representation and participation (Gottweis 1990). 
These connections can be explored further in considering the nature of the 
environmental movement that emerged in Austria during the 1980s. The success 
of this movement undoubtedly gave added momentum to Austrian green politics 
and facilitated moves towards the establishment of a united green party. Indeed 
many prominent movement activists - including ex-SPO members Freda 
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Meissner-Blau and GUnther Nenning - would later play a crucial role in the 
founding of the Austrian Greens. 
Inspired by the successes of the anti-nuclear movement a few years 
earlier, the environmental movement clashed with the state and its partners over 
the decision to build a hydro-electric power plant near Hainburg, Lower Austria 
in 1984. In particular, environmentalists protested against the devastation of 
unique wetland areas that the building of the dam would cause (Lauber 1997a: 
202). As has been noted, both Beck and Giddens have claimed that ecological 
protest may be understood in terms of a response by citizens to the 'high-
consequence' risks characteristic of the 'risk society' . Yet a closer look at the 
Hainburg movement reveals that such protest did not arise in response to the 
perception that the project would give rise to the 'risk' of future environmental 
damage (as was the case with the anti-nuclear movement) but, rather, 'from the 
certainty of future environmental damage' (Goldblatt 1996: 71). Both Beck and 
Giddens can thus be criticised for tending to overlook the extent to which the 
impetus for much ecological protest, and indeed green electoral politics, has 
come from widespread public concern about the certainty of future 
environmental damage, as well as actual environmental problems (Goldblatt 
1996: 71~ Affigne 1990). 
The centrality of environmental issues in terms of shaping the identity of 
the Austrian Greens has consistently been reflected in the party's election 
manifestos (Frankland 1992; Lauber 1997a). Environmental concern has also 
been a key motive for casting a vote for the Austrian Greens. At the 1994 
national elections, 77 per cent of those who voted Green identified the 
environment as being their principal motivation for supporting the party (Luther 
1995: 136). In 1995 environmental protection was ranked even higher by Green 
voters, with 82 per cent claiming that 'the environment' was the main reason for 
casting a vote for the Greens (Dawe 1996). 
Returning to the additional 'high-consequence' risks identified by 
Giddens, an examination of party documents and existing studies shows that 
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concerns about global poverty (capitalism), violence (militarism) and democracy 
(surveillance) have fundamentally informed and shaped the Austrian Greens' 
political programme (Die Grilnen 1995f; Frankland 1994: 205-206). The issue of 
militarism played a particularly important role in the emergence of the Greens 
and continues to form an important point of criticism within the party. Despite 
being a neutral country lacking nuclear weapons, Austria produced a significant 
peace movement in the early 1980s whose energies were principally directed 
towards the 'militaristic' actions of foreign governments (Gottweis 1990). Many 
of its activists played a key role in the development of the Austrian Greens 
(Parkin 1989). Alongside a rigorous defence of Austrian neutrality, the Greens' 
concern with military related hazards and risks has led to an advocacy of 'the 
dissolution of NATO and WEU, international negotiations for the destruction and 
banning of all biological and nuclear arms, visible steps towards disarmament 
and the restriction of arms exports' (Die Grlinen 1995f: 4). That the Greens have 
shown concern about a range of 'high-consequence' risks is hardly surprising in 
view of the origins of their activists in the environmental, peace and other radical 
movements (Die Grune Alternative n.d.). 
Assessing the impact of risk perception on the development of the Dutch 
Green Left is complicated by the involvement of four already existing parties in 
the party development process. However, one interesting issue that can be 
investigated here concerns the degree to which the ideological rapprochement of 
the ePN, PSP and PPR was facilitated by a mutual perception of the risks 
associated with nuclear power, the arms race and other ecological issues which 
came to prominence during the course of the 1970s and 1980s. It was the period 
1969-73 which marked the starting point of a rapid growth in public awareness of 
ecological issues in the Netherlands. This was in part the consequence of the 
expansion of higher education and growing media coverage of ecological issues, 
but it was also a response to the publication of international literature such as the 
Limits to Growth report (1972), which added a global and 'survivalist' dimension 
to the so-called 'new environmentalism'. Alongside this growing awareness of 
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the nature and causes of ecological problems was the formation of a variety of 
environmental action groups, each offering different analyses and solutions to the 
problem of ecological degradation (Jamison et aJ. 1990: 135, 143). In general, 
however, large-scale technology was viewed 'as having a negative influence on 
the environment' (Jamison et af. 1990: 143). To the extent that these groups were 
critical of the ecological effects of scientific and technological activities, it is 
possible to view them in terms of a 'new politics' generated by the increased 
levels of social reflexivity characteristic of 'late' modernity (Beck 1992a; 
Giddens 1990a). 
In terms of cross-party co-operation and activism, however, two issues 
would prove to be particularly important. First, within the context of heightened 
levels of environmental activism during the 1970s, the PSP, PPR, and somewhat 
later the CPN, participated together in several large demonstrations against the 
government's plans to extend the Dutch nuclear power programme (Voerman 
1995: 114; Jamison et at. 1990: 157). Second, during the early 1980s, the peace 
movement proved to be a focal point for the three small parties and together they 
took part in mass demonstrations against the stationing of cruise missiles in the 
Netherlands (Voerman 1995: 114). What all this suggests is that the widespread 
perception of certain 'high-consequence' risks - that is, those associated with 
nuclear power and militarism - and the desire to do something about those risks 
appear to have facilitated co-operation between the PSP, PPR and CPN and led to 
calls for the formation of a broader 'green left' organisation. The involvement of 
such movement activists in Green Left is supported by the results of a survey of 
party members carried out in 1992, which show that 43 per cent had been or were 
currently active in the peace movement whereas the corresponding figure for the 
environmental movement was 30 per cent. 13 Significantly, these figures were 
13 It might be argued that this lower figure for environmental movement involvement as compared 
to the peace movement goes against the main thrust of this thesis - that it is ecological concern 
which has formed the primary motive for engaging in green party politics. However, in the final 
chapter, it will be argued that much public concern about nuclear weapons and militarism bas been 
motivated by ecological concern, as well as by a more traditional pacifist morality. In terms of 
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higher than those relating to involvement in the women's movement (14 per 
cent), the student movement (17 per cent), trade unions (21 per cent), the church 
(23 per cent) and 'work councils' (17 per cent) (Lucardie et al. 1993: 50). 
A sceptical outlook towards technological and industrial evolution - the 
dominance of 'simple' modernisation (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1994a) - to some 
extent informs Green Left's political programme. Thus the party's call for a 
'sustainable economy' is based upon the premise that the present system 'is 
threatening the earth and human existence' (GroenLinks 1990c: 6). Production 
processes involving the burning of fossil fuels, along with nuclear power and the 
widespread pollution caused by both the chemical industry and increased use of 
pesticides, are discussed in terms of the threats they pose to both human beings 
and the non-human natural world. There is an awareness of the global nature of 
environmental problems and of the responsibilities that the 'developed' countries 
have towards those of the 'developing' world regarding their resolution 
(GroenLinks 1990c: 18-24). Finally, as was the case with the Austrian Greens, 
there are other important areas of Green Left's political programme that might be 
interpreted as reflecting the range of 'high-consequence' risks which, according 
to Giddens, are a feature of the late modem world. Global poverty and inequality 
(linked to capitalism), for example, are regarded as requiring urgent responses in 
view of their rising levels and the 'threat to peace and security' that this poses 
(GroenLinks 1990c: 14). In terms of militarism, Green Left considers armament 
to be 'the greatest threat to peace' and advocates a policy of 'total worldwide 
disarmament '" for peace and security in the long term' (GroenLinks 1990c: 16). 
As in the Netherlands, Britain experienced a growing public interest in 
ecological matters during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Robinson 1992: 9). 
Indeed, the unprecedented rise in the number of environmental interest groups 
during this period occurred alongside the publication of several economic and 
scientific reports, most notably the Limits to Growth report and A Blueprint for 
green parties, it win be maintained that peace movement aims are entirely consistent with the 
ecological perspective developed by these parties. 
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Survival, documenting the deleterious effects of the dominant patterns of 
industrial and technological development on human society and the earth itself 
(Lowe and Goyder 1983; Richardson 1995: 5).14 It was within this context that 
PEOPLE was formed. As Rudig has argued, 'the founders of PEOPLE were 
motivated by a strong sense of imminent collapse if fundamental change did not 
happen in a short time' (Rudig 1986: 453). The theme of 'survival' formed the 
centrepiece of PEOPLE's first party programme; indeed the new party adopted 
the four principles deemed essential by the writers of Blueprint for ensuring 'a 
stable society - one that to all intents and purposes can be sustained indefinitely 
while giving optimum satisfaction to its members' (cited in Parkin 1989: 218).15 
The main point here, then, is that a critique of 'simple' modernisation which 
came to light in the early 1970s - possibly a feature of an emergent 'reflexive' 
social order - seems to have provided the main catalyst for the emergence of the 
British Greens. An important element of this critique was the growing perception 
of the global ecological risks thought to result from continued industrial 
development. 
The theme of risk continues to occupy an important position within the 
policy base of the Green Party - Manifesto for a Sustainable SOCiety (1995) -
which raises concerns as to the potential risks and hazards associated with 
nuclear energy, genetic engineering, climate change and a range of other 
scientific and technology-related processes. Other categories of 'high-
consequence' risk highlighted by Giddens receive attention within this document; 
thus, concern is expressed with respect to the potential and actual hazards - social 
and ecological - associated with global militarisation. Attention is also drawn to 
the links between the existing global economic order, ecological problems and 
14 Most notably, the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth (1972) raised the question of the 
unsustainability of Western lifestyles within a finite planet, while, in the same year, the Ecologist 
magazine published its Blueprint for Survival predicting the breakdown of society should present 
~attems of consumption and resource depletion persist (Richardson 1995: 5). 
, The four principles were: (1) minimum disruption of ecological processes; (2) maximum 
conservation of materials and energy; (3) a population in which recruitment equals loss; (4) a social 
system in which individuals can enjoy, rather than feel restricted by, the first three conditions 
(parkin 1989: 218). 
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poverty, as well as to the need for the radical democratisation of society (Green 
Party 1995). 
Interestingly, however, and quite unlike the situation in Austria and the 
Netherlands, conflict surrounding the issue of nuclear power appears to have had 
little direct impact on the emergence and/or subsequent development of the 
British Greens (Rudig 1994: 70). Compared to the Austrian and Dutch cases, the 
British anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s was rather weak - a 
quality attributed to the tendency of the British government to utilise the public 
inquiry as a means of de-intensifying or defusing protest activity (Parkin 1989: 
215; Rudig 1994: 71). Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the use of this 
mechanism served to provide a framework and focus for anti-nuclear protest and, 
arguably, obviated the need for more radical fonns of political action. 16 It has 
been claimed that the British anti-nuclear movement was further weakened by 
the government's tendency to reverse controversial policy decisions - on nuclear 
waste disposal programmes, for example (Rudig 1994: 71). Of equal importance 
in explaining the relative weakness of the anti-nuclear movement in Britain was 
'the absence of a large-scale nuclear expansion programme in the 1970s' (Rudig 
1994: 70). Compared with countries such as Austria and the Netherlands, Britain 
did not respond to the 1973 oil crisis by embarking upon a 'crash nuclear 
programme'. On this point, Rudig and Lowe state: 
With stagnating demand, looming overcapacities, uncertainty over reactor 
choice and the prospect of large oil and gas resources in the North Sea in 
addition to substantial coal reserves, there was simply not the same 
pressure for rapid expansion of nuclear energy. (Rudig and Lowe 1986: 
273) 
The rapid growth of the peace movement in the early 1980s - undoubtedly a 
symptom of the growing perception of the considerable risks associated with an 
16 For example, the Windsca1e public inquiry of 1977 signalled the start of a public debate 
concerning nuclear energy in Britain. Another notable investigation was the SizeweU inquiry, which 
began in 1982 and finished in 1985. See Rudig (1994) for more information on these and other 
public inquiries. 
146 
escalation of the arms race during this period - also failed to yield developmental 
benefits for the Green Party. The failure of the Greens to capitalise on the revival 
of the peace movement has been explained with reference to the latter's 'near 
institutionalization ... by eND and the Labour Party' (Rootes 1995a: 84). Unlike 
the situation in other countries, the British Green Party did not become the main 
vehicle for the peace movement. The relationship between the lack of strong 
support from social movements - most notably, those concerned with ecological 
and other 'high-consequence' risks - and the electoral insignificance of the Green 
Party will be further explored in chapter 8. 
The purpose of this section has been to show that public scepticism about 
the wisdom of the modernisation project, and heightened perception of the large-
scale risks and ecological problems associated with scientific and technological 
developments, have played a central role in shaping the patterns of green party 
emergence in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. Yet the nature and intensity of 
these issues has clearly varied from one context to the next. In Austria, the key 
impetus to new party emergence came in the form of risk and ecologically 
orientated social movements. In the Netherlands, the development of common 
ground on peace and nuclear issues between the Green Left parties and pressure 
exerted from within various social movements proved to be catalysts in the 
decision to form a new political party that would accord a central priority to 
ecological, peace and other risk-related issues. In Britain, however, the impetus 
for party emergence came not from social movements but within the context of 
much public debate about the 'limits to growth' which came to the fore during 
the early 1970s. Green parties are clearly a symptom of the 'radical engagement' 
(Giddens 1990a) which characterises the late modem era. The presence and 
heightened perception of global risks and ecological problems have helped to 
carve out the political 'space' within which green parties have been able to 
emerge. 
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(b) 'Life Politics', 'Sub-Politics' and Green Parties 
Other aspects of the discussion in this chapter have concerned Giddens' notion of 
'life politics' and Beck's concept of 'sub-politics'. As was mentioned earlier, 
Giddens has argued that the recognition that lifestyle changes are required to 
resolve ecological issues and minimise risks is an important element of 
contemporary environmental politics and movements. 'Life politics' are 
considered to be a symptom of what Giddens has termed a 'reflexively mobilised 
order'. The concept of 'life politics' refers to the extent to which citizens are 
increasingly reflexively concerned with how they should live within a context 
characterised by the existence of global ecological risks and hazards. 
It is often claimed that green party politics are underpinned by a different 
philosophical outlook to that of the established political parties (Spretnak and 
Capra 1985; Richardson 1995). While the latter have tended to view nature in 
purely instrumental terms, and pursue the goal of unrestrained economic growth, 
it is suggested that green parties have advanced a new set of philosophical values 
based upon the prioritisation of the needs of the planet in personal life and 
politics (Parkin 1989: 18). From this philosophical basis has flowed the idea that 
lifestyle changes are a necessary part of the broader attempt to resolve the 
perceived ecological crisis. It could be argued that Giddens' notion of 'life 
politics' goes some way towards capturing this dimension of green party politics. 
To the extent that green parties question dominant lifestyle patterns and call for a 
different, less exploitative, relationship between humanity and nature they may 
be expressive of the 'life politics' which Giddens suggests become increasingly 
important in the late modem era. 
The central philosophical question raised by 'life politics' ~ that is: 'how 
should humans live in an age characterised by global risks and hazards?' - is 
certainly one to which green parties have responded. The Austrian Greens have, 
for example, drawn attention to the links between dominant lifestyle patterns and 
global ecological decline. They call for a radical restructuring of the economy 
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along ecological lines, through tougher state regulations and economic incentives 
designed to encourage more 'ecologically sound' lifestyle patterns within 
business, government and the wider community (Die Griinen 1995a, 1995b). 
'Life politics' are also reflected in the philosophy of the Dutch Green Left, to the 
extent that the party calls for citizens to adopt a 'different attitude towards nature 
and the environment' (GroenLinks 1993: 3). For the Green Left, it is the 
'production and consumption culture' which lies at the root of ecological 
problems, and humans 'need to move away from lifestyles premised upon a 
narrow definition of 'progress' linked to materialism and economic growth 
(GroenLinks 1990b: 23). The connection between existing lifestyle patterns and 
global ecological degradation is one that is also made by the British Green Party. 
In line with the previous two parties, the British Greens 'challenge the view ... 
that [humans] must tread the path of ever increasing production and consumption 
to improve [their] lot' (Green Party 1992: 4). The party's political programme is 
moulded by its advocacy of an alternative lifestyle based upon the themes of co-
operation and 'reverence and respect for the complex web of life of which 
[humans] are part' (Green Party 1995). 
For Giddens, feminism can be considered as a further prominent example 
of 'life politics' in conditions oflate modernity to the extent that it has prioritised 
questions of 'self-identity' by seeking to challenge established definitions of 
women's identities based upon notions of domesticity (Giddens 1991: 216). 
Feminist principles have been embraced by the green parties in this study and 
form a key element of the guiding principles of the European Federation of Green 
Parties, to which these parties are signatories (Die Grlinen 1995e; Green Party 
1995; GroenLinks 1993; EFGP 1993a). Giddens' broad definition of 'life 
politics' also stretches to the emergence of other disputes and struggles which 
concern issues relating to the 'remoralising of social life' (Giddens 1991: 224). 
The rise of lesbian and gay politics, for example, could be viewed in these terms. 
That the green parties oppose discrimination on the grounds of sexual preference, 
ethnicity, disability, etc., and promote diversity in terms of self-identity and 
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lifestyle, suggests that a broad swath of 'life politics' issues may have influenced 
their social and political outlook. 
It has already been observed that Giddens may have overplayed the 
significance of 'life politics' and neglected the degree to which environmental 
protest has been shaped by an emancipatory discourse. While 'life politics' issues 
may have exerted some influence on green parties, it is also the case that their 
political profile has been fundamentally informed by a commitment to the need 
for emancipation from an economic system which, on their reading, has been 
largely responsible for ecological degradation and widespread human 
unfulfilment, and from a political system which has minimised opportunities for 
citizen participation, and marginalised a range of minority groups, e.g. the 
disabled, the poor, ethnic minorities (GroenLinks 1993; Frankland 1992; Green 
Party 1995; EFGP 1993a). Contrary to what Giddens says about the declining 
importance of the theme of 'emancipation' for 'late' modem politics, an 
examination of the case of green parties shows clearly that emancipatory issues 
have formed, and will continue to form, a fundamental part of these new forms of 
political activity which have attained prominence on the European political 
landscape. 
Green parties may to some extent display elements of what Beck has 
termed 'sub-politics' in the age of 'reflexive modernisation'. As was discussed 
earlier, Beck proposes that various forms of 'sub-politics' emerge in response to 
the 'demystification' of science, and a growing realisation that heightened 
opportunities for democratic participation are necessary in order that citizens can 
attempt to exert a greater influence on the 'dynamics' of social change. In the 
previous chapter, it was observed that participation and democracy were key 
themes of green party politics in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. Such 
demands were facilitated by the higher education experience, wider media 
coverage of ecological issues, and the extent to which decision-making structures 
in 'post-industrial' society had obstructed the effective articulation of ecological 
concerns. However, what tends to give the 'risk society' perspective added 
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credibility is the way in which it connects the rise of these demands to a wider set 
of issues concerning the relationship between the unaccountable character of 
much scientific and technological decision-making in contemporary society and 
the 'risky' situation in which humanity now finds itself It suggests that the 
participatory demands of green parties are not just a response to what Bell might 
term 'elitist decision-making', but also to the ways in which a general lack of 
democratic accountability has contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of 
large-scale hazards, risks and manufactured uncertainties. This 'democratic 
deficit' is in part linked to globalising processes which, Giddens argues, 'have 
transferred powers away from nations and into depoliticized global space' 
(Giddens 1998b: 141). 
4. 'Risk Society': An Assessment 
While the arguments of Beck and Giddens appear to offer important insights into 
the changed environmental and social context within which green parties 
emerged, there remain a number of critical questions that can be asked of the 
'risk society' perspective. These potentially have implications for the overall 
status of the theory of 'risk society' in terms of developing a framework within 
which to interpret the emergence of green parties. One area of criticism has 
focused upon Giddens' theory of globalisation. The notion of 'risk society' is 
rooted in what Giddens terms 'accelerating globalisation'. Yet Giddens' concept 
of globalisation is characterised by a general vagueness - it has been defined as 
'the intensification of worldwide social relations' (Giddens 1990a: 64), and, most 
recently, in terms of a 'complex range of processes, driven by a mixture of 
political and economic influences' (Giddens 1998b: 33). Commentators such as 
Yearley have argued that the 'flexibility' - as he kindly puts it - of Giddens' 
concept of globalisation 'turns it, in practice, into a descriptive, nominalistic 
approach to global-level phenomena' (Yearley 1995: 16). Questions have also 
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been directed at Giddens' claim that globalisation is a consequence of modernity. 
It is suggested that there are 'independent dynamics of global culture' which are 
not necessarily connected with the modernisation process (Yearley 1995: 16). In 
short, Giddens can be criticised for failing to provide an adequate elaboration of 
the concept which underpins his theory of 'high-consequence' risks - that of 
'globalisation' . 
A further contentious issue concerns the extent to which it is accurate to 
describe contemporary societies as 'risk societies'. One way in which this issue 
can be approached involves a consideration of the degree to which ecological 
risks and hazards have become more prominent in Western societies in recent 
decades, and an assessment of the position and perception of risk issues in 
contemporary politics and society. There is now a considerable literature which 
broadly affirms the claim that ecological risks and hazards have increased both 
quantitatively and qualitatively during the course of the latter part of this century. 
As well as there being evidence to suggest that the number of ecologically 
damaging incidents has risen (Garner 1996), it is also widely recognised that 
ecological problems are now global in terms of their scope, scale and threat. 
Responses to these trends in the form of documents such as the Limits to Growth 
Report (1972), the Global 2000 Report to the President of the United States 
(1980), the State of the World Reports (from 1984 onwards), the Bruntland 
Report (1987) and Agenda 21 (1992) have played an important part in infonning 
international decision-makers and contributed to a broader public awareness of 
ecological issues. Certainly, it seems plausible to argue that the ecological risks 
and hazards with which the contemporary world appears increasingly aware are 
greater than those of earlier decades. As Goldblatt comments: 
the ozone holes are bigger; the apparent trends of climate change are 
more ominous; more land is under threat from infrastructures and 
industrial development or desertification~ there are innumerably more 
nuclear installations dotted across the earth; the state of the world's 
oceans is declining. (Goldblatt 1996: 175) 
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To the extent that green parties emerged across Europe during a period which 
saw notions of a global ecological crisis receive increasing attention among 
Western populations, and that their development was linked to rising concern 
about aspects of this crisis, it seems that there may be something in the argument 
that they represent a new politics of 'risk society' . 
Other authors are more sceptical with regard to Beck's more specific 
claim that conflicts over the distribution of wealth are becoming less important as 
society becomes increasingly concerned about the distribution of large-scale 
hazards and risks (Beck 1992a: 19). Traditional issues of economic inequality, 
welfare and security continue to dominate the content of the political agenda in 
Western countries. Goldblatt points out that, contrary to the 'risk society' thesis, 
major political parties 'of all complexions' in the West: 
continue to make their core appeals to the electorate in terms of economic 
growth, increasing prosperity, more jobs, etc. Government popularity still 
appears to be closely correlated to economic performance, economic 
expectations and the economic plausibility of the opposition. Taxation 
rates and take-home incomes continue to be one of the central issues of 
public policy. (Goldblatt 1996: 177) 
There can be little doubting the assertion that new conflicts concerning the 
distribution of ecological risks and hazards have become more prominent in 
recent decades. But the claim that the existence of such conflicts heralds the 
transition to a 'risk society' characterised by a break with traditional distributive 
politics can be questioned on the grounds that the latter continue to dominate 
affairs in Western countries. 
A further set of problems has more specifically to do with the 
characterisation and place of the theme of 'risk' in Beck and Giddens' work. It 
can be argued that both writers have adopted a very individuated conception of 
risk, and, consequently, overlooked the extent to which people have been 
motivated to engage in environmental protest activity out of concern about the 
'risks' posed to society as a whole, to the non-human natural world, and to future 
generations. The 'risk society' perspective would be enhanced by a more 
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comprehensive assessment of the parameters of risk; in particular, by a 
consideration of the degree to which concern about risks is triggered by concern 
with respect to 'others' as well as to the immediate individual. To the extent that 
green parties have expressed concern about risks, it is clear that their 
understanding of the significance of these risks is guided by a sense of their 
'collective' potential implications. 
More generally, there is a tendency within the writings of Beck and 
Giddens to exaggerate the role that risk has actually played in shaping the context 
within which green parties emerged. As the previous section of this chapter 
showed, awareness of risks has not been the sole factor which has motivated 
citizens to engage in environmental protest activity, or to form or support green 
parties. There is firm evidence to suggest that pressure to form green parties has 
in part arisen from the desire to tackle actual environmental problems, or from an 
awareness of the certainty of future ecological damage. As well as a response to 
the existence of 'high-consequence' risks, the rise of green parties must be 
understood as a mobilisation against the indifference of government 
organisations towards a new generation of global environmental problems which 
have impacted on human and non-human life, and which have particularly come 
to light since the 1980s. 
A brief consideration of green parties' policy documents lends support to 
this argument. As well as voicing concern about the risks associated with nuclear 
power, global warming, etc., green parties devote much time and energy to 
tackling actual instances of environmental pollution and attacking specific 
government policies which would add to existing global ecological pressures. For 
instance, an account of the Dutch Green Left's activities at the local level 
identifies the degree to which its council members have felt it important to 
respond to actual ecological problems, including air and water pollution, energy 
over-consumption and traffic congestion (GroenLinks I 990d). In Britain, the 
Green Party opposed the previous (Conservative) government's roads programme 
not just on the grounds that it contributed to ecological risks such as global 
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warming, but also because, if built, these roads would generate new pollution, 
destroy wildlife habitat and waste valuable resources (Green Party 1997: 7). In 
Austria, an important focus for the Greens' thinking has been the development of 
policies aimed at alleviating, among other things, energy and traffic problems, 
waste problems and water pollution (Die Griinen 1995a, 1995b). Beck and 
Giddens' view of the likely cause of environmental politics, i.e. rising levels of 
ecological risk perception, appears oversimplistic and needs to be supplemented 
by consideration of the factors mentioned above. 
One question that could be raised here concerns the relationship between 
actual environmental problems and ecological risks. Clearly, some problems 
classed as 'environmental' - e.g. atmospheric pollution, or toxic waste dumping-
can also carry associated 'risks'. Thus while dumping toxic waste at sea or on an 
urban site may cause significant damage to the local or global environment, there 
could be added health 'risks' posed to communities living in close proximity to 
the waste site. Similarly, landfill sites may be a 'blot on the landscape' but also 
carry significant risks arising from the generation of methane gas. The 
construction of a hydroelectric power station may cause untold damage to a river 
forest and also increase the 'risk' that a rare insect species, whose natural habitat 
is the forest, will become instinct. The point is that ecological risks and 
environmental problems are often inextricably linked. Yet neither Beck nor 
Giddens has drawn attention to this important issue. The perception of ecological 
risks, the existence of actual environmental problems and the certainty of future 
environmental damage have been important factors in the emergence of many 
green parties, but it should be noted that they are often characterised by complex 
interactions with each other. 
Several authors have been critical about the theory of 'risk society' 
because it tends to ignore the relationship between capitalism and the production 
of and exposure to ecological risks and hazards. This view has been most recently 
elaborated by Ted Benton (Benton 1997). According to Benton, many ecological 
risks and hazards are not so much outcomes of scientific and technological 
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advances as of capitalist economic trends. He refers to the case of the BSE crisis, 
claiming that 'the hazard was not generated by a technological advance, but 
rather by changes in animal feed regimes. These were adopted by the agricultural 
industry in pursuit of lower costs - and therefore higher profit' (Benton 1997: 39-
40). Even in the cases where technological innovation is more directly bound up 
with the production of ecological hazards, e.g. nuclear power or biotechnology, 
Benton claims that Beck and Giddens' accounts fail to see the interconnections 
between the latter, economic interests and power relations. For Benton, science 
and technology are not autonomous processes but rather have been subordinated 
'in key sectors to the competitive priorities of private capital' (Benton 1997: 41). 
Beck's analysis has been further criticised for its failure to address the 
potential link between capitalism, inequality and exposure to ecological risks and 
hazards. As was mentioned earlier, Beck suggests that the shift to the 'risk 
society' is marked by a break with the politics of economic distribution as society 
becomes increasingly preoccupied with the distribution of 'techno-scientifically 
produced risks' (Beck 1992a: 19). Yet several commentators have pointed out 
that those who are most directly exposed to ecological risks and hazards are often 
the poorest in society, suggesting that the politics of economic distribution are 
very much linked to the politics of risk (Benton 1997; The Independent on 
Sunday, 9 March 1999). According to Benton, all of this has implications for the 
way in which the emergence of green parties should be interpreted. He suggests, 
in contrast to Beck and Giddens, that 'they cannot be confined ... to the role of 
resisters to new industrial technologies, in abstraction from the capitalist 
relations under which those technologies are developed and implemented' 
(Benton 1997: 44). They are not, as Giddens has claimed, 'beyond left and right' 
(Giddens 1994a). To the extent that they arise within this context, argues Benton, 
such organisations should seek to establish dialogue and unite with labour and 
other movements opposed to capitalism (Benton 1997: 44-45; Red-Green Study 
Group 1995). 
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However, care must be taken in pursuing this line of argument. As Benton 
admits, [e ]ven where radical greens ... perceive "greed" and "profit" as the 
enemies of the environment, they by no means necessarily share other elements 
of a socialist understanding of capitalism, and generally do not see transition to a 
socialist society as an obvious solution' (Benton 1997: 45). With respect to green 
parties, the European Federation of Green Parties' GUiding Principles contains 
no reference to either 'capitalism' or 'socialism'. Green parties have tended to be 
critical of 'industrialism' and 'unlimited economic growth', but they have not 
explicitly defined themselves in 'anti-capitalist' terms. However, while Benton's 
understanding of green politics has been moulded by his own perspective - which 
does not seem to correspond with the political programmes of Europe's green 
parties - his point that Beck fails to address the connections between issues of 
economic distribution and exposure to ecological risks and hazards is probably 
accurate. 17 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued in favour of an understanding of the emergence of green 
parties which emphasises the importance of the existence and heightened public 
perception of global risks associated, in particular, with nuclear power, 
militarism, and the broader ecological crisis. Global industrialism, and 
developments in science and technology associated with the 'modernisation' 
process, have combined to produce a new order of environmental risks which 
pose a fundamental threat to the survival of humanity, broader ecosystems and to 
the earth itself The past few decades have also witnessed an increase in levels of 
public awareness of these risks, and it is within this context that the emergence 
and electoral appeal of green parties must, in part, be understood. Green parties 
17 The relationship between poverty and environmental issues is pursued further in relation to green 
parties in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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have undoubtedly been formed in response to the need for new political vehicles 
through which citizens' concerns about the large-scale risks posed to humans and 
the non-human natural world can be effectively articulated. It would, however, be 
mistaken to argue, in the vein of Beck and Giddens, that contemporary society 
should be defined as a 'risk society'. While risk issues have emerged as 
significant foci for political conflict in recent decades, it is undeniable that 
traditional distributive politics continue to dominate the political agenda in 
Western countries. 
Besides the theme of risk, it was argued that the emergence of green 
parties could be linked to the growth in public concern about actual 
environmental problems and the certainty of future environmental damage. A 
weakness of the 'risk society' perspective is that it does not allow for the role of 
these issues in stimulating ecological protest. An adequate understanding of the 
emergence of green parties must be supplemented by a consideration of the 
influence that the rise of a new, global generation of ecological problems that 
cannot easily be resolved has had on the fashioning of a public consciousness that 
is more attuned to green party politics. Chapter 4 showed that the development of 
this ecological consciousness has been further facilitated by processes of social 
change - e.g. higher education, developments in communications - linked to the 
shift to 'post-industrial' society. 
Of the additional themes considered in this chapter, Beck and Giddens' 
notions of'life-' and 'sub-' politics appear to cast some light on the character of 
green party politics. Clearly green parties have called for a serious rethinking of 
dominant lifestyle patterns and made demands for greater democratic 
participation so that the perpetuators of ecologically damaging politics might be 
more effectively challenged. Yet it is also true that the politics of green parties 
have been informed by a strong emancipatmy current. In broad terms, green 
parties wish to see an end to the exploitation of both person and planet. The 
ideological content of green party politics is not simply a reflection of the 
increased salience of 'life politics' issues in contemporary society. It can also be 
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seen as a representation of a new, emancipatory form of politics which has 
emerged in an era characterised by the prevalence of global ecological risks and 
problems. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, an attempt will be made to develop an 
ecologically informed understanding of the social and environmental conditions 
that facilitated the emergence of green parties based upon a synthesis of the 
themes discussed in the present chapter and in chapter 4. An attempt will also be 
made to work the theme of 'economic affluence' (discussed within the context of 
'post-materialist' theory in chapter 3), as well as some additional concepts which 
fall outside the scope of the main chapters, into this framework. 
Thus far the discussion has centred on the extent to which three macro-
theories can throw light on the processes of social and environmental change 
which have formed the context within which green parties have emerged. Yet 
there are a number of concepts that have been developed within the discipline of 
political studies which may enable a refinement of the understanding of the 
emergence of green parties advanced so far, and provide insight into the question 
that sociological and value-based theories have proved incapable of explaining: 
the varying electoral success of green parties. These issues are discussed in the 
following four chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
Political State-institutional Structures and 
Green Parties 
In this chapter, and the three following it, arguments derived from the political 
studies literature which have been deployed in the attempt to account for the 
emergence and varying electoral significance of green parties will be critically 
examined. The previous three chapters have explored the broad social and 
environmental context of the emergence of green parties. But as yet little has 
been said about the political and institutional conditions which may impinge on 
party emergence and/or on the electoral significance of green parties. The 
following four chapters are structured around four thematic categories which, 
taken together, provide a framework for thinking about these questions. The 
categories developed - namely, political state-institutional structures (chapter 6)~ 
electoral dealignment and the nature of political competition (chapter 7); modes 
of interest representation (chapter 8); and internal party dynamics (chapter 9) -
are an attempt to synthesise the diverse range of political and institutional 
structures and arrangements that have been cited as potentially impacting upon 
the emergence and/or electoral 'success' or 'failure' of green parties, as well as 
upon new parties generally (Hauss and Rayside 1978; MUller-Rommel 1982; 
Rudig 1986; Kitschelt 1988a, 1989, 1990; Rootes 1995b). 
The present chapter is divided into two main sections. The first outlines 
the definition and scope of the category 'political state-institutional structure'; 
the second section considers in turn the three key dimensions identified in the 
first section in terms of their impact on the emergence and electoral significance 
of green parties in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. The central argument in 
this chapter is that while certain political state-institutional structures - e.g. the 
electoral law - can potentially affect the timing of green party formation, the real 
160 
influence of such structures lies in the extent to which electoral systems, party 
financing arrangements, and government centralisation/decentralisation can 
significantly affect the electoral prospects of green parties. As will be 
demonstrated, political state-institutional structures can increase or decrease the 
likelihood that a green party will attain electorally significant status within a 
particular political system. 
1. Defining Political State-institutional Structures 
In general terms, political state-institutional structures consist in 'the rules of the 
political game, as defined in the constitutions, conventions or institutions of a 
particular polity' (Doyle and McEachern 1998: 124). There are several such 
structures that might affect the propensity of green parties to form, and the extent 
to which they will develop as electorally significant political actors. The first 
relates to the type of electoral system. The most important distinction here is 
between plurality systems 'usually with single-member districts, according to 
which a party or candidate securing a [relative or simple] majority of the votes 
"takes all'''; and proportional electoral systems 'by which a party's share of 
parliamentary mandates is proportional to its share of the popular vote' (MOUer-
Rommel 1982: 72). The work of Duverger (1954) is of direct relevance here. 
Duverger distinguishes between the mechanical and psychological consequences 
of electoral systems. The mechanical effect of electoral systems relates primarily 
to the fact that 'because it is more difficult for smaller parties to win seats under 
non-PR systems, the mechanics of these systems are bound to result in fewer 
parties in parliament' (Farrell 1997: 149). Electoral systems also have a 
psychological dimension insofar as their likely political consequences may 
influence the decision of elites to either form or not to form new political parties. 
Thus, in plurality systems, it is argued that elites may refrain from forming new 
parties on the grounds that they know it will be more difficult for their party to 
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win seats. In addition, plurality systems may have a psychological effect in the 
sense that 'voters are aware of the fact that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted 
vote and therefore they are less inclined to bother voting for them' (Farrell 1997: 
149). 
In light of the above, it might be expected that systems of proportional 
representation (PR) would be more likely to facilitate the emergence of 
electorally significant green parties. In terms of their mechanical effect, 
proportional electoral systems in Austria and the Netherlands may have 
facilitated the greater electoral success of green parties to the extent that their 
functioning has made gaining parliamentary representation an 'easier' task than 
in Britain. Turning to psychological aspects, it might be anticipated that systems 
of PR should lead to higher levels of electoral support for green parties as voters 
are aware that, under such conditions, their votes 'count'. That both Austria and 
the Netherlands have forms ofPR thus may go some way towards explaining why 
significant green parties have emerged in these countries and not in Britain. 
A second related factor that may have an impact on the electoral strength 
of green parties concerns party financing arrangements. As Rudig has pointed 
out, the extent to which new parties are able to mount effective electoral 
challenges often depends upon the availability of certain key resources; most 
importantly, that of money. Usually relying primarily upon members' 
contributions, newly formed parties will tend to find themselves in a 
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis established parties with which major financial 
interests are invariably linked (RUdig 1986: 143). In the case of green parties, it 
may be the case that electoral significance or insignificance will to some degree 
have been affected by regulations relating to the payment and returning of 
deposits by prospective parliamentary candidates, the availability of state funding 
for political parties in the form of help with campaign expenditures or subsidies 
supporting party research, etc., and rules governing access to the mass media, 
particularly radio and television, during election campaigns. 
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Third, the structure of government - that is, its degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation - may affect a green party's chances of attaining electoral 
significance (Hauss and Rayside 1978). In broad terms, a distinction can be made 
between unitary and federal structures of government. Green parties operating 
within federal systems, such as Austria, may enjoy certain advantages over those 
competing in unitary systems insofar as they are able to pursue political 
credibility and attract media attention through participation in state elections and 
governments. Since state governments often wield considerable political power, 
and thus have a higher profile than local authorities in unitary systems such as 
Britain and the Netherlands, they could possibly provide a green party with an 
ideal opportunity to establish a platform from which to launch itself at the 
national level. For example, referring to the German example, Frankland has 
argued that '[b]y clearing electoral hurdles in a number of Lander during the 
early 1980s, the Greens gained national media attention and built up financial 
resources, parliamentary skills and political credibility' (Frankland 1995: 27). To 
the extent that the Austrian Greens have been able to make electoral progress at 
the Land level, this could have raised their profile and facilitated electoral 
success at the national level. 
There is one additional theme connected to political state-institutional 
structures which has been discussed in relation to new political parties. 
According to Hauss and Rayside, a country's electoral focus - that is, whether its 
key electoral unit is the parliamentary seat or the single office of the presidency -
may have a bearing on the electoral 'success or failure' of new political parties 
(Hauss and Rayside 1978). The general argument runs as follows: 
When the key electoral unit is the parliamentary seat, there seems to be 
little discouragement of new parties. If, on the other hand, attention is 
focused on the single office of the presidency, its zero-sum nature 
encourages the bipolarization of the party system and makes it hard for 
weak parties (which most new parties, at least initially, are) to compete 
effectively. (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 37) 
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The fact that each of the three countries in this study has a parliamentary system 
of government, however, means that there is no real basis for comparing the 
relative impact of parliamentary and presidential systems on the electoral 
significance of green parties. For this reason, the present chapter will not enter 
too far into this debate. However, while having a parliamentary system of 
government, it should be noted that the Austrian political system does display 
some presidential features. The federal president is directly elected for a six year 
period and formal powers include the appointment and dismissal of cabinet 
members, and the right to dissolve parliament. In practice, the federal president 
has played a very limited role in Austrian politics and has on no occasion made 
use of his strongest constitutional powers (MUller 1994a: 24). Concerning the 
emergence of the Austrian Greens, one interesting development that should be 
mentioned here concerns the extent to which this albeit partial presidential focus 
did play some role in their emergence, particularly in the early stages. The 
moderately successful campaigning and performance of a 'green' candidate 
(Freda-Meissner Blau) in the 1986 Austrian presidential elections (5.5 per cent of 
the vote) gave a boost to the green movement and encouraged Meissner Blau and 
her 'loose association'. the BIP, to bring together the ALO and vGO into an 
electoral alliance. At least one commentator therefore considers Meissner-Blau's 
candidacy in these presidential elections to be a 'major development in the 
history of the greens' (Sully 1990: 133). Besides this observation, however, there 
is unfortunately very little that can be said with respect to the relative impact of 
parliamentary and presidential systems on the emergence and electoral success of 
green parties. 
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2. Tbe Impact of Political State-institutional Structures 
(a) The Electoral System 
As was mentioned earlier, commentators such as Duverger have claimed that 
electoral systems can have important political consequences (Duverger 1954). 
Yet the notion that the type of electoral system might have an impact on the 
emergence and/or electoral significance of green parties is a position to which 
some more recent commentators have expressed scepticism. In his study of 'left-
libertarian' parties, for example, Herbert Kitschelt contends that while 'none of 
the five countries with plurality voting systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States) has a relevant left-libertarian party ... 
[a]I1 of [these] cases are heavily "overdetermined" by one or several of the 
structural and institutional variables (affluence, the welfare state, labor 
corporatism, and left party governments)' (Kitschelt 1988a: 224). Kitschelt points 
to the existence of successful third-party challenges from non-'left-libertarian' 
parties in these countries as further evidence to support his claim that the 
electoral system need not necessarily impede the rise of new parties. For 
Kitschelt, therefore, whether a country produces an electorally significant 'left-
libertarian' party is not so much dependent upon electoral laws as other social 
and institutional circumstances (Kitschelt 1988a: 224). This conclusion is broadly 
in line with that reached by Hauss and Rayside in their study of the development 
of new political parties (Hauss and Rayside 1978). In light of this controversy, 
the following section considers in more depth the influence of the electoral 
system on the emergence and electoral significance of green parties in Austria, 
Britain and the Netherlands. 
Regarding the British Green Party, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the potential disadvantages invariably encountered by new parties competing 
under the 'first-past-the-post' (FPTP) electoral system were significant 
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considerations for its founders in 1973. If, as has been claimed, the initial goal of 
the party was to gain 'a majority of Westminster seats or strongly [influence] a 
governing party' (Wall 1994: 16), then this does suggest a large amount of 
naivety on the part of the party founders. In fact, the only electoral system related 
factor that did contribute to the Whittackers' decision to form PEOPLE was the 
relative lack of formal legal regulation of parties in Britain. According to Wall: 
[F]inding to their surprise that there were no legal requirements necessary 
to establish a Party, they simply placed an advertisement in the Coventry 
Evening Telegraph on January 31st 1973 proclaiming the existence of 
PEOPLE and asking for members willing to stand as candidates. (Wall 
1994: 16) 
However, while the disadvantages posed to small parties by the British electoral 
system were clearly not considered serious enough to prevent the formation of 
PEOPLE, it is possible that these issues may have limited the extent to which the 
new party was able to attract potential recruits. As Wall has argued, substantial 
sections of the environmental movement were against the formation of an 
'ecology' party, and early attempts by PEOPLE to strengthen the nascent party by 
attracting their support proved fruitless (Wall 1994: 19-20). It is likely that the 
prospects of limited electoral success under the present electoral law was one of 
the factors contributing to the environmental movement's lack of interest in 
PEOPLE. i 
Although the British electoral system clearly did not have psychological 
consequences strong enough to prevent the founding of a green party, it is clear 
that - contrary to the claims ofKitschelt - the former has been an important factor 
in the continued electoral insignificance of the Green Party. Under the FPTP 
electoral system, the country is divided up into 659 constituencies, each electing 
one MP. In order for a candidate to win a seat s/he needs 'more votes than any of 
I The relationship between the environmental movement and the British Green Party is explored in 
brief at a later point in this chapter and further in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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the other candidates, but not necessarily an overall majority of all the votes cast 
in the constituency' (Farrell 1997: 12). The mechanics of the FPTP electoral 
system make it extremely difficult for new and small parties without a 
geographically concentrated support base to achieve parliamentary 
representation. It is likely that this knowledge has fuelled a general perception 
that a vote for the Green Party is a 'wasted one' and hampered its performance at 
national elections. According to Sara Parkin, a poll carried out in the run-up to 
the 1987 general election showed that 13 per cent of the British electorate would 
have voted for the Greens if they considered that their candidates had a chance of 
winning a seat (cited in Rootes 1992: 182). The 'wasted vote' hypothesis receives 
some support considering that the highest share of the vote that a Green 
candidate received in the election was 3 per cent (Rootes 1992: 182). At the 1989 
European elections, the Greens Party's overall share of the vote surpassed the 
results of the 1987 poll, yet even with 14.9 per cent of the vote the party failed to 
win one seat (Carter 1997a: 197-198). At subsequent general and European 
elections the Green Party's overall share of the vote slumped back to its previous 
negligible levels. 2 
According to Rootes, the FPTP electoral system has contributed to the 
development of an extremely competitive party system in which 'there is room 
for no more than one new contender at a time' (Rootes 1992: 182). With the 
dominance of the Labour and Conservative parties, and the emergence and 
development of the Liberal Democrats as the 'third party' in British politics, the 
Green Party has found itself with little prospect of achieving electoral 
advancement - '[t]he ecology of the party system [has prevented] an ecology 
party from getting off the ground' (Rootes 1992: 182). 
Rootes (1995a) and RUdig and Lowe (1986) focus on a further way in 
which the FPTP system may have contributed to the electoral insignificance of 
2 Most recently, however, the Green Party's electoral fortunes have taken something of an upturn. 
At the June 1999 European elections the party gained 6.3 per cent of the vote and two MEPs (The 
Economist, 19 June 1999). Its improved performance can to some extent be explained by the new 
regional list system employed in these elections. It is likely that the Greens profited from the 
removal of the 'wasted vote' phenomenon which affected their vote at previous elections. 
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the British Green Party. For these authors, the marginal position of the Green 
Party under the current electoral system has meant that it has been unable to 
attract the membership or even votes of the wider environmental movement. 
Again, this may have been symptomatic of the psychological aspect of electoral 
systems discussed earlier. Conscious of the lack of opportunities presented by the 
adoption of an electoral strategy, the modem British environmental movement 
has tended to maintain its distance from the more radical Green Party, choosing 
instead to build upon the political influence that it has acquired within the 
established political system, and to focus on tactics such as pressure group 
lobbying. As Carter puts it '[t]he environmental lobby sees little to gain from 
working with a Green Party with no MPs' (Carter 1997a: 198). Other new social 
movements, such as the peace movement, have in the past similarly chosen not to 
work with the electorally weak Green Party, instead viewing the Labour Party as 
a more worthwhile target for advancing their causes. Their lack of support may 
have reinforced the public view of the Green Party as a 'narrow, single issue 
party', further dampening its electoral appeal (Carter 1997a: 198). More recently, 
the Green Party has been more openly supportive of extra-parliamentary protest 
activities, such as those staged by the anti-roads movement, and perhaps this 
reflects a growing realisation that, without electoral reform, there is little 
prospect of it advancing its politics directly through the Westminster Parliament 
(Carter 1997a: 200). 
At first sight, green parties in the Netherlands would appear to enjoy a 
considerable advantage over their British counterpart insofar as the Dutch 
employ an extreme form of PR for national elections based upon the list system. 
Under this system, the country is treated as a single ISO-member district so that 
'[t]he proportional distribution of seats is as close as possible to the proportion of 
votes that the parties have achieved' (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 89). In addition, 
the Dutch electoral system does not establish a 'special electoral threshold that a 
party must cross in order to achieve representation in Parliament' (Andeweg and 
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Irwin 1993: 87). Commenting on this aspect of the Dutch system, Andeweg and 
Irwin state that: 
The only threshold is the electoral quotient fonned by dividing the number of 
votes cast at an election by the number of seats in Parliament ... This 
amounts to only 0.667 percent of the vote ... Each multiple of the electoral 
quotient entitles a party to an additional seat ... The seats that remain after 
parties have been allotted their multiples of the electoral quotient are the so-
called "remainder seats". These seats are then distributed among the parties 
that have exceeded the electoral quotient, according to the method of largest 
average (the so-called d'Hondt method). (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 87i 
However, despite the existence of 'one of the most proportional [electoral] 
systems in the world' (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 89) certain green parties, and 
the political parties which later merged to form Green Left (pSP, PPR, CPN), 
have sometimes struggled electorally. Thus, commenting on the case of the small 
De Groenen party established in 1983, Lucardie notes that: 
it suffered failure after failure. In 1984 it failed to win a seat in the 
European Parliament, which requires 4 per cent of the popular vote. The 
Greens received 1.3 per cent. In 1986, 1989 and 1994 the party failed to 
win any seats in the Lower Chamber of Parliament. At the general 
elections of 1994, the Greens obtained hardly more votes than the Party 
for Environment and Law ... a conservative green group of only 35 
members founded in 1993. (Lucardie 1997: 187) 
At the 1998 Dutch parliamentary elections De Groenen once again perfonned 
poorly, attracting only 0.2 per cent of the vote and gaining no seats.' The degree 
to which opportunities for the electoral development of De Groenen have been 
affected by the patterns of political competition will be addressed more fully in 
chapter 7. 
Turning to the case of Green Left, it is clear that electoral co-operation of 
the Communists (CPN), Pacifist Socialists (PSP) and Radicals (PPR) during the 
1980s was, in part, triggered by the latters' failure to perform well in certain 
3 For further details on the Dutch electoral system. see Andeweg and Irwin (1993: Ch. 4). 
4 Information supplied by Richard Wouters (Green Left European Affairs Adviser), May 1998. 
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national parliamentary elections. At the 1977 elections, the CPN was 'shaken to 
its core' by the loss of five of its seven seats. It quickly embarked upon a 'process 
of ideological and organizational renewal' and soon became 'acceptable as a 
partner to the Pacifists and Radicals' (Voerman 1995: 114). Further electoral 
disasters occurred in 1986, with the CPN losing all of its seats, the PSP two of its 
three, leaving the PPR clinging to its two. In view of these developments 'it was 
not surprising that the parties reached an understanding for the national elections 
of 1989' (Voennan 1995: 117). Paradoxically it seems that even extreme forms 
of PR provide no necessary guarantees of small party electoral success, and that 
the emergence of Green Left was to some extent facilitated by the mutually held 
feeling that, in continuing to operate independently of each other, the declining 
small New Left parties would soon face the prospect of electoral extinction. 
Since its formation Green Left has benefited from the Dutch electoral 
system and consistently managed to clear the very low electoral threshold 
required for parliamentary representation which it imposes. It is an electorally 
significant green party, having surpassed the 4 per cent threshold for inclusion on 
two occasions in the past decade (1989 and 1998). The party's continued 
representation in parliament has enabled it to exert at least some limited pressure 
on the governing parties and occasionally to contribute to the shaping of the 
political agenda, as in the case of its 'green tax' on fuel proposals (Lucardie 
1997: 188-189). The relative ease with which new parties with modest electoral 
support bases - such as Green Left - have been able to surpass the threshold of 
electoral significance in the Netherlands has partly reflected that country's 
electoral system. Unlike in Britain, where voters have been reluctant - under the 
current electoral law - to cast a 'wasted' vote for the Green Party, voters 
sympathetic to green party politics in the Netherlands have been more willing to 
cast a vote for Green Left, on the grounds that the party stands a good chance of 
gaining parliamentary representation and wielding some measure of political 
influence. 
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A list-type system of PR is also employed in Austria, although the 
electoral law has been subject to some modification in recent years. Between 
1971 and 1992, the country was divided into nine electoral districts, 
corresponding to the Lander. Under this system the number of seats (183 in total) 
allocated to each electoral district was determined by the latter's population. The 
distribution of seats among political parties competing in National Council 
elections took place in two rounds. In the first round of seat distribution each 
party gained 'as many seats as the amount of times it [could] obtain the number 
of votes required for a seat in each electoral district'. i.e. the electoral quotient 
(MUller 1994a: 25). The second round involved aggregating the electoral districts 
of the first round into two units and distributing the remaining votes (according to 
the d'Hondt method) to those parties which obtained at least one seat in the first 
round (a Grundmandat) (MOller 1994a: 25). Research suggests that this second 
stage of vote distribution has been a highly significant factor in the election of 
Green parliamentary candidates (Lauber and MUller 1998: 12).5 
It could be argued that. until 1992, the absence of a fixed threshold of 
parliamentary representation also provided something of an electoral advantage 
for green parties in Austria compared with those competing in, for instance, 
Germany or Sweden. Yet despite this claim (Haerpfer 1989: 28), it was not until 
the 1986 elections - when members of the ALO and VOO joined hands in an 
electoral alliance (Die Grone Alternative - Freda Meissner-Blau) - that a green 
party achieved electoral significance winning 4.8 per cent of the vote and eight 
parliamentary seats (Haerpfer 1989: 27-28). In the previous national elections in 
1983 the ALO and vGO competed as separate parties, and neither gained 
sufficient votes to fulfil the 'significance' criterion nor to qualify for 
parliamentary seats (Frankland 1992: 6). Haerpfer points out that had the parties 
agreed on a 'common candidature' they would have together gained 'more than 
five seats' (Haerpfer 1989: 24). The degree to which the Austrian Greens have 
, According to Lauber and MOller '[i]n the four parliamentary elections so far, almost half of the 
Green MPs owed their election to this mode of calculation in which the "leftover" votes from the 
first phase are allocated' (Lauber and Moller 1998: 12). 
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been able to achieve electoral significance and national parliamentary 
representation has to an extent reflected their ability to form a united electoral 
front. This is a theme pursued further in the next chapter. 
In 1992, however, the SPO and OVP coalition government introduced a 
new, three-stage electoral system. The first stage distributes seats at the regional 
district level (of which there are 43); the second stage distributes seats at the 
Land level; the third stage distributes seats at the national level. In order for a 
party to participate in the second and third stages it must either have won at least 
one seat at the regional district level or have obtained at least 4 per cent of the 
national vote. This new system was first used in the 1994 national elections and 
has presented something of a new challenge for the Austrian Greens. For 
example, at the 1995 election the Greens came quite close to the new 4 per cent 
threshold (4.8 per cent). The decline in the Greens' share of the vote between 
1994 (7.3 per cent) and 1995 has in part been explained by many of their 1994 
voters switching tactically to the SpO in an attempt to prevent the possibility of a 
coalition between JOrg Haider's far-right FPO and the OVP (Sully 1996: 639; 
Dawe 1996: 6). This suggests that the Green vote in Austria may be somewhat 
volatile. Further, the presence of the 4 per cent threshold means that, in the 
future, the Austrian Greens may be faced with the prospect of losing their 
parliamentary representation should the formation of a similar coalition 
government seem a distinct possibility. However, this must be balanced against 
the reality that with regional electoral districts comprising an average of 20 seats, 
successfully clearing the alternative barrier (one regional seat) for gaining some 
national representation should not be too difficult a task for a political party such 
as the Greens (Farrell 1997: 70). 
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(b) Party Financing Arrangements 
One potentially important issue for consideration here is the financial threshold 
of deposits. The requirement that parliamentary candidates pay a deposit 
amounting to £500 for general elections and £750 in European elections in 
Britain has presented the Green Party with a further barrier to overcome in its 
attempt to attain electoral significance.6 The requirement that, in order for the 
deposit to be returned, a candidate must have received at least 5 per cent of the 
constituency vote has proved a particularly difficult one for the Green Party to 
fulfil since, as has been argued, potential voters have, in the past, been less 
inclined to vote for them on the grounds that they feel they do not have a realistic 
chance of winning a seat. On the few occasions where the Green Party has 
chosen to field a large number of candidates, e.g. in 1992, the total loss of 
deposits financially crippled the party, leading to a decline in party activity and 
membership levels, and the resurfacing of factional disputes between 
'electoralists' and 'decentralists' concerning the wisdom of a national election 
strategy. This debate continued into 1996 during which the Autumn Conference 
debated a motion proposing that the party should withdraw from the 1997 general 
election. It was eventually decided that the party should 'field a significant 
number of candidates and qualify for a TV and radio broadcast' (The Green 
Activist, Winter 1997). In the event, however, every one of the 95 who stood as a 
Green candidate at this election lost his/her deposit (Carter I 997b: 157). 
However, while the introduction of some form of public funding of campaigns or 
party activity would possibly ease the financial pressures imposed upon the 
Greens, and perhaps enable the party to achieve a more prominent national 
profile, the aforementioned obstacles presented by the FPTP electoral system 
would still prove extremely difficult for the party to surmount. 
6 The financial deposit payable by candidates competing in British general elections rose from £150 
to £500 in 1987 (Webb 1994: 840). 
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In the Netherlands, Green Left has benefited from more generous party 
financing arrangements than those found in Britain. For instance, deposit 
requirements are less demanding with each party, to compete in a national 
election, depositing 25,000 guilders (approximately £7,000) however many 
districts (19 in total) it chooses to contest. In addition, the deposit is returned 'if 
the party receives 75 per cent of the national electoral quotient, which amounts to 
roughly 0.5 per cent of the total vote' (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 86). This is 
clearly less demanding than the 5 per cent of the constituency vote required for a 
refund under the British system. In addition, political parties represented in the 
Dutch parliament - in 1998 there were nine (Irwin 1999: 275) - benefit through 
the receipt of modest financial assistance from the government in the form of 
help towards the cost of television and radio broadcasts, and subsidies for their 
research, education, training and youth work. The precise amount given to each 
party is determined by its size in Parliament (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 67). Thus 
even a party with a relatively small number of MPs, such as Green Left, obtains 
funds that it can use in ways which promote its activities and which might 
potentially broaden its electoral appeal. 
The availability of state subsidies for political parties has been a 
particularly important factor in the development of the Austrian Greens' 
organisation and the maintenance of their electoral position since the 1986 
National Council elections. MtUler describes the workings of the Austrian system 
in the following terms: 
Since 1975, all parties that poll more than one per cent of the vote have 
been entitled to receive state party finance in election years while the 
parties represented in the Nationalrat are entitled to receive these funds 
permanently. Parties with at least five MPs receive a fixed amount of 
money, the remaining funds are distributed according to the parties' share 
of the vote. Public party finance increased considerably in real terms 
since the 1970s. It is currently the single most important source of income 
for all parties and by far the dominant one for the FPO, the Greens and the 
Liberal Forum. (MOller 1996b: 66-67) 
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As well as subsidies at the national level, Austrian political parties benefit from 
the allocation of public funds at the Land and local levels.7 As the above 
quotation indicates, state finance has been the most important source of income 
for the Austrian Greens. Unlike other Austrian political parties, formal 
membership and the payment of a fixed membership fee have never been viewed 
as prerequisites for engaging in party activities and campaigns (Muller 1994b: 
58). Public financing is therefore the key factor which 'makes up for thin 
membership contributions' (Frankland 1993: 9). Such financing has been 
instrumental in enabling the Austrian Greens to develop a common party 
organisation, its parliamentary Fraktion and political education institution (Sully 
1990: 133). It has also enabled the Greens to mount effective electoral challenges 
and, since parties must raise a non-refundable 'deposit' of Os 54,000 
(approximately £2,500) in order to put up a nation-wide candidacy at general 
elections, it is difficult to see how they could comfortably accomplish the former 
in the absence of state party finance (MUller 1996b: 68). 
(c) Government CentralisationlDecentralisation 
Does the existence of a federal system of government in Austria provide certain 
advantages for the Greens as compared with green parties competing in unitary 
political systems such as Britain and the Netherlands? According to King, 
'[P]olitically and financially power in the British polity [has resided] at the centre 
and not outside Whitehall' (King 1993: 216). The sovereignty of parliament, and 
the lack of constitutional status of local government, means that the latter is 
without many of the powers granted to it in other European states. Since 1979, 
the position of local government in Britain has been further marginalised, with 
the establishment of alternative local agencies to deliver services that were 
previously the responsibility oflocal authorities (King 1993: 194). The peripheral 
7 MOller notes that • subsidies at the Land level are of greater importance than at the national level, 
and between 1979 and 1990 were almost three times as big' (MOller 1994b: 55). 
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status of local government in Britain has meant that even when the Green Party 
has managed to make some limited progress at the local level by winning council 
seats at the county, district or parish levels (Harrison 1995: 301-302), it has 
received minimal publicity. This has further marginalised the Green Party and 
provided little in the way of a platform from which to pursue electoral success at 
the national level. 8 
As in Britain, the Dutch political system is characterised by a high degree 
of centralisation. Consequently, the local government system in the Netherlands 
does not have a great deal of autonomy. The system is one based on 'provinces 
and municipalities, with lower tiers being subject to the control of higher tiers 
and the national government' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 148). According to 
Andeweg and Irwin, local government is thus a relatively 'depoliticised' affair 
with governing coalitions consisting of almost all parties and, for the most part, 
involves the implementation of central guidelines. It is for this reason that in the 
Netherlands local government is often referred to in terms of 'local 
administration' (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 163). In view of this, there are fewer 
opportunities for new parties such as Green Left to gain the media publicity and 
political experience that might flow from participation in more high profile state 
elections and governments in federal systems. However, compared with the 
British Green Party, the Dutch Green Left has achieved a greater level of 
electoral success at the local level, particularly in urban areas such as 
Amsterdam, Groningen and Nijmegen, allowing it some influence on the shaping 
of local environmental policy (Harrison 1995: 299; GroenLinlcs 1990d). 
In contrast to both Britain and the Netherlands, Austria is a federal system 
with its two main layers of government being at the central state (Bund) and 
provincial (Land) levels. Federalism 'implies an entrenchment of some level of 
regional government in the national decision-making process, with worthwhile 
powers that are protected by the constitution' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 135-136). 
8 The creation of a directly elected Scottish Parliament with tax-raising powers and a less powerful 
Welsh Assembly may provide new platfonns and opportunities for the advancement of green party 
politics in Britain. At the recent (6 May 1999) Scottish Parliament elections, the Scottish Green 
Party gained one seat (out of 129) (The Guardian, 8 May 1999). 
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According to MOller, the nine Lander have 'considerable legislative 
competencies of their own' and • are entrusted with a substantial body of indirect 
federal administration' (MOller 1994a: 24). Since the classic phase of 
'consociationalism' in Austria (1945-66) there has been greater importance 
attached to the territorial dimension of Austrian politics. In particular, elections 
to the provincial parliaments (Land/age) have assumed national importance with 
the consequence that Land party organisations and their leaders exercise 
considerable political power (MOller 1994a: 24; Luther 1995: 123). Because it is 
federal in structure, the Austrian political system has presented undoubted 
opportunities for the electoral development of green party politics. For example, 
the relative success of the VG()/ALO electoral alliance at the 1984 Land 
elections in Vorarlberg (13 per cent of the vote and four seats) gave an important 
boost to the view that a single, united green party could succeed in Austrian 
politics (Haerpfer 1989: 26). In addition, the considerable legislative power of 
Land government has provided the Greens with a potentially important platform 
on which to build their political reputation in Austria. For some time, the 
Austrian Greens have set their sights on governing Vienna in coalition with the 
SPO, yet these hopes were dashed in 1996 as a result of massive losses by the 
latter (Lauber 1997a: 186). As well as Vienna, the Greens' best results in the 
1990s have come in the urban centres of the more rural provinces of Tyrol, 
Vorarlberg and Salzburg (Lauber 1995: 316). As well as representation in the 
National Council, therefore, the Greens have been able to advance Green ideas in 
several Landtage. In some cases, e.g. in Tyrol, Green ministers have joined Land 
governments and, in others, e.g. Salzburg, the Greens have achieved coalition 
governing status (Lauber 1995: 319). Federalism has presented the Austrian 
Greens with certain advantages and has, in all likelihood, facilitated the party's 
national electoral success. 
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3. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine three political state-institutional 
structures in terms of the degree to which they have had a bearing on the 
emergence and electoral significance of green parties in Austria, Britain and the 
Netherlands. In contrast to the conclusions of Kitschelt (1988a), it has been 
argued that electoral systems have played an important role in accounting for the 
presence or absence of electorally significant green parties. Most importantly, the 
preceding discussion has shown that the mechanics of the British electoral system 
have meant that the Green Party has had little prospect of gaining any form of 
national representation. For much of its history, the Green Party has achieved 
negligible levels of electoral support, partially reflecting the reality that many 
potential voters consider a vote for the party to be a 'wasted' one. Any serious 
account of the continuing electoral marginality of the British Greens must take 
into consideration the impact of the British electoral law. It is interesting, 
however, that the inhospitable nature of the FPTP system did not act as a brake 
on the formation of a green party in the first place. To this extent, the present 
study confirms the views of Harmel and Robertson, who argue that while the type 
of electoral system does not necessarily hamper the emergence of new parties, it 
can play an important role in a party's chances of electoral 'success' (Harmel and 
Robertson 1985). 
In contrast to the British Greens, green parties in Austria and the 
Netherlands have competed under conditions of PRo That both the Austrian 
Greens and Dutch Green Left have attained electoral significance to some extent 
reflects the greater degree to which ecologically concerned citizens have been 
willing to cast a green vote, in view of the better prospects of achieving 
representation under their respective countries' systems of PRo Yet it has also 
been maintained that PR is not necessarily a sufficient condition for green party 
electoral success. As the Dutch situation shows, support levels for the 'pure 
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green' De Groenen have been negligible despite an electoral system based on an 
extreme form of PRo The existence of a direct electoral competitor in the form of 
Green Left has effectively 'cancelled out' any advantage that the party might 
otherwise have gained under the current electoral law. Further, in Austria, a 
significant green party failed to materialise until 1986 despite the existence of a 
PR-based electoral system. This again reflected the patterns of political 
competition - that is to say, competition between two separate 'green' parties 
(VOO and ALO) - in the party system prior to this point in time. With the 
development of a unified party organisation, the Austrian Greens have attained 
electoral significance and parliamentary representation under conditions of PRo 
The extent to which patterns of political competition have impacted on the 
electoral significance of green parties is explored in greater depth in the next 
chapter. 
It is also important to stress the degree to which party financing 
arrangements have influenced the electoral prospects of green parties. In Britain, 
levels of electoral participation by the Green Party have been restricted by the. 
substantial deposit requirement and the absence of state funding for political 
parties. In contrast, the Austrian Greens have benefited from generous levels of 
state funding which have enabled them to develop their party organisation and 
mount effective election campaigns. The Dutch Green Left has also received 
some state funding, and this has undoubtedly aided the party in its campaigning 
and other work. 
The Austrian Greens have been able to make considerable electoral 
headway at the Land level. Austria's federal system of government has provided 
opportunities for the Greens to build up their electoral support base insofar as 
elections at the provincial level tend to be high profile and attract considerable 
media attention. Moreover, participation, or power-sharing, at this level has 
undoubtedly given the Greens a chance to prove their political competence, and 
to enhance their reputation and appeal across the nation as a whole. In summary, 
examining green parties within the context of their respective political state-
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institutional structures appears to provide important insights into the factors 
impinging upon their national electoral performance. However, as will be argued 
in the next chapter, a consideration of patterns of electoral dealignment and the 
nature of political competition in each country can provide further insight into 




Green Parties, Electoral Dealignment and the 
Nature of Political Competition 
The relationship between social cleavages, the structures of political competition, 
and electoral stability and change has for several decades formed an important 
research theme for analysts of politics. I It was during the late 1960s that Lipset 
and Rokkan advanced their 'freezing' hypothesis, which stated that Western 
European party systems had taken shape with the coming of universal mass 
suffrage in the 1920s and had remained 'frozen' over the past 50 years (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). For the majority of political commentators until at least the 
mid-l 970s, social cleavages - principally those of class and religion - were 
considered to be the most important determinants of voting behaviour. Yet this 
relatively 'stable' model of voting patterns has more recently been challenged by 
those who argue that Western European party systems are undergoing a process 
of electoral dealignment. A number of recent studies have pointed to trends such 
as declining levels of social-based voting, lower levels of party identification, 
increased electoral volatility and the fragmentation of party systems as evidence 
in support of the view that European electorates are being fundamentally 
transformed (Gallagher et al. 1995). 
While there is a wealth of literature dealing with the impact of these 
processes on established political parties, very little has been written on the 
degree to which they might have influenced both the emergence and electoral 
significance of green parties. Hence an aim of the present chapter is to address 
precisely these issues. The first part of the chapter provides a discussion of the 
J The classic statement on this relationship can be found in Lipset and Rokkan (1967). For more 
recent surveys of the literature see Zuckerman (1975); Dalton et al. (1984); Mair (1996) and 
Dalton (1996). 
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key issues that have featured within the literature on electoral dealignment. This 
is followed in the second part by an assessment of these issues in terms of how 
they have affected political activity - including green party politics - in Austria, 
Britain and the Netherlands. As will be seen, however, a considerable degree of 
ambiguity surrounds the extent to which it is possible to unravel the patterns of 
cause and effect arising from these processes. Caution must be exercised when 
exploring the connection between increased electoral volatility and green party 
support, for example, since it is possible that such volatility may have been the 
effect, rather than the cause, of green voting. The problem of 'cause-effect' is one 
which emerges across the various aspects of electoral dealignment examined in 
this chapter and, therefore, the complexity of arguments linking dealignment to 
the emergence and electoral significance of green parties should constantly be 
borne in mind. 
The third part of the chapter marks a shift in emphasis and considers the 
structures of political competition in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. 
Several authors have argued that the emergence and electoral success of green 
parties may, to some extent, have been facilitated by the unresponsiveness of 
existing parties to 'new' issues - most notably 'the environment' - and broader 
patterns of political competition (Rootes 1995b: 241-247; Doyle and McEachern 
1998: 126-128). Within a climate characterised by increased electoral 
dealignment and volatility, it is possible that the degree to which the emergence 
and electoral success of green parties have been facilitated by these processes has 
depended upon the responsiveness of existing parties to heightened ecological 
concerns, and hence the availability of political 'space' within the party system 
for a green electoral challenge. This is one particular line of argument that will 
be pursued in this part of the chapter. In addition, it is possible that the electoral 
significance of green parties may to some extent reflect the political saliency of 
environmental issues; that is, whether or not 'the environment' has emerged as a 
key issue of electoral competition within the minds of voters and political parties 
in specific countries. Employing the terminology of Anthony Downs, levels of 
182 
electoral support achieved by green parties may in part reflect the dynamics of 
the 'issue-attention cycle' (Downs 1972). The overall argument of this chapter is 
that attention to issues of electoral dealignment, and the nature of political 
competition, can provide added insight into the range of political factors which 
have impinged upon the emergence and electoral significance of green parties. 
1. Electoral Dealignment in Western Party Systems 
The idea that party competition and voting decisions might be structured around the 
social divisions existing within a polity is one that has occupied a central position 
within traditional electoral research. It is a line of argument most notably and 
extensively pursued within the work of Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). Writing in the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan sought to establish the historical 
linkages between social cleavages and party systems. It is important at this stage to 
be clear about the sense in which Lipset and Rokkan used the term 'cleavage'. For 
these authors, a cleavage had three central components. The first is that it consisted 
in a social division between people based upon certain key characteristics such as 
occupation, status, religion or ethnicity. Second, the formation of a cleavage 
necessitated the existence of a sense of 'collective identity' among the groups 
involved in the social division - for example, as workers or employers - which forms 
a basis for their action. Third, a cleavage is expressed in organisational terms and 
'[t]his is typically achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a 
political party, or some other organisation that gives formal institutional expression 
to the interests on one side of the division' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 210-211). 
Central to Lipset and Rokkan' s argument was the idea that the origins of the 
social cleavages which determined contemporary political alignments could be 
traced back to two successive revolutions in the modernisation of Western Europe: 
the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Flanagan and Dalton explain 
their significance in the following terms: 
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In the course of the National Revolution, a number of segmental cleavages, 
revolving around religious, ethnic and regional divisions, emerged as 
modernising states struggled for national integration and the centralisation of 
political authority. In many respects, differences in culture and values lay at 
the base of these conflicts, although they certainly had important 
ramifications for the distribution of wealth and economic power. By contrast, 
the later Industrial Revolution was primarily associated with economic 
cleavages between industrial sectors (primaty and secondary industry) and 
between social classes (the middle and working classes). (Flanagan and 
Dalton 1984: 9) 
Lipset and Rokkan' s key point was that the divisions caused by these revolutions 
formed a basis from which political conflict, and thereby a framework for party 
competition, initially arose. For Lipset and Rokkan, Western European political 
parties essentially reflected established group cleavages within society and, to the 
extent that the latter remained significant, they could be expected to persist. An 
important theme within Lipset and Rokkan' s work related to the degree to which 
Western European party systems 'had crystallised with the advent of universal mass 
sufttage and had remained essentially frozen over the previous 50 years' - the so-
called 'freezing hypothesis' (Flanagan and Dalton 1984: 7). 
The conclusions of Lipset and Rokkan generated a wealth of literature that 
seemed to confirm the significance of the relationship between social cleavages -
particularly class and religious differences - and voting. For example, studies of 
modem party systems by Lipset, Rose and Lijphart stressed the importance of the 
class cleavage as a dimension of ideological cleavage in most democracies (Lipset 
1963; Rose 1974; Lijphart 1981). In addition, early empirical research affinned the 
centrality of religion as an influence on mass voting behaviour; hence Rose and 
Urwin's (1969) claim that 'religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of 
parties in the Western world today' (cited in Dalton 1996: 326). This picture of 
stability was seemingly completed with the development of the partisan learning 
model, which predicted that the durable structure of party systems would lead to the 
spread of long-standing party attachments among the electorate with the effect of 
reinforcing that system stability (Converse 1969). Until at least the mid-1970s the 
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'party identification' paradigm was dominant within the sub-discipline of electoral 
studies, and this implied that social alignments and partisanship fonned the principal 
explanations of voting behaviour. 
However, several problems with the 'stable' model of European party 
politics became apparent during the course of the 1970s. According to two political 
analysts, the 'pattern of frozen alignments and strong partisan attachments [gave] 
way to one of decomposition and partisan decline' (Flanagan and Dalton 1984: 7). 
As was discussed in chapter 4, some argued that changes in the social structure - in 
particular, the shift from industrial to 'post-industrial' employment patterns (Bell 
1974; Huntington 1974) - were leading to altered cleavage structures and a shift 
away from politics and political conflict based upon the central theme of class. 
Numerous studies attest to the general erosion in class voting differences across a 
wide range of advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 1996: 322-325). Others, as 
outlined in chapter 3, claimed that a general process of value change was taking 
place and claimed that this was further promoting the dealignment of mass politics 
(Inglehart 1971, 1977). The emergence of a new order of global ecological risks and 
problems that could not be easily resolved within the traditional framework of 'class' 
politics caused a further weakening of established party loyalties and fuelled 
demands for new vehicles of political representation. 
Along with an erosion in the impact of traditional social cleavages on voting 
choice, the argument that Western political systems were undergoing a process of 
dealignment rested upon the observation of three further and, to some extent, related 
trends. First, several studies pointed to declining levels of party identification, that is 
'the psychological attachment which is alleged to tie voters to parties' (Gallagher el 
a/. 1995: 230). A second symptom of dealignment was considered to involve the 
trend towards the increasing fiagmentation of party systems and, in particular, the 
rise of new parties. The main point here was that the weakening of party ties based 
upon traditional cleavages would provide a more favourable environment for the 
emergence of political parties that would seek to advance new political programmes 
(Dalton 1996: 332). The third trend cited in support of the dealignment thesis 
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concerned increased 'electoral volatility'. This latter concept has been defined by 
Pedersen as the number of voters changing their choice of party between elections 
(pedersen 1979). 
Returning to the case studies it seems reasonable to propose that processes of 
electoral dealignment may have had some influence upon the emergence and 
electoral success of green parties. It may, for instance, be the case that the 
development of green parties in part reflects the degree to which there has been a 
decline in social cleavage voting, and levels of party identification more generally, in 
each country. The implication here is that green parties may perform less well 
electorally in those countries where voters already have strong and long-standing ties 
to one of the established parties (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 49). Of related interest 
here is the question of electoral volatility. As a further symptom of dealignment, 
increasing electoral volatility may have benefited green parties insofar as votes are 
less 'structured' around established party loyalties with the consequence that more 
votes are 'up for grabs' from election to election (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 99). The 
interest here will be on the extent to which green parties have been able to appeal to 
former supporters of established or other parties from one election to another. 
Finally, a process of party system fragmentation, brought about by a weakening of 
links between voters and established political parties, may have created a more 
favourable climate for the emergence of green parties as voters seek new political 
platforms from which to advance ecological and other comected issues. These 
possibilities are explored in relation to the three case studies below. 
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2. Party Identification, Electoral Volatility and 
Party System Fragmentation in Three Countries 
(a) Austria 
For much of the post-war period Austria's party system was characterised by high 
levels of stability and reflected the social cleavages whose origins lay at least as 
far back as the late nineteenth century. The Austrian party system has 
traditionally been dominated by three political subcultures, or Lager (camps): 
Socialist, Catholic-conservative and the German-national-Iiberal Lager. 
According to Mtlller '[t]he traditional cleavages between the three Lager were 
socio-economic and religious. While the socio-economic cleavage divided the 
Socialist Lager from the other two, the religious cleavage separated the Catholic-
conservatives and the other two Lager' (MQller 1996b: 60). Each of these 
political subcultures became allied to one of Austria's major political parties. In 
the post-war period, the socialist Lager was expressed principally through the 
Socialist Party (SPO), the Catholic-conservative Lager through the People's Party 
(OVP) and the German-national-liberal Lager through the Freedom Party (FPC) 
(MOller 1996b: 60-62). One commentator expresses the significance of the Lager 
parties in the following terms: 
[they] involved life-long loyalty of supporters and even inter-generational 
party loyalty. Ideology and subcultural ties ensured the cohesion and 
maintenance of the Lager. The subcultural ties were provided by the 
homogeneous social composition of each Lager and by the vast network 
of Lager organizations which made it possible to spend one's life within 
the boundaries of one particular Lager from the cradle to the grave. 
(MUller 1996b: 71) 
The effect of all this was a highly stable party system in which the social 
structures of the two main parties - the sPO and OVP - were predominantly 
based upon membership of a particular class. As Mt1ller and Ulram put it: 
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the major Austrian parties in the inter-war and immediate post-war 
periods had a clear class basis. The sPO represented first and foremost 
manual workers and low-ranking white-collar employees, which the party 
referred to as its 'core groups' until the mid-I960s. The OVP, calling 
itself a Volkspartei (a party of all people), aimed at a wider appeal but 
had its strongholds in two occupational groups. the farmers and the self-
employed, which were still numerous in the immediate post-war period. 
(MUller and Ulram 1995: 147) 
Studies show that levels of party identification in Austria were at their strongest 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout these decades almost three quarters of 
the electorate identified with a political party (plasser and Ulram 1985: 6). Yet 
successive surveys have shown that there has been a progressive decline in levels 
of party identification in Austria since this period. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
between 60 and 65 per cent of the electorate identified with a political party and, 
in 1994, only 44 per cent did so (plasser and Ulram 1985: 6; MUller 1996b: 72). 
One explanation for this decline stresses the extent to which changes in the social 
structure - most notably. the shift from an industrial to 'post-industrial' economy 
(chapter 4) - have gradually eroded the social bases of the two main Lager 
parties. In particular. a decline in the proportion of the workforce employed in 
'blue-collar' occupations, a shrinking of the agricultural and self-employed 
sectors, and the expansion of a service sector employing white-collar workers 
(now the strongest occupational group) with fewer traditional party loyalties, 
have resulted in political parties 'no longer [having] the clear class profile which 
was a prominent feature of Lager parties' (MUller 1996b: 71). Further, increased 
social reflexivity and public concern about global ecological risks and problems 
(chapter 5) have fostered the emergence of a new critical consciousness among 
new middle class groups in recent decades. Declining party attachments from the 
late 1970s onwards also reflected 'sharp reductions in public confidence in 
system output' (Luther 1987: 380). as the stability of the social-democratic 
hegemony of the 1970s gave way to a climate of economic insecurity and rising 
unemployment (Gerlich et al. 1988). Austrian citizens became increasingly 
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critical of what they saw to be the self-seeking, inept and corrupt behaviour of 
mainstream party politicians (Luther 1987). Together, these developments 
contribute towards an explanation of the declining levels of party identification 
witnessed in Austria over the past few decades. Another marked trend within the 
context of Austrian electoral behaviour has been a sharp increase in levels of 
electoral volatility. The period 1953-83 was characterised by electoral stability in 
Austria with an average Pedersen index of aggregate electoral volatility of 2.9 per 
cent. However, according to election surveys, aggregate volatility has increased 
steadily since this period - from 6.4 per cent in 1986, to 9.3 per cent in 1990 and 
to its all time high (14.2 per cent) in 1994 (MOller 1996b: 72-75). Thus, as well 
as declining levels of class-based voting and party identification, studies of 
Austrian electoral behaviour suggest that voters have been more willing to 
consider switching from one party to another between elections (MOller 1996b). 
These tendencies may have had important implications for the 
development of green party politics in Austria It might be that the emergence 
and eventual electoral success of green parties in Austria during the 1980s were 
in part facilitated by a changing class structure, a decline in traditional class 
voting and the weakening of links between voters and parties as outlined above. 
As was described in chapter 4, the Austrian Greens have certainly been over-
represented in their support base by 'post-industrial' white-collar workers 
employed in the service sector, which suggests that they do not have a traditional 
'class' identity. 
Evidence with respect to electoral volatility at first sight appears to offer 
some confirmation of this argument. Kitschelt, for example, argues that at the 
1983 elections many of the SpO's losses were the result of voters switching to 
one of the. then. two green parties (ALO and VGO). Further, in 1986. more than 
1 per cent of the SpO's tota1loss of 4.8 per cent was accounted for by former 
sro voters moving to the Greens (Kitschelt 1994: 177). Another source claims 
that, at the 1990 parliamentary elections, only 36 per cent of Green voters had 
supported the party in 1986. The Greens were able to draw upon first-time voters 
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(22 per cent) but also former SpO voters (15 per cent) and OVP voters (12 per 
cent) (Frankland 1994: 200). Yet the point raised earlier in this chapter should 
also be borne in mind - i.e. that while increased electoral volatility may be a 
process lying behind green party support, there is the possibility that such 
volatility might to some extent be the effect,' rather than the cause, of green 
voting. 
Even if the Austrian Greens have benefited from electoral dealignment in 
the party system, this by no means implies that they will continue to make 
electoral advances as long as any such trend continues. As Haerpfer has pointed 
out, one cost of the Greens appealing to a more fickle segment of the Austrian 
electorate is that they become 'prey to an unstable and volatile group of 
supporters' (Haerpfer 1989: 29). The effects of this were seen at the 1995 
parliamentary elections, in which the Greens lost 90,000 votes to the Right (OVP 
and the Liberal Forum) and 33,000 votes to the sPO (Fitzmaurice 1996: 294). 
The implications of this issue in terms of the future prospects of green parties is 
pursued in the final chapter. 
Public opinion on the need to expand the party spectrum in Austria would 
seem to lend some further support to the dealignment thesis. In 1976, only 10 per 
cent of the electorate were in favour of increased party choice in Austria; by 
1984, this figure had increased to 39 per cent (Dachs 1989: 186). The arrival of 
the Greens in 1986 as the first new party in parliament since the departure of the 
Communists (KPO) in 1959 (Luther 1989: 13) could perhaps be viewed as a 
manifestation of heightened public demands for greater diversity within the 
Austrian party system. However, it should be stressed that the Greens have not 
been the sole beneficiaries of any electoral dealignment that has occurred in 
Austria As Lauber has argued, both the Liberal Forum and the populist FPC have 
benefited from the decline of the two main parties as well as the Greens (Lauber 
1997a: 187). 
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(b) The Netherlands 
Until the 1960s party choice in the Netherlands was broadly structured by the 
religious and class cleavages characteristic of the system of 'pillarisation'. The 
four pillars of Dutch political culture - Protestant, Catholic, socialist, liberal - had 
given rise to a party system distinguished by a high degree of stability in which 
the vast majority of votes were 'structured' along these lines. Irwin and van 
Holsteyn describe the 'structured system' in the following terms: 
Church-going Catholics voted almost exclusively for the Catholic 
People's Party (KVP), as did such adherents of the Gereformeerde 
(reformed) faith for the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP). Support for the 
Christian Historical Union (CHU) consisted heavily of more devout 
members of the Dutch Reformed Church. Those who were not strong in 
their religious beliefs or had none, split along class lines, with workers 
supporting the social-democratic party (after World War IT the PvdA) and 
the middle class tending to support the liberal parties, most recently 
(since 1948) the VVD. (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 94) 
However. recent studies suggest that the importance of this system has been 
declining for some time. Thus, whereas in 1956 the proportion of party choices 
determined by religion or class amounted to 72 per cent, this percentage had 
declined to 60 per cent in 1968,52 per cent in 1977.42 per cent in 1989 and 36 
per cent in 1994 (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 95). One of the main 
explanations for the decline of the structured model concerns the erosion of the 
strongly 'pillarised' subcultures on which the traditional cleavage structure in the 
Netherlands rested.2 During the 1960s, Dutch society underwent processes of 
secularisation and individualisation with the consequence that religion 
subsequently 'lost much of its predictive power with regard to voting behaviour' 
(Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 44). In addition to this, the 'post-industrialisation' of 
2 Once again, issues of cause and effect come into play here. These arise because of the possibility 
that depillarisation may have been, in part, an effect of the decline of the structured model of 
voting as opposed to the cause. However, while this possibility exists. studies of Dutch politics 
have consistently emphasised the causal link between the process of depillarisation and the decline 
of the structured voting model (Andeweg and Irwin 1993). 
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the Dutch economy - most notably indicated by the decline of the traditional 
working class and the rise of a new middle class - has weakened ties between 
voters and parties, making class a much less effective predictor of partisan 
choice. As well as class and religious-based dealignment, studies suggest that 
levels of party identification have declined in recent decades (Dalton 1998: 210). 
Within this context commentators on Dutch politics have observed a significant 
increase in electoral volatility. While during the 1950s it was estimated that 
between 10-15 per cent of voters switched from one party to another between two 
elections, recent studies have suggested that as many as one third of all voters 
may now change their choice of party between elections (Andeweg and Irwin 
1993: 99). 
To what extent has electoral dealignment in the Netherlands aided the 
emergence and electoral success of green parties? On a general level, it can be 
observed that the decline of the structured model of voting during the 1960s and 
1970s did coincide with the rise of new parties - such as 066 and PPR - stressing 
'new' issues, and appears to have prompted an increase in the number of parties 
contesting national elections in the Netherlands. For example, whereas the 1950s 
saw between ten and 13 political parties competing in national elections, 20 or 
more parties have submitted lists in all such elections since 1967 (Andeweg and 
Irwin 1993: 72). There is some evidence to suggest that the genesis of Green Left 
was indirectly facilitated by electoral dealignment. The formation and 
development of the PPR, a left-wing offshoot of the Catholic People's Party 
which merged into Green Left in 1990, took place within a climate of 
secularisation within Dutch society (Lucardie 1980: 169). According to Lucardie, 
the PPR '[g]radually ... shed its Christian legacy and began to identify with the 
New Left' (Lucardie 1989: 9). Thus, it is possible that this transformation - from 
Confessional to New Left party - meant that the party became a more obvious 
collaborator with other New Left parties such as the PSP and (later) the CPN, 
smoothing the path towards the formation of Green Left. 
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In addition, the transformation of the CPN from a Marxist-Leninist party, 
primarily representing industrial workers, to one advancing new social movement 
concerns, to some extent reflected changes in the structure of the Dutch economy 
and a process of class dealignment in the Netherlands. On the one hand a 
shrinking of the industrial sector in which the party had strongholds, and the 
changing composition of the working class, resulted in a decline in its traditional 
support base (van der Linden and Wormer 1988: 79, 84). On the other, the 
composition of the party's membership underwent something of a transformation 
during the 1970s, with industrial workers gradually fading into the background as 
members of the ascendant 'new middle class', advocating peace, environmental 
and feminist issues, assumed a dominant position within the party organisation 
(Voerman 1991: 467-470). From this perspective the ideological renewal of the 
CPN, and its eventual merger into Green Left, was to some extent facilitated by a 
weakening of established political alignments and the influx of young, 'new 
middle class' radicals into the party. 
Regarding the issue of greater electoral volatility, available evidence 
suggests that, like the Austrian Greens, electoral support for Green Left has 
fluctuated quite considerably in the few national elections in which it has 
competed. At the 1994 elections, for example, and despite record levels of 
volatility (22.5 per cent), Green Left failed to benefit from the decline of the 
Labour Party (PvdA) and, in fact, lost one of its six seats (Wolinetz 1995: 188). 
According to Wolinetz, the PvdA's losses could in part be explained by previous 
supporters switching to D66, to VVD and the parties for the aged and not to 
Green Left (Wolinetz 1995: 191-192). However, at the 1998 elections Green Left 
more than doubled its share of the vote and seats in parliament, an outcome 
possibly related to previous 066 voters swapping to the party. If this was indeed 
the case, then this might suggest that Green Left also has a somewhat unstable 
electoral base and that, as a consequence, its prospects for electoral stability 
and/or advancement are somewhat uncertain. That the Green Left electorate 
appears relatively young - more than half of the party's voters were under 35 in 
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1989 - may also mean that it is more vulnerable to fluctuations in party choice at 
elections, on the grounds that younger people may be more flexible in their 
voting patterns (Hauss and Rayside 1978).3 
(c) Britain 
Britain has been regarded as possessing one of the simplest cleavage structures in 
Western Europe, being based mainly upon class, but with a small centre-
periphery cleavage reflecting the multinational character of the British state 
(Gallagher et al. 1992: 216). As a result, and certainly until the late 1960s, voting 
choice has predominantly been associated with social class. Sanders sums up this 
dominant pattern as follows: 
The interests of middle-class voters were most obviously represented by a 
Conservative Party that sought to promote private enterprise and to keep 
taxation low - and they duly showed a greater than average tendency to 
vote Tory. The interests of working-class voters, on the other hand, were 
most obviously served by the Labour Party's emphasis on redistributive 
policies and by its connections with the trade unions - and their political 
loyalties were accordingly tied primarily to Labour. In the 1964 and 1966 
elections, roughly two-thirds of electors voted for their 'natural' class 
party, so that the class influence was by no means universally decisive, 
but its influence was none the less impressive. (Sanders 1997: 53) 
However, successive academic surveys carried out by the British Election Study 
have drawn attention to a 'progressive, if uneven, reduction in the extent of 
~~absolute" class-based voting between 1964 and the late 1980s' (Sanders 1997: 
54). As in Austria and the Netherlands, this can to some extent be explained by 
Britain's shift from an industrial to 'post-industrial' economy. This has resulted 
in an expansion of the service sector, a decline in industrial manufacturing and 
marked changes in the class structure. Class voting indices developed to examine 
the strength of the class-party relationship would also indicate that there has been 
3 Information supplied by Paul Lucardie (letter dated 8 June 1995). 
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a tendency for class dealignment in Britain since the 1960s (Sanders 1997: 54-
55). However, it should be noted that there is still considerable debate as to 
whether there has been a marked decline in the significance of the class cleavage, 
with some political analysts contending that social class continues to occupy a 
central position within the context of British electoral behaviour (Webb 1994: 
838. Sanders 1997: 56). 
Along with class dealignment, some academics have observed changes in 
the strength of partisan attachments in Britain during the same period. For 
example, commenting on British Election Study data between 1964 and 1987. 
Heath et al. concluded that 'there are fewer electors nowadays than there used to 
be who identify with any of the political parties and, even more strikingly, fewer 
with a very strong identification' (Heath et al. 1991: 11). Reflecting such patterns 
of class and partisan dealignment, voters in Britain are considered to have 
become more volatile over the past 30 years (Webb 1994: 838-839; Sanders 
1997: 73). 
Within this context it might be anticipated that a party such as the Greens 
would have benefited in electoral terms, as voters with weaker class and partisan 
ties become more inclined to switch party allegiances from one election to the 
next. At the 1989 European elections. in which the Green Party gained an 
impressive 14.9 per cent of the vote4, poll data suggests that the Greens did 
indeed gain substantial votes from previous Conservative, Alliance and to a lesser 
extent Labour voters (Rootes 1995a: 73). In addition, Green voting at this 
election was strongly related to youth (RUdig et al. 1996: 12-13). But as Rootes 
has shown, this unprecedented result 'was only possible because of the 
extraordinary conditions of electoral competition which obtained in that election 
for the European Parliament' (Rootes 1995a: 86). According to this 
interpretation, it was a combination of the unpopularity of the then Conservative 
government, the weakness of the newly formed Liberal Democrats and the 
deradicalisation of the Labour Party on such issues as nuclear energy which 
4 As was pointed out in chapter 2, the 1989 European election result was so extraordinary for the 
Green Party that to exclude it from the discussion would seem ill-judged. 
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provided the Green Party with an opportunity to 'pick up' the protest vote 
(Rootes 1995a). It is highly likely that the Greens' 'success' in 1989 was less the 
result of long-term class and/or partisan electoral dealignment than a unique set 
of electoral circumstances unlikely to be repeated. Additional factors which 
probably contributed to the party's electoral performance include the 'second-
order' status of European elections - which often provide occasions for 
widespread protest voting - and heightened public concern about ecological risks 
and problems that had come to light during the 1980s (Rudig et al. 1993). Indeed, 
an examination of the electoral performance of the Green Party under 'normal' 
conditions of political competition in general elections reveals that it has 
remained negligible, consistently failing to surpass the 1 to 2 per cent mark. This 
is in spite of a progressive decline in class-based voting and the strength of 
partisan identification in Britain during the period within which the Green Party 
has competed in general elections. 
The failure of the Green Party to benefit at general elections from 
electoral dealignment can primarily be linked to the political consequences of the 
FPTP electoral system outlined in chapter 6. Many potential Green Party voters 
probably tend not to vote Green because the mechanics of the system mean that 
their vote will invariably be a 'wasted' one. The prospects of green parties in 
Austria and the Netherlands benefiting electorally from a more dealigned 
electorate may thus be greater than in Britain since the former have proportional 
electoral systems in which all votes 'count'. 
3. Green Parties, the Nature of Politieal Competition and 
the 'Environment' 
A further focus for enquiry that may be of relevance when attempting to uncover 
the conditions which potentially impact upon the emergence and electoral 
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significance of green parties concerns the behaviour of existing political parties. 
According to Hauss and Rayside: 
new parties develop only when there is something wrong, that is, when a 
substantial number of people are concerned about a serious issue. New 
parties develop only when existing parties will not or cannot appeal to 
these discontented voters (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 46). 
As was argued in chapter 5, the existence and perception of global ecological 
risks and problems played an important part in the emergence of green party 
politics in Austria, Britain and the Netherlands. Thus far, however, the possibility 
that the emergence of green parties may also have reflected a general lack of 
responsiveness by established parties to the rise of ecological issues and concerns 
has not been considered in any great depth. In addition, it may be the case that 
certain green parties have been able to benefit further from the process of 
electoral dealignment described above only to the extent that the more 
established parties have not managed to respond adequately to ecological issues 
and thus to 'compete' effectively with green parties for the 'green' vote. Where 
existing parties have made serious attempts to respond to and accommodate 
ecological issues and concerns, this may have reduced green parties' chances of 
being the sole recipients of the environmentally-motivated vote (Rootes 1995b: 
242). However, these outcomes may depend upon the degree to which ecological 
issues have continued to occupy a prominent place on the political agendas of the 
three countries. Where 'the environment' has become less salient and is less an 
'issue' of electoral competition, the degree of responsiveness of existing parties 
to the former may have little impact on a green party's electoral prospects. These 
issues are explored below. 
197 
(a) Austria 
In Austria. the failure of the SPO to respond adequately to the demands of 
environmental challengers undoubtedly facilitated the emergence of green party 
politics. As was argued in chapter 5, the intense protest triggered by the SPO 
government's nuclear energy policy was a key catalyst for the formation of two 
national parties emphasising environmental themes - the ALO and vGO - in 
1982. It was also noted that the sPO and labour unions' support for the building 
of a hydro-electric plant at Hainburg (the site of a unique wildlife habitat) in 
1984 gave a considerable boost to the environmental movement in Austria. The 
actions of the SpO, and the party's failure to respond to rising ecological 
concern, were key factors in enabling nascent 'green' political organisations to 
access 'space' within the previously 'closed' party system. 
In response to the growing salience of ecological issues, however, the 
mam political parties underwent something of a 'greening' process - a 
development which 'peaked' in the late 1980s and which may have been a factor 
in the stagnation of the Green vote at the 1990 elections. For example, in 1989 
the SPO introduced a new political programme - Social Democracy 2000 - which 
stressed 'green' themes in calling for an 'ecological market society' (Kitschelt 
1994: 177). The OVP. in coalition with the SPO, developed a similar programme 
based upon the concept of the 'eco-social market economy', and called for the 
introduction of market-based environmental policy instruments, an energy tax on 
fossil fuels and the creation of a national park on the Danube. Even JOrg Haider's 
far-right FPC incorporated a limited 'green' agenda into its political programme 
in response to the growing significance of the green vote. In 1993, the liberal 
wing of the FPO broke away and formed the Liberal Forum, a party which has 
proved relatively more open to ecological issues than the established parties 
(M1lller 1996b: 62; Lauber 1997a: 318; Lauber 1997b: 90-91). All political 
parties in Austria are currently committed to 'sustainable development' although, 
of course, there are considerable differences concerning their respective 
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understandings of this concept (Lauber 1997b: 90). In examining the case of the 
Austrian Greens it should therefore be acknowledged that increased competition 
for the 'green' vote may have had a negative impact on the party's electoral 
performance in recent years. While the Austrian Greens have surpassed the 4 per 
cent threshold of electoral significance at successive national elections since 
1986 - reaching a high of 7.3 per cent in 1994 - the extent to which they have 
been able to make substantial electoral advances may to some degree have been 
thwarted by the mild 'greening' of other parties. 
As well as the aforementioned political parties, the Austrian Greens have, 
in the past. faced competition from the VGO, a political party which defines 
itself as 'green' but which is not a member of the European Federation of Green 
Parties. At the 1990 elections, for example, the failure of the Greens to build 
upon their 4.8 per cent share of the vote gained in 1986 might further be 
explained by the presence of the VGO. which gained 2 per cent of the vote 
(Frankland 1994: 197). As was mentioned above, the Greens gained 7.3 per cent 
of the vote in 1994 and this increase may, in part, have reflected the fact that the 
vGO had all but disappeared from the political landscape by this point (Lauber 
1997a: 185). However, as will be demonstrated in chapter 9, the improved 
performance of the Greens at this election has also been attributed to the 
effectiveness of their campaign, and, in particular, of their de facto leader, 
Madeleine Petrovic, during the run-up to the election. 
The recent electoral decline of the Greens may in part be related to the 
shifting position of the environment on the party political agenda in Austria, 
particularly during election campaigns. In 1995, the parliamentary election 
campaign was structured around budgetary issues and the Left-Right cleavage, 
which left little room for the Greens to mount a strong electoral challenge based 
around distinctive ecological issues (Sully 1996: 639). Yet public opinion surveys 
in Austria indicate that concern about the environment in Austria continues to 
rise, despite the emphasis on more 'traditional' issues of public policy by 
government, business and industry (Lauber 1997a). This suggests that the Greens 
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- along with parties such as the LF - may stand to benefit electorally should 
ecologically-conscious citizens consider the established political parties and 
organisations to be ignoring their concerns in the future. 
(b) The Netherlands 
The timing of the emergence of green parties in the Netherlands - as well as their 
electoral performance - also reflects the behaviour of other political parties. The 
failure of a significant green party to emerge prior to Green Left in 1989 can in 
large part be explained by the existence of several New Left parties which had 
long emphasised environmental themes. The PSP, for instance, had been active 
against pollution and nuclear power since the late 1960s (Lucardie et al. 1993). 
Similarly, the PPR had, since its formation in 1968 'faced up to the increasing 
impairment of the environment' (Voerman 1995: 116).5 The CPN, by contrast, 
remained a Marxist-Leninist party until the late 1970s. Yet from this period 
onwards the party opened itself to new social movement concerns, facilitating the 
rapprochement of Radicals, Pacifists and Communists (Voerman 1995: 112). As 
a consequence of intense electoral competition, the 'pure' green party founded in 
1983 (De Groenen) consistently failed to make any significant electoral impact, 
and its poor performance at elections has continued in the light of Green Left's 
presence on the political landscape since 1989 (Voerman 1995: 111). 
The relatively delayed formation of a significant green party in the 
Netherlands was also a partial consequence of the positive response of the more 
mainstream Dutch parties to the rise of the environment as a political issue since 
the 1970s. The publication of the Limits to Growth report in 1972, and the United 
Nations (Stockholm) Conference on environmental pollution held during the 
same year, served as catalysts for the 'greening' of parties of the Left, including 
, The PPR participated in the Coordination of European and Radical Parties after the 1979 
European elections along with green parties from West Germany, Belgium, France and Britain 
(parkin 1989: 257). 
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PvdA and D66, and, somewhat later, the parties of the Right. The PvdA's 
adoption of an anti-nuclear stance from the late 1970s onwards led to improved 
contacts between the party and environmentalists, and this to some extent 
diminished the need for a newly formed green party (Jamison et al. 1990). In 
sum, the existence of New Left parties increasingly committed to environmental 
issues, along with a 'greening' of the mainstream parties, meant that, for much of 
the 1980s, there was insufficient 'space' for a significant green party on the 
Dutch political landscape. 
It seems likely that the Dutch Green Left's electoral progress since 1989 
has been adversely affected by two political competition related issues. First, the 
establishment of an integrated system of environmental policy planning in recent 
years (exemplified by the government's adoption of a National Environmental 
Policy Plan in 1989), along with the setting up of voluntary agreements with 
polluters, and the growing tendency of environmentalists to seek involvement in 
the policy-making process (LiefTerink: 1997), may have served to weaken the 
oppositional electoral potential of Green Left. The emergence of the Netherlands 
as one Europe's most environmentally progressive states may to some extent 
explain why Green Left's electoral progress has been somewhat unremarkable 
since its formation. Second, the degree to which Green Left has been able to 
market itself as the Dutch 'party of the environment' has been further limited by 
the behaviour of a comparatively successful centre to centre-left party - D66 -
which appeals particularly to left-wing liberal voters. This well-established, 'anti-
establishment' party has consistently given ecological issues a high priority 
(Jacobs 1989: 271). It is possible that some of Green Left's losses at the 1994 
Dutch elections were the result of voters switching to the relatively 'greenish' 
D66 party, which doubled its share of the vote and seats in parliament. However, 
it is also likely that Green Left lost some votes in 1994 simply because, compared 
with 1989, ecological problems were not considered to be key election issues by 
voters, and did not assume a prominent position in the election campaign 
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(Lucardie 1995: 122). This was perhaps a reflection of the increasing 
'internalisation' of environmental issues by the Dutch state mentioned above. 
At the most recent national elections (1998), however, Green Left appears 
to have made gains at the expense of the ruling coalition's most junior partner, 
066. According to one Green Left politician, the party's success in these 
elections was more a consequence of voters warming to its detailed plans 
concerning salient social issues such as unemployment, persistent poverty and 
healthcare provision (Wouters 1998). It is thus probably accurate to state that 
Green Left's appeal stretches beyond the ecologically motivated section of the 
Dutch electorate to encompass those with a more general 'leftist' or 'New Left' 
social outlook. This is reflected in Green Left's attempts to develop policies that 
will appeal to both greens and socialists: for example, the party's current 
proposals for tackling unemployment would involve 'shortening the working 
week and using taxes on pollution and profits to finance more public-sector jobs' 
(The Economist, 9 May 1998: 111). 
(c) Britain 
Until the mid 1980s 'the environment' hardly featured upon the mainstream 
political landscape of British politics. Yet it should be noted that the 1970s did 
see the development of fringe involvement with ecological politics in each of the 
main parties6. Of the three 'ginger groups' which developed, it was the Liberal 
Ecology Group which had the most impact within its party - indeed, at the 1979 
Liberal Party Assembly a motion to the effect that 'sustained economic growth, 
as conventionally measured, is neither feasible nor desirable' was approved 
(cited in Robinson 1992). According to one group of commentators, the Liberal 
Party 'had a major wing whose main policy positions were very close to the 
6 For example, the Socialist Environment and Resources Association (SERA) was fonned within 
the Labour Party in 1973. The year 1977 saw the formation of the Liberal Ecology Group within 
the Liberal Party and the Conservative Ecology Group within the Conservative Party (Robinson 
1992). 
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Greens' (Rtldig et al. 1993: 22). It was hardly surprising, then, that at the 1979 
general election it was the Liberal Party which, of the three main parties, devoted 
the most attention to ecological issues. It is possible that the presence of the 
relatively 'green' Liberals - whose leader David Steel 'unblushingly' adopted the 
Green Party's slogan 'The Real Alternative' for the 1979 general election - had a 
negative effect on the extent of the Green Party vote at this election (parkin 1989: 
221). But the Liberal Party's radicalism was soon submerged by the centrist 
alliance forged in 1981 with the newly formed Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
(Robinson 1992). 
According to Rootes, throughout much of the 1980s the Labour Party 
remained largely 'locked into an ideology of human progress through material 
productivity and did not accord environmental issues high priority' (Rootes 
1995a: 84). Yet there were exceptions to this pattern, particularly when it carne to 
the large-scale 'risks' associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. 
During the early 1980s the Labour Party became the main party political vehicle 
for the peace movement, committing itself to a policy of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament. And following the Chemobyl disaster of 1986, the Labour Party 
embraced a non-nuclear energy policy that would involve 'the eventual closure of 
all nuclear power stations' (Rtldig et al. 1993: 22). As will be argued in more 
depth in the next chapter, the openness of the Labour Party to the British peace 
movement during this period was a contributing factor to the continued electoral 
marginality of the Green Party. The orientation of the resurgent peace movement 
towards the Labour Party meant that the Green Party was deprived of the support 
of an important social movement which had, in other European countries, given a 
boost to the development of significant green parties (parkin 1989; O'Neill 
1997). 
After 1987, however, the key aim of the Labour leadership was to 
transform the party into one which would attract the 'middle-of-the-road' voter 
and, consequently, many of its more radical policy positions - including the non-
nuclear energy policy - were dispensed with (Rtldig et al. 1993: 22). Yet towards 
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the end of the 1980s public awareness of and concern about ecological issues 
grew, prompting an attempt by the major parties to obtain a 'greener' profile 
(Robinson 1992). Most analyses of the 'greening' of British politics attach 
considerable significance to Mrs Thatcher's so-called 'first speech' on the 
environment given to the Royal Society in September 1988. In this speech, the 
Prime Minister outlined the nature of environmental problems, gave support to 
the concept of 'sustainable development' and talked about need for the 
environment to be nurtured and safeguarded (Robinson 1992). Gallup opinion 
poll data shows that there was a sharp rise in public environmental concern 
(which peaked in 1989) following Thatcher's speech (Rtldig et 01. 1993: 16). 
Following the Green Party's electoral 'success' at the 1989 European 
elections, the three main parties published documents on the subject of the 
environment: the Conservative government produced a white paper - This 
Common Inheritance; Labour published a weighty document called An Earthly 
Chance while the Liberal Democrats issued a report entitled What Price our 
Planet? It could be argued that the electoral decline of the Green Party post-
1989, demonstrated by its very poor performance at the 1992 and 1997 general 
elections, was in part the result of the major parties having successfully embraced 
environmental issues, thereby 'smothering' the Green vote. Others have more 
convincingly suggested that of considerably greater importance in explaining the 
fading of the Greens was 'the declining salience of environmental issues and the 
change of the political agenda back to traditional economic issues with the 
coming of the recession' (RQdig et 01. 1993: 62). Indeed, opinion poll data show 
that while in July 1989, 35 per cent of the public considered the environment to 
be one of the two most important political issues, this figure had fallen to 6 per 
cent by the beginning of 1991 (Carter 1997a: 200). However, the changing 
balance of political competition also offers a strong explanation of the party's 
rapid decline (Rootes 1995a; Carter I 997a). As was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the Green Party in 1989 was presented with an opportunity to pick up the 
'protest vote' on account of the heightened salience of ecological issues. But 
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crucially this opportunity was temporary, and arose because of the weakened 
competitive position of the main political parties. With the restoration of 
'normal' patterns of party competition, the vast majority of 1989 Green voters 
returned to 'their various folds in 1992, leaving the Greens to fall back on the tiny 
percentage of the electorate they have been able to attract at all other times' 
(Byrne 1997: 152). 
Should ecological issues once again rise to the top of the British political 
agenda the electoral prospects of the Green Party may thus to some extent depend 
on the contemporary state of party competition. Yet it should be remembered that 
the Green Party's 'success' in 1989 was achieved in a relatively 'low status' 
European election, and that the support levels achieved would probably not be 
repeated within the context of 'more important' - within the minds of most voters 
- general elections. As was argued in the last chapter, the psychological and 
mechanical consequences of the British electoral system further reduce the 
chances of the Greens surpassing the threshold of electoral significance in the 
foreseeable future. 
4. Conclusion 
The three COWltries in this study have experienced declining levels of traditional 
cleavage voting and party identification in recent decades, as well as increased 
electoral volatility. Yet it is clear that these trends have impacted upon the 
development of green party politics to varying degrees, as well as in different ways. 
In Austria, the Greens have benefited from the weakening of voter attachments to 
established parties in recent decades, and this is shown by the nwnber of voters 
switching from these parties to the Greens at certain National Council elections. 
However, it was also noted that increased electoral volatility has not always 
benefited the Greens, making the party's electoral prospects somewhat uncertain. In 
the Netherlands, the emergence of Green Left has been facilitated by electoral 
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dealignment insofar as the ideological renewal of two parties involved in the merger 
reflected patterns of secularisation and 'post-industrialism' in Dutch society. As in 
Austria, however, greater electoral volatility has had uncertain outcomes in tenns of 
the electoral perfonnance of Green Left. In Britain, electoral volatility seems to have 
contributed to the Green Party's electoral 'success' of 1989 - that is, to the extent that 
a high proportion of Green voters had voted for another party at the previous general 
election However, the fact that the British Greens have consistently failed to benefit 
from increased dealignment in general elections suggests that the 1989 result was 
more a consequence of temporary conditions of political competition, and the 
saliency of ecological issues, than long-tenn processes of electoral change. The re-
establishment of 'nonnal' conditions of political competition, i.e. the dominance of 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, in combination with the 
inhospitable nature of the current electoral system, have meant that the Green Party 
bas failed to benefit from any dealignment in the British political system. 
A further aim of this chapter was to explore the argwnent linking the 
emergence and electoral significance of green parties to the responsiveness of 
existing parties to heightened public concern about the environment. In Austria, the 
lack of responsiveness of the sPO to prominent ecological issues was clearly an 
important factor in creating the conditions for the emergence of green party politics. 
Yet during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the electoral progress of the Greens was 
perhaps impeded by the limited 'greening' of the established parties in Austria and 
the emergence of the Liberal Forum, a party which placed considerable emphasis on 
environmental issues. The established parties undoubtedly responded to what they 
perceived to be the growing significance of 'the environment' as an issue of political 
competition However, by 1995 the environment had ceased to be a central electoral 
issue for voters and established parties, and this probably contnbuted to the Greens' 
electoral decline of that year. 
Turning to the Netherlands, the development of an electorally significant 
green party prior to the emergence of Green Left in 1989 was prevented by the 
presence of several New Left parties for whom 'the environment' had been a key 
206 
electoral campaigning issue. The emergence of Green Left has served to further 
marginalise the small, 'pure' green party, De Groenen. Yet Green Left's electoral 
development has been somewhat constrained by advances in environmental policy 
and political competition for the 'green' vote from 066, a party which has sought to 
respond to growing environmental concern in recent years. Green Left's improved 
perfonnance at the 1998 elections suggests that the party may be successfully 
appealing to voters on the basis of its broader agenda for social as well as ecological 
refonn. 
The electoral perfonnance of the British Green Party in general elections has 
been consistently poor. The Green Party's most respectable showing came in the 
European elections of 1989. The most convincing explanation for this result must 
take account of the rising levels of ecological concern apparent in Britain during the 
late 1980s, the perceived lack of responsiveness of existing parties to such mounting 
concern and the unique conditions of political competition that prevailed during the 
election campaign. The decline of the Green Party post-1989 was less the result of 
the main parties responding to public concern about ecological issues than a 
declining public interest in the latter, and the return to 'nonnal' conditions of 
political competition in Britain. 
What emerges from this chapter's discussion are the clear connections 
between several of the themes explored in previous chapters and those examined 
here. The process of electoral dealignment - demonstrated in general tenns by the 
declining attachment of voters to established political parties - has clear links to the 
changing class structure symptomatic of the shift to 'post-industrial' society (chapter 
4). The rise of a society characterised by the heightened perception of global 
ecological risks and problems (chapter 5) has clearly contributed to the emergence of 
green parties, although whether these parties have been able to make significant 
electoral advances has to some extent depended upon the responsiveness of 
established and other parties to ecological problems, and on the electoral salience of 
ecological issues. Combined with a consideration of the impact of political state-
institutional structures on the emergence and electoral significance of green parties 
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(chapter 6), a clearer picture of the nature of the political and institutional 
dimensions most likely to impact upon green parties is beginning to emerge. In the 
next chapter, the focus shifts to a further set of issues which have been cited as 
potentially impacting upon the emergence and electoral significance of green parties: 




Modes of Interest Representation and Green Parties: 
The Role of Neo-Corporatism, Pluralism 
and Social Movements 
This chapter focuses attention on the proposed connections between 'modes of 
interest representation' - defined here as the patterns of representation of social 
and economic group interests in the formal decision-making and wider political 
process - and the emergence and electoral significance of green parties. One of 
the major themes within the social movement literature in recent years has been 
the relationship between neo-corporatism, pluralism and the nature and extent of 
political protest (Offe 1981~ Scott 1990~ Wilson 1990~ Nollert 1995~ Wallace and 
I 
Jenkins 1995). Theorists have argued that neo-corporatist forms of elite 
negotiation, in particular, may have facilitated the development of new social 
movements in certain Western European countries. For Claus Offe. this is 
because such arrangements largely represent the interests of capital and labour, 
and are inclined to ignore and oppose the concerns of citizens on a range of new 
political and social issues. Citizens are thus compelled to develop alternative 
vehicles of interest representation and to engage in unconventional forms of 
social protest activity in the struggle for political access and influence (Offe 
1981). Herbert Kitschelt has recently applied this line of argument to the case of 
green parties, arguing that the extent to which they will attain electoral 
significance is linked to the presence or absence of 'centralized, corporatist 
patterns of labor union organization' (Kitschelt 1993: 98). By contrast, countries 
with more pluralist patterns of interest intermediation tend to provide a less 
favourable political environment for the emergence of significant green parties, 
since they are characterised by a more open political process which theoretically 
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allows for more effective representation and participation of new groups in 
decision-making (Kitschelt 1990: 184). 
The first part of the chapter deals with arguments linking neo-
corporatism/pluralism to the emergence of significant green parties before 
proceeding to apply them to green party politics in Austria, the Netherlands and 
Britain. It is argued that political analysts such as Kitschelt have tended to 
overgeneralise with respect to the character and impact of neo-corporatist 
decision-making structures. In particular, it is maintained that while neo-
corporatist structures can have a positive impact upon the electoral performance 
of green parties, this depends on whether those structures have been • open' or 
'closed' to the articulation of ecological demands. Further doubt is cast on the 
claim that pluralist patterns of interest intermediation have necessarily been more 
open to ecological interests. Overall. it is argued that future assessments of the 
impact of patterns of interest intermediation on the electoral strength of green 
parties must be more sensitive to the different degrees of accessibility accorded 
to new political interests in both neo-corporatist and pluralist polities. 
In the second part of the chapter attention is turned to further modes of 
interest representation which have been cited as potentially facilitating the 
emergence and electoral success of green parties. This discussion concerns, more 
directly, the role of social movements. There are at least two ways in which the 
emergence and electoral significance of green parties may be related to social 
movement activity. First, the emergence of green parties may have been a 
'logical' outgrowth of social movement activism in Austria, the Netherlands and 
Britain. According to Kitschelt • [f]ounding new parties ... constitutes a second 
step [after social movements] in placing [new] demands on a country's political 
agenda' (Kitschelt 1990: 184). Kitschelt argues that social movement activity has 
often been followed by the emergence of demands to form green parties because 
participants have soon become aware of the limits of movement protest and wish 
to confront 'political elites in the arena of electoral competition' (Kitschelt 1989: 
26). Kitschelt's approach is partly rooted in resource mobilisation theory (RMT), 
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an approach influenced by rational choice theory, which stresses the largely 
instrumental and self-interested basis of the social movement-green party 
transition process. It will be argued that attention to aspects of RMT, in some 
cases, can add to an explanation of the emergence of green parties which stresses 
the interaction between social movements, political state-institutional structures, 
patterns of electoral change and political competition, and, potentially, modes of 
interest representation such as neo-corporatism. 
Second, the electoral significance of green parties may be related to the 
degree to which they have been able to establish strong links with social -
particularly environmental - movements and an electoral support base rooted in 
the latter. It will be shown that, indeed, the electoral success of green parties in 
Austria and the Netherlands has, to some extent, been a consequence of the 
strong links which these parties have managed to establish with environmental 
movements. The British Green Party, by contrast, has been weakened by its 
failure to attract the support of the wider environmental movement. 
1. Neo-Corporatism, Pluralism and Political Protest 
'Neo-corporatism' is a concept that has been subject to much critical discussion 
within comparative research in recent decades (Williamson 1989). However, 
scholars have yet to reach an overall consensus on the question of precisely how 
the term should be defined. 1 Of the various attempts to define neo-corporatism it 
is Schmitter's that has proved to be most dominant, and it is therefore the one 
which will be adopted within the context of the present discussion. According to 
Schmitter: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
I See WtlJiamson (1989) for a comprehensive discussion of the various conceptual understandings 
of neo-oorporatism. 
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functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports. (Schmitter 1974: 93-94) 
Neo-corporatist polities can be contrasted with pluralist ones in which an 
unspecified number of 'multiple, overlapping, spontaneously formed, 
voluntaristically supported, easily abandoned, and politically autonomous 
associations' seek to influence the political decision-making process (Schmitter 
1981: 293). The essential point about neo-corporatism is that is refers to a 
specific 'mode of arranging the political process' (Schmitter 1981: 295), which 
usually takes the form of large and powerful interest groups - representing 
interests of employers and workers - having privileged access to government and 
playing a key role in both the formulation and implementation of major political 
decisions. Unlike the pluralist model, which stresses the 'largely informal and ad 
hoc pattern of interaction' between government and interest groups, neo-
corporatist arrangements are characterised by the existence of 'well structured 
and institutionalized' relationships within the formal political arena, and the 
exclusion of 'outside' interests or rival groups from this representative 
framework (Wilson 1990: 69). 
Advocates of the neo-corporatist policy-making style have tended to argue 
that by 'restricting involvement to official groups committed to accommodation 
[it] channels participation into acceptable forms' (Wilson 1990: 70). It therefore 
acts as a 'restraint on uncontrolled participation' (Wilson 1990: 70). A further 
advantage identified by some commentators is that to the extent that it fosters a 
culture of 'discipline' by encouraging individual group members to accept the 
'general interest' negotiated by group leaders, neo-corporatism represents 'the 
ideal solution to the central problem of modem capitalism: the maintenance of 
order' (Crouch, cited in Wilson 1990: 70). In short, neo-corporatism has been 
viewed in terms of a means of reducing the traditional conflict between labour 
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and capital through the formal organisation and representation of these interests 
within a policy framework characterised by accommodation and negotiation. 
According to some critics, however, neo-corporatist decision-making has 
also had the effect of stimulating the development of oppositional political forces 
- principally those of new social movements and green parties - in certain 
countries. They have pointed to the rigidity of neo-corporatist arrangements and 
the extent to which this has fostered a lack of responsiveness on the part of 
established actors to the rise of new issues such as 'the environment'. It is argued 
that those concerned with such issues commonly find little response from noo. 
corporatist bodies whose interests lie in maintaining a 'cosy consensus' on issues, 
and in preserving a policy system characterised by a stable agenda, set rules and 
the stifling of debate (Scott 1990: 144). The result is that concerned citizens have 
little option but to form new groups with the aim of advancing the neglected 
issue(s). Certain commentators have suggested that the 'closed' character ofneo-
corporatist patterns of decision-making tends to promote the adoption of 
unconventional political tactics by excluded groups. Because they are unable to 
access established channels for interest representation 'outside groups resort to ... 
demonstrations, boycotts, political strikes, sit-ins, and even violence to draw the 
attention of the public or the policy-makers to their concerns' (Wilson 1990: 71). 
The tendency for neo-corporatist structures to 'ignore' movement concerns is 
therefore considered to stimulate the development of an 'anti-systemic' 
disposition among new political groups (Wilson 1990: 72). 
The proliferation of green parties concerned about ecological and other 
'new' issues, and critical of the existing political order, has led some observers to 
pursue the neo-corporatist question in further detail. According to Kitschelt, neo-
corporatism has been an important factor in the rise of the green phenomenon in 
Western party systems (Kitschelt 1993). In a similar vein to the position outlined 
above, Kitschelt claims that neo-corporatist patterns of interest intermediation 
have constrained consideration of so-called 'left-libertarian' demands in two 
main ways. As he comments: 
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In terms of policy-making procedures, new, less well-organized interests 
are rarely recognized by the dominant corporatist interest associations and 
parties. And in terms of policy outcomes, business and labor build 
compromises around economic and social policies diametrically opposed 
to left-libertarian demands: the imperatives of industrial growth and 
bureaucratic regulation. When a coalition of producer interests dominates 
policy-making, left-libertarians resort to new and disruptive vehicles of 
interest representation. (Kitschelt 1989: 20) 
For Kitschelt such 'vehicles of interest representation' would include green - or 
other 'left-libertarian' - parties. During the 1970s, the close association between 
governing social democratic parties and neo-corporatist arrangements in 
countries such as Austria, Belgium and Germany meant that the traditional Left 
was unavailable for the representation of 'new' interests and this ultimately 
fuelled demands for the formation of green parties (Kitschelt 1989: 22; Kitschelt 
1993: 99). Clearly, there are possible links between neo-corporatism and the 
existence and creation of the ecological risks and problems outlined in chapter 5 
of this thesis. As Scott succinctly puts it: 
Corporatism is premised on sustained economic growth, and high levels 
of employment. Therefore, corporatist 'solutions' to differences of class 
interest, even or especially where they are successful, displace social and 
economic 'crises' on to environmental pressures. (Scott 1990: 146) 
In terms of accounting for the significance of green parties, it might reasonably 
be argued that to the extent that neo-corporatism has provided few opportunities 
for consideration of ecological demands on account of it being grounded on such 
'an ideology of growth' (Scott 1990: 147), these parties might attract higher 
levels of electoral support than those competing in countries with more 'open' 
structures of political decision-making. While 'post-industrial' societies tend to 
be characterised by elitist decision-making and demands for participation 
(chapter 4), these features may be more pronounced in those polities with neo-
corporatist arrangements. This may lead to a greater number of ecologically 
concerned citizens being attracted to political organisations such as green parties, 
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that is, organisations which seek to expose the dysfunctional effects of these 
structures. 
Employing Schmitter's measure of neo-corporatism2 Kitschelt presents 
evidence that indeed suggests a 'very high association' between levels of neo-
corporatism and the electoral strength of green parties. Electorally significant 
green parties are therefore more likely to develop in those countries with medium 
to high levels of neo-corporatism. For Kitschelt, the importance of neo-
corporatism for the development of green parties is also demonstrated by the 
'high negative correlation' between levels of strike activity - an 'indirect measure 
of economic interest intermediation' (Kitschelt 1988a: 213) - and the existence of 
significant green parties. In addition, Kitschelt points out that those countries 
without significant green parties tend to 'share relatively pluralist patterns of 
interest intermediation and have been dominated by non-socialist political forces' 
(Kitschelt 1990: 184). In the next section these arguments are explored in more 
detail through a discussion of the degree to which patterns of interest 
intermediation have impacted on the electoral significance of green parties in 
Austria, the Netherlands and Britain. 
2. Neo-Corporatism, Pluralism and Green Parties 
(a) Austria 
Austria has been defined as a political system characterised by very high levels of 
neo-corporatist policy-making (Gallagher et 01. 1995: 365; Wilson 1990: 73). It 
has been noted that • Austria is widely regarded as the "paradigm case" of 
corporatism' (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991: 241). The Austrian form of neo-
2 Neo-corporatism is measured on the basis of 'two core structural characteristics of the trade 
union movement': (1) the degree of organisational centralisation and (2) the extent to which a 
single national association enjoys a representational monopoly. Schmitter presumed that trade 
union centralisation and monopolisation would result in other interests beins orsanised 
correspondingly (Schmitter 1981: 293). 
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corporatism which developed during the post-war period, called 
SozialpartnerschaJt (social partnership), established a distinct model of interest 
representation and intermediation based upon close co-operation between trade 
unions, business associations and government. The most important institutions 
within the Austrian model ofneo-corporatism are the statutory 'chambers' whose 
role is to formally represent the interests of labour, commerce and agriculture, 
and all working citizens in Austria must belong to one of these chambers (Gerlich 
1987: 88). Besides these, there exist a number of voluntary interest groups - most 
notably, the Trade Union Federation (COB) and the Federation of Austrian 
Industrialists (Val) - which are represented within the Austrian system. These 
interest groups have traditionally been closely linked with one of the two major 
political parties (OVP and SPO). and this is demonstrated by the extensive 
institutional connections that have been established between these organisations 
(TaIos 1996: 108). The Austrian model is therefore one which is characterised by 
high levels of concentration and integration (pelinka 1987: 63-64). To the extent 
that the system of economic planning established by the social partners in Austria 
delivered steady growth and comparatively low levels of inflation and 
unemployment during the post-war decades, commentators have judged it to be 
an 'outstanding success' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 366). The climate of consensus 
that pervaded Austrian politics during this period delivered stability within the 
political system and across society as a whole. 
Several studies have investigated the degree to which neo-corporatism in 
Austria has been a factor in the emergence of new social movements and/or green 
parties (Dachs 1989; Gottweis 1990; Kreuzer 1990). Of the policy spheres that 
are subject to neo-corporatist patterns of decision-making, it is energy which has 
proved to be the most prominent site of political conflict. The conflict between 
new groups and the social partners (led by the Spa) over the use of nuclear 
energy was an important catalyst in the emergence of 'green' parties (ALa and 
VOO) in Austria. In addition, the conflict over the proposed construction of a 
hydroelectric power plant at Hainburg effectively amounted to a challenge by 
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movement activists against powerful economic lobbies which had the backing of 
the social partners (led by the SpOIFPO coalition). The victory achieved by the 
green movement boosted support levels and gave an added impetus to the 
development of green party politics in Austria. All this suggests that, as well as a 
consideration of ecological conflicts, an examination of the emergence of the 
Greens requires attention to the ne().COrporatist nature of decision-making within 
Austria's political system. Because the stability characteristic ofneo-corporatism 
in Austria was premised upon sustained economic growth and high levels of 
employment, the political system has traditionally been 'closed' to new issues 
such as 'the environment', and this has facilitated the development of new forms 
of interest representation critical of the social partnership and supportive of 
greater participation, and unconventional methods of political protest. 
Survey data relating to green voting motives show that, along with 
environmental protection, protest against the major parties and discontent with 
existing patterns of political decision-making in Austria have consistently 
featured within the collection of reasons cited for casting a green vote (plasser 
and Ulram 1985; Dachs 1989; Frankland 1994). But while, on the face of this 
evidence, it seems that hostility to neo-corporatist decision-making was a factor 
in the emergence of an electorally significant green party in Austria, recent 
studies have questioned the proposed association between strength of neo-
corporatism and support levels for new social movements and/or green parties 
(Wilson 1990). To what extent does the Dutch case shed further light on the neo-
corporatism/green party issue? 
(b) The Netherlands 
The Dutch political system has also been defined in 'neo-corporatist' terms by 
political analysts. Andeweg and Irwin have described the Dutch system of neo-
corporatism as comprising a strong and well-integrated system of interest groups; 
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the existence of venues for consultation and bargaining between government and 
interest groups; and a commitment to the rules of bargaining and compromise on 
the part of involved parties (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 164). As in Austria, the 
dominant function of neo-corporatism in the Netherlands is considered to be 
policy formation and implementatio~ and actors operating within this context 
take the form of interest associations (representing employers and workers) as 
well as state agencies. Because only officially recognised associations have 
access to state agencies the Dutch system has been characterised as 'relatively 
closed'. The strongly institutionalised and stable character of neo-corporatist 
arrangements means that 'many issues just do not reach the general public' and 
that '[i]ssues get depoliticized' (van Waarden 1992: 139-140). 
The degree to which neo-corporatist patterns of decision-making have 
contributed to the emergence of a significant green party in the Netherlands is, 
however, difficult to establish. While, as has been noted, some political issues 
have undoubtedly been excluded from consideration in the policy-making 
process, it should be pointed out that scholars have stressed the high level of 
success, in terms of policy influence, that the Dutch environmental movement 
has achieved at local as well as central government levels since the late 1960s 
(van der Heijden 1994: 107). As van der Heijden comments: 
in the 1970s the moderate faction of the Dutch environmental movement 
had become part of the so-called "iron ring": the grouping of pressure 
groups, advisory boards and consultative bodies around the government. 
Ever since the foundation of the Ministry of Public Health and the 
Environment in 1972 this ring has largely influenced environmental 
policy-making ... The "iron ring" reflects the history of pillarised Holland 
in which the government is used to concerted action with all kinds of 
societal organisations. (van der Heijden 1994: 108) 
The involvement of environmental organisations in government policy-making 
has increased further since the 1980s with a growing number of previously 
radical environmental groups choosing a more 'pragmatic' approach and 
becoming more institutionalised into the neo-corporatist framework (Jamison et 
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al. 1990: 167; Liefferink 1997: 224). More recent developments - for example, 
the growing popularity of environmental covenants - suggest that the sphere of 
environmental policy is becoming further integrated into the neo-corporatist, 
consensual policy style in the Netherlands (Liefferink 1997: 224). 
It would thus appear inaccurate to argue that Dutch neo-corporatism has 
been completely closed to the demands and interests of the environmental 
movement - a situation that KitscheIt suggests would tend to favour the 
emergence of a significant green party. One of the issues perhaps overlooked by 
Kitschelt is the extent to which there might be differences in the relative 
'openness' of different neo-corporatist systems. Schmitter has gone so far as to 
argue that neo-corporatist forms of interest intennediation may actually coexist 
with pluralist forms of policy-making (Schmitter 1982: 263). Commenting on the 
nuclear energy debate in the Netherlands in the 1970s Nelkin and Pollak stated 
that: 
The Netherlands ... [is] accustomed to accommodating the demands of 
multiple interest ... Criticism and the expression of diverse opinion are 
encouraged. Activists who are openly opposed to government policies are 
brought directly into advisory groups so that adversary politics are played 
out within the system. Conflict is expected and accepted as a political 
reality. (Nelkin and Pollak 1977: 354-355) 
As far as the Dutch example is concerned, there has, it seems, been an attempt to 
fuse traditional neo-corporatism with a more pluralist style of politics. This raises 
the important question of whether Kitschelt is correct in viewing all neo-
corporatist arrangements as 'closed' to new demands, and as facilitating the rise 
of significant green parties. 
One of the main questions that arises from this discussion relates to 
whether the incorporation of ecological concerns into public policy-making since 
the 1970s - in contrast to the mid-1980s in the Austrian case (Lauber 1997b: 86) -
might possibly contribute to an explanation of why a significant green party 
failed to materialise in the Netherlands prior to Green Left (which was essentially 
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the outcome of a merger of already existing New Left parties) in 1989/90. Van 
der Straaten veers towards this conclusion when he states that '[g]reen parties are 
in a difficult position in the Netherlands with its culture of consultation and 
collectivism' (van der Straaten 1992: 68). Within this climate, it would be 
difficult to interpret the emergence of Green Left in terms of a response to the 
perceived 'rigidity' of neo-corporatist patterns of interest intermediation. 
(c) Britain 
In contrast to Austria and the Netherlands, Britain is often cited as a classic 
example of the pluralist mode of decision-making. Indeed, a recent academic 
study rates the British political system as being the least neo-corporatist of 
European countries (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991: 239). The claim that Britain is not 
a neo-corporatist system is based upon two observations: '[T]he first is the 
general lack of integration of both unions and management into the policy-
making process. The second is the apparent preference of both sides for 
confrontational methods of settling their disputes' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 370). 
With the exception of a brief period during the 1970s in which the emergence of 
a 'Social Contract' between the then Labour government, the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) and Confederation of British Industry (CBI) suggested a 
possible move towards a more neo-corporatist model, policy-making in Britain 
has been described as conforming to 'the model of a pluralist system based on a 
political market in which self-generating interest groups compete freely with one 
another to influence the flow of public policy' (Gallagher et al. 1995: 370). In 
terms of the representation of ecological interests, the British system has been 
noted for its 'permeability' - that is, its capacity for accommodating these 
concerns - and it has been suggested that this has had the effect of absorbing 'a 
lot of the environmentalist energy which in other, less open systems might have 
found an outlet in radical politics' (Rootes 1992: 183). It has been argued that the 
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levels of access granted to environmental groups in Britain have meant that the 
environmental movement has been largely indifferent towards the Green Party, 
precisely because it views conventional pressure group lobbying to be a far more 
effective means of seeking to advance its cause. On this reading, many 
environmental groups have been reluctant to associate themselves with the Green 
Party for fear of 'alienating [themselves] from centres of influence [and] 
supporters or potential supporters who vote for other parties' (Gamer 1996: 138). 
From this perspective, then, the electoral marginality of the British Green Party 
can partly be explained by the political system's traditional openness to 
ecological interests, thus tempering the feeling among a large section of the 
environmental movement and ecologically concerned citizens that a green 
political party is either desirable or necessary. 
However, critics have argued that despite its supposed 'inclusiveness', the 
British system has remained at least as - if not more - committed to the pursuit of 
economic growth and 'at least equally insensitive to its possible secondary 
dysfunctions' as some neo-corporatist ones (Scott 1990: 147). The dubbing of 
Britain as the 'dirty man of Europe' during the 1980s reflected a long history of 
government indifference towards environmental issues. During the Thatcher 
years, British governments were highly criticised for their refusal to reduce 
sulphur emissions and their advocacy of a 'dispersal and absorption' pollution 
control philosophy (Robinson 1992). In addition, access to official policy-making 
forums by established environmental groups in Britain has been limited. Even 
when environmental groups have been accorded access, the 'representatives of 
producer interests - farmers, industrialists, trade unions - [have] exerted powerful 
external and internal pressure on both (Labour and Conservative] parties not to 
accede to the demands of the environmental lobby' (Carter 1997a: 194). The 
recent emergence of new, radical environmental groups willing to engage in 
direct action protests can be viewed as a response to the limited success achieved 
through traditional lobbying-based strategies (Carter 1997a: 201-202). Again, 
then, doubt can be cast upon Kitschelt's general claim that pluralist polities have 
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necessarily been consistently more accommodating towards ecological issues and 
interests than neo-corporatist ones such as those found in the Netherlands. 3 
3. Social Movements, Resource Mobilisation Theory and 
Green Parties 
The relationship between social movements and the emergence of green parties is 
a further theme that has been a focus for academic discussion in recent decades 
(MtUler-Rommel 1985c, 1990; Richardson and Rootes 1995). A common claim 
is that green parties are the 'parliamentary arm' of the new social movements; 
that is, they are parties which first and foremost represent the demands of these 
movements (MUller-Rommel 1990: 211). An important issue has concerned the 
conditions under which social movement activists may decide to form a green 
party. One theoretical approach which may be of use in addressing this question 
is that of resource mobilisation theory (RMT). A crucial feature of RMf is that 
'[t]he actor is credited with the capacity for rational calculation, and collective 
action is itself bound by the rules and limitations of rational action' (Scott 1990: 
115). For resource mobilisation theorists, a key issue which all social movements 
must confront is that of choosing the most appropriate organisational form for 
advancing their aims (Rudig 199Oa: 39). For authors such as Oberschall, the 
integration of social movements into more institutionalised forms of political 
action such as political parties can be viewed as a 'natural progression'. Such an 
interpretation is clearly opposed to one rooted in the Tourainean tradition which 
would view such developments as a retreat into 'lower forms of social struggle' 
3 The case of the United States (US) provides added weight to this argument. The USA bas often 
been defined as a 'pluralist' polity (Smith 1995), and rankings of countries by degree of neo-
corporatism have consistently placed this country in the 'weak to no corporatism' category 
(Wtlson 1990). Despite the country's supposed pluralist credentials, US governments have 
consistently disregarded environmental interests. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan campaigned to 
weaken environmental regulation as part of an agenda aimed at advancing free market, pro-
business reform. Since the Reagan years, US presidents Bush and Clinton have resisted 
international environmental measures, e.g. concerning climate change, on the grounds that they 
would undermine the US economy's global competitiveness (Doyle and McEachern 1998: 33). 
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(Scott 1990: 115). In terms of green parties, then, some analysts of politics have 
chosen to adopt aspects of RMT and developed approaches which emphasise the 
importance of '[t]he actors' skills, resources, and capacities for rational 
calculation' in the party formation process (Kitschelt 1989: 14). Stressing the 
'rationality' of strategic activity, Kitschelt has argued that individuals will be 
more likely to form green parties in circumstances where the effective 
representation of new demands through this institutional channel is made 
realisable through the existence of favourable 'political opportunities' for party 
development. For Kitschelt, this is 'when the unresponsiveness of existing 
political institutions coincides with favorable political opportunities to displace 
existing parties' (Kitschelt 1988a: 209). The impact of political state-institutional 
structures, patterns of electoral change/political competition, and neo-
corporatist/pluralist political arrangements on the emergence and electoral 
significance of green parties has been explored at earlier points in this thesis. 
Below, an attempt is made to consider the extent to which these dimensions have 
facilitated a transition from 'informal' social movement type organisations to 
more institutionalised political phenomena such as green parties. In addition, the 
degree to which green parties, once established, have been able to forge and/or 
maintain links with social movements and thereby potentially boost their 
electoral support base is examined. 
(a) Austria 
The involvement of new social movements in the genesis of the Austrian Greens 
has been documented in earlier chapters as well as in several other academic 
studies (Dachs 1989~ Haerpfer 1989~ Frankland 1994; Lauber and Mtllier 1998). 
A large portion of those active in the ALO during the early 1980s had previously 
been involved in the anti-nuclear, environmental, peace, feminist, and 'third 
world' movements, and the party viewed itself primarily as an instrument of 
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these movements. Similarly, the vGO drew upon the new social movements, 
although its activists were mainly derived from the anti-nuclear movement. The 
BIP, the organisation which played an important role in bringing these parties 
together in time for the 1986 elections, included well-known veterans of 
movement campaigns against the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant and the 
hydroelectric plant at Hainburg, as well as the peace movement of the early 
1980s. Reflecting the centrality of new social movements within the party, the 
newly formed Austrian Greens' party charter (Satzung) of 1987 clearly stated that 
the intention was not to adopt the organisational patterns of traditional parties but 
to build 'a broad democratic organisation of those engaged in ecological, 
democratic, social, cultural, peace and women's issues' (Franldand 1994: 201). 
The importance of the role of new social movements in the emergence of green 
parties in Austria therefore cannot be doubted. 
An interpretation of the Austrian Greens guided by RMT would 
emphasise the degree to which the timing of their emergence reflected a 'rational 
calculation' on the part of social movement activists that such actions were 
considered to be the most effective course of action open to them at that 
particular time. It has previously been argued that the political system and 
existing parties were seen to be failing to respond adequately to the demands of 
environmental activists prior to the emergence of the Greens in Austria (chapter 
5). In addition, it could be argued that the success of recent movement campaigns 
(e.g. at Zwentendorf and Hainburg), and the opportunities presented by political 
state-institutional structures such as a proportional electoral system, meant that 
the chances of green party electoral success were quite high. Embarking upon an 
unified electoral strategy could therefore potentially offer the prospect of 
receiving substantial levels of public support and a realistic chance of gaining 
representation in parliament, thereby securing a more 'permanent' and direct means 
of influencing the political decision-making process than had hitherto been the case. 
Securing green representation would also bring with it financial rewards in terms of 
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state subsidies (chapter 6), enabling the further development of the party 
organisation. 
There are some difficulties in this characterisation of the Austrian Greens, 
not least the 'rationality' premise which underpins the RMf approach. One such 
problem is that RMf takes it for granted that social movement activists will always 
behave in a 'rational' manner - it assumes that their actions are guided by 
'rationality' in the instrumental sense. But as Ward argues, '[d]ecisions are often 
made more on the grounds of consistency with past actions, reductions of strains 
within the individual's belief system (cognitive dissonance), or normative 
orientation, than through a calculation of the most efficient means to given ends' 
(Ward 1995: 89). Furthermore, RMT presents a very narrow image of social 
movements and, it should be added, green parties in terms of their goals. In 
presuming that these organisations are formed according to pragmatic political 
considerations it fails to recognise that political activity can have an 'expressive, as 
well as an instrumental, function for the actor' (Scott 1990: 121). While RMT may 
potentially provide important insights into the conditions under which green parties 
emerge, researchers must remain alert to its limitations - that is to say, open to the 
possibility that party emergence and/or engagement in party activity may reflect less 
instrumentally motivated patterns ofbehavioUf. 
It is important to point out that the Austrian Greens have, since their 
formation, continued to receive support from the new social movements. This has 
for some time provided an important support base for the Greens and contributed 
to the maintenance of the party's status as a significant actor within the political 
system. Yet the fact that these movements have experienced some decline in 
recent years may have limited the Greens' electoral appeal and, should this trend 
continue, the party may find it difficult to sustain and further develop its electoral 
support base in the future (Lauber 1997a: 190). 
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(b) The Netherlands 
Social movements have also played an important role in the emergence of the 
Dutch Green Left. Political activists - particularly from the environmental and 
peace movements, but also from the feminist and labour movements - made plain 
their support for a strong, 'red-green' formation prior to the national elections of 
1989. In addition, the eventual merger of the four small left-wing parties in 1990 
was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that many party activists had previously 
worked together in these movements. The significance of social movements in 
the development of Green Left is underlined by the results of a survey carried out 
at the last conventions of the PSP, PPR, EVP and CPN in 1991: of the 
respondents, 55 per cent were active in a social movement (environmental, 
peace, feminist, labour). However, as Voerman points out, social movement 
activism tended to reflect the respective main ideological concerns of the small 
Left parties. Thus, Communists were more likely than other party members to be 
active in the labour movement (32 per cent); on the other hand, members of the 
PSP, PPR and EVP were far more likely to be involved in the environmental and, 
to a lesser extent, the peace movement than Communists. Interestingly, a 
considerably smaller proportion of respondents was active in the feminist 
movement and this can possibly be explained by the under-representation of 
women in the Green Left parties. Of the four parties, however, Communists were 
most involved in the feminist movement and this may have reflected 'the 
important contribution of feminists to the renewal of the party in the 1980s' 
(Lucardie et 01. 1994: 104-105). The lasting influence of social movements on 
Green Left is demonstrated, for example, by the close relations between the party 
and the environmental movement, particularly the Dutch Friends of the Earth 
(Milieudefensie) (Lucardie 1997: 187-188).4 
4 As Lucardie points out 'Bram van Ojik, the present chairman of Milieude/ensie, was Member of 
Parliament for the Green Left in 1994; the first president of the party, Marijke Vos, worked on the 
staff of the Dutch Friends of the Earth' (Lucardie 1997: 188). 
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While data relating to the specific social movement backgrounds of Green 
Left voters are unavailable, there is limited evidence to suggest that the latter 
may be more inclined to support and engage in 'unconventional' political protest 
activity than other Dutch voters. The Dutch 1989 Election Study revealed that 
Green Left voters were more likely to lend their support to petitions and 
participate in action groups than the average voter (55 per cent compared with 24 
per cent) and demonstrations (75 per cent compared with 24 per cent of average 
VOters).5 It therefore seems likely that Green Left's support base is more firmly 
rooted in the social movement/protest orientated cohort of society than the other 
Dutch parties. 
Scholars in the RMT stream would presumably argue that the Dutch 
Green Left's emergence was the outcome ofa conscious, 'rational' calculation on 
the part of the declining small New Left parties and social movement activists 
(who had tended to be supportive of the former) that the most effective means of 
advancing their aims was through a new party organisation which might derive 
greater electoral support from a broader cross-section of social movement 
sympathisers. Thus the decision to incorporate already existing parties and 
previously unaffiliated social movement activists into a united organisation may 
have been taken on the understanding that such action, at the time, represented 
the most effective means of halting the further decline of the involved parties, 
and of ensuring that ecological and other social movement interests would 
continue to have a voice in parliament. The 'rationality' of forming a unified 
party had added appeal during the late I 980s in light of the heightened interest in 
environmental issues and intense political competition for the 'green' vote, 
themes explored in the previous chapter. 




In contrast to both Austria and the Netherlands, the fonnation of the forerunner to 
the British Green Party - PEOPLE - was not the outcome of pressure applied by 
social movements. Rather, the main catalysts for the fonnation of the party were 
publications dealing with the ecological crisis such as Blueprint for Survival, the 
Limits to Growth report and the writings of Paul Erlich. These had a profound 
impact on the founder members of PEOPLE and strongly influenced their 
decision to fonn the new party in 1973. Efforts made to bring together members 
of the environmental movement following the founding of PEOPLE met with 
little success, and the vast majority of environmental activists and thinkers 'were 
hostile to the fonnation of an ecology party' (Wall 1994: 18). For example, a 
conference planned by PEOPLE aimed at uniting Britain's major environmental 
groups ultimately failed to materialise as a result of lack of interest on the part of 
the latter. Some writers have argued that the failure of the broader environmental 
movement to support the British Green Party has partially reflected the albeit 
limited extent to which the fonner has, in the past, been able to exert influence 
on the decision-making process through mechanisms such as the public enquiry 
and other fonns of public consultation (Rtidig and Lowe 1986). Yet the 
mechanics of the British electoral system have also contributed to the failure of 
the Green Party to attract the support of certain social movements, which in some 
cases, e.g. eND during the early 1980s, have found it more worthwhile to seek to 
advance their aims within well-established party organisations such as the Labour 
Party. Forging links with a Green Party which had little prospect of achieving 
electoral success was simply not considered to be a 'rational' act by a 
considerable proportion of new social movement activists. 
Although social movements did not playa direct role in the emergence of 
the British Green Party, the period 1979-80 did represent something of a 
transfonnation in tenns of the membership, and, ultimately, the ideology of the 
party with the influx of young radicals from the peace, animal rights and feminist 
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movements. In contrast to the then Ecology Party leaders, these members were 
strongly committed to a more decentralist (as opposed to an electoralist) 
approach which emphasised the importance of 'empowennent politics, 
community action, NVDA [non-violent direct action] and coalition building to 
create a Green movement outside of Westminster' (Wall 1994: 40). As will be 
examined in chapter 9, this influx gave rise to internal tensions which were to 
plague the party for almost a decade. Since the Green 2000 debacle, however, the 
Green Party has endorsed a strategy of coalition building, working more closely 
with direct action protest groups and focusing more on politics at the grass-roots 
level (Morrissey 1996). While social movement activists have played some role 
in the development of the Green Party, particularly since the early 1980s, its 
consistent failure to attract the support of the more mainstream environmental 
movement has been a further obstacle to the party gaining an enhanced public 
profile and achieving greater electoral success. 
A further consideration derives from the premises ofRMT. In view of the 
considerable impediments to new party success imposed by the British electoral 
system, the following question arises: has participation in green party politics in 
Britain primarily been motivated by a 'rational' calculation of the 'costs' and 
'benefits' of engaging in electoral politics by party founders and social 
movement activists? The first point that can be made here is that the party 
founders did seriously believe that engaging in party political activity would fonn 
the most 'rational' response to what they perceived to be the growing ecological 
crisis. Their aims were clear: to gain a majority of Westminster seats or to exert 
strong influence on a governing party (Wall 1994: 16), Yet the nature of the 
FPTP electoral system meant that these aims were essentially unrealistic, and it 
could be argued that the fonnation of PEOPLE amounted to a fundamental 
miscalculation on the part of the founders. While there may be some degree of 
accuracy in this statement, it would be wrong to conclude that a (naive) electoral 
optimism necessarily fonned the key motive for those who subsequently joined 
or became actively involved in the Green Party. A recent membership survey 
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clearly shows that the majority of members do not view political success, in the 
traditional electoral sense, to be that important a party goal. Rather, members 
appear to have joined the British Greens on grounds of a personal commitment to 
the principles of green politics (Rlldig et al. 1991: 59). The persistence of the 
Green Party over the past two and a half decades, in a decidedly hostile political 
environment, highlights the extent to which party activity can reflect a different 
structure of citizen preferences to that employed in Kitschelt's RMT-based 
approach to understanding green party development. 
4. Conclusion 
It has been shown that Kitschelt's argument linking neo-corporatism to the 
presence of significant green parties requires some refinement. In Austria, 
responses to the rigidity of neo-corporatist structures were important factors in 
the emergence of green party politics, and it is true that these structures have 
continued to form a key point of criticism for many ecologically concerned Green 
voters. Yet the Dutch case shows that neo-corporatist structures of elite 
negotiation need not exclude environmental interests from the decision-making 
process. In contrast to Kitschelt's reasoning, it seems likely that Dutch neo-
corporatism has to some extent impeded the greater electoral success of green 
parties on account of its relative openness towards ecological concerns. Thus, 
rather than there being a clear-cut link between neo-corporatism and the 
emergence of significant green parties, it is perhaps more accurate to say that 
neo-corporatism may benefit these parties in electoral terms, but that this 
depends largely on the degree to which it has been able to extend its 
inclusiveness to groups representing interests other than those of capital and 
labour. The case of Britain further clouds the issue in question, showing clearly 
that even relatively pluralist patterns of intermediation have provided only 
limited representation of ecological interests. Citizen awareness of this fact has in 
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recent years prompted the rise of new forms of ecological protest based upon a 
direct action strategy. The continued marginality of the Green Party in a political 
system which penalises small parties has meant that ecologically concerned 
citizens have sought to move beyond an electorally based political strategy. 
Clearly future studies of the impact of'neo-corporatism/pluralism' on green party 
development need to be more sensitive to national differences in terms of the 
relative openness of these patterns of interest intermediation. 
In the second part of the chapter, and drawing upon aspects ofRMT, the 
impact of social movements on the emergence and electoral significance of green 
parties was examined. It was argued that the backing of social movements has 
played an important part in the electoral significance of green parties in Austria 
and the Netherlands. In addition, insofar as RMT argues that the building of new 
vehicles of interest representation is often the outcome of a process of calculation 
on the part of 'rational' activists, it can perhaps throw some limited light on the 
circumstances under which the emergence of green parties took place in these 
countries. In Austria, a political system characterised by 'closed' neo-corporatist 
patterns of decision-making and favourable political state-institutional structures, 
combined with the success of recent environmental campaigns, meant that the 
formation of a unified green party was an attractive and viable option for 
environmental and other new social movement activists. The 'rationality' of the 
two separate 'green' parties (VGO and ALO). along with movement activists. 
building an electoral alliance in time for the 1986 elections was further 
reinforced by the realisation that electoral disunity would possibly result in both 
parties failing to secure parliamentary representation, as had been the outcome in 
1983. 
In the Netherlands, the decision taken by the small New Left parties to 
intensify electoral co-operation and ultimately to form a new party was in part 
motivated by calls from social movement activists to build a more effective 
vehicle through which their interests could be advanced, but also by the prospect 
of maintaining representation in parliament. The British case presents something 
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of a contrast, however, and highlights the limitations of approaching the 
emergence of green parties from a 'resource mobilisation' perspective. While it 
could be argued that the decision to form PEOPLE was made on the basis of a 
rational (mis)calculation of the advantages of pursuing a party based strategy. the 
fact that the Green Party has persisted despite a lack of widespread support from 
social movements, and an electoral system disadvantageous to small parties, 
shows the extent to which a different. more philosophical set of preferences has 
underpinned green party politics in Britain. Suitably conceptualised, modes of 
interest representation can be understood to represent an important focus for 




Internal Dynamics in Green Parties 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the electoral 
significance of green parties and what will be termed 'internal party dynamics'. 
The previous three chapters have focused attention on potential external 
influences upon green parties; namely, those relating to political state-
institutional structures, electoral dealignment and political competition, and 
modes of interest representation. In this chapter, it is argued that internal 
dynamics - which would include such issues as party ideology. strategy, 
organisation and leadership - constitutes a further important dimension whose 
consideration can contribute towards the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of why certain green parties have attained electoral significance 
while others. e.g. the British Greens, have not. 
It is unfortunate that so little has hitherto been said on this subject. While 
much has been written on the nature of green ideology (Bennie et al. 1994; 
Eckersley 1992; Goodin 1992; Vincent 1993; Dobson 1995); the character of 
internal green party debates concerning strategy and structure (Kitschelt 1989; 
Doherty 1992); and green party organisational change (Frankland 1993), there 
have been remarkably few attempts to assess the extent to which such issues have 
impinged upon the electoral significance of these parties. This chapter therefore 
represents a first attempt to address some of these questions. 
The potential influence of internal issues on the electoral significance of 
green parties is not immediately obvious. However, a brief introduction to some 
key areas of party research should help to clarify why they are worthy of further 
enquiry. One area of green party research has focused upon the eco-philosophical 
and political orientations of green parties towards the 'ecological issue'. At a 
philosophical level, some commentators have stressed the 'non-anthropocentric' 
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basis of green parties. Richardson, for instance, suggests that green parties have 
embraced a 'biocentric' philosophy equating 'the needs of the planet with the 
needs of the person, the rights of the person with the rights of the planet' 
(Richardson 1995: 11; see also Spretnak and Capra 1985). Politically, 
distinctions have been made between 'pure green' and 'eco-socialist' green 
parties, and the extent to which these tendencies can co-exist within single party 
organisations (O'Neill 1997). The first part of this chapter explores, in general 
terms, the ways in which orientations towards political ecology might hinder or 
facilitate the electoral success of green parties. 
Further foci for green party research have concerned party organisation 
and strategy. Such issues, for example, have been central to Kitschelt's work on 
so-called 'left-libertarian' parties in Belgium and Germany (Kitschelt 1988b, 
1989). Briefly put, Kitschelt argues that these parties generally face a choice 
between pursuing a logic of constituency representation on the one hand - in 
which party structure is decentralised, horizontal and based upon an aversion to 
the professionalisation of political leaders - and a logic of electoral, or party, 
competition on the other - according to which such parties adopt structures 
similar to those of 'conventional' parties and strive for vote maximisation 
(Kitschelt 1989). Kitschelt's analysis suggests that - according to the mix of 
activist types within the party - a 'left-libertarian' party will pursue a strategy that 
will either maximise vote-getting, or one that will cater 'to ideological 
sensibilities by preserving a fluid, informal, participatory dynamic' (Kitschelt 
1989: 281). Attention to the components of each of these strategies - to the extent 
that they have become manifest in the three green parties - may therefore provide 
further important insights into the internal factors which impact upon green 
parties' comparative electoral strength. 
A closely related set of issues concerns the degree to which internal 
tensions and contlict have characterised individual green parties over these 
questions of organisation and strategy. Green party analysts have employed labels 
such as 'realos' and 'fundis', 'pragmatists' and 'anti-partyists', and 'electoralists' 
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and 'decentralists' in the attempt to clarify the nature of these tensions and 
conflicts. 1 At the risk of over-simplifying a quite complex and ambiguous area of 
debate, 'realos', 'pragmatists' or 'electoralists' have been more sympathetic to 
the idea of adopting a traditional hierarchical organisation with a party leader, 
fighting elections, building coalitions with other parties, and presenting a 
'respectable' and 'professional' image to the public in an attempt to win votes. 
'Fundis', 'anti-partyists' or 'decentralists', however, have tended to advocate the 
creation of a more decentralised party organisation, extra-parliamentary action 
and to be suspicious of coalitions with other political parties (Rtldig and Lowe 
1986; Doherty 1992). Internal conflicts over these latter issues have been a 
feature of much of the British Green Party's history and, as will be argued later, 
the considerable energy and time consumed by these matters has, in the past, 
done little to enhance the public image and hence electoral potential of the party. 
As well as the British case, however, these issues will be examined as they have 
affected the electoral prospects of green parties in Austria and the Netherlands. 
One issue which, certainly in Britain, has been particularly prominent in 
debates about green party organisation and strategy is that of party leadership. It 
is also noteworthy that the idea that political leadership can playa significant role 
in modem electoral competition is one that has received increasing attention in 
recent decades (McAllister 1996). While not claiming that the issue of party 
leadership has become decisive in explaining voting behaviour, studies suggest 
that 'leaders are one of the factors ... that need to be taken into account' 
(McAllister 1996: 298). One study of new political parties points out that such 
parties, in particular, 'need effective leadership' (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 51). It 
is suggested that 'highly visible and charismatic leaders' can provide a new party 
with a focus for its appeal and attract media attention for the party, thus possibly 
making it easier for voters to 'learn about and support a new party' (Hauss and 
Rayside 1978: 51). Conversely, lack of coherent leadership may result either in 
1 It should be noted that these labels are by no means exhaustive. As Bennie et al. have pointed 
out, most commentators have adopted a 'two-dimensional' approach to green party ideology and 
strategy. However, it should be stressed that others have developed more complex. multi-
dimensional approaches to these issues (Bennie et al. 1994: 220). 
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the absence of new parties or 'factionalism' and, ultimately, schisms, which may 
lead directly 'to the loss of voters and members' (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 51-
52). In terms of seeking to identify the internal dynamics which may impact upon 
green party significance, then, it is suggested that leadership questions and, in 
particular, the issue of whether such parties have either resisted or embraced an 
electoral strategy based around the 'appeal' of a single leader, should form a 
further topic of investigation. The present chapter is divided into two main parts. 
The first part considers the potential impact of green party ideology - in 
particular, orientation towards political ecology - upon the electoral significance 
of green parties. This is followed in part two by a detailed assessment of issues of 
strategy, organisation and party leadership as they have affected the electoral 
success of green parties. 
1. Internal Green Party Dynamics I: 
Ideological Orientation Towards Political Ecology 
A persistent theme in analyses of green parties is that they challenge the existing 
way of doing things (Richardson 1995). It has been argued in this thesis that a 
defining feature of green parties is their embrace of a political perspective which 
places ecological issues at the centre of political concern. Despite this common 
emphasis, it is clear that green parties have adopted a diversity of approaches to 
the 'ideology of ecology' (Vincent 1993). One possible means of grasping this 
diversity is to draw upon existing classifications of ecological thought. In general 
terms, commentators have attempted to typologise the 'ecology movement' on 
the basis of philosophical and political tendencies. On the philosophical level, 
Andrew Vincent has distinguished between a 'light anthropocentrist wing, where 
the main body of arguments stress (in varying degrees) that human beings are the 
sole criterion of both what is valuable and what can value' and 'the ecocentric 
wing [where if] there is a primary locus of value it is not the human individual or 
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biosphere but the ecosphere as a whole' (Vincent 1993: 254-257). Vincent argues 
that between these two extremes lies a broad intermediate category which in turn 
can be further subdivided into the 'moral extensionist' and 'reluctant holism' 
tendencies. For Vincent 'the former leans uncertainly towards moderate or weak 
anthropocentrism whereas the latter leans very reluctantly toward moderate 
ecocentrism and holism' (Vincent 1993: 258). 
To some extent the philosophical positions referred to here can be seen to 
underpin political tendencies within the ecology movement. For example, 
'ecocentric' arguments have been employed in parts of North America, 
Scandinavia and Australia in campaigns for wilderness preservation (Doyle and 
McEachern 1998: 39). For authors such as Dobson, it is this 'ecocentric' 
tendency which is considered to be one of the core ingredients which separates 
'dark-green' politics from 'light-green' politics (Dobson 1995: 72). 'Light 
anthropocentrist' arguments are commonly found within the 'light-green' or 
'reformist' wing of the ecology movement and they are associated with 'some of 
the most traditional environmental groups '" conservation and resource groups ... 
preservation, single issue and recreation groups' (Vincent 1993: 263). Other 
political tendencies - for instance, 'eco-socialism' - are more difficult to classifY 
in terms of Vincent's philosophical typology. For Vincent, 'eco-socialism' falls 
somewhere in between the 'dark-green' and 'light-green' tendencies (Vincent 
1993: 264). But most commentators have argued that 'ceo-socialism' veers more 
towards anthropocentism - defined in the 'weak' sense - as opposed to the 
ecocentrism characteristic of 'dark-green' politics (Eckersley 1992; Pepper 
1993). 
The significance of all this becomes clearer in turning to the green parties 
in this study. While there is undoubtedly a diversity of ecological views present 
within the British Green Party - including that of eco-socialism - it has been 
demonstrated that the vast majority of members support an 'ecocentric' position 
when it comes to the value of nature (Bennie et al. 1994: 235). The Green Parly 
is widely noted for its 'ideological purity' and scholars have noted the extent to 
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which the party's political programme has been 'strongly influenced by holistic 
"dark green" politics' (Rootes 1995a: 85). In contrast to the British Greens, the 
Dutch Green Left displays a political outlook more sympathetic to 'eco-
socialism' than to the 'dark green' position, and this is perhaps unsurprising 
given its origins in parties of the New Left (Dickson 1992; Lucardie et al. 1993; 
Lucardie 1997). According to Voerman, '[ c ]onsidering its origins and 
composition, [Green Left's] development in a biocentric direction is hardly to be 
expected, since this would jeopardize its unity and hence its existence' (Voerman 
1995: 125). The small Dutch green party - De Groenen - by contrast, seems more 
akin to the British Green Party, to the extent that it has adopted a 'holistic', 
'dark-green' approach to ecological politics (Voerman 1995). Although there are 
difficulties in classifying the Austrian Greens precisely in terms of the 'dark-
green'I'eco-socialist' dichotomy - they are considered by Frankland to lie 
somewhere between these two extremes (Frankland 1994: 213) - it is clear that 
the party has managed to 'touch base with conventional leftist and eco-socialist 
thinking' (O'Neill 1997: 142). This in all likelihood reflects the dominance of the 
'leftist' ALO - as opposed to the 'pure green' vGO - in the party formation 
process (O'Neill 1997). 
More germane to the concerns of this thesis, however, is whether the 
'dark green' influenced ideology of the British Green Party has to some extent 
contributed to its continued electoral marginality. It could be argued that one of 
the factors which distinguishes the Dutch Green Left from the British Green 
Party, and which possibly contributes to an explanation of the electoral 
significance of the former and insignificance of the latter, concerns the Dutch 
party's capacity to appeal to a larger electoral constituency on account of its 
leftist origins and 'eco-socialist' tendencies. What is being suggested here is that 
as well as capturing some support from purely ecologically concerned voters, 
Green Left's electoral appeal may be sufficiently wide so as to appeal to a much 
broader array of citizens who are sympathetic to a more 'anthropocentric eco-
socialism' or 'New Leftist' political perspective (Lucardie et al. 1994). The 
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electoral significance of the Austrian Greens may, again, partially be a reflection 
of the party's less than 'dark-green' approach to green politics. That the party 
exhibits leftist tendencies could account for its appeal among disenchanted 
socialist (SPO) voters (Frankland 1994: 211). As one author has noted, the 
Austrian Greens have also been able to draw upon the support of former People's 
Party (Conservative) (OVP) voters and this probably reflects the fact that the 
party has exhibited 'rightist' tendencies on some policy issues (Frankland 1994: 
211). In contrast, that the majority of British Green Party members have defined 
'themselves in purely ecological terms and therefore as beyond left and right' 
(Doherty 1992: 105) has probably had the effect of narrowing the party's 
electoral support base and limited the party's prospects of attaining some 
modicum of significance within the British party system. The recent Green Left 
Convergence initiative launched by the Red-Green Network, The Way Ahead (the 
'radical' tendency within the Green Party), Green Socialist Network, Socialist 
Movement and Red-Green Study Group may be viewed as an attempt to build a 
broader electoral coalition of those sympathetic to a more distinctly and openly 
socialist informed Green politics, although differences of opinion exist as to 
whether the Green Party should dilute its 'dark-green' position and orientate 
itself more directly towards the politics of the Left (Norris 1995, Frankel 1996). 
Clearly ideological orientation towards political ecology is not the only 
issue which can potentially affect levels of green party electoral success. The 
varying electoral performance of green parties has also been linked to a number 
of policy issues. For example, a recent study suggests that electoral successes for 
the Swedish Greens in 1994 and 1995 were linked to the degree to which the 
party was able to tap into the considerable swell of anti-EU sentiment among the 
Swedish electorate (Burchell 1996). The opposite has been the case in Austria. 
Here, the Greens were forced to reverse their oppositional stance on the question 
of EU membership as two thirds of the electorate voted in favour of Austrian 
entry in the 1994 referendum. The Greens evidently feared that their negative 
stance was 'out of touch' with the majority of Austrian citizens, and that to 
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continue with such a policy would damage the party's long-term electoral 
prospects (Burchell and Williams 1996). In Germany, the Greens' negative 
standpoint on reunification was undoubtedly a factor in the party's debacle at the 
first all-German elections in 1990 (O'Neill 1997). Ideological orientation towards 
political ecology can have an important impact on a green party's chances of 
electoral success, but it is important to recognise that a party's electoral 
performance can also be a reflection of its positioning with respect to salient 
policy issues. 
2. Internal Dynamics in Green Parties ll: 
Strategy, Organisation and Party Leadenhip 
Attention to issues concerning party organisation and strategy may cast further 
light on the internal factors potentially impinging upon the electoral significance 
of green parties. Several authors have contended that a feature which 
distinguishes green parties from 'conventional' political parties is an 'alternative' 
model of party organisation inspired by an ideological commitment to 
participatory democracy, or Basisdemokralie (grass-roots democracy) (Poguntlce 
1987, 1989; Muller-Rommel 1990; Kitschelt 1993). According to Poguntlce: 
The essence of it is direct participation in decision-making on specific 
issues as opposed to the usual choice between political programmes 
which are then specified and realized by professional politicians. It means 
that the lower units of any societal organization ought to have extensive 
decision-making powers, which implies decentralized structures. Ideally, 
the lowest unit has most resources and competencies, and the higher-level 
bodies only take over tasks which the basic unit is structurally incapable 
of mastering. (Poguntlce 1989: 10) 
As was documented in chapter 4, however, the Dutch Green Left has, from the 
outset, chosen not to develop in this organisational direction, and even the 
Austrian Greens have undergone recent organisational adaptation in an attempt to 
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become a more effective electoral competitor (Frankland 1993). Organisational 
restructuring aimed at increasing party efficiency has taken place within other 
European green parties, including those of Sweden and Germany (Frankland 
1995; Burchell and Williams 1996). Employing Kitschelt's terminology, it is 
clear that as certain green parties have increasingly come to emphasise the 
importance of 'effective' or 'pragmatic' electoral candidates, visible leadership 
and strategies of alliance building, they are displaying signs of becoming more 
orientated towards a 'logic of electoral competition' (Kitschelt 1989). According 
to Kitschelt, the degree to which green parties follow a logic of electoral 
competition depends upon the relative strength and patterns of coalition of three 
groups of activists within any given party: 'ideologues' (committed to a logic of 
constituency representation); 'lobbyists' (who 'choose between the logics of 
constituency representation and party competition depending on the opportunities 
and constraints their pursuit of special interests encounters in a given situation') 
(Kitschelt 1989: 50-51); and 'pragmatists' (the group most inclined to press for a 
logic of electoral competition) (Kitschelt 1989: 49-51). As Kitschelt explains: 
If ideologues and lobbyists coalesce, the party will emphasise its unique 
left-libertarian organizational form and engage in a logic of constituency 
mobilization. If pragmatists and ideologues or pragmatists and lobbyists 
join forces, the party will more likely move to a logic of party 
competition. The concern with votes and incremental policy reform is 
greater in the latter coalitions than in that of ideologues and lobbyists. 
(Kitschelt 1988b: 131-132) 
The scope of the discussion needs to be narrowed, however. What is particularly 
interesting in terms of this study is whether the existence of structurally 
motivated tensions between different internal party factions and/or the pursuit of 
different organisational and strategic 'logics' by green parties might affect their 
effectiveness as electorally competitive organisations. In the case of the British 
Green Party, tensions between 'electoralists' and 'decentralists' since the early 
1980s may have seriously weakened the party's electoral prospects. For example, 
Parkin points to the extent to which the 'Maingreen' episode of 1986, in which 
241 
tensions between these two factions came to a head, resulted in a 'siege' 
mentality which 'carried over into a badly planned and lacklustre [1987] election 
campaign' (parkin 1989: 228). This theme is explored in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
One of the issues that has frequently occupied a central position within 
green party debates about organisation and strategy relates to party leadership. As 
ROdig has suggested, this issue has been 'one of the most bitter sources of 
internal conflict in green parties, namely that about its internal organisation and 
the avoidance of any "leaders'" (ROdig 1986: 157). According to Hauss and 
Rayside, a feature of most 'electorally successful' new parties is 'effective 
leadership'. It is important to point out that exactly what is meant by 'effective 
leadership' is open to considerable debate. As Elgie comments, there is no one 
type or form of political leadership. Leadership can take a variety of forms based 
on charisma, heroism, innovation, collectivity and a wide range of other qualities 
(Elgie 1995: 4).2 In their study of new parties, however, Hauss and Rayside argue 
that two factors relating to leadership are particularly important to the formers' 
electoral success. The first of these relates to 'charisma' and the consequent 
'popularity' that this is presumed to bring; the second concerns the presence or 
absence of a 'unified, coherent leadership' (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 52). With 
respect to the first point: 
'[ t ]hose that have had highly visible and charismatic leaders have used 
that popularity to build at least their initial support ... [L]eaders [with 
these qualities] provide new parties with a focus for their appeal. A new 
party often finds it hard to gain exposure, particularly through the mass 
media, exposure which can be more easily obtained if it has a 
"newsworthy' leader ... More importantly, voters probably find it easier to 
learn about and support a new party if they can identify its cause with a 
popular and respected leader. (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 51) 
Related to this aspect of Hauss and Rayside's work is a growing body of 
literature which suggests that the modernisation of political communications has 
2 For a fuller discussion of the nature ofpoliticaJ leadership, see Elgie (1995: 2-5). 
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resulted in an increasing personalisation, or even 'presidentialisation', of politics 
(McAllister 1996: 281). These studies add weight to the idea that, in recent 
decades, political leaders have become increasingly important within the sphere 
of electoral politics in democratic political systems. The extent of the so-called 
rise of 'candidate-centred politics' (Wattenberg 1991) can be seen by the 
switching of leader images for party symbols at election campaigns; the readiness 
to associate governments with the leader rather than the party; and the 
widespread media interest in the personalities and private lives of political 
leaders. A series of studies in the USA, Britain and elsewhere has shown that 
public perception of leaders is now an important factor in determining voting 
behaviour (McAllister 1996: 286-297). 
The second theme highlighted by Hauss and Rayside - that of leadership 
coherence and unity - overlaps to a considerable degree with the issues of internal 
conflict discussed earlier. According to Hauss and Rayside, the lack of coherent 
leadership may lead to '[t]actionalism, and ultimately schisms [leading] directly 
... to the loss of voters and members' (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 52). In addition 
'a squabbling leadership can also present a poor image for a party and thus eat 
away at its support' (Hauss and Rayside 1978: 52). In terms of green parties, 
ideological commitments to the principles of participation, rotation of offices, 
and collective leadership as opposed to the more centralised structures (including 
the office of leadership) of established parties may, in some cases, have 
contributed to the emergence of a climate of conflict, discontinuity and disunity 
within such parties, with the negative public image and electoral ineffectiveness 
that this creates. 
What then might all this mean with regard to the case studies? First of all 
it suggests that internal party conflict over the question of leadership - and, in 
particular, party resistance to the idea of a single leader who could prove to be an 
effective and respected ambassador for the party in the media and the public eye -
may have had an adverse effect on the electoral success of green parties. Second, 
if leadership is becoming an increasingly important factor within the minds of the 
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voting public then it might be anticipated that those green parties which have 
adapted to this by adopting a more 'professionalised', 'candidate-centred' style of 
political campaigning will have made electoral gains as a consequence. Third, 
and more generally, the answers to these questions may have broader 
implications concerning the range of additional factors that should be taken into 
account when examining the electoral significance of green parties, and the 
potential interrelation between these internal dynamics, and the additional 
political and institutional themes explored elsewhere in this thesis. Below, issues 
of strategy, organisation and leadership are discussed in terms of how they have 
impacted upon the case studies. 
(a) Austria 
Studies have shown that tensions over questions of strategy and party 
organisation have been features of the internal politics of green parties in Austria 
(Frankland 1994: 205; Lauber 1997a: 190). Yet prior to the emergence of the 
Austrian Greens in 1986/7, it was mainly inter- (as opposed to intra-) party 
tensions between the ALO and vGO which. according to one author, 
• discouraged many activists and disappointed many voters sympathetic to the 
green cause' (Lauber 1995: 315). During this period, the two separate 'green' 
parties spent a considerable amount of time quarrelling with each other, and this 
division and confusion was to some extent reinforced by the established parties, 
some of whom went so far as to 'fund and otherwise support straw green parties, 
and sometimes the VGO, in some elections' (Lauber 1995: 315). 
The arrival of the Austrian Greens in parliament in 1986 resulted in the 
granting of state financial support to the new party. Yet such funding was to 
prove to be the source of internal tensions as a minority of right-wing vGO 
activists attempted to preserve what they perceived to be their party's autonomy 
(arguing that the new party organisation was merely an 'alliance' and not a 
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separate political party), and demanded a third of the new party's budget. The 
resultant split led to the right wing of the vGO running candidates against the 
Austrian Greens in local elections, and to the expulsion of MP and vGO 
president Josef Buchner in December 1987. Further problems occurred towards 
the end of 1988 with the resignation of three leading 'moderate' Austrian Green 
MPs - Freda Meissner-Blau, Herbert Fux and Walter Geyer. These served to add 
further fuel to the media image of the Greens as a party continually engaged in 
sectarian disputes and personal disagreements, and both the sPO and OVP 
attempted to make political capital out of such events (Sully 1990: 133-134; Die 
Griine Alternative n.d.). 
During their brief history, the Austrian Greens have experienced their 
own version of the so-called 'fundi-realo' conflict.3 Essentially this has taken the 
form of a debate within the party between those content to pursue a 'logic of 
constituency representation', emphasising extra-parliamentary activity and 
decentralisation (the 'grass roots' or Basis), and those - termed leaders or Promis 
geared towards a 'logic of electoral competition', aiming for a more 
centralised and professional party organisation concerned with vote maximisation 
(Kitschelt 1989; Frankland 1994). Yet these tensions never reached the intensity 
of those experienced by the German Greens during the late 1980s (Frankland 
1994). One of the most notable phases in the internal development of the 
Austrian Greens occurred in 1992 with prominent activists from both wings of 
the party agreeing that reform was necessary. A consensus had developed within 
the party that the 'grass-roots' organisational model was inefficient and 
preventing its further electoral success at both the Land and national level. 
Consequently, extensive organisational changes to the party were adopted at two 
party conferences in May and October 1992, and these were intended to achieve 
a greater degree of professionalism and electoral efficacy (Frankland 1994; 
Lauber and Moller 1998). 
3 However. Frankland has questioned the applicability of these labels to the Austrian Greens not 
least because the question of coalition participation - a key aspect of the 'fundi-realo' debate - has 
remained hypothetical in view of the opposition of the majority of sPO members to the idea of a 
red-green coalition (Frankland 1994: 204). 
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The Greens' strategic shift towards a 'logic of electoral competition' was 
most evident during the run up to the 1994 national elections. According to 
Luther, the Greens recruited professional media consultants and ran a highly 
candidate centred, professional and effective campaign (Luther 1995: 132). It is 
here that the potentially important question of party leadership referred to earlier 
becomes relevant. It is probably accurate to argue that the emergence (in terms of 
the achievement of an electoral alliance) and initial electoral success of the 
Austrian Greens in 1986 was partly aided by the charismatic leadership of Freda 
Meissner-Blau - a high profile personality who had performed well in the 
presidential elections of that year. As Frankland puts it, 'without the "situational" 
charisma of Freda Meissner-Blau, the Green Alternatives might not have 
emerged' (Frankland 1993: 9). If leadership was probably important in 1986, 
however, it was undoubtedly so in 1994. Studies of the 1994 Austrian election 
have shown that a key factor in the Greens' success in that election (the party 
increased its share to 7.3 per cent and 13 seats) was the leadership style and 
performance of the green candidate Madeleine Petrovic (Luther 1995; Lauber 
1995; Pulzer 1995). In television debates Petrovic 'turned out to be extremely 
effective ... and more than held her own against supposed heavyweights such as 
Vranitky and Haider' (Luther 2995: 132). For Sully, '[s]he symbolised the new 
respectable, professional Green image. Gone were the bearded vegetarians in 
sandals and in came designer business costumes for the fashion conscious' (Sully 
1994: 220). Exit polls confirm that the personality of Petrovic was an important 
motive for casting a Green vote at the 1994 election; thus, 49 per cent of Green 
voters stated that this had been a factor - second only to concern about 'the 
environment' - in their final voting choice (Luther 1995: 136). 
Further confirmation that leadership can impact upon the electoral 
success of green parties can be seen in the results of the December 1995 Austrian 
parliamentary elections. In contrast to her dynamic performance of 1994, 
Petrovic's performance in 1995 was described as 'stilted and lifeless in many of 
the debates' (Sully 1996: 639) and 'rather poor' (Lauber 1997a: 186). This may 
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have had some affect on the Green vote although the fact that the election 
campaign was geared towards budgetary issues prevented the party from selling 
its distinctive ecological agenda to voters. Following Petrovic's resignation as de 
facto party leader in March 1996, the Greens elected a new speaker in the form of 
Christoph Chorherr - a candidate noted for his 'dynamism' and 'pragmatism' -
although he faced stiff competition from 'a candidate closer to the grass roots' 
(Lauber and MOller 1998: 17). However, Chorherr resigned at the end of 1997 as 
a result of intra-party criticism and was replaced by another so-called 
'pragmatist' Alexander Van der Bellen (Lauber and MOller 1998: 18). 
(b) The Netherlands 
The Dutch Green Left is unusual among European green parties in that it was 
formed through the unification of four small political parties. Despite the fact 
that these parties had undergone something of a rapprochement prior to Green 
Left's formation, it seems plausible that internal tensions on matters of ideology 
and organisation between the former parties may have existed within the new 
party from the outset. One of the issues that initially caused some friction within 
the new party concerned the relative weight to be accorded to the 'red' and 
'green' elements in the manifesto. As Voerman points out '[f]rom the beginning, 
Green Left has struggled with its ideology ... Radicals have put forward 
ecological elements, while the Communists (and Pacifist-Socialists) have brought 
in their socialist heritage (Voerman 1995: 118). At the party's second annual 
congress in December 1991 this ambiguity was seemingly resolved when a 
majority voted in favour of the view that ecological sustainability should limit the 
scope of economic development, but also that 'people on lower incomes should 
be financially compensated in the event of their economic position deteriorating 
in consequence' (Voerman 1995: 118). The party has since become more 
ecological in orientation; for example, in 1993 its parliamentary group chose to 
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give precedence to the environment over socio-economic issues such as income 
and employment (Voerman 1995: 118). The organisation of the socialist wing of 
the party into the 'Left Forum' seemed to hint at the emergence of internal 
factionalism, although this group was dissolved in 1994 as a result of too few 
active members. A survey carried out at party congress in 1995 showed that the 
majority of respondents felt that the former parties (CPN, PSP, PPR and EVP)-
termed 'blood groups' or 'h/oedgroepen' - were able to exert 'adequate' levels of 
influence within the Green Left organisation (Voerman and Lucardie 1998). It 
seems that the somewhat disparate ideological heritage of Green Left has not 
resulted in the existence of internal tensions of the kind that may have damaged 
the electoral prospects of other European green parties. 
It must be added that the Dutch Green Left appears to have been 
remarkably free of internal conflict over the question of party organisation and 
strategy. Thus there is little evidence of crippling conflicts between 'fundis' and 
'realos' or 'decentralists' and 'electoralists'. Unlike other green parties, the 
Dutch Green Left from the outset chose to adopt an organisational structure 
based upon the 'mass party model' (chapter 4). It is certainly the case that since 
1990 changes have taken place within the organisation, but these have intended 
to further professionalise the party (Voerman and Lucardie 1998). The strategy 
pursued by Green Left would appear to be based upon a 'logic of party 
competition' (Kitschelt 1989). The party has shown a willingness to form 
coalitions with other parties at the local level (GroenLinlcs 199Od) and has set its 
sights on national government participation, aiming to build on its electoral 
success of 1998 and ultimately take the place of D66 as the most electorally 
significant and influential 'alternative' party in the Netherlands. 
The dominance of a similar logic within the party can be discerned over 
the issue of leadership. In a political climate in which the quality of party leaders 
is increasingly becoming an important consideration within the minds of Dutch 
voters (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 106), Green Left has, from the outset, 
recognised the role of personalities in bringing political messages to the public, 
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and has, for most of its history, had one political leader (Interview, Anne de Boer. 
3 March 1996; Voennan and Lucardie 1998). Following the resignation of its 
leader Ria Beckers in 1993, however, Green Left experienced a period of 
uncertainty as candidates from different 'blood groups' began competing for the 
leadership. According to one study the leadership contest, noted for its 
'fierceness', was covered extensively within the media, and its negative portrayal 
was later considered to have partly contributed to the party's poor performance at 
the 1994 elections (Voennan and Lucardie 1998). In addition, the dual leadership 
that emerged out of this 'battle' - Ina Brouwer and Mohammed Rabbae - was not 
noted for its dynamism or charismatic qualities (Lucardie 1995: 121-122). By the 
1998 elections a new single leadership had emerged in the fonn of Paul 
RosenmOller, a fonner radical dockers' leader from Rotterdam and Green Left 
MP since 1989. His leading position on the party's list of candidates for the 1998 
parliamentary elections was unopposed. While, given the current lack of exit poll 
data on these elections, it is difficult to assess with any accuracy the contribution 
made by RosenmOller's leadership to the improved perfonnance of Green Left in 
1998, a party member's report on the elections suggests that RosenmOller's 
'credibility and eloquence' made an important contribution to the party's 
electoral gains.4 A recent academic report on the Dutch elections of 1998 
suggests that RosenmOller had perfonned effectively for Green Left 'both in 
Parliament and electorally' (Irwin 1999: 272). As has been the case with the 
Austrian Greens, then, it seems likely that quality of party leadership has been a 
factor in the varying electoral perfonnance of the Dutch Green Left. 
(c) Britain 
Of the three main parties in this study it is the British Green Party that has 
experienced the most intense internal conflict over questions of strategy • 
.. This report was based on the views of Richard Wouters. Green Left's European affairs adviser. 
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organisation and leadership. These tensions came to the fore during the 1980s 
with the influx of young people and radicals committed to a 'decentralist' 
approach to green politics (Wall 1994: 40). Opposed to the philosophy of the then 
Ecology Party leaders - which stressed the importance of developing a party with 
a more moderate 'environmentalist' agenda and a conventional organisational 
structure capable of fighting effective election campaigns (ROdig and Lowe 1986: 
275) - the so-called 'decentralists' clashed with the 'electoralists' over questions 
ofparty strategy, organisation and leadership. According to ROdig and Lowe: 
Much of the work of national conferences consisted in working out 
compromises between these two different aims: for example, attempts to 
institute a Party leader and centralize Party organization were successfully 
resisted, as were demands for a dissolution of the national Party 
organization and an exclusive emphasis on community-level politics. The 
fundamental split remained, with the "electoralists" predominant in the 
national organization and the so-called "anarchists" dominating a number 
of the Party's relatively autonomous branches. (ROdig and Lowe 1986: 
275). 
However, it was during the mid-1980s that this split first prompted the 
manifestation of a real crisis for the Green Party. At the 1986 conference, two of 
the party's leading 'electoralists' - Jonathan Tyler and Paul Ekins - put forward 
several constitutional amendments which, if implemented, would in their view 
improve party structures and enable the more efficient co-ordination of party 
activities. When these were rejected by conference, Tyler and Ekins responded 
by discussing the formation of a covert faction, or 'parallel organisation', called 
Maingreen which would campaign for the electoralists' perspective and put 
forward a slate for election to the party council (parkin 1989: 227). Tyler 
suggested that the Green Party could progress by developing a strategy according 
to which organisation, image and leadership were the operative themes. Arguing 
that these were the 'substance and backbone' of 'real-world politics', Tyler 
argued that 'our reward for continuing to pretend they are not will be eternal 
marginality' (cited in Robinson 1992: 213). Yet when news of the Maingreen 
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initiative reached the party council, the move was condemned and led to the 
eventual resignation of Tyler and Ekins, and the exit of other leading electoralists 
(parkin 1989: 228). The bitterness resulting from this episode was carried over 
into a badly organised general election campaign in 1987. But such events were 
also to leave wounds in the form of an escalation of the tensions between 
'electoralists' and a strengthened 'decentralist' faction, and these became 
increasingly 'confrontational' between 1988 and 1992, frustrating progress 
towards more 'efficient' and 'empowering' party structures (Wall 1994: 60). 
Soon after the impressive 1989 European election performance, several 
prominent 'electoralists' within the Green Party formed a group - Green 2000 -
with the aims of streamlining the party organisation and securing 'a mandate for 
green politics by the year 2010' (Green Activist, October 1991: 1). Supporters of 
the Green 2000 motion which, despite considerable opposition from 
decentralists, was adopted in 1991 claimed that a reassessment of the party's 
position was required; in particular, they argued for the 'need for a formal, open, 
and accountable leadership' (Green Activist, October 1991: 1). With the reforms 
in place, the party decided to contest more seats at the forthcoming general 
election than it had ever done, fielding 256 candidates (Rootes 1995a: 75). 
Despite optimism among supporters of Green 2000, the Green Party's electoral 
performance in 1992 was a huge disappointment; it attracted no more support 
that in previous general elections and the financial cost of campaigning almost 
crippled the party. The failure of Green 2000 prompted further criticism of the 
party's electoral strategy and resulted in the resignation of key figures such as 
Sarah Parkin and a dramatic fall in membership levels (Green Activist, August 
1992). The post-Parkin era has been characterised by a relative lack of internal 
strife and it would seem that the Green Party has gone some way towards 
resolving its internal problems, focusing on grass-roots politics and a more 
limited national electoral campaign (Green World, Winter 1998/9: 31). 
This brief survey of the British Green Party shows the extent to which its 
history has been dominated by intense internal debates and infighting over 
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organisational and strategic issues. The issue of leadership has frequently 
occupied a central position in internal debates over Green Party organisation and 
strategy. The division of opinion is reflected in a study of Green Party members, 
which showed that 50 per cent agreed that the party should elect one party leader; 
31.4 per cent were against this measure; 18.6 per cent were undecided (RUdig et 
aI. 1991: 78). The desire that the party should, in effect, be moving away from a 
collective leadership model towards one based upon a single national speaker 
was a central theme of the Maingreen and Green 2000 initiatives discussed 
above. Yet the 'decentralist' element within the Green Party has consistently 
rejected such moves, arguing that such an idea of 'leadership' is inconsistent with 
a vision of green politics which stresses ideas of self-reliance, community, 
democracy and non-exploitation. In terms of achieving greater public visibility, 
and perhaps attracting higher levels of electoral support, a problem for the Green 
Party has been that its most 'pragmatic', 'media friendly' personalities - notably 
Sarah Parkin and Jonathon Porritt - have left the party following controversies 
over party strategy.s Another media figure who joined the Greens in 1987 - the 
TV sports presenter David Icke - espoused unusual spiritual views and his 
presence did little to enhance the party's reputation (Wall 1994: 64). More 
recently, the Green Party's 'three year rule' with respect to holding the post of 
Principal Speaker has meant that certain key figures who had begun to make a 
positive impression in the media - notably David Taylor - have been obliged to 
stand down (Green World, Winter 1998/9: 31). 
While internal problems of strategy, organisation and leadership have 
undoubtedly done little to improve the Green Party's image and performance in 
general elections, these issues must be set against the broader range of political 
state-institutional structures and other arrangements working against the party's 
, Porritt was suspended from the party in 1994 for recommending (on grounds of electoral 
pragmatism) that a feHow member support a ~laid Cymru candidate rather than the Green Party 
candidate in the forthcoming European electtons. Porritt argued for this strategy because he 
believed that the Plaid Cymru candidate 'was both green and could well get elected, whereas the 
Green Party's candidate was truly, madly, deeply green, but unlikely to save his deposit' (The 
Guardian, 24 August 1994). 
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electoral progress explored in previous chapters. It could be argued that to the 
extent that the Green Party has had to operate within such a hostile political 
environment, there has been little incentive for it to dilute its 'dark-green', 
decentralist ideology and become a more 'mainstream' party. Many within the 
party would seem to bear a similarity to the category of activist that Kitschelt 
terms 'ideologues'. For Kitschelt, these actors 'constrain a party's flexibility in 
the choice of goals and strategy ... oppose alliances with other parties and make it 
difficult to diversify a party's appeal to new electoral constituencies' (Kitschelt 
1989: 50). A Green Party strategic shift in favour ofa 'logic of party competition' 
(which would involve a shift in balance towards the demands of 'pragmatists') 
seems a distant prospect in the current political and institutional context of 
British politics. 
3. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explore the extent to which the 'internal 
dynamics' of green parties - essentially issues of ideology, strategy, organisation 
and leadership - have impacted upon their electoral significance. On the question 
of ideology, it was argued that the fact that the British Green Party has chosen to 
adopt a more radical ecological political perspective than its Dutch and Austrian 
counterparts may have had the effect of limiting its electoral appeal, particularly 
among those sympathetic to a more 'ecosocialist' or 'New Left' perspective. The 
lack of opportunities provided for small parties operating within the current 
political and institutional context of British politics has provided little incentive 
for the Green Party to move towards a less radical ideological position. Because 
of the existence of greater opportunities for electoral success, as well as historical 
factors, both the Austrian Greens and Dutch Green Left have managed to extend 
their electoral appeal well beyond the narrow constituency of 'dark-green' 
ecologists. 
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In tenns of strategy, organisation and leadership it was claimed that the 
different ways in which green parties have tackled these issues can potentially 
have an effect on levels of electoral support attracted by these parties. While the 
Austrian Greens have experienced some internal conflict over these issues, the 
party has, since the early 1990s, implemented structural refonns which have 
made it a more professional, electorally competitive organisation. The 
professionalisation of the Greens' leadership was widely considered to have been 
a factor in their electoral success of 1994. In addition, their electoral decline in 
1995 may partially be attributed to the poor perfonnance of their de facto leader -
Petrovic - during the election campaign. The Dutch Green Left has, from the 
outset, been content to adopt a more conventional organisational structure with a 
single party leader and has pursued a 'logic of electoral competition' (Kitschelt 
1989). However, the varying quality of its party leadership may go some way 
towards accounting for its electoral decline in 1994 and gains in 1998. Of the 
three parties, however, it is the British Green Party that has experienced the most 
intense internal strife over questions of organisation, strategy and leadership. The 
internal battle between 'electoralists' and 'decentralists' has plagued the party 
since the early I 980s, presenting an image of disunity and disorder, and 
preventing the development of a more effective and coherent electoral strategy 
that might appeal to a larger number of ecologically concerned voters. While 
such strife has undoubtedly weakened the Green Party, its impact must be set 
against the considerable array of additional political and institutional factors 
explored in previous chapters. 
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Chapter 10 
Rethinking Green Parties 
The emergence and varying electoral success of green parties in Europe has 
generated a diversity of sociological, cultural change and political studies based 
approaches each claiming to provide insight into the factors impinging upon 
these two issues. With respect to the conditions considered to have created fertile 
ground for the emergence of green parties, most commentators have tended to 
concentrate on the extent to which a 'silent revolution' has prompted a pervasive 
shift in political priorities among Western citizens towards 'post-materialist' 
issues. One of the purposes of this study has been to demonstrate that green party 
researchers' overwhelming trust in Inglehart's 'post-materialist' thesis has been 
seriously misplaced. Reservations can also be voiced with regard to 'post-
industrial' interpretations of green parties. This thesis has shown clearly that 
neither of these influential theoretical frameworks can provide a convincing 
account of the changing social conditions which have been central in facilitating 
the emergence of parties with an explicitly ecological identity on the European 
political landscape. 
The approach argued for in this thesis situates the rise of green parties 
principally against the backdrop of the historical development and existence of 
global ecological risks and problems that have come to the fore during the past 
half century. Modernisation in its most recent guise - exemplified by the 
globalisation of production forces stemming from developments in technology 
and science - has brought with it a new order of global manufactured risks and 
ecological problems, which has in turn contributed to the rise of ecological 
critiques of the ways in which 'growth orientated' political projects have 
unfolded. The Enlightenment idea that human progress arises from advances in 
scientific and technological knowledge, and continued economic development, 
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has in recent decades become the focus for increased public criticism. This 
criticism reflects a growing concern about the global and more localised 
ecological damage arising from continued industrialisation and the considerable 
risks - to humans and the natural environment - associated with modem 
technologies such as nuclear power and the phenomenon of global climate 
change. Against the claims of existing green party scholars, it has been argued 
that attention to these issues can provide a more powerful account of the changed 
social climate which has increased public pressure to create green parties in 
Europe during the latter part of the twentieth century. Yet the patterns of green 
party development have also been shaped by a range of political and institutional 
factors. Elsewhere in the thesis, a variety of concepts derived from the political 
studies literature was organised into four overarching themes to facilitate an 
assessment of their impact on the emergence and electoral success of green 
parties. It was demonstrated that a consideration of these four themes can 
potentially yield important insights into the political and institutional 
environment within which green parties emerged, and the circumstances which 
have facilitated or impeded their electoral success. 
Building on the insights of previous chapters, this final chapter develops 
an integrated framework by means of which students of politics might in future 
approach the questions of green party emergence and electoral success. In the 
first part of the chapter, an alternative approach to understanding the context 
within green parties emerged is elaborated. This involves attention to the 
heightened impact of scientific, technological and industrial activity on the 
environment, together with a reworking and repositioning of themes - for 
example, economic affluence - introduced in previous chapters. Based upon a re-
conceptualisation of Inglehart's 'scarcity' hypothesis - i.e. the idea that people 
place a high value on those things which are in short supply - the section also 
seeks to account for the often strong moral content of green party politics. The 
second part inserts a new concept into the discussion - the 'contagion factor' -
and considers the extent to which it may facilitate an understanding of the recent 
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rapid spread of the green party as an organisational form in Europe. In part three, 
it is suggested that an ecologically informed understanding of green parties can 
cast new light on the meaning and significance of the four principles which form 
the ideological underpinnings of their political programme: ecology, social 
responsibility, enhanced democracy and non-violence. In short, it argues for a 
rethinking of the ideological character of green party politics. The fourth part of 
the chapter discusses the political and institutional context of green party 
development, focusing principally on the question of electoral significance. It is 
argued that attention to the interconnections between four overarching themes 
can enhance understanding of the factors impinging upon the electoral success of 
green parties. The fifth part develops and applies a simple model to a further 13 
green parties, which incorporates these four themes and assesses the degree to 
which the model can 'predict' the presence or absence of significant green parties 
across sixteen European countries. In light of the arguments developed in this 
thesis, the final section examines the long-term prospects for green party politics 
in Europe. 
1. Towards an Ecologically Informed Understanding of GreeD Parties 
The idea that green parties should be subsumed under the generic labels of ~left­
libertarian' or 'new' politics parties has been a frequent argument made by party 
specialists (Poguntlce 1987, 1993a; Kitschelt 1988a; MOller-Rommel 1990). In 
disputing this claim, this thesis calls for a serious rethinking of the question of 
green party identity based upon the irreducible centrality of ecological thinking to 
these parties. In what follows, an attempt is made to rework some of the themes 
explored in previous chapters and to develop a new ecologically informed 
approach to understanding the economic, social and political climate within 
which green parties emerged. 
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Much has been said with respect to the role of 'post-materialist' value 
change as a contextual factor in the emergence of green parties. This perspective 
was found to be inadequate principally on the grounds of its failure to capture the 
ecological dimension of green party politics. Yet the link between economic 
aftluence and green parties need not be interpreted in 'post-materialist' terms; it 
can and should be interpreted in a way that renders it consistent with the 
ecological approach to green parties argued for in this thesis. It must be 
recognised that the economic affluence of the post-war period was made possible 
by the very scientific and technological developments which ultimately 
contributed to the global ecological crisis. For example, while bringing benefits 
in terms of raised productivity, the spread of modem agricultural techniques has 
carried significant environmental costs in the form of soil erosion, habitat 
degradation, deforestation and risks to human health posed by the use of 
pesticides (Brenton 1994). The development of new capitalist production 
methods and energy technologies, upon which humans became increasingly 
dependent in the decades following World War II, has been a major contributor 
to environmental problems such as acid rain, oil spills and climate change. In 
addition, economic and technological 'progress' designed to satisfY rising 
consumption demands and to enable continued economic growth - e.g. the 
nuclear power industry - has brought with it global ecological dangers. One 
further noteworthy point concerns the link between enhanced levels of economic 
prosperity witnessed in Western nations during the post-war period, the age of 
mass consumerism and ecological problems. The rise of the 'post-industrial' 
society - made possible by changes in technology, and exemplified by the more 
widespread availability and use of consumer goods and services - has 
exacerbated pressures on the global environment. Rising aftluence appears to 
have bred rampant consumerism rather than an 'aesthetic' appreciation of the 
environment as outlined in the 'post-materialist' thesis. The emergence of green 
parties should be situated within the context of the economic aftluence of the 
post-war period, but only in the sense that the global ecological risks and 
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problems with which these parties have been concerned are rooted in the 
scientific and technological developments which facilitated this prosperity, and 
the increasingly 'post-industrial', consumerist culture which arose out of this new 
economic climate. 
It is one thing to describe the economic and social conditions underlying 
global environmental degradation, but quite another to account for the 
politicisation of ecological issues and increased societal pressure to form green 
parties. With respect to accounting for the politicisation of 'the environment', 
one plausible explanation can be developed through the reworking of a concept 
originally employed within the 'post-materialist' thesis; that is, the notion that 
humans tend to value things which are in relatively short supply. The widespread 
satisfaction of basic 'material' needs, made possible through the science and 
technology driven economic growth of the post-war period, has been 
accompanied by the generation of new global ecological risks and problems. 
Drawing upon the concept of 'scarcity', an argument can be made which 
connects humans' greater political concern about 'the environment' to the 
growing scarcity of 'goods' such as environmental quality. Or putting this 
another way, economic afl1uence in Western Europe has bred scarcity of a new 
kind: scarcity which is not defined by a shortage of basic 'material' goods, but, 
rather, in terms of the declining environmental quality and growing ecological 
uncertainty which the 'progress' of the post-war period has brought with it The 
intensity and impact of human economic activity on the natural environment has 
reduced the biosphere's capacity to absorb environmental 'bads' such as 
pollution, and this has to some extent diminished, rather than enhanced, humans' 
'material' quality of life. As a result the environment has, in recent decades, 
become an issue with clear political overtones. 
Yet it is important to recognise that there are a number of other reasons 
why humans have become increasingly inclined to view the environment as an 
issue requiring political attention, and, ultimately, to seek new political vehicles 
for articulating and advancing their concerns. Crucially, humans have become 
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more aware of the nature, causes and potential consequences (in human and non-
human welfare terms) of new and global ecological problems in recent decades. 
It is also true that certain social groups have become more disposed towards 
environmental politics as an activity than others. A combination of several 
themes, many of which have been explored at length in previous chapters, can 
facilitate an understanding of why these developments have taken place. 
First, it is important to acknowledge the degree to which recent scientific 
discoveries and developments in communications have played a part in 
increasing awareness of global environmental problems such as acid rain, ozone 
depletion and climate change. It is true that an appreciation of the nature and 
potential severity of environmental problems cannot be grasped 'without some 
knowledge of natural science' (Glasbergen 1996: 177). The degree to which the 
mass media have raised public awareness of large-scale risks and environmental 
problems through the communication of scientific concerns should also be 
recognised (Thompson and Rayner 1998: 148). Media coverage of a series of 
high profile catastrophes involving technologies such as nuclear power, and the 
release of toxic chemicals into the local environments of usually poorer 
communities, have intensified public concern about environmental issues and 
given an added credibility to environmental arguments. I Such widespread 
coverage has been made possible by developments in telecommunications, a 
symptom of the 'post-industrial' age. These processes, combined with the lack of 
urgency with which established political actors on the Left and Right have 
responded to ecological issues, and the wide availability of environmental 
literature and critical reports, have clearly been factors in hardening public 
attitudes towards science, technology and industrial development In turn they 
I Environmental accidents which have received extensive media coverage in recent decades include 
'the dioxin leak at Seveso in Italy in 1976, the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978, the Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident in 1979, the catastrophic leak ofmetbyl isocyanate in Bhopal in IDdia in 1984, the 
Chernobyl nuclear explosion followed by the Basle fire and pesticide leakage into the Rhine in 
1986, and the environmental depredations of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991' 
(Brenton 1994: 55.56). 
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have served to further POlilicise the environment, providing a more favourable 
climate for the emergence of green parties. 
Second, awareness of and concern about environmental issues appears to 
be particularly acute among young and 'well-educated' citizens. It is possible that 
certain forms of higher education have fostered a heightened sense of political 
efficacy and a greater willingness to engage in new forms of party political 
activity aimed at resolving the ecological crisis. Several studies suggest that, of 
the 'highly educated' cohort, it has been graduates in the liberal arts and 
humanities who have been more inclined to criticise established ideas of 
technological progress, and to embrace alternative political viewpoints which 
have provided ideological frames of reference for Europe's green parties (chapter 
4). These groups have questioned established views of 'progress' and been 
instrumental in the development of a new, emancipatory form of politics which 
accords a central position to the needs of the human and non-human 
environment. They have also tended to display more sympathy towards 
alternative political perspectives which challenge dominant cultural ideas about 
what constitutes 'the norm' in terms of gender, sexuality, and other issues of self-
identity. 
Third, linked to developments in technology and the expansion of higher 
education have been changes in the class structure, which have decreased the 
salience of the traditional capitalist/worker conflict and provided further scope 
for the emergence of new political organisations which challenge the comfortable 
assumptions of the 'growth orientated' economics and politics of modern society. 
Certain groups within the 'new middle class' - chiefly young, 'well educated' 
professionals working in human services, as opposed to more technologically and 
business orientated contexts - have been more open to new political perspectives 
and have constituted the core occupational group within the support base of green 
parties (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992). The fact that these groups have less 
of a personal stake in the production processes of the technological, scientific 
and industrial sectors has meant that they have been more disposed to a new 
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ecological politics which challenges these very arrangements (Eckersley 1989). 
That many of these citizens work in highly bureaucratic and hierarchical 
organisations has probably further increased the appeal of green party politics, 
which incorporates commitments to enhancing levels of democracy, 
decentralisation and participation in society. 
But have not moral/ethical arguments, in addition to an awareness of the 
nature, causes and (actual and potential) consequences of global environmental 
problems, played an important part in precipitating the emergence of green 
parties? Since the 1960s there has been an abundance of texts published dealing 
explicitly with the question of the extension of the moral community; that is, the 
degree to which the non-human natural world should become morally 
considerable (Singer 1975; Midgley 1983; Regan 1988; Eckersley 1992; Goodin 
1992; Benton 1993). As Dobson states, [m]uch ink has been spilt over issues such 
as the rights of animals, plants and wildernesses, and the duties that we as human 
beings might have towards them' (Dobson 1995: 48). It has been customary for 
greens to criticise the strong anthropocentrism which has traditionally 
underpinned human attitudes towards the natural world, and to call for a 
broadening of the moral community on the grounds that non-human animals, 
species or ecosystems possess 'intrinsic' value (Eckersley 1992). In other words, 
the possibility that the emergence of green parties has to some extent been 
facilitated by a growing sense that humans have been fundamentally wrong in 
their treatment of the non-human natural world should be acknowledged. While 
concerns as to the morality of human actions towards the natural world long 
predate the emergence of green parties (Singer 1975: 7), there may be an 
important link between (1) the recent emergence and heightened awareness of a 
new order of global ecological risks and problems, (2) humans placing a greater 
'value' on those aspects of the natural world which are subsequently threatened, 
(3) the development of an ecological 'consciousness' connecting 'the individual 
to the larger world' (Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville 1987: 282), and, (4) the 
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SIrong moral arguments for environmental protection developed within much 
recent green discourse and politics. 
2. Green Parties aDd tile 'Contagioa Factor' 
The issues discussed above have clearly been important in increasing societal and 
political pressure to form green parties. But they cannot entirely account for the 
ubiquitous presence and appeal of the green party as a vehicle for bearing the 
toR:h of political ecology in Europe. It is argued here that what can be termed the 
'CODtagion factor' can yield further insight into the rise of the green party as a 
distinctive form of organisation on the contemporary European political 
landscape. The 'contagion factor' can be defined as the degree to which ideas 
have spread from one country to the next either throush the formal exchange of 
information among politically like-minded people, or the development of an 
awareness of international developments via various media including television, 
radio, newspapers and. more recently, the Internet. The rate with which green 
party politics has been able to spread is to some extent connected to the 'post-
industrial' communications revolution referred to earlier in this section. 
The electoral successes of tile west German Gn:cus during the 1980s in a 
large and important European countly clearly led to their forming a 'model' for 
nascent green movements elsewhere. One of the predecessors of the Austrian 
~ the ALO. established contacts with the West German Greens in the early 
1980s and their political programme was based upon the guiding principles of the 
latter's first programme: ecology. social responsibility, grass-roots democracy 
and non-violence (letter from Gerhard Jordan. 30 July 96; Rotbacher 1984; 
Deehs 1989). Further, the organisational development of the Austrian Greens 
several years later was clearly '''inspired" by the structun:s and rules of tile West 
Ocnnan Greens' (Frankland 1994: 203). In the Netherlands the (positive and 
negative) experiences of the German Greens have provided the relatively 
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youthful Dutch Green Left with a basis from which to develop a clearer 
understanding of the relative merits of different political strategies and policy 
options and, indeed, international representatives of Green Left have been regular 
attenders at conferences of the German Greens (Wainwright 1994: 204; interview 
with Marijke Vos, 29/3/96). Even in Britain, the electoral weakness of the Green 
Party has not prevented it from influencing the development of green parties 
elsewhere in Europe, particularly within the field of green economics. It has been 
suggested that the relative lack of distraction by 'the trappings of power' has 
meant that the British Greens have been able to devote much more attention to 
the development of policies and these have proved attractive to emergent green 
parties and movements in other countries (Green World, Winter 1998/9). 
The spread of green party politics across Europe and beyond has also 
been facilitated by the formation of international organisations such as the 
European Federation of Green Parties (EFOP), which aim to exchange 
information, support each others campaigns. engage in joint actions, develop 
common policies and hold regular conferences and seminars. The EFOP supports 
green organisations from other continents and encourages their attendance at its 
congresses, which act as meeting places for the discussion and development of 
green ideas. The European model of a network of green parties committed to c0-
operation has inspired the formation of similar organisations in other continents 
such as Africa in which the Co-ordination des Partis Verts d'Afr;que 
encompasses green parties from nine countries (Green World, Summer 1996). 
The 'contagion factor' casts new light on the green party phenomenon in drawing 
attention to the degree to which political ideas have spread across the globe. To 
this extent, parallels can be drawn with the propagation of other political ideas 
which have successfully spanned countries and continents in the past - for 
instance, on the part of socialist movements and think tanks of the New Right 
(Schecter 1994; interview with Andrew Gamble, Red Pepper, November 199'). 
In the case of green politics, however, the global nature of the ecological crisis 
has been an important factor in facilitating the wider development and 
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communication of green ideas, and the awareness that green parties have 
managed to establish new political programmes and achieve electoral success has 
had something of a catalytic influence on the patterns of party emergence in 
various countries. 
3. Green Parties and the Ecological Imperative 
An examination of green parties as they have evolved in Austria. Britain, the 
Netherlands and elsewhere lends considerable support to the ecologically 
informed approach to understanding these parties developed in this thesis. Public 
concern about the ecological risks arising from developments in science, 
technology and the drive for economic growth has clearly played a catalytic role 
in the emergence of the green parties examined in this study. For example, 
PEOPLE - the first incarnation of the British Green Party - was formed within a 
climate characterised by increased public anxiety about the 'limits to growth' and 
global 'ecological crisis' which had come to the attention of journalists, 
academics and policy-makers in the early 1970s. In Austria. concern about the 
safety of nuclear power, crystallised initially in the form of a powerful anti-
nuclear movement, provided the foundation stone for the emergence of green 
party politics. In the Netherlands, concern about nuclear power provided 
common ground between 'risk movements' and 'New Left' party activists, which 
ultimately smoothed the path towards the formation of Green Left. 
Indeed, it is precisely this climate of ecological concern voiced by 'risk 
movements' that has proved to be crucial in the emergence of green parties in a 
host of other European countries. In Belgium, Germany, Italy, France and 
Sweden the nuclear energy issue was an important catalyst in preparing the 
ground for the emergence of green parties (parkin 1989; ROdig 1990b). Intense 
opposition to nuclear power - the latter being the technology which has most 
symbolised the climate of manufactured uncertainty which characterises 
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contemporary society - was arguably the most important 'risk' factor promoting 
the rise of green parties in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet the eruption 
of other large-scale ecological risks arising from global climate change, ozone 
depletion, genetic manipulation, chemical usage, etc. on the political scene, and 
their communication to the wider public in recent decades, has undoubtedly 
contributed to this new climate of uncertainty; one which has facilitated the 
emergence of green parties. It is also likely that higher levels of risk awareness 
brought about by more immediate ecological problems have, in certain contexts, 
impacted temporarily upon the levels of electoral support attracted by green 
parties, and there is no reason to suppose that this should not prove to be the case 
should similar events occur in the future. In Sweden, for example, concern about 
the ecological and health effects of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 - in which 
radioactive clouds spread across large areas of Sweden - contributed to 
heightened public awareness of the risks associated with its 12 operating nuclear 
power stations and lay behind the Greens' national electoral breakthrough of 
1988 (Affigne 1990). Similarly, the Irish Greens have reaped modest electoral 
benefits - mainly at the European and local level - on account of public concern 
about the expansion of the Sellafield nuclear plant in England (Holmes and 
Kenny 1994). 
However, it would be a misunderstanding to suppose that it is purely 
responses to large-scale technological and ecological risks which have generated 
a climate conducive to the emergence of green parties. The analysis carried out in 
this thesis has clearly demonstrated that an understanding of the emergence of 
green parties must incorporate consideration of the role of actual ecological 
problems and the certainty of future ecological damage in this process. In the 
case of the Austrian Greens, the impetus to form a united party was boosted by 
the successful campaign to halt construction of a hydroelectric dam - a 
development that would have caused irreversible ecological damage to the 
surrounding landscape. In Finland, public protest against the draining of a unique 
bird lake constituted the 'starting point' for green party politics (parkin 1989: 
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81). Looking beyond Europe towards North America and Australasia, 'green' 
electoral politics have been motivated by attempts to defend wilderness areas 
from proponents of large-scale developments (Hay and Hayward 1988). While 
the emergence of numerous green parties can be understood within a new climate 
of concern about global ecological risks, their appearance on the political 
landscape has often been the direct result of attempts on the part of citizens to 
resolve more localised, ecological problems and to prevent what they perceive to 
be the ecologically damaging outcomes attendant with the advancement of global 
industrialism. 
Ecological issues, either in the form of risks, or the actuality/certainty of 
environmental damage, have clearly played a key role in shaping the character of 
European green party politics. Yet it was argued in chapter 1 that green parties 
are further defined by their commitment to the principles of social responsibility, 
enhanced democracy and non-violence. How should these further commitments 
be explained? The argument here is that there are clear links between each of 
these three principles and green parties' profound and overarching concern about 
the ecological crisis. It is not claimed that green parties' adherence to these 
themes is solely ecologically motivated. Their commitment to ideas of social 
justice, for example, may reflect a broader moral concern about inequality, 
discrimination, and human rights. But it cannot be denied that the ecological 
imperative is a theme which binds these principles together. 
With respect to the theme of social responsibility, green parties have 
called for a rethinking of the consumerism of contemporary society and the 
movement towards an ecologically sustainable society in which the needs of all 
humans - including future generations - should be met. Issues of global poverty 
and social injustice have formed significant foci for green parties, and while this 
has sometimes reflected a more general 'leftist' ideological disposition, it must 
be recognised that these problems are considered by such parties to be among the 
key causes of global ecological degradation.2 Green parties have drawn attention 
1 Of course, the links between global poverty. social injustice and ecological degradation have been 
mapped out elsewhere; most notably in the BruntJand Report, Our Common Fllhue (1987). But it 
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to the important connections between poverty, population growth and pressures 
on land and water resources (resulting in deforestation and the destruction of 
agricultural land). They have also highlighted the complex interplay between the 
exploitation of the South by the 'rich' capitalist North and ecological 
degradation, and pointed to the destruction of the homes of indigenous peoples 
and life-sustaining environments in the 'developing' countries by multi! 
transnational companies keen to profit from the often less stringent 
environmental regulations of these nations (GGEP 1991). A further issue here 
concerns the degree to which the burden of debt on the poor countries has 
encouraged the continuation of ecologically damaging practices in their struggle 
to meet repayments. Green parties stress the importance of addressing inequality 
between North and South and this internationalism can also be linked to their 
overarching concern with global ecological risks associated with processes such 
as climate change (EFGP 1993a). To a considerable degree, then, green party 
concern with issues of poverty and social injustice can be interpreted with respect 
to the latters' ecological impact in the broadest sense - on the quality of human 
life, the rights of future generations, and the natural world in all its diversity. 
Demands for enhanced democracy, decentralisation and participation 
have also been central to the political programmes of Europe's green parties. To 
some extent this reflects societal concern about technological developments in 
the field of surveillance which have enabled modem states to 'keep a tab' on the 
activities of citizens, posing a threat to human rights and civil liberties. Yet green 
parties' greater concern with these themes must also be set against the 
background of their ecological demands. For green parties, solving the ecological 
crisis and ensuring long-term sustainability requires a radical restructuring of 
political institutions along participatory lines. The involvement of local 
communities and a broader range of citizens in political decision-making is 
considered to be of paramount importance in the pursuit of these objectives. 
is important to point out that many radical greens have directed criticism towards this report and 
the conceptualisation of 'sustainable development' which it advances (Doyle and McEachern 
1998). 
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Green parties point out that the prospects of achieving ecological sustainability 
rest upon democratic requirements and the maximisation of participation. As 
Kemp and Wall have put it: 
[g]reen politics cannot be imposed; on the contrary it demands active 
support and participation. We all need to take action if the ecological 
crisis is to be overcome ... Green parties the world over believe that peace 
between humanity and nature, and between different human beings, can 
only be achieved by giving everyone a political say. (Kemp and Wall 
1990: 186). 
With regard to the principle of non-violence it is clear that there are 
important, though hitherto underemphasised, connections to be made with the 
ecological issue. Green parties have taken a strong stand against militarism and 
promoted non-violent means of conflict resolution. Two of the most important 
issues that sparked protest across Western Europe, and which undoubtedly 
contributed to the development of a social climate within which many green 
parties emerged, were the escalation of the arms race and the decision to deploy 
Cruise missiles in Europe at the end of the 1970s. Green parties have expressed 
deep concerns about the risks posed to humanity and wider nature by nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction and the resource exploitation and 
wastefulness associated with global arms spending (GGEP 1994). In this respect, 
green party concerns about militarism have moved beyond the pacifist sentiments 
associated with much left-wing and anarchist writing3. To the extent that green 
parties stress the links between militarism, global risks and ecological issues, 
they have evidently added a new twist to traditional pacifist arguments. 
Again, case study material lends support to these arguments. Despite 
being a neutral country lacking nuclear weapons, Austria produced a significant 
peace movement in the early 1980s whose energies were principally directed 
towards the 'militaristic' actions of foreign governments (Gottweis 1990). Many 
of its activists - including Freda Meissner-Blau - played an important role in the 
3 For a review of pacifist arguments as they have been expressed within movements of the Left see 
Carter (1992); and Schecter (1994). 
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emergence of the Austrian Greens. In the Netherlands, the political parties 
involved in the fonnation of Green Left - most notably, the New Left PSP and 
PPR - had long advocated disannament and been involved in the Dutch peace 
movement. The merger of the PSP and PPR with the EVP and ideologically 
rejuvenated Communists into Green Left was facilitated by sympathy towards 
pacifist ideas and a common concern about the ecological risks associated with 
the anns race and global militarism. Anti-militarism also occupies a central place 
within the political programme of the British Green Party, but links between the 
latter and the peace movement, particularly its largest organisation (CND), have 
historically been weak. Yet the role of peace movements - situated within a 
global climate of militarism - has been acknowledged in accounts of the 
emergence of green parties in a variety of additional European countries 
including Gennany and France (parkin 1989). 
Considerable overlap exists between green party politics and what might 
be described as the politics of the Left. In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that 
many greens share with socialists a concern about, for example, social justice, 
emancipation and participation, and, like socialists, demand fundamental social 
change. Yet the discussion above shows that green parties' reading of these 
issues has to a considerable extent been shaped by an ecologically informed 
perspective. The decline of socialism in recent years and the rise of free market 
philosophies have provided green parties with an opportunity to appeal to citizens 
concerned about ecological problems and broader issues which have traditionally 
been the preserve of the Left. It could be argued that green party politics 
represents a new fonn of emancipatory politics; a politics which incorporates 
many of the themes which have traditionally concerned socialists but which 
offers a fresh and distinct programme of ecological and social reform aimed at 
resolving the problems confronting modem societies. 
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4. The Political and Institutional Dimensions of Green Party Emergence and 
Eleetonl Success 
So far the discussion in this chapter has almost exclusively centred on the 
description of the economic, social and environmental context within which 
green parties emerged and the essentially ecologically motivated character of 
their political demands. Yet the timing of the emergence of green parties has also 
been affected by certain political and institutional factors. Electoral dealignment, 
arising partly from the processes of • post-industrialisation , referred to in chapter 
4, has clearly been a factor in creating a more favourable political climate for the 
emergence of green parties in certain European countries, including Austria and 
the Netherlands. In addition, it has been shown that the nature of political 
competition - in particular, the extent to which existing parties have been able to 
respond to the ecological challenge - can potentially affect the timing of green 
party formation. It also seems likely that • closed' patterns of neo-corporatist 
decision-making, impenetrable to ecological demands, may have facilitated the 
emergence of green parties in certain European countries, e.g. Austria. 
Yet while such issues have played some role in creating the conditions for 
the emergence of green parties, the principal contribution of political and 
institutional factors lies in the extent to which they have shaped the conditions 
under which Significant green parties - i.e. those attracting at least 4 per cent of 
the national vote - have been most likely to emerge. The discussion below seeks 
to extend the evaluation carried out in previous chapters by bringing into sharper 
focus the interrelation between the four thematic categories - political state-
institutional structures, electoral dealignment and the nature of political 
competition, modes of interest representation and internal party dynamics - and, 
where appropriate, between the latter and processes of social change. The 
intention is to develop a more complex, multi-dimensional view of the conditions 
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and contexts which can affect the electoral significance of green parties than has 
been characteristic of the arguments developed in this thesis so far. 
Despite emerging and existing within a social climate characterised by the 
growing salience of global ecological issues the British Green Party has spent all 
of its 2S year history in the political wilderness. It has continually failed to attract 
a significant share of the vote at general elections. How should its insignificance 
be explained? In this case the starting point must involve consideration of the 
range of effects of the electoral law upon electoral and broader political 
behaviour in Britain. For reasons that were explored in chapter 6 the first-past-
the-post system has both mechanical and psychological effects. The mechanical 
factor consists in the 'under-representation' of small parties; the psychological 
factor refers to the extent to which people are less likely to consider voting for a 
small party on account of their perception that such an action would amount to a 
'wasted' vote. One implication of this is that the Green Party has been unable to 
benefit from an increasingly dealigned electorate; one symptom of the move 
towards 'post-industrialism', and a phenomenon that has undoubtedly contributed 
to the electoral strength of green parties in other European countries such as 
Belgium, Finland and Sweden (O'Neill 1997). While there is evidence to suggest 
that British voters have become more volatile and less inclined to vote on the 
basis of class or partisan identification in recent years (Sanders 1997), the Green 
Party has been unable to profit electorally from these trends.4 The claim here is 
that the mechanical and psychological effects of British electoral system must 
form a major part of an explanation of why this has been the case. S 
4 A possible exception to this occurred at the 1989 European elections Although, as was argued in 
chapter 6, the Green Party's success of 1989 was probably more a temporary reflection of the state 
of political competition and the salience of environmental issues at the time than it was of an 
increasingly dealigned British electorate. 
5 At the 1999 European elections the British Green Party received 6.3 per cent of the vote and two 
MEPs. This was a considerable improvement on its 1994 perfonnance (3.2 per cent and no seats) 
(The Economist, 19 June 1999: 42). It is likely that the new voting system ofPR employed at the 
1999 elections encouraged many people to vote Green on account of their vote not being 'wasted' 
under the new system. Of course, it is possible that such a result would not be repeated at a general 
election conducted under a similar system of PR European elections are often perceived as 
'second order' elections within the minds of the British electorate. Yet the European election result 
has undoubtedly provided the Green Party with a new platform from which it can seek to obtain 
added electoral credibility and political visibility, and potentially to be considered as a serious 
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Of course, it is not solely in relation to the theme of electoral dealignment 
that the insignificance of the British Green Party can be interpreted. The Green 
Party has also failed to attract the support of the broader environmental and peace 
movements. One reason for this links back to the workings of the British 
electoral system. The point here is summed up neatly by Rootes who suggests 
that because the British system discriminates against new parties it 'also 
discourages the translation of movements into parties' (Rootes 1992: 181). 
Environmental and other risk movements, e.g. the anti-nuclear movement. have 
been consistently reluctant to lend their support to the Green Party - either in 
terms of supporting ideas based around the development of a unified electoral 
strategy encompassing the Green Party and other movements, or in terms of 
actually casting votes for Green candidates (Rootes 1992: 181). The nature of the 
British electoral system has meant that social movements have sought, and 
sometimes obtained, influence within other political parties - for example, eND 
in the Labour Party - and for the most part ignored the Green Party. But there is 
an additional point that needs to made here. This reluctance to lend support to the 
Green Party has been further reinforced by the limited access that the 
environmental movement has secured in the past to decision-makers, and an 
unwillingness to risk jeopardising this access through the adoption of an overtly 
party political stance. Evidence which suggests that the British political system 
may be weakening further in terms of the extent to which it accommodates 
ecological demands offers little in the form of encouragement for the Green Party 
(Carter 1997a). The recent rise of direct action environmental protest in Britain 
shows the degree to which an electoral strategy has been perceived to be a largely 
ineffective means of pursuing political influence by large numbers of young 
people. 
Internal party dynamics can also shed light on the continued electoral 
marginality of the Green Party. Again, however, the extent to which these must 
political force. It is possible that, should the Green Party achieve a raised profiJe on account of its 
recent electoral 'success', this could lead to more positive electoral outcomes should future general 
elections in Britain be conducted under PRo 
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be placed within the context of the inhospitability of the British electoral system 
needs to be emphasised. The Green Party is noted for its uncompromising 
ecological ideology (Bennie et 01. 1994). One of the main reasons why the party 
has been unwilling to embrace a less radical approach to green politics is quite 
simply because there has been no electoral incentive for it to do so. The party has 
been reluctant to adopt a full-blown 'logic of electoral competition' (Kitschelt 
1989) since the current electoral law offers little prospect of electoral success. It 
has also been demonstrated that the financial deposit requirement at general 
elections has restricted the Green Party's levels of electoral participation. This 
has served to further reinforce its marginality and acted as an additional 
disincentive for it to embark upon a more moderate electoral strategy. There 
have, of course, been those within the Green Party who have argued vociferously 
for ideological, strategic and organisational change. There have even been 
initiatives by party members - such as Maingreen and Green 2000 - which 
explicitly set out to transform the party into a more 'electable' political force. But 
these have met with considerable resistance from grass-roots activists committed 
to the 'decentralist' model of green politics and the consequent internal party 
strife can only have served to further damage the Greens' electoral prospects. 
Further, the issue of leadership has proved to be a particularly contentious one 
with the party consistently resisting the replacement of its 'collective' model with 
that of a single national leader. The point is that much of the internal conflict -
which to some extent stems from a sense of frustration felt at the persistently 
'outsider' status of the Green Party in British politics - has served to further 
marginalise the party by presenting an image of incompetence and disunity to the 
wider public. The electoral insignificance of the British Green Party can thus be 
explained with reference to the four political/institutional themes considered in 
this thesis. Yet it must be acknowledged that there are important interconnections 
between these various dimensions, and that these flow, to a considerable degree, 
from the most significant impediment to Green Party electoral success: the 
electoral system. 
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Whereas the electoral system has been an obstacle to 'green' electoral 
success in Britain, green parties in Austria and the Netherlands have to some 
extent been advantaged by the systems of proportional representation (PR) which 
these countries employ. Having said this it is important to point out that PRo in 
itself, does not necessarily guarantee electoral success. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that in both Austria and the Netherlands 'green' parties have emerged 
which have been electorally unsuccessful. And it should be noted that a host of 
other European countries has failed to produce significant green parties despite 
using PR electoral systems, e.g. Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Norway and 
Denmark. It is here that attention to the patterns of political competition can 
yield important insights into the reasons for the electoral 
significance/insignificance of green parties competing within certain PR-based 
electoral systems. 
In Austria, the failure of the ALO and VQ() to emerge as electorally 
significant actors at the 1983 parliamentary elections can largely be explained by 
the fact that these parties were direct electoral competitors. It was this situation 
which effectively resulted in a split within the 'green' vote thus weakening both 
parties. With the development of a unified electoral strategy in time for the 1986 
national elections, however, the Austrian Greens benefited from less intensive 
patterns of political competition and successfully surpassed the criterion of 
electoral significance. A similar situation prevailed in the Netherlands prior to 
the formation of Green Left. Here, the small green party - De Groenen - faced 
stiff electoral competition for the 'green' vote from more well-established radical 
parties such as PPR, PSP and, to some extent, 066. Yet even the then separate 
Green Left parties experienced electoral difficulties during the 1980s, and it was 
only with the decision to 'pool' their resources by developing a new, unified 
party organisation that a significant green party emerged on the Dutch political 
landscape. Faced with intense competition from this new party, the 'dark green' 
De Groenen have had their electoral prospects further diminished While the 
emergence of significant green parties in Austria and the Netherlands has been 
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facilitated by a marked de-intensification of party political competition, both the 
Austrian Greens and Green Left currently face electoral competition from parties 
which, to some extent, have managed to appeal to environmentally concerned 
citizens6, and it is likely that this has acted as a partial brake on the further 
electoral progress of the green parties. 
The founding of unified, national green party organisations in Austria and 
the Netherlands has created a more favourable climate within which such parties 
have been able to achieve electoral success for other, though related, reasons. 
Unlike in Britain, where electoral dealignment has failed to yield electoral 
benefits for the Green Party, the greater prospects of the Austrian Greens and the 
Dutch Green Left achieving representation under PR has created a situation in 
which an increasingly dealigned electorate has been more inclined to consider 
voting green. But, of course, one of the consequences of electoral dealignment 
has been increased electoral volatility, and it is the volatility of the green vote 
which may have important implications for the future electoral prospects of green 
parties in Europe. This point is pursued in more depth at a later stage in the 
chapter. 
Another point to consider is the extent to which the emergence of 
significant green parties in Austria and the Netherlands has been facilitated by 
the involvement of environmental and other social movements in the party 
formation process and the cultivation of support bases rooted within these sectors 
of political activity. It is clear that one of the most important reasons for such 
social movement backing in these countries relates to the greater prospects of 
green party electoral success which prevail under their respective systems of PRo 
The British Green Party, by contrast, has failed to attract the support of the wider 
environmental movement and, as has been argued, this difference has to some 
extent reflected its awareness of the futility of lending support to a party with few 
political prospects and the risk of jeopardising the political influence already 
obtained within the context of the political system. With respect to Austria, neo-
6 In the Netherlands. Green Left face competition from 066; in Austria. the Liberal Forum. 
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corporatist arrangements have further contributed to the orientation of social 
movements towards the Greens as more traditional means of pursuing political 
influence have been denied on account of the 'closed' character of these 
arrangements. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that neo-corporatist 
arrangements have had the same impact in the Netherlands and it has been 
suggested that a distinction perhaps needs to be made between 'closed' and 
'open' forms ofneo-corporatism. 
Of the additional themes examined in this thesis, federalism has offered 
definite advantages for the Austrian Greens. In contrast to the unitary structure of 
the British and Dutch political systems, federalism in Austria has presented the 
Greens with opportunities to build up support bases at the Land level, to gain 
valuable experience of working in powerful regional legislative and 
administrative bodies, and to attract a greater degree of national media attention. 
The federal structures of the Austrian state have thus provided the Greens with a 
'launch pad' from which they have been able to pursue greater electoral success. 
A recent study demonstrates that, of Europe's green parties, it is those operating 
in federal systems - Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Germany - that have 
indeed enjoyed a greater degree of electoral success than those competing in 
unitary states (Moller-Rommel 1998). However, it should be pointed out that 
electorally significant green parties have emerged in non-federalist states, e.g. 
Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands. It therefore seems that 
while federalism is not a reliable predictor of the presence or absence of 
significant green parties, it may help to explain why significant green parties 
have generally performed better in federal states as opposed to unitary ones. It is 
also necessary to mention the extent to which the Austrian Greens and Dutch 
Green Left have benefited from less restrictive and more generous party 
financing arrangements than those in Britain. These have undoubtedly enabled 
the allocation of more resources to campaigning and other profile raising 
activities which may have boosted electoral support levels. 
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As in Britain, the variety of themes highlighted here to some extent 
influenced the internal party dynamics of the Austrian Greens and Dutch Green 
Left. Both parties have adopted a less 'ecocentric', more 'ecosocialist' form of 
green politics and expressed a greater tendency towards compromise. While 
historical factors must be considered in accounting for the more 'leftist' 
orientation of these parties, it is also important to recognise that the political and 
institutional arrangements referred to above have created a climate within which 
the development of a more 'pragmatic' form of green party politics has been the 
more prudent - in electoral terms - course of action to follow. As well as such 
orientations towards political ecology, both the Austrian Greens and Dutch Green 
Left have pursued a 'logic of electoral competition' and, of course, this again 
reflects the fact that these parties compete in a political environment more 
conducive to the electoral success of new parties than has been the case in 
Britain. It is for this reason that both the Austrian and Dutch parties have been 
more willing to 'play the electoral game' and to embrace more conventional 
patterns of party leadership and organisation. In addition, while internal conflicts 
over ideology and strategy have been occasional features of the Austrian Greens -
and to a lesser degree the Dutch Green Left - these have not been as prolonged or 
intense as have been the case within the British Green Party. One possible reason 
for this is that, given the potentially serious electoral implications of persistent 
internal factionalism, the Austrian and Dutch parties have been under more 
pressure to resolve or at least placate these differences in the interests of political 
expediency. With poor electoral prospects, the British Greens have had less of a 
'concrete' incentive to settle their internal differences on issues of ideology, 
organisation and leadership. 
This section has pointed to some important interconnections between the 
political and institutional themes examined at length in this thesis. It is clear that 
the electoral significance or insignificance of green parties reflects an array of 
factors, but these are intimately interwoven and should not be viewed in isolation 
from each other. 
278 
5. Extending the Argument to Further West European Green Parties 
In seeking to identify the factors which may account for the presence or absence 
of electorally significant green parties, a framework based upon the complex 
interaction of four overarching themes developed from the political studies 
literature has been elaborated. Drawing principally upon the Austrian, Dutch and 
British cases an attempt has been made to demonstrate the degree to which 
political and institutional aspects of each 'dimension' have impacted upon the 
electoral significance of green parties within these contexts. One way of further 
exploring the potential usefulness of the framework outlined above would 
involve its application to a larger number of case studies. The aim of this section 
is to take a very modest first step in this direction by attempting to develop a 
simple model - based upon aspects of the four overarching themes - which might 
predict the comparative electoral strength of green parties in Western Europe. 
Table 10.1 therefore places Austria, the Netherlands and Britain alongside 
13 additional Western European countries.' Of course, further and more detailed 
research will be needed on each country in order to confirm or challenge the 
classifications and conclusions of this provisional enquiry. The framework set out 
below is intended to illustrate one of the possible ways in which the themes 
developed in this thesis might be applied in future comparative green party 
research. 
7 Green parties included in this analysis are all members of the European Federation of Green 
Parties and are as rauows: Belgium (AgalevlEcolo); Germany (Die Griinen); Austria (Die Griinen); 
Luxembourg (Dei Greng Alternative); Finland (Vihre4 Liitto); Sweden (Milj6partiet de Gr6na); 
Italy (Federazione dei Verdi); France (Entente Ecologiste - an electoral pact between Les Verts 
and Generation Ecologie); Switzerland (Federation der Griinen Parteiten der Schweiz); 
Netherlands (GroenLinks); Ireland (Comhaontas OIas); Norway (Milj6partiet de Gr6nne); 
Denmark (De Gnmne); Spain (Los Verdes); Greece (Federation d'Organisations Ecologistes-
Alternatives); Britain (The Green Party). Portugal is not included in the foUowing analysis. This is 
because while a Green Party does exist in Portugal (Os Verdes), the situation is complicated by the 
fact that the party bas competed in national elections as part of the United Democratic Coalition 
(CDU) - an alliance which has included the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and dissidents 
from the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) (O'Neill 1997). As such, it would be 
inaccurate to classifY this quite disparate array of political parties as constituting a 'green' party or 
alliance. 
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The electoral success of green parties in the 16 countries is measured in 
terms of the highest percentage of the vote that a single green party or green 
electoral alliance has gained in a national election during the period 1980-98. 
Ten variables have been selected for inclusion in the table on the basis of their 
importance to the previous assessment of the Austrian, Dutch and British cases. 
Individual variables are coded so that one indicates presence of the property 
deemed to be conducive to green party electoral success (e.g. proportional 
representation (PR), strong links to the broader environmental movement, etc.) 
and zero the absence of it. Of course, some components of the four main themes 
examined may be subject to change over time - for example, the extent to which 
there is direct electoral competition for the 'green' vote can alter from one 
election to the next, reflecting the changing nature of political competition. 
Similarly, political state-institutional structures may change from one election to 
the next - a good example being the electoral law - as may internal dynamics 
such as the ideological orientation of a green party. In view of this, scores of one 
or zero for most variables are awarded on the basis of an assessment of the 
situation, e.g. the presence or absence of 'professional party leadership', at the 
time of the national elections indicated in Table 10.1 with respect to each green 
party. Several of the variables, however, cover a broader time period, and, where 
possible, this is the period 1980-98 as a whole. Such variables include electoral 
volatility, neo-corporatism, links to the environmental movement, and strategic 
conflict. Individual variable scores are then summed for each country in order to 
give a total out of ten. These scores can then be examined in terms of how well 
they correlate with the presence or absence of a significant green party (Y=Yes; 
N=No). A significant green party or electoral alliance is defined as one which has 
obtained at least 4 per cent of the vote at a national parliamentary election at 
least once during the 1980-98 period. 
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Table 10.1 Factors Potentially Influencing the Electoral Significance of West European Green Parties (1980-98) 
TllelDes Political State-b .. dtutioa.1 Electonl Chanle!Political Modes of Iaterest lateraal Dyaamla Outcomes 
Structures Competitioa Represeatatloa 
Country PR Direct Federal Increase in Absence of 'Closed' Strong Links 'Light Absence of 'Professional' Score Best Vote Year Presence 
Subsidies System Mean Direct Electoral Neo- to GreenIEco Prolonged Party (/10) in of 
to Parties Aggregate Competition for Corporatist Broader socialist' Intense Leadership National Significant 
Electoral Green Vote Structures Environment Ideology Strategic Election Green 
Volatility Movement Contlict 1980-98 Party? 
during 19805 (%) 
Belgium I 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 9 10.0 1991 Y 
Germany I 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 0 1 9 8.3 1987 Y 
A.stria 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9 7.3 1994 Y 
Luxumbourg I 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 I 8 10.2 1994 Y 
Finland I 1 0 I 0 1 1 1 1 1 8 6.8 1991 Y 
Sweden 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 I 1 1 8 5.5 1988 Y 
Italy 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 I 0 1 6 2.8 1992 N 
France 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 7.6 1993 Y 
Switzerland 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 7.5 1995 Y 
Netbertaads 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 7.3 1998 Y 
Ireland 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 2.8 1997 N 
Norway 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.4 1991 N 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 I.3 1988 N 
Spain 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.0 1986 N 
Greece 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.8 1990 N 
L BritaiD _ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.4 1987 N 
-
Sources: political state-institutional structures (Gallagher et al. 1995; Leduc et al. 1996); electoral change/party system (Lane and Ersson 1991; Gallagher et al. 1995; 
Richardson and Rootes 1995; O'Neill 1997); modes of interest representation (Kitschelt 1988, 1994; Parkin 1989; Miiller-RommeI1989b; Gallagher et al. 1995; Richardson 
and Rootes 1995; O'Neill 1997); internal dynamics (parkin 1989; Richardson and Rootes 1995; O'Neill 1997); green party election results (Muller-Rommel 1998; Irwin 
1999; Keesings Archives; The Independent, 31 October 1998). 
. 
Inspecting Table 10.1 shows that, overall, there is a close match between 
the presence of significant green parties and a positive score on at least five of 
the specified variables. A total of nine countries can be considered as cases with 
significant green parties. It is notable that each of these countries also possesses 
at least five out of ten of the variables identified in the table. Six countries with 
significant green parties score positively on eight or nine of the variables 
according to the assessment criteria. In contrast, countries without significant 
green parties (seven in total) tend to receive a score towards the lower end of the 
scale - thus, six of the seven countries in this category receive a total score of 
between one and four. In terms of the three case studies, the model correctly 
predicts the absence of a significant green party in Britain, and the presence of 
such parties in Austria and the Netherlands. Only one country - Italy - does not fit 
into the classificatory framework outlined. 8 
Clearly there are several weaknesses associated with the simple model 
elaborated in Table 10.1. First, there are problems concerning the 
dichotomisation of several of the independent variables employed in the model. 
For example, placing a zero in the 'closed neo-corporatist structures' column 
effectively implies that the state in question has displayed a greater 'openness' to 
the representation of ecological interests, and that this has acted as a brake on the 
development of a significant green party. Yet as the British case shows, the 
absence of 'closed' neo-corporatist structures does not necessarily result in a 
political system that is more 'open' to ecological concerns. A more sophisticated 
analysis would therefore pay greater attention to the different degrees of 
openness displayed by 'neo-corporatist' and ~pluralist' systems, and possibly 
a The poor electoral performance of the Italian Greens at recent national elections may to some 
reflect the marginalisation of ecological issues on account of the corruption scandals which have 
rocked the country since the 1980s. According to Rhodes, the issues raised by these scandals were 
so large that they 'outstripped the capacity of the Greens to respond to them' (Rhodes 1995: 184). 
Since 1994 the electoral prospects of the Italian Greens have further declined as a series of 
institutional changes - including the introduction of a first-past-the-post electoral system and the 
withdrawal of state func:Iing for political parties following a referendum in 1993 - have been 
implemented (The Guardian, 1611199). Consequently, national elections since 1994 have forced 
smaller parties, such as the Greens into electoral coalitions. Since 1994 the Greens have 
participated in an progressive electoral alliance (progressive Front) orchestrated by the former 
Communist Party: the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) (O'Neill 1997). 
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establish terminological categories more sensitive to these differences. Other 
problems arise in the classification of green parties in terms of their orientation 
towards political ecology. Inevitably, there is a degree of subjectivity, and 
perhaps oversimplification, involved in defining green parties in 'light greenldark 
green' or 'eco-socialistlecocentric' terms. In short, more detailed attention to the 
operationalisation and measurement of several of the variables in Table 10.1 
would undoubtedly improve the model. 
A second limitation of the model is that it does not, in its present form, 
take account of the relative importance of different factors on the electoral 
success of green parties, or, indeed, the contrasting extent to which these may 
have impacted on the electoral performance of green parties in separate 
countries. It may be, for instance, that certain factors have had more impact on 
party performance than others and thus need to be weighted, i.e. to count as 
double. Only by undertaking a more detailed examination and comparison of 
each case could a satisfactory decision on the precise weighting of factors be 
made. 
Third, the model does not allow for temporary factors which may have 
contributed to the varying levels of electoral support attracted by green parties. 
For example, one of the factors that undoubtedly contributed to the electoral 
success of the Swedish Greens in 1988 was the Chemobyl nuclear disaster of 
1986, which saw the contamination of large areas of Sweden (Affigne 1990). A 
host of additional issues may have an effect upon the electoral performance of 
green parties from one election to the next, e.g. political scandals, crises, but it 
would be difficult to incorporate factors such as these into a model of the kind 
outlined in this section. Despite these obvious limitations, however, the model 
does give an indication of ten themes which can potentially influence the 
electoral significance of green parties in Europe, and, to this extent, it might 
serve as a starting point for future researchers of green parties. 
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6. Conclusion: Whither Green Parties? 
In this thesis it has been argued that existing arguments which claim to account 
for the emergence of green parties are weakened by their failure to acknowledge 
the centrality of ecological thinking to green party politics. Theoretical attempts 
to account for the emergence of green parties have tended to situate the latter 
within the broad context of 'post-materialist' value change and/or 'post-
industrial' society, without exploring the important links between the large-scale 
ecological degradation and risks induced by scientific and technological change 
on the one hand, and political change on the other. Each of the three green parties 
examined in this thesis emerged primarily within a climate of public concern 
about ecological degradation and global risk awareness, and the same can be said 
for a host of other green parties in Europe. This thesis is primarily designed as a 
contribution to the development of an alternative, more ecologically informed 
understanding of green parties. 
Although the thesis defends an approach which emphasises the role of 
ecological issues in the emergence of green parties, concepts derived from the 
'post-materialist' and 'post-industrial' society perspectives can be reworked and 
integrated into the new framework. Economic aftluence, it has been argued, has 
been important in creating the social conditions for the emergence of green 
parties but not in the 'post-materialist' sense. The drive for greater economic 
prosperity during the post-war period, assisted by developments in science and 
technology, has contributed to a new generation of global ecological risks and 
problems which pose a fundamental threat to the survival of ecosystems. The 
shift towards the 'post-industrial' society, a change made possible by greater 
material aftluence and which has seen the increased consumption of resources in 
the drive to satisfy heightened public demand for goods and services, has placed 
further pressures on the global environment. In short, a new climate of 
environmental 'scarcity' characterises modem society. To some extent humans' 
growing concern about the environment stems from their placing a higher value 
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on scarce environmental 'goods' than has hitherto been the case, and, in 
consequence, the environment has increasingly become an issue of moral and 
political considerability. 
Additional themes emphasised by theorists of 'post-industrial' society -
such as developments in telecommunications, the expansion of higher education 
and changes in the class structure - cast further light on the changing social 
context within which political parties with an ecological identity have emerged. 
Yet the idea of green party politics has proved to be contagious, and it is the 
'contagion factor' which to some extent accounts for the spread of these parties 
across Western Europe, into the ex-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and 
beyond. 
In seeking to understand the context in which significant green parties 
emerge, it was argued that the perception of ecological catastrophe can have an 
important, though usually temporary, impact with regard to this issue. Yet 
attention was mainly centred on the interaction of four key dimensions: political 
state-institutional structures, electoral dealignment and political competition, 
modes of interest representation and internal party dynamics. It was shown that 
by focusing on these themes and, in particular, how they relate to each other, a 
more sophisticated understanding of the political and institutional arrangements 
which prompt the emergence of electorally significant, as opposed to 
insignificant, green parties can be grasped. An account of processes of social, 
economic and environmental change during the post-war period, combined with 
a consideration of the contagious aspect of green party politics, can throw light 
on the new climate within which political parties with ecological identities have 
emerged, but it is only by considering the political and institutional context that 
an understanding of the varying electoral fortunes of these parties can be gained. 
Given all this, what does the future hold for green parties in Europe? Are 
green parties 'here to stay'. or merely an aberration destined to become less 
significant and potentially redundant as established actors increasingly come to 
accommodate ecological concerns? The social and ecological changes that have 
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characterised the post-war period have presented a new challenge to established 
political traditions of the Left and Right. Green parties have clearly emerged as a 
response to the new ecological challenges which confront the global political 
order. In most European countries they have appealed to 'highly educated', 'new 
middle class' and more 'ecologically conscious' citizens. For these citizens, 
green parties have provided a vehicle for the articulation of a new and radical 
politics which questions the legitimacy of the 'modernisation' project 
traditionally embraced by social democrats, communists and neo-liberals alike. It 
is clear that ecological challenges cannot be solved 'overnight'. The complexity 
and high degree of public uncertainty which surround contemporary 
environmental problems such as global warming mean that, inevitably, there will 
continue to be intense political debate concerning how seriously governments 
should take ecological problems, and how best they might transform the state, 
economy and society in order to tackle them. Within this climate of disagreement 
and dispute - destined to extend well into the next century - there will clearly be 
room for dissenting voices and opportunities for political organisations to 'push' 
the ecological agenda; to pressurise governments into providing more radical 
responses to the ecological questions confronting modem society. And it is 
within this context that Europe's green parties could come to play an increasingly 
important role. 
Yet the move towards greater electoral pragmatism on the part of several 
European green parties may mean that green party politics in the twenty-first 
century is set to take on a decidedly different character to that of the past two 
decades. Green party politics may well be entering a less oppositional, more 
consensus based, phase of development. Since the 1980s the concept of 
'ecological modernisation' has emerged as a significant locus for debate among 
sociologists, environmentalists and within certain European governments. For 
some writers, 'ecological modernisation' refers to the process whereby ecological 
concerns gradually become institutionalised 'within the media and its publics, 
within different levels of the government administration and within business 
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circles' (Spaargaren 1997: 2). It implies 'a partnership in which governments, 
businesses, moderate environmentalists, and scientists cooperate in the 
restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more environmental 
defensible lines' (Dryzek 1997: 145).9 If green parties continue along the path of 
moderation and pragmatism, it is possible that they could playa direct role in the 
process by which modem societies attempt to come to terms with the ecological 
challenge. In other words, green parties may become important 'social carriers of 
ecological restructuring' (Mol 1996: 313). That green parties are currently 
participating in several national governments in Europe suggests that they may 
already have become important agents in the process by which capitalist 
economies are beginning to be reformed along more ecologically conscious lines. 
If this is indeed the direction in which green parties are moving then two 
basic problems have yet to be confronted. First, a key challenge facing green 
parties concerns the resolution of the fundamental contradiction that exists 
between their traditional opposition to the forces of ecologically damaging 
economic growth, and their increasing tendency to participate in the very 
political and economic structures responsible for driving this process forward. If 
green parties are to prosper within a climate of 'ecological modernisation', then 
they must seek new ways of reconciling environmental protection with continued 
demands for economic development and international competitiveness, and of 
disengaging economic growth from its wider environmental and social impacts. 
The extent to which some, particularly Northern European, governments have 
been willing to embrace environmental tax reform - in which the burden of 
taxation is shifted onto environmental 'bads' such as pollution and waste - and 
other 'market-based' environmental policy mechanisms, suggests that 
opportunities may exist for green parties to play an important part in the 
development of more ecologically sensitive economic policy initiatives in the 
future. Yet the dilemma for green parties is that, in advocating a more moderate 
9 The con<:ept of ecological modernisation has been defined in a number of different ways. For an 
outline of competing interpretations of ecological modernisation see Christoff (1996), and Mol 
(1996). 
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and piecemeal approach to solving the ecological crisis, they may risk alienating 
many of their core supporters, for whom ecological sustainability requires a more 
fundamental shift away from the culture of economic growth, industrialisation, 
and consumption which continues to define modem capitalist societies. At the 
time of writing, the resurgence of potentially damaging internal factionalism 
within the German Greens over the extent to which they should be prepared to 
compromise over environmental policy issues threatens the party's first full term 
in office (The Guardian, 5/7/99). There is the possibility that the ideological 
conflict which stained the reputation of several European green parties during the 
1980s and 1990s may become a more intractable problem in the coming years, as 
green parties seek to balance their political role as actors involved in shaping the 
increasingly high profile discourses of ecological modernisation and 'sustainable 
development' with the demands of some of their more radical, and 
uncompromising, • grass-roots' activists. 
The second problem for green parties is to develop new proposals for 
broader social reforms, e.g. within the spheres of business and work, which more 
directly link up with the processes of 'ecological modernisation' and 'sustainable 
development'. Of course, some green parties - e.g. the Austrian Greens - have 
begun to respond to this challenge by developing detailed investment 
programmes aimed at maximising environmental protection and job creation 
(Die Griinen 1995a, 1995b). But green parties also need to develop coherent 
responses to other key challenges which will increasingly occupy European 
governments in the next century. Welfare reform is clearly one such issue. Green 
parties' concern with ecological themes, and issues of social justice, means that 
they could potentially be well-placed to participate in and shape debates about 
the future of the welfare state, and, in particular, to push for reforms which are in 
keeping with the goal of creating a sustainable society. A further important - and 
related - theme concerns the future place of 'work' in society. Heightened 
insecurity in the workplace and unemployment are issues which will continue to 
affect society in the twenty-first century and, again, green parties should be 
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developing strategies designed to address these concerns - strategies which might 
involve radically redefining the place of work in society and/or the expansion of 
environmental protection orientated employment sectors. These are the directions 
in which Europe's green parties should be moving if they wish to maximise their 
electoral appeal, be taken seriously among established government and economic 
actors, and, ultimately, to give added momentum to contemporary efforts to 
resolve the ecological crisis. 
These issues will clearly be important for Europe's green parties in the 
next century. But this thesis has also shown that the degree to which green parties 
will continually be able to attract significant levels of electoral support, and to 
potentially play an important role in shaping the ecological and social agenda of 
modem European capitalist states, will depend upon political and institutional 
factors. Paradoxically, the future of green parties depends not so much upon the 
social, economic and environmental forces which gave rise to their emergence, as 
on more overtly political and institutional ones. In Britain, the prospects of the 
GTeen Party attaining greater influence at the national level clearly rest upon 
there being a change in the current electoral system employed at general 
elections. The introduction of PR at general elections could possibly see the 
Green Party shifting more distinctly and successfully in the direction of a 'logic 
of electoral competition', thereby improving its appeal among a large number of 
environmental movement sympathisers and disillusioned socialists, and its 
prospects of securing a foothold in the British political system. Yet despite Tony 
Blair's commitment to holding a referendum on this issue, it is uncertain whether 
the electorate would accept any proposal for electoral reform (Dunleavy 1997: 
151). In large part, the chances of a future national electoral breakthrough by the 
Green Party rest upon the twin hope of Blair keeping his commitment to hold a 
referendum on the issue, and the British electorate being sufficiently persuaded 
of the need for electoral reform. 
In Austria and the Netherlands, more propitious political state-
institutional structures mean that green parties should be able to sustain the 
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significant levels of electoral support that they have achieved in recent years, and 
to seek opportunities to influence, and perhaps participate in, government at the 
national level. Yet, in both cases, it is clear that party support levels have been 
subject to some fluctuation and this has to some extent reflected the volatile 
nature of electorates in these countries, and more intense political competition 
for the 'green' vote. However, in the Netherlands, recent election results suggest 
that Green Left is successfully coping in the competitive environment of Dutch 
politics and establishing itself as the principal vehicle for green electoral politics. 
The party's improved electoral position owes much to its strong leadership, 
professional organisation and 'leftist' orientation; clearly a lesson for other, less 
successful European green parties. In Austria, the Greens have increasingly 
recognised the importance of political moderation and organisational discipline, 
and the need for pragmatism has become more acute in light of competition from 
the 'greenish' Liberal Forum. It is also worth pointing out that both countries 
have witnessed a decline in levels of social movement activity in recent years, 
and this suggests that in order to build on their electoral success, the green parties 
must continue to make efforts to appeal to a broader electoral constituency than 
has hitherto been the case. 
For those green parties intent on pursuing the 'pure green' ideological 
agenda, the future thus looks bleak in electoral terms. Such parties simply cannot 
expect to become significant forces in the context of modem electoral 
competition, governed as it is by the 'personalisation' of campaign politics, 
sound party organisation and policies designed to maximise votes. In some cases 
- e.g. the Dutch De Groenen - the 'pure green' experiment has been eclipsed by 
successful attempts to forge a more pragmatic form of green party politics. But 
for other green parties which have chosen the more radical option, the future is 
clearly one of continued electoral marginality. Those parties which refuse to 
engage in the politics of pragmatism should think seriously as to whether their 
own politics offer a serious platform for advancing the ecological cause. In short, 
such green parties face a stark choice: to transform themselves into professional 
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party organisations displaying effective leadership and an ideological pragmatism 
open to the Left. or to remain on the very periphery of the European political 
landscape. 
The aim of this thesis has been to rethink and rework established accounts 
of green parties and to develop an alternative framework which recognises the 
extent to which they have emerged against the backdrop of important ecological, 
economic and social changes that have occurred during the post-war period. It 
has also sought to unravel and synthesise a variety of political and institutional 
factors which potentially impact upon the emergence and electoral success of 
these parties. It is only by considering the complex interplay between processes 
of broad social change on the one hand, and political and institutional factors on 
the other, that students of politics can begin to understand the nature of the 
challenge which green parties pose to established political parties and traditions, 
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